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CHAPTER 1. 
Introduction 
1.1. Background and reasons for research
“After a night of drinking with friends, the applicant’s son, who was deaf and 
mute, fell down a flight of stairs, injuring his head and losing consciousness for 
several minutes. The police called to the scene were informed of the events and 
of the son’s sensory disabilities. They took him to the police station to sober up, 
without waiting for an ambulance which had also meanwhile been called. The 
police officer on duty noted a graze on the son’s face, but when the ambulance 
crew contacted the police they were informed that no medical examination was 
needed since the son was simply intoxicated. After being locked up in a cell, the 
son knocked on the doors and walls for a while, but to no avail. He had no means 
of communicating with the police officers since none of them appeared to under-
stand sign language and the notepad which he normally used to communicate had 
been taken away from him. The following morning, seven hours after taking him 
into custody, the police officers unsuccessfully tried to wake the applicant’s son up, 
but although he managed to open his eyes he was otherwise unresponsive. Another 
seven hours later, after finding that the son had been “sleeping for too long”, the 
police called an ambulance and he was finally taken to hospital only after repeated 
requests by the applicant. He died several hours later and a subsequent autopsy 
confirmed multiple injuries to the head and brain as the cause of death.”1
This is a summary of the facts regarding the case Jasinskis versus Latvia, one of 
the cases lodged to the European Court of Human Rights (hereinafter: ECtHR) 
that strikingly illustrates the vulnerable position of people who are deprived of 
their liberty by the State (hereinafter: detainees) and, as a consequence, also of 
the means to take care of themselves, for example by calling in health care staff 
1. ECtHR 21 December 2010, no. 45744/08 (Jasinskis v. Latvia), legal summary. Italic: ET.
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if the need arises. Valdis Jasinskis, the person who eventually died in the afore-
mentioned case, was extra vulnerable due to his disability. Such vulnerability of 
detainees is not uncommon. Several studies show that a large number of detain-
ees are extra vulnerable due to, for example, mental health problems (including 
addiction).2 The vulnerability of detainees brings along responsibilities for the 
State involved. A relevant legal European framework in this regard is the Euro-
pean Convention on Human Rights (hereinafter: ECHR), in particular Article 2 
(right to life), Article 3 (prohibition of torture) and Article 8 (right to respect for 
private and family life). Member States who are bound by the ECHR, such as 
the Netherlands, have a duty to protect the health and life of detainees,3 (among 
others) by providing the necessary healthcare during deprivation of liberty.4 A 
death occurring during deprivation of liberty by the State raises questions and 
may even result in unrest, as illustrated by the death of Mitch Henriquez after the 
use of force by the police during his arrest in The Hague.5 Member States are also 
obliged to investigate deaths that occur while the person in question was deprived 
of his liberty by the State to account for these deaths.6 Both obligations have been 
studied and discussed in literature.7 An in-depth study on both obligations, com-
bined with a study on whether safeguards exist in the Dutch legal framework to 
fulfil these obligations has however not yet been performed. Several questions 
remain therefore unanswered. What are, for example, preconditions to fulfil the 
obligation to protect the health and life of detainees by providing the necessary 
healthcare and taking protective measures? What is the precise scope of the obli-
gation to investigate deaths occurring during deprivation of liberty by the State? 
Another question is whether, and if so, to what extent, safeguards exist in the 
Dutch legal framework to fulfil the aforementioned obligations. The aim of this 
study is therefore to explore the precise scope of the aforementioned obligations 
of Member States bound by the ECHR and if, and if so, what, safeguards exist 
2. See, for example, Bulten and Nijman 2009. Payne-James et al 2010. Blaauw, Kerkhof and 
Vermunt 1993.
3. ECtHR 16 November 2006, no. 52955/99, §§57-58 (Huylu v. Turkey).
4. ECtHR 26 October 2000, no. 30210/96, §94, GC (Kudła v. Poland). 
5. There are also numerous other cases, for example, in the United States.
6. ECtHR 10 April 2001, no. 26129/95, §149 (Tanli v. Turkey).
7. See, for example, the Swiss Network on International Studies project on Deaths in Custody 
– towards an International Framework for Investigation and Prevention, and the project output. 
Gaggioli and Elger 2010. Bollmann et al 2011. Mutzenberg, Mangin and Elger 2012. Ruiz et al 
2014. Elger, Ritter and Stöver 2017. Wangmo et al 2014. See furthermore: Gevers 1994. Irwin 
1998/1999. Mowbray 2002. Ang 2005, pp. 249-276. Van Dijk et al 2006, chapter 6-7. Van 
Kempen 2008. Hendriks and Van Dijk 2008. Coyle 2009. Brems 2013. Chevalier-Watts 2010. 
Jacobs 2012. Roscam Abbing 2013. Lavrysen 2016, in particular pp. 105-107, 61-66. 
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in the Dutch legal framework to fulfil these obligations. The importance of this 
study is to contribute to literature and to provide a useful tool for all professionals 
involved in implementing the legal obligations in practice. Essential for effective 
implementation of legal obligations is that these obligations are clear and known 
to the professionals involved.8 It is furthermore important to note that the right to 
life and the prohibition of torture, inhuman and degrading treatment and punish-
ment are fundamental human rights9 and Member States must secure these rights 
and freedoms to everyone within their jurisdiction (Article 1 ECHR), including 
detainees who find themselves in a vulnerable position.
The results of earlier studies performed in the Netherlands and the number or 
deaths occurring during deprivation of liberty by the Dutch State are also note-
worthy in relation to the reasons to perform this study. Earlier studies show for 
example shortcomings in relation to medical examinations and the monitoring 
of police custody detainees,10 or that the investigation into deaths of detainees in 
the Netherlands could be improved.11 The ECtHR has also ruled that there had 
been a procedural violation of Article 2 ECHR in relation to an investigation into 
lethal firearm use by the Dutch police.12 It is furthermore noteworthy that the 
information provided to the general public about deaths occurring in Dutch ju-
dicial institutions is scarce. Though the Custodial Institutions Agency publishes 
the number of suicides in penal institutions,13 the total number of deaths per year 
is not proactively published on the national level. As for institutions where hos-
pital orders with compulsory treatment can be enforced, neither the figures on 
suicides nor the total number of deaths are published.14 Occasionally, numbers 
are provided by the Minister and the State Secretary of Security and Justice to the 
8. Courses such as those given by the Norwegian Medical Association and the World Medical 
Association on Human Rights contribute to this knowledge among physicians. See also Gaggiogli 
and Elger 2017, p. 35: they stress the importance that involved professionals are guided on how to 
investigate deaths in custody.
9. ECtHR 27 September 1995, no. 18984/91, §147, GC (McCann and others v. The United 
Kingdom, hereinafter: UK). ECtHR 17 February 2015, no. 70555/10, §94 (Ion Bălăşoiu v. 
Romania).
10. Blaauw, Vermunt and Kerkhof 1997. See also: Blaauw et al 1995.
11. National ombudsman 2012. Duijst et al 2012, pp. 90-91. See also: Thoonen and Duijst 2014c.
12. ECtHR 15 May 2007, no. 52391/99, GC (Ramsahai and others v. The Netherlands). See also 
ECtHR 20 November 2014, no. 47708/08, GC (Jaloud v. The Netherlands).
13. Custodial Institutions Agency 2016g, pp. 39-40 (number of suicides in 2011: 15, 2012: 
10, 2013: 4, 2014: 14, 2015: 11). See also Custodial Institutions Agency 2015, p. 54. Custodial 
Institutions Agency 2014b, p. 52. Custodial Institutions Agency 2013, p. 48. The total number 
of deaths in correctional institutions for juvenile offenders in the period 2011-2015 are published 
(namely none). Custodial Institutions Agency 2016g, p. 92.
14. See for example Custodial Institutions Agency 2015b. 
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Lower House on the latter’s request.15 Journalists have received figures on the total 
number of deaths in penal institutions after a request pursuant to the Freedom of 
Information Act.16 Information about individual deaths occurring in judicial insti-
tutions, for example by a news report on its website, is in general not provided by 
the Custodial Institutions Agency. An argument put forward for not publishing 
any data on individual cases is the privacy of the deceased in question.17 On the 
European level, the number of deaths occurring in penal institutions is available 
through the Space I-project of the Council of Europe. Table 1 shows the statistics 
concerning the Netherlands that have been published in the Council of Europe 
Annual Penal Statistics with regard to the period 2010-2014.
Table 1. Deaths in penal institutions in the Netherlands 2010-201418
Year Total number of 
deaths
Total number of 
detainees19 on 1st 
September 
Mortality rate per 
10,000 detainees20
2010 28 11,737 23.9
2011 40 11,579 34.5
2012 25 11,324 22.1
2013 14 10,547 13.3
2014 25   9,002 27.8
15. Kamerstukken (Parliamentary papers) II 2010/11, 24 587, no. 435, p. 2-3. Aanhangsel 
Handelingen II 2011/12, 2207. Aanhangsel Handelingen II 2011/12, 2384.
16. Aanhangsel Handelingen II 2011/12, 2207.
17. Aanhangsel Handelingen II 2015/16, 1907. 
18. More recent figures are not available. Council of Europe 2017, pp. 34, 114-115; 2013, pp. 
134-135; 2014, pp. 129-130; 2015, pp. 140-141; 2015b, pp. 119-120. Relative frequency is in 
the Space I-project determined by relating the total number of deaths to the prison population on 
a certain reference date, namely 1st September. One may argue that the total number of deaths 
should be related to the annual inflow of detainees or to the unique persons annually detained. 
However, when using the latter number, the average length of the detention period should be taken 
into account, as a large part of these persons are not deprived of their liberty for an entire year. 
Furthermore, when using the annual inflow of detainees it should be taken into account that some 
persons are more than once detained in the same year. Another complicating factor is which deaths 
are included in these statistics. See for example: Council of Europe 2015b, p. 123, explanatory 
notes. See about the latter factor also Ruiz et al 2014. See also Blaauw and Kerkhof 1999: study 
on suicide in detention.
19. Space I uses the term ‘prisoners’ instead of detainees.
20. Space I uses the term ‘prisoners’ instead of detainees.
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A comparison with statistics on the mortality rate in free society shows the follow-
ing. In 2010 approximately 136,000 persons died in the Dutch general population, 
i.e. 8.2 deaths per 1,000 civilians (with a population of 16.6 million in 2010).21 
Compared to the mortality rate in the general population, the mortality rate per 
1,000 detainees seems favourable (on average 2.4 per 1,000 detainees in 2010). 
However, 86% of the detainees held in penal institutions in 2010 were between 
the age of 20 and 49 years.22 The mortality rate of the general population be-
tween 20-44 years was, in 2010, 1 per 1,000 civilians.23 This would mean that 
the mortality rate per 1,000 detainees is roughly 2.4 times higher than in the 
general population, which shows the significance of performing a study on this 
matter. The statistics of the Council of Europe furthermore reveal that in Dutch 
penal institutions in 2013, 8 deaths (57.1%) occurred due to other causes includ-
ing illnesses, 4 deaths (28.6%) were suicides, 1 death (7.1%) occurred due to an 
intoxication, and 1 death (7.1%) was a homicide. The statistics also show that the 
largest category of causes/manners of deaths of all the Council of Europe’s coun-
tries included are deaths caused by other causes, illnesses included (57.8%).24 This 
finding justifies a study on the legal obligations to prevent premature deaths dur-
ing deprivation of liberty by the State by providing the necessary healthcare and 
taking protective measures.
Information about deaths occurring during deprivation of liberty by the 
Dutch police force is also scarcely provided by the Dutch police to the general 
public. These numbers are not published in the annual reports of the police.25 
Occasionally, news reports about a death during deprivation of liberty by the 
police are published on the website of the police.26 The information provided by 
the National Police Internal Investigations Department and the Public Prosecu-
tion Service on the results of the investigations performed into deaths occurring 
during deprivation of liberty is often limited to a news report on their website.27 
The study of Thoonen, Kubat and Duijst shows that in the period 2005-2010, an 
average of 13 deaths per year occurred during deprivation of liberty by the police 
21. Statistics Netherlands. http://statline.cbs.nl/Statweb/. Last accessed: 15 April 2017.
22. Custodial Institutions Agency 2011, p. 26.
23. 5,652 deaths between 20-49 years, compared to a population of 5,490,000 civilians between 
20-44 years.
24. Council of Europe 2015b, pp. 119-120. See also: Council of Europe 2017, pp. 114-115.
25. See for example: Annual report police 2014.
26. https://www.politie.nl/. Last accessed: 15 April 2017. For example, news report 5 June 2013 
about a man who died in a police cell in a police station in Arnhem. Or, news report 9 December 
2012 about a man who died in the police custody suite in Houten.
27. See also: Thoonen and Duijst 2015.
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(police shootings included),28 i.e. 0.065 per 1,000 suspects taken into police cus-
tody.29 The Dutch police does not publish figures on the average age of persons 
taken into police custody. Blaauw, Vegter and Monterie stated in 2002 that 75% 
of the detainees held by the police are between the age of 20 and 40 years old.30 
Comparing the mortality rate of deaths in the general population (1 per 1,000 ci-
vilians per year between the age of 20-44 years) and during deprivation of liberty 
by the police (0.065 per 1,000 suspects locked in by the police) could lead to the 
conclusion that death in the general population occurs circa 15 times more of-
ten than during deprivation of liberty by the police. One must however keep in 
mind that deprivation of liberty by the Dutch police does in general not exceed 
the length of three days and fifteen hours, which makes the mortality rate during 
deprivation of liberty by the police less favourable, as one may argue that the mor-
tality rate should be multiplied (for example by 100) considering the total number 
of days in one year. The study of Thoonen and Duijst also shows that the mean 
age of the persons who died during deprivation of liberty by the police in the pe-
riod 2005-2010 was 39.9 years, whereas the mean age of deceased persons in the 
general population in 2005-2010 was 76.4 years.31 Deaths during deprivation of 
liberty by the Dutch police occur therefore relatively frequently and at a younger 
age than in free society, showing the significance of performing an in-depth ex-
amination of this subject. 
1.2. Research questions, demarcation and normative 
framework
The aim of this legal study is twofold: on the one hand, it aims to examine the 
scope of the legal obligations of Member States to prevent premature deaths dur-
ing deprivation of liberty by the State by providing the necessary healthcare, 
taking protective measures and the obligation to perform an investigation if a 
death during deprivation of liberty occurs. On the other hand, this study aims to 
examine if, and if so, what, safeguards exist in the Dutch legal framework to fulfil 
these obligations. Inevitably, several choices have been made to limit the scope of 
28. Thoonen, Kubat and Duijst 2015.
29. The Inspectorate Security and Justice reports that annually 200,000 suspects are locked in by 
the Dutch police. Inspectorate Security and Justice 2014b, p. 3.
30. Blaauw, Vegter and Monterie 2002, p. 15.
31. http://statline.cbs.nl/Statweb/. Last accessed: 15 April 2017. Average age of the deceased in 
2005: 75.9, in 2006: 76.2, in 2007: 76.3, in 2008: 76.6, in 2009: 76.6 and 2010: 76.9.
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this study. Deprivation of liberty by the State can be enforced for several reasons. 
The first two demarcations of this study relate to this aspect; this study only relates 
to deaths of adults during deprivation of liberty by the State in a criminal justice 
context.32 This means that this study does not specifically relate to legal obligations 
in relation to, for example, minors who are deprived of their liberty. Neither does 
this study specifically relate to deprivation of liberty outside the criminal justice 
context, for example to prevent a person effecting an unauthorised entry into the 
country or of persons against whom action is being taken with a view to deporta-
tion. Furthermore, it only includes the obligation to prevent premature death of 
detainees by providing the necessary healthcare (or medical care), i.e. improving 
health by diagnosing, treating and preventing physical and mental illnesses and 
injury, and by taking other protective measures. These protective measures do 
not specifically involve healthcare, but must nevertheless be taken to protect the 
health and life of detainees. Obligations regarding the use of force by State offi-
cials and to ensure a safe environment will therefore be discussed as far as positive 
obligations are concerned that support the negative obligation, such as protective 
measures that need to be taken to prevent lethal incidents between custodial staff 
and detainees and between detainees. Aspects of proportionality of used violence 
or subsidiarity will not be subjected to an in-depth study. Fundamental obliga-
tions to ensure the detainee’s access to food and liquids will also not be discussed 
in this study. The obligations which will be comprehensively studied are:
1) the obligations to protect the life of detainees by providing the necessary health-
care, taking protective measures and the dilemma which may arise between the 
obligations of Member States versus end of life decisions of detainees;
2) the obligation to investigate deaths during deprivation of liberty by the State.33
The central research question is:
What obligations arise from the ECHR regarding deaths during deprivation of 
liberty by the State in a criminal justice context and does the Dutch legal frame-
work contain the safeguards necessary to fulfil these obligations?
To answer the central research question the following sub questions are formulated:
 – What constitutes deprivation of liberty under responsibility of the State in a 
criminal justice context within the meaning of the ECHR?
32. Not including the Dutch Military Criminal Code.
33. The obligations arising from art. 13 ECHR (right to an effective remedy) will therefore not be 
included in this study. See ECtHR 24 March 2011, no. 23458/02, §299, GC (Giuliani and Gaggio 
v. Italy): the procedural obligation under art. 2 ECHR is a distinct obligation from the obligation 
under art. 13 ECHR.
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 – Which means of coercion and criminal law penalties and measures in re-
sponse to a suspicion or conviction of having committed a criminal offence 
laid down in Dutch law, constitute deprivation of liberty pursuant to Dutch 
law?
 – Does the Dutch legal framework regarding deprivation of liberty under re-
sponsibility of the State in a criminal justice context meet the requirements 
that follow from the ECHR?
 – What obligations regarding healthcare and protective measures do Member 
States have pursuant to the ECHR with an aim to preventing premature 
death of detainees?
 – What safeguards exist in the Dutch legal framework to fulfil the aforemen-
tioned obligations?
 – Does the Dutch legal framework meet the requirements that follow from the 
aforementioned obligations under the ECHR?
 – What is the scope of the obligation to investigate the death of a detainee pur-
suant to the ECHR?
 – What safeguards exist in the Dutch legal framework to fulfil the aforemen-
tioned obligation?
 – Does the Dutch legal framework meet the requirements that follow from the 
aforementioned obligations under the ECHR?
One may raise the question why this study primarily focuses on the ECHR, con-
sidering that a number of other international and regional human rights treaties/
documents34 also contain rights and obligations which are relevant for this study. 
Examples are the Universal Declaration of Human Rights,35 the International 
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (hereinafter: ICCPR),36 the International 
Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (hereinafter: ICESCR),37 and 
34. See for example: Bollmann et al 2011, Annex I. Jacobs 2012, pp. 78-126. See also the treaties 
collected by Van Kempen 2010.
35. More specifically art. 3 (the right to life, liberty and the security of person), art. 5 (prohibition 
of torture) and art. 25 (the right to a standard of living adequate for the health and well-being).
36. More specifically art. 6 (the right to life), art. 7 (prohibition of torture) and art. 10 (treating 
persons deprived of their liberty with humanity and with respect for the inherent dignity of the 
human person).
37. Art. 12 (the right to the enjoyment of the highest attainable standard of physical and mental 
health.). Rule 39 of the European Prison Rules (hereinafter: EPR) is according to its commentary 
based on art. 12 ICESCR.
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the European Social Charter (hereinafter: ESC).38 This large number of human 
rights treaties/documents makes a choice regarding the treaties included in this 
study inevitable. To answer the research question, only European (regional) le-
gal instruments of the Council of Europe are included in this study, namely the 
ECHR and the soft law of the European Committee for the Prevention of Torture 
and Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment (CPT) and the Committee 
of Ministers. These legal instruments are selected for the following reasons. 
A first reason to examine the ECHR is that the Dutch legal framework will 
be examined in the light of human rights obligations, thus requiring examination 
of a legal framework which is binding for the Netherlands. The Netherlands is 
a State Party to the ECHR and the ECHR is directly applicable in the Nether-
lands.39 The ECHR is an international (though regional) convention which came 
into force in 1953. The ECHR is the basis of fundamental human rights in Eu-
rope, upon which other instruments are founded on.40 Article 11 ESC, containing 
the right to protection of health, complements for example Article 2 and Article 
3 ECHR.41 
Secondly, the ECHR has instituted the ECtHR.42 Everyone may lodge a com-
plaint to the ECtHR claiming to be a victim of a violation of one or more of the 
rights and freedoms laid down in the ECHR by one of the Member States.43 This 
is a strong safeguard for alleged victims of human rights violations. The ECtHR 
has been established pursuant to Article 19 ECHR and is a judicial body (contrary 
to, for example, the European Committee of Social Rights which observes the 
Member States’ compliance with the European Social Charter) that aims to ensure 
the Member States’ observance of the obligations arising from the ECHR by pass-
ing judgments concerning alleged violations of the Convention.44 The ECtHR’s 
jurisdiction extends to all matters concerning the interpretation and application 
of the ECHR and the protocols to the ECHR.45 As for the binding force of the 
ECtHR’s case law, State Parties are pursuant to Article 46 ECHR obliged to abide 
38. Art. 11 (the right to protection of health) and art. 13 (anyone without adequate resources has 
the right to social and medical assistance).
39. Art. 93 Dutch Constitution. Supreme Court 3 March 1919, NJ 1919, p. 371 (Grenstractaat 
Aken). See also: Kortmann 2016, pp. 399-400. Barkhuysen 2004, p. 46. Vlemminx and Boekhorst 
2000, p. 467. Van Kempen 2003, pp. 47-49.
40. See also: Van Kalmthout, Knapen and Morgenstern 2009, pp. 3-9. 
41. Council of Europe 2008, p. 81.
42. Until 1998, there also existed the European Commission of Human Rights (hereinafter: 
EComHR).
43. Art. 34 ECHR.
44. Art. 19 ECHR. The decisions of the EComHR are also included in this study.
45. Art. 32 ECHR.
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to the final judgments of the ECtHR in any case to which they are parties. It is 
however generally accepted that Member States are bound by the interpretation 
of Convention principles in the case law of the ECtHR, regardless of whether 
the State was a party in the case involved (erga omnes-effect).46 The ECtHR also 
acknowledges that judgments establish precedents albeit in a greater or lesser ex-
tent47 and that the judgments of the ECtHR serve to decide on the individual case 
and  (…) to elucidate, safeguard and develop the rules instituted by the Conven-
tion (…)”.48 Several authors argue that the ECtHR seems to hold the view that 
the ECtHR’s interpretations are part of the ECHR.49 It is furthermore notewor-
thy that the ECtHR is not formally bound by its previous case law,50 though the 
ECtHR has stressed that “(…) it is in the interests of legal certainty, foreseeability 
and equality before the law that it should not depart, without good reason, from 
precedents laid down in previous cases (…)”.51 
Thirdly, the ECHR is the most relevant legally binding framework with re-
gard to the legal obligations of the Dutch State which are examined in this study, 
namely the obligations to prevent premature death and to investigate deaths oc-
curring during deprivation of liberty by the State. The focus of this dissertation 
lays therefore on deprivation of liberty by the State. The ECtHR’s case law shows 
explicit and detailed requirements regarding the obligation to prevent premature 
death of detainees which are derived from Article 2, Article 3 and Article 8 ECHR. 
The legally binding force of the ECHR and the detailed case law of the ECtHR 
(a judicial body) regarding the obligations to prevent premature death of detain-
ees and to perform an investigation when detainees die justify examination of the 
ECHR. 
Nevertheless, it is noteworthy that Article 11 ESC contains the right to protec-
tion of health.52 Article 11 ESC states:
46. Dzehtsiarou 2015, pp. 90-91, 102-103. Dissenting opinion of Judge Pinto De Albuquerque 
in ECtHR 28 June 2013, no. 16574/08, GC (Fabris v. France). Van Kempen and Fedorova 2016, 
pp. 20-21. Van Kempen 2003, pp. 39-46. See with regard to the binding force of the ECHR for 
the Netherlands: Barkhuysen 2004, p. 47. He refers to Supreme Court 10 November 1989, NJ 
1990, 628. Supreme Court 10 May 1996, NJ 1996, 578. Administrative Jurisdiction Division of 
the Council of State 10 April 2002, JB 2002, 146. 
47. ECtHR 29 April 2002, no. 2346/02, §75 (Pretty v. UK).
48. ECtHR 18 January 1978, no. 5310/71, §154 (Ireland v. UK).
49. Martens 2000, p. 756. Gerards 2011, p. 29. See also: Hey, de Lange and Mevis 2005.
50. ECtHR 27 September 1990, no. 10843/84, §35 (Cossey v. UK). ECtHR 11 July 2002, no. 
28957/95, §74 (Christine Goodwin v. UK).
51. ECtHR 11 July 2002, no. 28957/95, §74 (Christine Goodwin v. UK). See also ECtHR 18 
January 2001, no. 24882/94, §81 (Beard v. UK). ECtHR 17 September 2009, no. 10249/03, §104 
(Scoppola v. Italy (No. 2). See furthermore: Gerards 2011, pp. 24-29.
52. See also art. 12 ICESCR.
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Article 11: The right to protection of health
“With a view to ensuring the effective exercise of the right to protection of health, 
the Contracting Parties undertake, either directly or in co-operation with public 
or private organisations, to take appropriate measures designed inter alia:
1. to remove as far as possible the causes of ill-health;
2. to provide advisory and educational facilities for the promotion of health and 
the encouragement of individual responsibility in matters of health;
3. to prevent as far as possible epidemic, endemic and other diseases.”
As this study aims to examine the legal obligations to prevent premature death of 
detainees by providing the necessary healthcare, one could argue that the right to 
protection of health needs to be discussed in this study. However, Article 11 ESC 
mainly contains obligations for States on public health issues and not about care 
for individual (detained) patients. This right and the European Committee of So-
cial Rights’53 interpretations of this right either do not or hardly provide detailed 
standards for healthcare during deprivation of liberty by the State. The relevance 
of this right for the context of deprivation of liberty is therefore limited, whereas 
the legal obligations of States while depriving a person of his liberty is the central 
theme of this study. Furthermore, the interpretations of the European Commit-
tee of Social Rights do not have the same legally binding force as the case law of 
the ECtHR.54 For these reasons, Article 11 ESC will not be further discussed in 
this study.
In addition to the legal framework of the ECHR, relevant standards of two bodies 
of the Council of Europe, namely the CPT and the Committee of Ministers will 
be included in this study (hereinafter: soft law). The CPT has been established by 
the European Convention for the Prevention of Torture and Inhuman or Degrad-
ing Treatment or Punishment (ECPT). This Convention came into force in 1989. 
Contrary to the ECtHR, the CPT does not perform any judicial functions.55 It 
examines, by means of visits, the treatment of persons who are deprived of their 
liberty by State Parties. The aim is to strengthen the protection of these persons 
from torture and inhuman and degrading treatment and punishment.56 After each 
visit, a report is drawn up by the CPT, holding the facts found during the visit 
53. http://www.coe.int/en/web/turin-european-social-charter. Last accessed: 15 April 2017.
54. See also: Van Kempen and Fedorova 2016, p. 74.
55. Explanatory report to the European Convention For the Prevention of Torture and Inhuman 
or Degrading Treatment or Punishment, §17.
56. Art. 1 ECPT.
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and, if necessary, recommendations.57 The CPT has developed standards for the 
treatment of detainees, including on healthcare, which are brought together in 
the CPT Standards.58 The Committee of Ministers is the decision-making body of 
the Council of Europe and consists of the ministers of Foreign Affairs of the State 
Parties or their permanent diplomatic representatives.59 The aim of the Council 
of Europe is to achieve greater unity between its members on economic, social, 
cultural, scientific, legal and administrative matters.60 Pursuant to Article 15, sec-
tion b of the Statute of the Council of Europe, the Committee of Ministers may 
formulate recommendations. Examples of such recommendations are Recom-
mendation Rec(2006)2 of the Committee of Ministers to Member States on the 
European Prison Rules and Recommendation No. R (98)7 of the Committee of 
Ministers to Member States concerning the ethical and organisational aspects of 
health care in prison. Though it is stressed that the CPT standards and the rec-
ommendations of the Committee of Ministers are not legally binding,61 there is 
an interaction between on the one hand the recommendations of the Committee 
of Ministers and the CPT standards and on the other hand the case law of the 
ECtHR.62 The ECtHR has emphasised that, although recommendations of the 
Committee of Ministers do not have force of law for the ECtHR, “(…) they may 
define a common European standard in this area”.63 Furthermore, as opposed to 
the Decisions and Conclusions of the European Committee of Social Rights, the 
CPT Standards and the recommendations of the Committee of Ministers provide 
detailed recommendations on how to fulfil the obligations to protect the health 
and life of detainees. The ECtHR refers in its case law to these standards of the 
CPT and recommendations of the Committee of Ministers under the relevant in-
ternational law/standards64 and also explicitly examines whether a State acted in 
accordance with these standards.65 By doing so, the ECtHR attaches binding force 
57. Art. 10 ECPT. See with regard to the CPT in more detail: De Lange 2008, chapter 2 and 
chapter 3. Morgan and Evans 2001.
58. CPT/Inf/E (2002) 1 – Rev. 2015.
59. Art. 16 and art. 14 Statute of the Council of Europe.
60. Art. 1, section a-b Statute of the Council of Europe.
61. Explanatory report to the European Convention For the Prevention of Torture and Inhuman 
or Degrading Treatment or Punishment, §25. Council of Europe 2009, p. 9. See also Daems, 
Vander Beken and Vermeulen 2012, p. 43. De Lange 2008, pp. 202, 320-321, 355. Jacobs 2012, 
p. 80. 
62. For example, Recommendation CM/Rec(2012)5.
63. ECtHR 27 March 2008, no. 44009/05, §95 (Shtukaturov v. Russia). See also Hendriks 2009, 
p. 66. Barkhuysen and Van Emmerik 2010.
64. For example, ECtHR 26 April 2016, no. 10511/10, §66, GC (Murray v. The Netherlands).
65. For example, ECtHR 22 January 2013, no. 31963/08, §49 (Mitić v. Serbia). ECtHR 21 
December 2010, no. 45744/08, §§39, 66 (Jasinskis v. Latvia).
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to this soft law.66 Furthermore, the CPT standards and the recommendations of 
the Committee of Ministers can be regarded as complementary to the case law 
of the ECtHR, namely on aspects not yet examined by the ECtHR. Therefore, 
the relevant standards of the CPT and the recommendations of the Committee 
of Ministers will be included in this study, either explicitly used as a norm in the 
ECtHR’s case law (and discussed simultaneously with the ECtHR’s case law) or 
discussed under a separate heading. 
As with human rights documents/treaties, diverging parties (e.g. 
Non-Governmental Organisations) have developed a large number of guidelines 
etcetera regarding healthcare67 and the investigation into deaths during depriva-
tion of liberty by the State. A selection of the included documents is therefore 
inevitable. This study only includes standards developed by the World Medical 
Association (hereinafter: WMA)68 as it is an international organisation represent-
ing physicians that has developed standards for physicians working in prisons. 
Furthermore, the Royal Dutch Medical Association, that has developed standards 
regarding healthcare during deprivation of liberty in the Netherlands, is a mem-
ber of the WMA.
To answer the question whether, and if so, what, safeguards exist in the Dutch 
legal framework to fulfil the obligations arising from the ECHR, the following 
sources are used. Firstly, this study includes the traditional sources of law, namely 
Dutch legislation and case law (including case law of the Appeal Commission of 
the Council for the Administration of Criminal Justice and Protection of Juve-
niles).69 Secondly, relevant national policy (i.e. circulars, instructions, guidelines, 
processes) that applies to deprivation of liberty within a criminal justice context is 
also included in this study, as it aims to equate processes. Local guidelines issued 
within a single penal institution or police custody suite are therefore not included 
in this study considering their limited applicability. As for the execution of hospi-
tal orders with compulsory treatment (Forensic Care Division), it is noteworthy 
that these orders are executed in non-judicial and judicial institutions. Consid-
ering this construction, development of policy has been left to these institutions. 
As this study only includes national policy, this local policy is not included in 
this study. Since healthcare for police custody detainees is at present provided by 
several parties (physicians connected to Community Health Services or to private 
organisations), a national policy is absent on this subject. The Dutch Association 
66. De Lange 2008, pp. 183-210, 267. 
67. For example, WHO 2007.
68. Except for guidelines of other bodies that are adopted in the ECtHR’s case law.
69. Art. 71 Custodial Institutions (Framework) Act.
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of Community Health Services and the Forensic Medical Society, the professional 
association for forensic physicians, have however developed guidelines on health-
care for police custody detainees and on the investigation after a person has died, 
which are included in this study.70 Relevant guidelines of the Royal Dutch Med-
ical Association are also included in this study. The same applies to the standards 
developed by the diverging bodies explicitly assigned to supervise deprivation of 
liberty in a criminal justice context, namely the standards of the Dutch Health 
Care Inspectorate (that has legal instruments to intervene),71 and the Inspectorate 
Security and Justice,72 although the latter does not have legal instruments to en-
force these standards (besides publishing their findings). Though the Council for 
the Administration of Criminal Justice and Protection of Juvenile has, when its 
advisory task is concerned, only the possibility to issue recommendations with-
out the possibility to enforce them, these standards are nevertheless included as 
relevant Dutch legal framework as the Council is legally authorised to advise the 
Minister on policy and legislation relating to the execution of deprivation of lib-
erty within a criminal justice context,73 these standards are explicitly developed 
to uniformize supervision on the diverging penal institutions by the supervisory 
committees and are based on European standards.74 
1.3. Methodology, research sources and structure
This legal study uses the traditional methods of legal research (desk research), by 
describing and analysing the relevant case law (European and Dutch), legisla-
tion (including legislative history), national policy and, additionally, literature. 
To obtain an overview of the available case law of the ECtHR and of the CPT 
70. Some of the Forensic Medical Society’s guidelines seem no longer in force as the mentioned 
period of validity has expired. These guidelines are nevertheless published on the website of the 
Forensic Medical Society and therefore included in this study.  
71. As enumerated by the Health Care Inspectorate (2013), for example reporting the case to 
the Public Prosecution Service, by submitting a disciplinary complaint (art. 65 §1 (d) Individual 
Health Care Professions Act) or by giving a direction (art. 27 §1 Healthcare Quality, Complaints 
and Disputes Act).
72. Art. 60 §1 (a) Ministry of Security and Justice (Organisation) Decree 2015.
73. Art. 24 Act establishing the Council for the Administration of Criminal Justice and Protection 
of Juveniles 2015.
74. Council for the Administration of Criminal Justice and Protection of Juveniles 2014, p. 3; 
2015, p. 3. Worth mentioning is that a physician must participate in the supervisory committee of 
a penal institution (art. 11 §3 (c) Prison Rules). The supervisory committee of judicial institutions 
for the enforcement of hospital orders with compulsory treatment must have a psychiatrist as 
member (art. 7 §3 (b) Hospital Orders (Care) Regulations).
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standards and reports, this study uses the database of the ECtHR75 and the CPT.76 
Both English and French terms are used to make an inventory of relevant case 
law of the ECtHR. Relevant case law has however also been found through refer-
ences made in the decisions and judgments of the ECtHR (snow-ball system) and 
through screening of the weekly press releases regarding forthcoming judgments 
and decisions of the ECtHR. Recommendations of the Committee of Minis-
ters are retrieved from the website of the Council of Europe.77 The website of 
the World Medical Association is used to retrieve relevant statements and res-
olutions.78 With regard to Dutch case law, this study uses the official database 
of the Netherlands judiciary79 to make an inventory of relevant case law, just 
like the database of the Council for the Administration of Criminal Justice and 
Protection of Juveniles80 and of the Dutch Disciplinary Tribunals.81 Case law jour-
nals82 are examined as additional sources to find missing case law. The case law is 
collected and, arranged by subject, brought together in an excel database for ex-
amination. If policy was not accessible through public sources, the State authority 
involved has been asked to provide relevant current national policy. Guidelines of 
the Dutch Association of Community Health Services and Forensic Medical So-
ciety are retrieved from the website of the latter association.83 Standards (and/or 
reports) of the Health Care Inspectorate,84 the Inspectorate Security and Justice 
and the Inspectorate on the Enforcement of Sanctions (predecessor of the In-
spectorate Security and Justice),85 the Council for the Administration of Criminal 
Justice and Protection of Juveniles,86 and the Royal Dutch Medical Association87 
are retrieved from their websites. The database ‘Juridisch-Economisch Lexicon’ is 
used to translate legal terms.
Though this is a legal study and not empirical research, this book describes 
data to illustrate how risks or problems may arise in practice in the Netherlands, 
75. http://hudoc.echr.coe.int. Last accessed: 16 April 2017.
76. http://hudoc.cpt.coe.int. Last accessed: 16 April 2017.
77. http://www.coe.int/t/dghl/standardsetting/prisons/Recommendations_en.asp. Last 
accessed: 16 April 2017.
78. https://www.wma.net/policy/. Last accessed: 16 April 2017. 
79. https://www.rechtspraak.nl/. Last accessed: 16 April 2017. 
80. https://www.rsj.nl/. Last accessed: 16 April 2017. 
81. http://tuchtrecht.overheid.nl/nieuw/gezondheidszorg. Last accessed: 16 April 2017.
82. For example, European Human Rights Cases, Nederlandse Jurisprudentie, Tijdschrift voor 
Gezondheidsrecht, Sancties.
83. https://www.forgen.nl/. Last accessed: 16 April 2017.
84. www.igz.nl. Last accessed: 16 April 2017.
85. https://www.inspectievenj.nl/. Last accessed: 16 April 2017. 
86. https://www.rsj.nl/. Last accessed: 16 April 2017.
87. https://www.knmg.nl/. Last accessed: 16 April 2017.
Death in State Custody DRUK.indd   37 13-Sep-17   2:39:56 PM
38 Chapter 1 
namely risks or problems in relation to the obligation to protect the health and 
life of detainees and risks for the effectiveness of the investigation performed 
after the death of detainees. Included data/findings are those gathered by the 
Dutch Health Care Inspectorate and a special committee appointed to assess (the 
organisation of ) healthcare during deprivation of liberty, and findings of the In-
spectorate Security and Justice and Inspectorate on the Enforcement of Sanctions 
on protective measures during deprivation of liberty. Part of the data that will be 
discussed in this thesis has also been collected in multidisciplinary studies by me, 
in cooperation with Wilma Duijst. As for the methods used to obtain the data in 
those studies, reference is made to the study concerned. 
To answer the central research question, this study is divided into three parts, 
namely: 
1) deprivation of liberty in a criminal justice context; 
2) the obligations of Member States to prevent premature deaths during depri-
vation of liberty by providing the necessary healthcare and taking protective 
measures; and 
3) the obligation of Member States to investigate deaths during deprivation of 
liberty. 
In the first part of this volume, the scope of the term ‘deprivation of liberty in 
a criminal justice context’ within the meaning of the ECHR will be explored 
(chapter 2). A clear demarcation of this notion is essential because deprivation of 
liberty by the State brings along responsibilities for that State. The responsibilities 
of Member States to prevent premature deaths during deprivation of liberty by 
providing the necessary healthcare, taking protective measures and to investigate 
deaths during deprivation of liberty will be delineated in the second and third part 
of this study. To determine the scope of deprivation of liberty by the State within 
the meaning of Article 5 ECHR, this study examines the ECtHR’s case law un-
der Article 5 ECHR and Article 2 of Protocol No. 4 to the ECHR (hereinafter: 
P4 ECHR). The definition of ‘deprivation of liberty’ developed by the CPT and 
in relevant literature will be taken into account in this analyses. To demarcate the 
scope of deprivation of liberty within a criminal justice context, this study follows 
the definition of ‘criminal charge’, as laid down in Article 6 ECHR. 
In chapter 3, it will be explored which means of coercion and criminal law 
penalties and measures in response to a suspicion or conviction of having com-
mitted a criminal offence laid down in Dutch law constitute deprivation of liberty 
according to Dutch law, where discussions arise on this topic, and whether the 
principles on deprivation of liberty in Dutch law correspond with the principles 
arising from the ECHR as discussed in chapter 2. Examination of these topics is 
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necessary to determine the scope of this study as far as the Dutch context is con-
cerned. The principles regarding deprivation of liberty arising from the ECHR 
will be followed to demarcate this study. This means that if Dutch law does not 
correspond with the principles arising from the ECHR, this study will follow the 
principles arising from the ECHR.
In the second part of this volume, the legal obligations of Member States to pre-
vent premature88 death of detainees by providing the necessary healthcare and 
taking protective measures arising from the ECHR will be discussed (chapter 4). 
This study examines the ECtHR’s case law under Article 2, Article 3 and Article 
8 ECHR to define the positive obligations to provide the necessary healthcare to 
detainees and to take protective measures to protect the health and life of detain-
ees. By studying this case law and, additionally, the standards of the CPT and 
the Committee of Ministers, preconditions to provide the requisite healthcare 
are identified. These preconditions will be discussed in section 4.4. Preconditions 
which can be deduced from both the ECtHR’s case law and the standards of 
the CPT and/or Committee of Ministers are simultaneously discussed, whereas 
norms which can only be deduced from the CPT standards and/or recommenda-
tions of the Committee of Ministers are discussed under a separate heading and 
are referred to by the term ‘should’, to stress their non-binding force. The question 
how the obligations of Member States relate to end of life decisions of detainees 
and the dilemmas that arise in these cases are discussed in section 4.5. 
To determine whether, and if so, what, safeguards exist in the Dutch legal 
framework to meet the obligations arising from the ECHR, the relevant Dutch 
legislation (including its history), case law, national policy, and standards of the 
supervisory bodies, the Council for the Administration of Criminal Justice and 
Protection of Juveniles and representative bodies of professionals involved are 
studied. This Dutch legal framework is discussed in chapter 5. In chapter 5, I will 
discuss if, and if so, what, safeguards exist in the Dutch legal framework to fulfil 
the obligations discussed in chapter 4. 
The obligation to investigate deaths occurring during deprivation of liberty by 
the State arising from Article 2 ECHR will be discussed in the third part of this 
study (chapter 6). The scope of the obligation to investigate deaths during dep-
rivation of liberty by the State is determined by an examination of the ECtHR’s 
case law under Article 2 ECHR, more specifically the ECtHR’s case law on deaths 
88. The ultimate goal of healthcare is to avert death as long as possible.
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during deprivation of liberty by the State.89 Other case law under Article 2 ECHR 
is also examined as far as it shines more light on the aforementioned obligation, 
more specifically in relation to the minimum standards for the investigation’s ef-
fectiveness. These standards are also specified in case law that does not relate to 
deaths occurring during deprivation of liberty. The ECtHR has also derived pro-
cedural obligations from Article 3 and Article 8 ECHR. These obligations are to a 
large extent similar to the procedural obligations derived from Article 2 ECHR.90 
Furthermore, the procedural obligations following from Article 3 and Article 8 
ECHR are relevant in relation to risks for life, whereas such risks are no longer 
present if the person in question is deceased. Therefore, the procedural obligations 
derived from Article 3 and Article 8 ECHR are not discussed in the following.
To determine whether, and if so, what, safeguards exist in the Dutch legal 
framework to fulfil the obligation to investigate, this study examines relevant 
Dutch legislation (including its history), case law, national policy, and standards 
of the supervisory bodies, the Council for the Administration of Criminal Justice 
and Protection of Juveniles and representative bodies of professionals involved. 
This legal framework will be discussed in chapter 7. 
A synthesis of the findings will follow in chapter 8. 
1.4. To conclude
This study includes legal instruments that were in force on 1 March 2017. Any de-
velopments after this date have not been included in this study. All references to 
websites were up to date on the aforementioned date. When reference is made to 
detainees, physicians or nurses etcetera, “he” and “his” should be read as includ-
ing “she” and “her(s)”.
Though approximately half of this dissertation concerns the Dutch legal frame-
work, it is written in English. This choice has been made because an in-depth 
study of the legal obligations to prevent and to investigate deaths during dep-
rivation of liberty by the State does not exist, neither in Dutch nor in English. 
By writing this dissertation in English instead of in Dutch, this dissertation is 
89. I.e. deprivation of liberty by the police (as of the outset of the deprivation of liberty, including 
lethal force) and other forms of deprivation of liberty, for example in prison. See chapter 2.
90. See also Van Kempen 2008, pp. 44-50. Van der Wilt and Lyngdorf 2009, pp. 39-75. Gerards 
2011, pp. 239-241, 248-253. Brems 2013, pp. 137-161. See also ECtHR 13 December 2012, no. 
39630/09, §§182-185, GC (El-Masri v. The Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia). ECtHR 4 
December 2003, no. 39272/98, §§148-153 (M.C. v. Bulgaria). ECtHR 17 September 2014, nos. 
10865/09, 45886/07 and 32431/08, §§317-325, GC (Mocanu and others v. Romania).
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accessible to a wider public. Furthermore, this dissertation can be a useful tool for 
policy makers and other professionals in other Member States to examine whether 
the legal obligations arising from the ECHR have been implemented in their na-
tional legal framework and/or whether points of improvements can be identified. 
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CHAPTER 2. 
Deprivation of liberty within the 
meaning of the Convention
2.1. Introduction
One of the purposes of this study is to determine the scope of the Member States’ 
obligations arising from the ECHR with regard to (prevention of ) deaths of 
adults during deprivation of liberty under responsibility of the State1 within a 
criminal justice context. A first crucial step to achieve this purpose is to determine 
what constitutes deprivation of liberty under responsibility of the State within a 
criminal justice context. Although the main elements are ‘deprivation of liberty 
under responsibility of the State’ and ‘criminal justice context’, it is nevertheless 
necessary to provide a basic idea of what liberty entails, as it is precisely that lib-
erty which is deprived in case of deprivation of liberty. Therefore, the following 
questions require answering: 
1) What is liberty? 
2) What is deprivation of liberty? 
3) What constitutes deprivation of liberty under responsibility of the State? 
4) What constitutes deprivation of liberty under responsibility of the State in a 
criminal justice context? 
These questions will be answered in the following. Section 2.2 will be used to 
define and demarcate the meaning of the right to liberty under the ECHR and 
its protocols. I will explore the applicable rights and freedoms laid down in the 
ECHR and its protocols and demarcate the scope of other rights and freedoms 
laid down in the Convention that are adjacent to the right to liberty. The scope 
of Article 2 P4, Article 3, Article 4, and Article 8 ECHR will therefore also be 
1. See also: Wangmo et al. 2014, pp. 30-37. The authors stress that no internationally recognised 
definition of death in custody exists.
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discussed as far as these provisions are relevant to define liberty. The question what 
constitutes deprivation of liberty under responsibility of the State will be answered 
in section 2.3. To answer this question, I will explore the factors that are relevant 
in view of the ECtHR to establish whether a person has been deprived of his lib-
erty. These factors will be discussed in more detail in sections 2.3.1.-2.3.3. Section 
2.3.4 will be used to demarcate the outset and end of deprivation of liberty, and 
to explore the circumstances in which the responsibility of the State for depriva-
tion of liberty is engaged and the consequences of deprivation of liberty. Section 
2.4 will be used to examine what constitutes deprivation of liberty in a criminal 
justice context. In section 2.5, the question what constitutes deprivation of liberty 
under responsibility of the State in a criminal justice context within the meaning 
of the ECHR will be answered.
2.2. The right to liberty
ARTICLE 5: Right to liberty and security
“1. Everyone has the right to liberty and security of person. No one shall be de-
prived of his liberty save in the following cases and in accordance with a procedure 
prescribed by law: (…).”2
ARTICLE 2, Protocol No. 4: Freedom of movement
“1. Everyone lawfully within the territory of a State shall, within that territory, 
have the right to liberty of movement and freedom to choose his residence.
2. Everyone shall be free to leave any country, including his own.”3
Article 5 ECHR protects the right to liberty (and security) of person.4 ‘Liberty’ 
has not been defined in Article 5 ECHR.5 According to the ECtHR’s case law, 
2. Italic: ET.
3. Italic: ET. See with regard to this article also: Vande Lanotte and Haeck 2004, pp. 523-552. 
Murdoch 2006, pp. 74-78.
4. The EComHR stressed that ‘liberty’ and ‘security’ must be read as a whole. It is a guarantee 
against arbitrariness of arrest and detention. EComHR 4 March 1998, no. 29361/95 (Ketenoglu 
v. Turkey). See also: ECtHR 7 June 2011, no. 26814/09, §134 (Mulder-Van Schalkwijk v. The 
Netherlands). ECtHR 18 December 1986, no. 9990/82, §54 (Bozano v. France).
5. The term ‘liberty’ (and deprivation of liberty) is also used in art. 1 P4 ECHR (deprivation of 
liberty for debts). The explanatory report to P4 states that the term ‘deprivation of liberty’ is used 
in this article instead of the term ‘imprisonment’. It also states that the term ‘deprived of his liberty’ 
included any form of deprivation of liberty, regardless its duration. Explanatory report to Protocol 
No. 4 to the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, securing 
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‘liberty’ relates to the physical liberty of a person.6 This physical element refers 
in my view to the ‘subject’ of freedom (i.e. which freedom is involved: physical 
liberty, freedom of thought, conscience and religion, freedom of assembly and 
association etcetera). ‘Physical liberty’ has not been further defined by the EC-
tHR. It has been further defined by philosophers; one of the views that has been 
put forward in this regard (which I can endorse) is that ‘liberty’ or ‘freedom’ 
means the absence of restrictions, though within a framework that introduces 
some non-physical restrictions developed by people (such as a democratic society) 
to ensure liberty (for example State borders).7 The above-mentioned physical el-
ement brings along that Article 5 ECHR encompasses the liberty to move one’s 
own body, and to come and go as a person pleases. Article 2 P4 ECHR contains 
the right to liberty of movement within the territory of a State, freedom to choose 
one’s residence and the freedom to leave any country. These three rights inevitably 
concerns the physical liberty of a person, namely the liberty to come and go as a 
person pleases. Both Article 5 ECHR and Article 2 P4 ECHR contain therefore 
rights relating to the physical liberty of a person. Article 2 P4 ECHR contains 
in my view specific elements of the general right to physical liberty of a person 
as laid down in Article 5 ECHR,8 which is also supported by the system of the 
ECHR (the primary document) and its additional protocols (including Proto-
col No. 4). De Jong states that the rights laid down in Article 2 P4 ECHR and 
Article 5 ECHR contain the liberty of civilians to determine where to go, stand 
and stay without interference of the State (vrijheid te gaan, staan en verblijven 
zonder overheidsinmenging).9 I would like to stress that this definition should 
also include the freedom to move one’s body on the spot without interference of 
the State, thus without physically restraining a person, and that the difference be-
tween both provisions is that Article 2 P4 ECHR protects specific aspects of the 
right to physical liberty of persons laid down in Article 5 ECHR. 
The scope of the right laid down in Article 5 ECHR can be further demar-
cated by determining the scope of other rights and freedoms adjacent to Article 5 
certain rights and freedoms other than those already included in the Convention and in the first 
Protocol thereto.
6. ECtHR 8 June 1976, nos. 5100/71; 5101/71; 5102/71; 5354/72; 5370/72, §58 (Engel and 
others v. The Netherlands). ECtHR 23 February 2012, no. 29226/03, §84, GC (Creangă v. 
Romania).
7. Mertens 2012, pp. 135-138. Another view implies the complete absence of restrictions.
8. See however EComHR 15 May 1996, no. 25472/94, p. 4 (Iris Heikkilä, Marjut Ojala, Marja 
Hakalin and Aki Hyödynmaa v. Finland). The EComHR stressed that the right to liberty laid 
down in Article 5 ECHR is a lex specialis of the right guaranteed by Article 2 P4 ECHR. This was 
also proposed by De Jong 2000, p. 144.
9. De Jong 2000, p. 103.
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ECHR, in particular Article 8 (right to respect for private and family life), Article 
3 ECHR (prohibition of torture) and Article 4 (prohibition of slavery and forced 
labour). The right to move one’s body on the spot (one of the aspects of Article 
5 ECHR) must, for example, be distinguished from the right covered by Article 
8 ECHR, namely the right to respect for one’s private life, more specifically the 
right to physical integrity. This distinction can be illustrated with the case X versus 
Austria, where the applicant complained that he was taken by force to a medical 
expert to undergo a blood test. The fact that he was led to the medical expert by 
force constituted a deprivation of liberty according to Article 5 ECHR.10 If a par-
ticular treatment caused bodily injury, Article 3 ECHR may also come into play, 
provided that the minimum level of severity required under Article 3 ECHR is at-
tained.11 Important in this regard is that if the minimum level of severity required 
under Article 3 ECHR is not attained, Article 8 ECHR may nevertheless be ap-
plicable.12 The freedom to go, stand and stay without interference of the State 
(right to liberty) includes in my view also the freedom not to be forced to per-
form physical work for another person. If a person is forced to perform physical 
work for another person, he is not free to go, stand and stay of his own volition. 
A special provision is nevertheless drafted to protect civilians from being forced to 
work and being held in slavery, namely Article 4 ECHR. If a situation specifically 
entails forced labour or slavery, Article 4 ECHR will therefore be applicable seeing 
that this provision specifically prohibits these situations.13 
To conclude, considering the ECtHR’s case law14 and the definition already 
formulated in literature,15 the concept of ‘liberty’ laid down in Article 5 ECHR 
and Article 2 P4 ECHR encloses the liberty of civilians to move (on the spot) and 
come and go as one pleases.
10. The fact that blood had been taken from the applicant (therefore breaching his physical 
integrity) needed to be examined under art. 8 ECHR, the right to respect for private life. EComHR 
13 December 1979, no. 8278/78 (X. v. Austria). Art. 5 ECHR is a lex specialis of art. 8 ECHR 
when the freedom of individuals is at stake. ECtHR 16 June 2005, no. 61603/00, §142 (Storck v. 
Germany).
11. ECtHR 11 July 2006, no. 54810/00, §68, GC (Jalloh v. Germany). ECtHR 12 January 2016, 
no. 40355/11, §68 (Boacă and others v. Romania). Art. 3 ECHR will be discussed in more detail 
in chapter 4.
12. ECtHR 25 March 1993, no. 13134/87, §36 (Costello-Roberts v. UK).
13. In my view and considering section 2.3, being held in slavery will also constitute deprivation 
of liberty.
14. ECtHR 8 June 1976, nos. 5100/71; 5101/71; 5102/71; 5354/72; 5370/72, §58 (Engel 
and others v. The Netherlands). ECtHR 23 February 2012, no. 29226/03, §84, GC (Creangă v. 
Romania).
15. De Jong 2000, p. 103.
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2.3. Deprivation of liberty by the State
Article 5 ECHR stipulates the conditions under which, and situations where, 
deprivation of liberty is allowed. Restrictions on the freedom of movement are 
regulated in Article 2 P4 ECHR. The ECtHR stresses that the distinction between 
deprivation of liberty and restrictions on liberty of movement is “(…) merely 
one of degree or intensity, and not one of nature or substance”.16 This principle 
supports the view that the rights laid down in Article 2 P4 ECHR contain spe-
cific elements of the right to liberty of person as laid down in Article 5 ECHR, 
as the difference does not lay in nature or substance. As stated by De Jong, dep-
rivation of liberty means that a person’s liberty is completely, or to a large extent 
taken from him, whereas restrictions on the freedom of movement relate to less 
intrusive measures.17 Because the distinction between deprivation of liberty and 
restrictions on the freedom of movement relates to the degree or intensity, this 
study will only discuss deprivation of liberty and circumstances in which ques-
tions arise as to whether deprivation of liberty or a restriction on the freedom of 
movement is present.
Deprivation of liberty within the meaning of Article 5 ECHR comprises an objec-
tive factor (element), namely confinement in a restricted place for a not negligible 
length of time. With regard to placement of a mentally disordered person in an 
institution, the ECtHR stresses that deprivation of liberty also holds a subjective 
element, namely the absence of a valid consent of the person concerned.18 To 
give a valid consent, the person concerned must be capable to decide for himself 
(competent). Relevant factors in this regard are the age of the person in question 
(for example a minor versus a person of age) and whether the person is placed un-
der guardianship.19 A person who is not legally capable to decide for himself may 
nevertheless be able to comprehend his situation and express the desire to leave 
16. ECtHR 6 November 1980, no. 7367/76, §93 (Guzzardi v. Italy). See also ECtHR 5 October 
2004, no. 45508/99, §89 (H.L. v. UK). ECtHR 15 March 2012, nos. 39692/09, 40713/09 and 
41008/09, §57, GC (Austin and others v. UK). See furthermore De Jong 2000, p. 144. The ECtHR 
nevertheless stresses that art. 5 ECHR should not, in principle, be interpreted as incorporating the 
requirements of P4, since not all States have ratified that protocol. ECtHR 15 March 2012, nos. 
39692/09; 40713/09 and 41008/09, §55, GC (Austin and others v. UK).
17. De Jong 2000, p. 103.
18. ECtHR 26 February 2002, no. 39187/98, §46 (H.M. v. Switzerland). ECtHR 16 June 2005, 
no. 61603/00, §74 (Storck v. Germany). ECtHR 27 March 2008, no. 44009/05, §106 (Shtukaturov 
v. Russia). ECtHR 17 January 2012, no. 36760/06, §117, GC (Stanev v. Bulgaria). ECtHR 19 
June 2012, no. 22883/05, §55 (Cristian Teodorescu v. Romania).
19. ECtHR 16 June 2005, no. 61603/00, §75 (Storck v. Germany). ECtHR 27 March 2008, 
no. 44009/05, §§108-109 (Shtukaturov v. Russia). See for the subjective element of consent 
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the institution where he is admitted or make actual attempts to leave. If so, that 
person is considered to be deprived of his liberty,20 even though the guardian con-
sented with admission.21 Furthermore, a person should not lose the protection of 
Article 5 ECHR only because he reported himself to be taken into detention, for 
example, in a state of temporary distress.22 
As for the objective element, examination of the ECtHR’s case law shows that the 
starting point to determine whether a person is deprived of his liberty is the con-
crete situation. Furthermore, several factors should be taken into account, such 
as the nature, duration, effects and manner of execution of the measure in ques-
tion.23 The term ‘such as’ suggests that this is not an exhaustive account of factors. 
The Grand Chamber of the ECtHR furthermore stresses that the purpose behind 
the measure is not a factor to be taken into account when determining whether 
deprivation of liberty is present.24 The purpose is relevant in the examination of 
whether a measure is applied in accordance with the requirements laid down in 
Article 5 §1 ECHR.25 The aforementioned factors to determine whether a person 
is deprived of his liberty will be discussed in the following.
from parents when minors are concerned: ECtHR 28 November 1988, no. 10929/84 (Nielsen v. 
Denmark).
20. Provided that the objective element for deprivation of liberty is fulfilled. ECtHR 17 January 
2012, no. 36760/06, §§130-132, GC (Stanev v. Bulgaria).
21. ECtHR 27 March 2008, no. 44009/05, §§108-110 (Shtukaturov v. Russia).
22. ECtHR 18 June 1971, nos. 2832/66; 2835/66; 2899/66, §65 (De Wilde, Ooms and Versyp 
(“Vagrancy”) v. Belgium).
23. ECtHR 8 June 1976, nos. 5100/71; 5101/71; 5102/71; 5354/72; 5370/72, §59 (Engel 
and others v. The Netherlands). ECtHR 23 February 2012, no. 29226/03, §91, GC (Creangă v. 
Romania): ECtHR refers to manner of implementation of the measure in question. ECtHR 15 
March 2012, nos. 39692/09; 40713/09 and 41008/09, §57, GC (Austin and others v. UK). See 
also ECtHR 14 January 2014, no. 35807/05 (Chosta v. Ukraine): ECtHR refers to “(…) manner 
and context of implementation of the measure in question”.
24. ECtHR 15 March 2012, nos. 39692/09; 40713/09 and 41008/09, §58, GC (Austin and 
others v. UK). See also ECtHR 23 February 2012, no. 29226/03, §93, GC (Creangă v. Romania): 
the Court explicitly stresses that the case law had evolved since the Commission decisions of X. 
versus Germany (no. 8819/79), Guenat versus Switzerland (no. 24722/94) and E.G. versus Austria 
(no. 22715/93), where the Commission stressed that the police action was not aimed at depriving 
the children in question of their liberty but to obtain information, the fact that the police acted out 
of humanitarian considerations, or the person concerned never intended to leave the courtroom 
where he was attending a hearing.
25. Thus whether deprivation of liberty falls within one of the grounds laid down in art. 5 §1 
and is “(…) in accordance with a procedure prescribed by law (…)”. ECtHR 23 February 2012, 
no. 29226/03, §93, GC (Creangă v. Romania). See also ECtHR 31 January 2017, no. 38898/04, 
§74 (Rozhkov v. Russia, No. 2).
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2.3.1. Type or nature of the measure
That confinement of a person against his will in a restricted space or area, such as 
a cell, entails deprivation of liberty is not under discussion. The ECtHR stresses 
that deprivation of liberty may however take numerous other forms (types) than 
confinement in a cell.26 A crucial factor is whether the measure concerned has a 
coercive nature. The presence of coercion is indicative for deprivation of liberty.27 
Coercion may consist of physical force28 (including being authorised by law to 
use force),29 but may also consist of mental coercion, for example, by creating a 
situation where the person concerned gains the impression that he has no option 
but to follow the directions of State officials.30 On the other hand, the absence 
of duress is not a decisive factor in determining whether deprivation of liberty 
is present.31 If a person follows police officers after receiving an order to follow 
them, it cannot be said that the person in question voluntarily accompanied the 
police officer if he is obliged to follow such orders.32 Under these conditions, the 
person will be deprived of his liberty as of the moment the person is given the 
order.
Considering the aforementioned definition of the right to liberty and the objec-
tive element of deprivation of liberty (confinement in a restricted place for a not 
negligible length of time),33 two main types of measures entailing deprivation of 
liberty can be distinguished, namely: 1) measures as a result of which a person is 
26. ECtHR 6 November 1980, no. 7367/76, §95 (Guzzardi v. Italy).
27. ECtHR 21 June 2011, no. 30194/09, §50 (Shimovolos v. Russia). ECtHR 15 March 2012, 
nos. 39692/09; 40713/09 and 41008/09, §64, GC (Austin and others v. UK). ECtHR 1 March 
2016, no. 52942/09, §59 (Popoviciu v. Romania). 
28. ECtHR 24 June 2008, no. 28940/95, §78 (Foka v. Turkey).
29. ECtHR 13 December 2016, no. 36188/09, §38 (Tiba v. Romania).
30. ECtHR 18 December 2012, no. 39804/04, §55 (Baisuev and Anzorov v. Georgia). ECtHR 
11 December 2012, no. 10645/08, §73 (Venskutė v. Lithuania). In Pavlides and Georgakis versus 
Turkey, the ECtHR concludes that there was no proof that coercive measures had been applied by 
police officers. The applicants had been waiting in the courtyard of a church for the return of one 
of their members. In the meantime, police officers were present. There was no proof that any police 
officer applied a measure of direct coercion or force to prevent applicants from going home or going 
to any other specific place. Considering the lack of proof of coercive measures and the relatively 
short period in which the applicants waited, the ECtHR was not persuaded that the applicants 
where deprived of their liberty. ECtHR 2 July 2013, nos. 9130/09 and 9143/09, §§20-23.
31. ECtHR 23 February 2012, no. 29226/03, §94, GC (Creangă v. Romania). ECtHR 22 
December 2015, no. 68736/11, §78 (Lykova v. Russia).
32. ECtHR 22 December 2015, no. 68736/11, §78 (Lykova v. Russia). See also ECtHR 15 April 
2014, no. 8933/05, §130 (Tomaszewscy v. Poland).
33. ECtHR 17 January 2012, no. 36760/06, §117, GC (Stanev v. Bulgaria).
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not able or free to leave a restricted space or area, and 2) measures as a result of 
which a person is not able to move as he is physically restrained. 
Not able or free to leave a restricted space or area
The objective element of deprivation of liberty entails confinement to a restricted 
space.34 Confinement means that the person concerned is not able to leave a 
space (e.g. room, ward) or area due to physical barriers. A physical barrier is, for 
example, a locked room or ward. Physical barriers may also imply that a person 
is constantly guarded or escorted by State officials.35 The fact that confinement 
is imposed in an unusual location not (primarily) intended for deprivation of 
liberty, for example in a hospital,36 a hotel,37 or an aircraft38 does not affect the 
conclusion whether this entails deprivation of liberty. Another possibility is that 
the person concerned may be physically able to leave but does not have a (reason-
able) choice to leave of his own volition, for example because he will be brought 
back (by State officials) if he leaves.39 
The place where a person can be confined may vary from a single room, a 
ward, or a restricted area. The case law of the ECtHR also shows that the nature 
of the place where confinement is imposed may vary from a public building or 
area to a private institution or home. Deprivation of liberty is evidently present 
34. ECtHR 17 January 2012, no. 36760/06, §117, GC (Stanev v. Bulgaria). 
35. ECtHR 16 September 2014, no. 51012/11, §§65-71 (Valerian Dragomir v. Romania). 
ECtHR 13 January 2015, no. 41040/11, §§88-89 (Iustin Robertino Micu v. Romania). ECtHR 
13 November 2014, no. 31973/03, §§99-100 (Lazariu v. Romania). ECtHR 21 June 2016, no. 
23559/07, §§34-37 (Oleynik v. Russia). See also ECtHR 29 March 2010, no. 3394/03, §§73-75, 
GC (Medvedyev and others v. France): the ECtHR stresses that although the applicants’ movements 
were already confined to the physical boundaries of the ship, the crew members were placed under 
the control of special forces during the voyage to the mainland and therefore deprived of their 
liberty.
36. ECtHR 28 November 2002, no. 58442/00, §§27, 63 (Lavents v. Latvia). ECtHR 25 January 
2005, no. 56529/00, §33 (Enhorn v. Sweden). ECtHR 20 November 2012, no. 55421/10, §80 
(Ghiurău v. Romania). See also ECtHR 10 September 2013, no. 34010/06, §§30-36 (Fatma 
Akaltun Firat v. Turkey): applicant was manhandled and physically dragged to a police room in a 
hospital and was not free to leave that room for one hour.
37. ECtHR 13 December 2012, no. 39630/09, §§234-237, GC (El-Masri v. The Former 
Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia).
38. EComHR 7 October 1976, no. 7376/76 (X. and Y. v. Sweden). EComHR 13 December 
1965, no. 1983/63 (X. v. The Netherlands).
39. ECtHR 22 October 2009, no. 1431/03, §29 (Trajče Stojanovski v. The Former Yugoslav 
Republic of Macedonia). ECtHR 22 March 2016, no. 60113/12, §28 (Ulisei Grosu v. Romania). A 
contrario ECtHR 3 November 2015, no. 46413/10, §§59-61 (Miķelsons v. Latvia).
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if a person is confined in a cell (for example in prison40 or in a police station).41 
The regime imposed in prison (open/closed) does not seem to be relevant when 
considering whether deprivation of liberty exists. A person is both deprived of 
his liberty if he is placed in a closed or in an open prison.42 Imposing discipli-
nary punishments on detainees during lawful detention in prison after conviction 
must in principle be considered as modifications of detention conditions and are 
therefore not covered by Article 5 ECHR. Such measures may raise issues under 
Article 3 or Article 8 ECHR. The ECtHR did however stress that under excep-
tional circumstances measures taken during deprivation of liberty may fall within 
the ambit of Article 5 ECHR,43 for example if the person in question is compul-
sory admitted to a psychiatric hospital and is subsequently subjected to complete 
isolation for several days.44 Article 5 ECHR furthermore applies to compulsory 
confinement to a ward of a psychiatric hospital45 (also if this involves a minor),46 
to forced confinement to a ward of a nursing home,47 and to forced confinement 
in a detention centre for asylum seekers or persons to be deported to their coun-
try of origin.48
40. ECtHR 22 February 1989, no. 11152/84, §34 (Ciulla v. Italy). See also ECtHR 14 November 
2013, no. 47152/06, §§105-107 (Blokhin v. Russia): placement of the applicant in a temporary 
detention centre for minor offenders constitutes deprivation of liberty.
41. ECtHR 1 June 2006, no. 39922/03, §100 (Taïs v. France). ECtHR 7 March 2013, no. 
15598/08, §64 (Ostendorf v. Germany). Including a cell in a sobering-up centre (of the police): 
ECtHR 4 April 2000, no. 26629/95, §46 (Witold Litwa v. Poland). ECtHR 3 February 2011, no. 
37345/03, §30 (Kharin v. Russia). ECtHR 15 April 2014, no. 14920/05, §85 (Djundiks v. Latvia).
42. ECtHR 2 March 1987, no. 9787/82, §20, 40 (Weeks v. UK): recall to prison after release 
on license and subsequently being transferred to an open prison constitutes a fresh deprivation of 
liberty. See also EComHR 9 May 1977, no. 7754/77 (X. v. Switzerland): “The normal conditions 
of life in prison do (…) constitute deprivation of liberty regardless of the freedom of action which 
the prisoner may enjoy within the prison”.
43. ECtHR 4 May 2000, no. 42117/98 (Bollan v. UK).
44. ECtHR 31 March 2005, no. 63062/00 (Schneiter v. Switzerland).
45. ECtHR 5 October 2000, no. 31365/96, §43 (Varbanov v. Bulgaria). ECtHR 19 July 2011, 
no. 26000/02, §44 (L.M. v. Latvia). Though the subjective element of consent is an important 
and complicating factor in these cases. See for example ECtHR 16 June 2005, no. 61603/00, §§74 
-78 (Storck v. Germany).  
46. See however the subjective element of consent (for example from parents) when minors are 
concerned. ECtHR 28 November 1988, no. 10929/84 (Nielsen v. Denmark). See also ECtHR 
19 May 2016, no. 7472/14, §§6, 69 (D.L. v. Bulgaria) and ECtHR 29 November 2011, no. 
51776/08, §§5, 62-63 (A. and others v. Bulgaria): placement of a minor in a centre for children in 
crisis situations constitutes deprivation of liberty.
47. ECtHR 26 February 2002, no. 39187/98, §45 (H.M. v. Switzerland).
48. ECtHR 29 January 2008, no. 13229/03, §§25, 42 (Saadi v. UK).
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House arrest49 (for example in the last phase of a prison sentence or during the 
pre-trial phase) constitutes deprivation of liberty.50 That the person subjected to 
house arrest is physically able to breach the arrest does not affect the applicabil-
ity of Article 5 ECHR.51 House arrest is however a different type of measure than 
imprisonment, as the nature of the place where it is executed is different, namely 
a private home instead of a prison.52 A measure that does not constitute depri-
vation of liberty, but a restriction on the freedom of movement is night curfew. 
This measure falls under Article 2 P4 ECHR instead of Article 5 ECHR.53 Other 
examples of restrictions on the freedom of movement instead of deprivation of 
liberty are restraining orders,54 a prohibition to leave town,55 and the obligation 
to request for permission to leave a place of residence.56 An interference with the 
right to liberty of movement was also found in a case where the domestic author-
ities refused to register the applicant’s chosen address as her residence, though the 
applicant was obliged to report a change in the place of residence within three 
days of moving, which obligation was punished with administrative penalties and 
fines.57 The seizure of a passport or other identification documents also amounts 
to an interference with the exercise of the right to liberty of movement.58 Another 
example of a restriction on the liberty of movement is monitoring the movements 
of a person between certain parts of the country, for example by imposing an obli-
gation to report to the police authorities the intention to go to another part of the 
country to visit family and friends and by imposing a prohibition to move freely 
within a certain part of the country.59
In Austin and others versus The United Kingdom, the ECtHR needed to an-
swer the question whether there had been a deprivation of liberty because the 
49. Under the condition that he has to stay at home and is only allowed to leave with the 
authorities’ prior authorisation.
50. ECtHR 2 August 2001, no. 44955/98, §19 (Mancini v. Italy). See also ECtHR 28 November 
2002, no. 58442/00, §63 (Lavents v. Latvia). ECtHR 18 December 2002, no. 24952/94, §50, GC 
(N.C. v. Italy). ECtHR 16 December 2014, no. 23755/07, §33 (Buzadji v. Moldova). ECtHR 21 
July 2015, no. 13312/12, §§18-19 (Galambos v. Hungary).
51. ECtHR 30 March 2006, no. 50358/99, §73 (Pekov v. Bulgaria).
52. ECtHR 2 August 2001, no. 44955/98, §19 (Mancini v. Italy).
53. EComHR 10 July 1976, no. 6780/74 and 6950/75, §§232-234, p. 163 (Cyprus v. Turkey).
54. EComHR 22 February 1995, no. 22838/93 (Van den Dungen v. The Netherlands).
55. ECtHR 10 January 2013, no. 39327/06, §§9 and 30 (Zarochentsev v. Ukraine). 
56. ECtHR 7 December 2006, no. 15007/02, §§83-85 (Ivanov v. Ukraine).
57. ECtHR 22 February 2007, no. 1509/02, §§44-46 (Tatishvili v. Russia).
58. ECtHR 22 May 2001, no. 33592/96, §62 (Baumann v. France). See also ECtHR 27 
September 2011, no. 32250/08, §211 (Diamante and Pelliccioni v. San Marino). 
59. ECtHR 23 May 2001, no. 25316-25321/94 and 27207/95, §§403-404 (Denizci and others 
v. Cyprus).
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police had contained a large group of people on the street for several hours on 
public order grounds. The ECtHR concluded that there had not been a depri-
vation of liberty, considering the type and manner of implementation of this 
measure and the context in which the measure took place. Imposing a cordon 
was in the situation in question the least intrusive and the most effective means to 
avert a real risk of serious injury or damage. The ECtHR could not identify a mo-
ment when the measure changed from a restriction on the freedom of movement 
into a deprivation of liberty, considering that the police planned a controlled re-
lease within five minutes after they imposed the absolute cordon. The ECtHR 
stressed that the conclusion that this situation did not constitute deprivation of 
liberty was based on the specific and exceptional circumstances of this case. In 
view of the ECtHR, if it had not been necessary to impose and maintain the 
cordon to prevent serious injury or damage, the type of the measure would have 
been different and the coercive and restrictive nature could then be sufficient to 
conclude that there was a deprivation of liberty. In my view, Judges Tulkens, Spiel-
mann and Garlicki rightly conclude in their dissenting opinion that there was a 
deprivation of liberty. They stress that the aim or intention of a measure cannot 
be taken into account when determining whether there had been such a depriva-
tion.60 Earlier case law of the ECtHR shows that the necessity of the measure and 
therefore also its purpose should not be relevant in determining whether there had 
been a deprivation of liberty. The dissenting opinion is also more in line with the 
conclusion of the ECtHR in Brega and others versus Moldova, where the ECtHR 
concludes that there had been a deprivation of liberty because the applicant had 
been forced into a trolley by police officers and was cornered by them. The po-
lice officers released the applicant approximately eight minutes and several stops 
later.61 Nevertheless, the ECtHR repeated the Austin-line of reasoning in Birgean 
versus Romania, where the ECtHR needed to determine whether the applicant 
was deprived of his liberty as he was removed from a demonstration, placed in a 
police vehicle and subsequently released. Considering the unstable and dangerous 
circumstances during the demonstration necessitating the removal of the appli-
cant, the ECtHR concluded that there had not been a deprivation of liberty.62 
60. ECtHR 15 March 2012, nos. 39692/09; 40713/09 and 41008/09, GC (Austin and others 
v. UK).
61. ECtHR 24 January 2012, no. 61485/08, §§19, 43 (Brega and others v. Moldova). 
Confusingly, the ECtHR stressed the police officers’ intention to hinder the applicant from taking 
part in a demonstration, in which they succeeded. 
62. ECtHR 14 January 2014, no. 3626/10, §§89-95 (Birgean v. Romania). In ECtHR 8 July 
2014, no. 33038/04, §§105-106 (Stoian v. Romania), the ECtHR did not answer the question 
whether the applicant had been deprived of his liberty while placed in a police car for about two 
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Leaving aside the question whether the situation about which has been com-
plained in Austin versus The United Kingdom constitutes deprivation of liberty, 
the Austin judgment shows in any event that imposing a cordon (surrounding a 
person by actually putting up physical barriers) will entail deprivation of liberty 
if it is not necessary to impose the measure to prevent serious injury or damage,63 
for example if it is imposed to arrest a person or a group of people on suspicion of 
having committed a criminal offence.
A person is also deprived of his liberty when he is forced to accompany State of-
ficials or, due to an element of coercion, does not really have an option but to 
accompany State officials to another location and to remain at that location, for 
example to establish one’s identity or to await being questioned.64 What if a per-
son (voluntarily) appeared at the premises of a State body, such as a courtroom 
(for a hearing), a police station or the premises of the prosecution service (for 
questioning), but is not confined during his stay at such State premises? May this 
situation entail deprivation of liberty? An important factor is whether it is rea-
sonable to assume that the person concerned is free to leave. If not, the person 
concerned is deprived of his liberty. Relevant factors to determine whether it is 
reasonable to assume that the person concerned is free to leave a police station or 
the premises of the prosecution service is whether investigative actions are being 
carried out into (incidents involving) the person concerned,65 such as interroga-
tions.66 In Cazan versus Romania, decisive factors to conclude that the person in 
question was not deprived of his liberty were that the person in question went to 
hours, as the material did not disclose any appearance of a violation of the rights and freedoms laid 
down in the ECHR or its protocols.
63. ECtHR 15 March 2012, nos. 39692/09, 40713/09 and 41008/09, §68, GC (Austin and 
others v. UK).
64. ECtHR 23 July 2013, no. 41872/10, §§191-195 (M.A. v. Cyprus). ECtHR 16 September 
2014, no. 51012/11, §§65-71 (Valerian Dragomir v. Romania). ECtHR 26 April 2016, no. 
1443/10, §§194-195 (Amarandei and others v. Romania). See also ECtHR 4 November 2003, 
no. 47244/99 (Novotka v. Slovakia): the applicant was actually placed in a cell. See furthermore 
ECtHR 24 June 2008, no. 28940/95, §78 (Foka v. Turkey): the applicant was brought by force 
to the police headquarters to perform certain checks. This element of coercion affected her 
liberty and constituted deprivation of liberty. ECtHR 5 April 2011, no. 14569/05 (Sarigiannis v. 
Italy): the applicants were forced to accompany State officials to their office and remain there for 
approximately 2.5 hours after they had refused to submit to an identity check at an airport, which 
constituted deprivation of liberty.
65. ECtHR 9 June 2005, no. 44082/98, §87 (I.I. v. Bulgaria). ECtHR 9 November 2010, no. 
40900/05, §42 (Salayev v. Azerbaijan).
66. ECtHR 9 November 2010, no. 4634/04, §49 (Osypenko v. Ukraine). See also ECtHR 23 
February 2012, no. 29226/03, §97, GC (Creangă v. Romania). ECtHR 22 December 2015, no. 
68736/11, §78 (Lykova v. Russia).
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the police station of his own volition and that he could leave the police station 
very shortly after the incident he complained about (less than ten minutes).67 The 
question whether the applicant had been prevented from leaving the police station 
is not discussed by the ECtHR, whereas this factor is in my view, considering the 
ECtHR’s case law, decisive.
Law enforcement officials may have several powers to stop people in the pub-
lic domain and to perform certain checks on the spot. The question can be raised 
whether the use of these powers entails deprivation of liberty. The ECtHR stresses 
that a relevant factor not pointing towards deprivation of liberty is the foresee-
ability of the power to stop and perform a check, for example a security check 
(identity check and baggage search) at an airport by law enforcement officials or 
at the entrance of other public buildings. Persons confronted with these measures 
can be seen as consenting to such checks by choosing to travel by air or by going 
to such buildings,68 as people have a choice to walk away or to avoid being sub-
jected to these measures. Though people may choose to walk away or avoid being 
subjected to these measures by not going to an airport or other public build-
ings, these measures nevertheless imply in my view restrictions on the freedom 
of movement as laid down in Article 2 P4 ECHR. In Gillan and Quinton versus 
The United Kingdom, the ECtHR furthermore stresses that the search power in 
question differs from the aforementioned checks as the individual can be stopped 
anywhere and at any time, without notice and without any choice as to whether 
or not to submit to the search. The persons who were subjected to the powers of 
stop and search were entirely deprived of any freedom of movement, were obliged 
to remain where they were and submit themselves to the search. If they had re-
fused, they could face arrest, confinement at a police station and criminal charges. 
The ECtHR stresses that this element of coercion indicates the presence of dep-
rivation of liberty.69 This conclusion corresponds with the view of the CPT, who 
states that being stopped and held by State officials to carry out certain checks 
67. ECtHR 5 April 2016, no. 30050/12, §§66-69 (Cazan v. Romania).
68. ECtHR 12 January 2010, no. 4158/05, §64 (Gillan and Quinton v. UK). See also ECtHR 
15 October 2013, no. 26291/06, §40 (Gahramanov v. Azerbaijan). ECtHR 15 March 2012, 
nos. 39692/09; 40713/09 and 41008/09 §59, GC (Austin and others v. UK). That certain checks 
are performed when visiting a detainee in prison is also foreseeable and will not be regarded as 
deprivation of liberty. See for example ECtHR 26 September 2006, no. 12350/04 (Wainwright 
v. UK): strip-searches of persons visiting a detainee in prison examined under Article 8 ECHR. 
In Kasparov versus Russia, the ECtHR concludes that the authorities went beyond performing a 
regular border control. Therefore, the applicant was deprived of his liberty. ECtHR 11 October 
2016, no. 53659/07, §§46-47.
69. The Court did not ultimately answer the question whether there was deprivation of liberty in 
this case. ECtHR 12 January 2010, no. 4158/05, §57 (Gillan and Quinton v. UK). 
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constitutes deprivation of liberty, no matter how briefly the person concerned is 
being held.70 Considering the Gillan and Quinton judgment and the principle 
formulated by the CPT, it is in my view reasonable to conclude that the power to 
stop people and perform certain checks on the spot (and therefore hold a person 
for a certain period against his will) and without the possibility to walk away or 
to avoid it, entails deprivation of liberty.
Not able to move
A person is in principle also deprived of his liberty if he is physically restrained by 
handcuffs (for example during transportation)71 or otherwise,72 through which 
that person is to a large extent or completely deprived of the possibility to move. 
The EComHR concluded in 1979 that a person is deprived of his liberty if he is 
forcibly led to a medical expert to undergo a blood test.73 Considering that the 
purpose of a measure is not a factor to be taken into account when examining 
whether deprivation of liberty is present, the decision of the EComHR in the case 
Järvinen versus Finland seems to be out of date. The applicant was brought to a 
hospital, was subsequently no longer allowed to leave and was tied to a stretcher. 
The Commission concluded that the applicant was not deprived of his liberty 
as there were no indications that the treatment was not justified from a medical 
perspective, the medical personnel acted out of concern for the applicant’s health 
and the applicant had not objected to being brought to a hospital.74 The applied 
coercion by tying the applicant to a stretcher is in my view decisive in concluding 
that the applicant was deprived of his liberty.
2.3.2. Duration of the measure
The ECtHR stresses that the objective element of deprivation of liberty requires 
that the measure imposed is applied for a not negligible length of time.75 Depri-
vation of liberty may nevertheless exist even if a measure is applied for a relatively 
70. CPT/Inf (2007) 30, Spain, p. 30. See also: Harris et al 2009, p. 125.
71. ECtHR 18 December 1986, no. 9990/82, §§59-60 (Bozano v. France). ECtHR 28 April 
2016, no. 42906/12, §§111-112 (Čamans and Timofejeva v. Latvia).
72. ECtHR 9 June 2005, no. 44082/98, §87 (I.I. v. Bulgaria). Physically restraining a person 
who is already deprived of his liberty for multiple hours may fall within the ambit of Article 3 
ECHR. ECtHR 19 February 2015, no. 75450/12, §102 (M.S. v. Croatia, No. 2).
73. EComHR 13 December 1979, no. 8278/78 (X. v. Austria). 
74. EComHR 15 January 1998, no. 30408/96 (Järvinen v. Finland).
75. ECtHR 17 January 2012, no. 36760/06, §117, GC (Stanev v. Bulgaria).
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short duration.76 A short duration will not affect the conclusion that there has 
been a deprivation of liberty if other factors point towards deprivation of liberty.77 
This even applies if the measure lasted only a couple of minutes.78 An important 
factor pointing towards deprivation of liberty if the measure was of a short dura-
tion is the (highly) coercive nature of the measure in question.79 The notion ‘for 
a not negligible length of time’ does therefore not seem to have an independent 
meaning,80 but seems to be relevant in connection with the intensity of the meas-
ure, whereas the intensity is the main criterion.81 The more intense the nature of 
a measure is, the less importance should be attached to the duration of a meas-
ure. On the other hand, applying a measure for a considerable length of time will 
point towards deprivation of liberty.82 In Ciancimino versus Italy, the length of 
the period (two years and nearly ten months) during which the measure of special 
police supervision was imposed was however not in itself sufficient to conclude 
that it constituted deprivation of liberty.83
The case law of the ECtHR shows another relevant factor in relation to the 
duration of a measure. As discussed above, the power to stop and perform certain 
checks to reduce safety risks, for example at airports or at the entrance of public 
buildings, will not constitute deprivation of liberty if these measures are fore-
seeable for the people concerned (and therefore avoidable) and the time strictly 
76. EComHR 7 October 1976, no. 7376/76 (X. and Y. v. Sweden). EComHR 13 December 
1979, no. 8278/78 (X. v. Austria). ECtHR 4 November 2003, no. 47244/99 (Novotka v. Slovakia). 
ECtHR 18 December 2012, no. 39804/04, §50 (Baisuev and Anzorov v. Georgia).
77. ECtHR 7 January 2010, no. 25965/04, §317 (Rantsev v. Cyprus and Russia).
78. ECtHR 24 January 2012, no. 61485/08, §§19, 43 (Brega and others v. Moldova): measures 
lasted eight minutes.
79. EComHR 7 October 1976, no. 7376/76 (X. and Y. v. Sweden): police escort during 
deportation. EComHR 13 December 1979, no. 8278/78 (X. v. Austria): “leading a person by 
force to a medical expert to undergo a blood test (…)”. ECtHR 4 November 2003, no. 47244/99 
(Novotka v. Slovakia): brought to police station against applicant’s will and held in a cell. ECtHR 
18 December 2012, no. 39804/04, §55 (Baisuev and Anzorov v. Georgia): identification documents 
taken from applicants, escorted to and questioned at police station. ECtHR 7 January 2010, no. 
25965/04, §§315-317 (Rantsev v. Cyprus and Russia): held at police station and released in the 
custody of employee, subsequently involuntary stay in private apartment. ECtHR 24 January 
2012, no. 61485/08, §19 (Brega and others v. Moldova): forced into a trolleybus, cornered and 
released several stops later.
80. See also De Jong 2000, p. 196.
81. De Jong 2000, p. 178.
82. ECtHR 6 November 1980, no. 7367/76, §95 (Guzzardi v. Italy): sixteen months. ECtHR 
15 March 2012, nos. 39692/09; 40713/09 and 41008/09 §64, GC (Austin and others v. UK): 
approximately seven hours. ECtHR 31 March 2005, no. 63062/00 (Schneiter v. Switzerland): 
measure of complete isolation applied for several days.
83. EComHR 27 May 1991, no. 12541/86 (Ciancimino v. Italy).
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necessary to comply with the relevant formalities has not been exceeded.84 This 
may be different if the time necessary to perform the check has been exceeded. 
The foregoing implies that holding aliens in the international zone of an airport to 
accomplish certain formalities, with suitable safeguards for the persons concerned, 
will in principle only constitute a restriction on liberty of movement, unless this 
measure is prolonged excessively. In the latter case, the restriction on liberty of 
movement will turn into deprivation of liberty.85 The circumstances in which a 
person is held in the transit zone is also a relevant aspect: locking a person up in a 
small room for several hours will entail deprivation of liberty.86 
2.3.3. Effects on the person concerned and manner of execution
Relevant factors as to the effects on the person concerned are for example whether 
the measure affected the possibility to have social contact (with the outside 
world),87 or whether the measure resulted in physical discomfort.88 This criterion 
relates to the consequences of the measure imposed for the person in question. 
The manner of execution of a measure relates to the actual consequences for the 
person concerned when executing the measure(s) in question (thus how the meas-
ure is executed in practice),89 including the degree of supervision and control over 
84. ECtHR 15 October 2013, no. 26291/06, §41 (Gahramanov v. Azerbaijan).
85. ECtHR 25 June 1996, no. 19776/92, §§41-49 (Amuur v. France): the applicants were held 
in the transit zone for twenty days.
86. ECtHR 12 February 2009, no. 2512/04, §96 (Nolan and K. v. Russia).
87. ECtHR 26 February 2002, no. 39187/98, §45 (H.M. v. Switzerland). See also ECtHR 31 
March 2005, no. 63062/00 (Schneiter v. Switzerland): subjecting the applicant to an isolation 
measure while compulsory admitted to a psychiatric hospital, combined with the length of time 
(two days) in which this measure had been imposed, constituted deprivation of liberty. Art. 8 
ECHR will however also come into play when family life and social contacts are concerned.
88. ECtHR 15 March 2012, nos. 39692/09; 40713/09 and 41008/09, §64, GC (Austin and 
others v. UK): measure concerned a cordon imposed by the police. People could walk around and 
there was no crushing, but there was no shelter, food, water or toilet facilities. The ECtHR also 
stresses that the persons within the cordon could not leave the area. The inability to leave is in my 
view inherent to the nature or type of measure, which has already been discussed in section 2.3.1. 
89. ECtHR 6 November 1980, no. 7367/76, §§88, 94-95 (Guzzardi v. Italy). ECtHR 24 June 
1982, no. 7906/77, §34 (Van Droogenbroeck v. Belgium): according to the applicable domestic law, 
placing a person at the disposal of the Government is regarded as a penalty involving deprivation 
of liberty, regardless how the order is executed in practice, such as detention, semi-custodial care, 
or at liberty under supervision or probation. On the other hand, differences between regimes of 
hospitals do not necessarily affect the conclusion that there has been a deprivation of liberty while 
admitted to these hospitals. ECtHR 28 May 1985, no. 8225/78, §§40-42 (Ashingdane v. UK). 
See with regard to the manner of implementation of a measure also ECtHR 15 March 2012, nos. 
39692/09; 40713/09 and 41008/09, §§59, 65, GC (Austin and others v. UK).
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the movement of the person in question.90 The case law of the ECtHR shows 
that the criteria concerning the effects on the person concerned and manner of 
execution of the measure are closely connected. These criteria may be decisive 
when the applied measures individually constitute a restriction on the freedom of 
movement, but may cumulatively constitute deprivation of liberty.91 The Court 
stresses for example that “(…) mere restrictions on liberty of movement result-
ing from special supervision fall to be dealt with under Article 2 of Protocol No. 
4”.92 This also applies to a measure of special supervision by the State combined 
with a compulsory residence in a specified district. These measures do not in itself 
constitute deprivation of liberty. However, the manner in which these measures 
were implemented in the Guzzardi case led to the conclusion that there had been 
a deprivation of liberty, considering the accumulation of the measures’ conse-
quences. The treatment resembled detention in an ‘open prison’.93 The effects on 
the person in question and the manner of execution of the measures are, in my 
view, of importance if the other criteria (type and nature of the measure, duration 
of the measure) are not in itself sufficient to conclude that there had been a dep-
rivation of liberty or not. The effects on the person in question is furthermore a 
highly subjective factor: the experience of being subjected to a particular measure 
can vary immensely depending on the person to whom the measure is applied. 
The independent meaning of this factor to determine whether a person had been 
deprived of his liberty is therefore limited.
2.3.4. Outset, consequences and end of deprivation of liberty by the 
State
The ECtHR’s case law provides starting points to establish the outset and end of 
deprivation of liberty by the State. Firstly, the ECtHR takes into consideration 
90. ECtHR 14 January 2014, no. 35807/05 (Chosta v. Ukraine).
91. EComHR 27 May 1991, no. 12541/86 (Ciancimino v. Italy).
92. ECtHR 23 May 2001, nos. 25316-25321/94 and 27207/95, §§400-404 (Denizci and 
others v. Cyprus). See also ECtHR 22 February 1994, no. 12954/87, §39 (Raimondo v. Italy). 
A prohibition to enter or transit through a particular territory did not constitute deprivation of 
liberty, though the applicant was unable to leave the enclave as a result of that measure. ECtHR 12 
September 2012, no. 10593/08, §§224-234, GC (Nada v. Switzerland).
93. The area around which the applicant could move was no more than a tiny fraction of an 
island, which island was difficult to access, the applicant was housed in a building which was in a 
state of disrepair/dilapidation, the applicant had few opportunities for social contacts, supervision 
was strict and almost constantly applied and the length of the stay on the island was more than 
sixteen months. ECtHR 6 November 1980, no. 7367/76, §§94-95 (Guzzardi v. Italy). 
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the moment the situation in question actually started and ended.94 Secondly, the 
case law indicates that a court order for a person’s deprivation of liberty is not suf-
ficient to conclude that the person in question is deprived of his liberty. To reach 
that conclusion, the order must actually be enforced on the person concerned.95 
To determine the outset of an arrest (and therefore deprivation of liberty), it is 
also interesting to take into consideration the definition established by the CPT 
on the outset of deprivation of liberty. The CPT stresses that deprivation of liberty 
by the police commences as from the moment the person concerned is obliged 
to remain with the police.96 It furthermore stresses that deprivation of liberty by 
the police commences from the moment the person concerned is apprehended by 
the police and not the moment he arrives at a police station.97 Considering the 
aforementioned case law of the ECtHR and the basic principles developed by the 
CPT, an arrest commences as from the moment the person in question is made 
clear that he has to stay with State officials, e.g. by stating that he is arrested or by 
otherwise making clear that the person concerned is not free to leave (for example 
by holding a person at gunpoint).98
What if the person concerned subsequently tries to escape and State officials 
have to chase the suspect and physically restrain or even shoot the suspect? Will 
the deprivation of liberty come to an end due to the attempt to escape? As dis-
cussed before, deprivation of liberty implies that the person concerned does not 
have the freedom to move (on the spot), or to go and stay where he wants to as 
he is physically restrained or is not able to leave a restricted space or area. On the 
one hand, law enforcement officials do not (completely) control the physical lib-
erty of the person concerned during a chase. On the other hand, it cannot be said 
that the person concerned has complete liberty to go, stand and stay on his own 
volition if he is being chased by State officials. The effects on the person concerned 
while being chased and the highly coercive nature of being chased outweigh in 
94. ECtHR 23 February 2012, no. 29226/03, §§85-87, GC (Creangă v. Romania). ECtHR 22 
March 1995, no. 18580/91, §42 (Quinn v. France). ECtHR 2 August 2001, no. 44955/98, §§17-26 
(Mancini v. Italy). See also ECtHR 18 September 2014, no. 47837/06, §§32-34 (Rakhimberdiyev 
v. Russia): applicant was under the effective control of police officers from the moment he was 
taken to the police station and was not free to leave. Deprivation of liberty was present.
95. ECtHR 28 September 2010, no. 4488/03, §32 (E.M.B. v. Romania). ECtHR 27 May 
2004, no. 35584/02 (Guliyev v. Azerbaijan). ECtHR 4 October 2011, no. 35559/05 (Guliyev v. 
Azerbaijan).
96. CPT/Inf (2012) 11, Albania, p. 16. CPT/Inf (2007) 32, Czech Republic, p. 19. CPT/Inf 
(2009) 3, Kosovo, p. 17.
97. CPT/Inf (2012) 15, Bosnia and Herzegovina, p. 19. CPT/Inf (2003) 28, Turkey, p. 17.
98. See however ECtHR 7 June 2011, no. 26814/09, §§133-134 (Mulder-van Schalkwijk v. The 
Netherlands): case involving deadly firearm use by the police. According to the ECtHR, Article 5 
ECHR was not relevant to this case.
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my view the fact that law enforcement officials do not have complete control over 
the person concerned during a chase. A person will therefore be deprived of his 
liberty while being chased. If a person tries to leave and he actually succeeds, the 
deprivation of liberty will come to an end. 
What does the foregoing mean for the situation where the person concerned 
voluntarily arrived at a police station, public prosecutor’s office or a court room 
(for example for questioning or a hearing) and is subsequently arrested? As dis-
cussed in section 2.3.1, a relevant factor is whether it is reasonable to assume that 
the person concerned is free to leave. If not, the person concerned is deprived of 
his liberty as from the moment it is reasonable to assume that he is no longer free 
to leave.99
That a person is allowed to leave prison or a psychiatric hospital (whether 
or not unescorted) to prepare himself for his return to society does not affect 
the conclusion that he is still deprived of his liberty.100 After all, he is not free to 
leave the institution of his own volition101 and will be brought back if he does 
not return on his own. Whether a detainee regained his liberty will depend on 
the circumstances of the new regime to which he is subjected. In Weeks versus 
The United Kingdom, the applicant was released under the conditions that, inter 
alia, he was placed under supervision of a probation officer, he had to have con-
tact with that officer according to the latter’s instructions, he had to reside in an 
approved residence and he was not allowed to leave Great Britain without prior 
permission. The ECtHR concludes that the restrictions imposed were not suffi-
cient to conclude that the applicant was still deprived of his liberty after his release 
on licence.102 The circumstances of a new regime are also relevant if a person who 
is deprived of his liberty is transferred to an institution with a different, more lib-
eral regime. The fact that the new regime allows the person to leave the institution 
unescorted does not affect the conclusion that the measure constitutes deprivation 
of liberty.103 Deprivation of liberty by the police will in my view come to an end 
from the moment the person concerned is free to leave and is actually able to leave 
(e.g. no locked doors).104
99. ECtHR 9 November 2010, no. 4634/04, §49 (Osypenko v. Ukraine). See also ECtHR 27 
November 2007, no. 41578/05, §§34-35 (David v. Moldova).
100. ECtHR 28 May 1985, no. 8225/78, §§24, 41-42 (Ashingdane v. UK). ECtHR 22 November 
2016, no. 1967/14, §54 (Hiller v. Austria).
101. ECtHR 22 October 2009, no. 1431/03, §29 (Trajče Stojanovski v. The Former Yugoslav 
Republic of Macedonia).
102. ECtHR 2 March 1987, no. 9787/82, §§20, 40 (Weeks v. UK). 
103. ECtHR 28 May 1985, no. 8225/78, §§24, 41-42 (Ashingdane v. UK). EComHR 3 October 
1988, no. 10801/84 (L. v. Sweden).
104. Cf. ECtHR 23 February 2012, no. 29226/03, §86, GC (Creangă v. Romania).
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If a person is deprived of his liberty by State officials (such as police officers) or if 
the deprivation of liberty is executed in a public institution (such as a prison or a 
public hospital), the State’s responsibility for that deprivation of liberty (and for 
the care of the person in question) is engaged. Under these conditions, the acts 
and omissions of the staff are attributable to the involved State.105 The responsibil-
ity of the State for deprivation of liberty in a private institution will be engaged if 
public authorities are directly involved in the deprivation of liberty, for example 
if it is authorised by a court or any other State entity, or if the person concerned 
is brought back by State officials after escaping from the institution. Acts and 
omissions of the private institution’s staff after the involvement of the State will in 
these cases engage the responsibility of the State.106 
Noteworthy is that the theory of implied limitations has been applied in the 
past.107 This theory proposed that restrictions on the human rights of detainees 
are inherent to lawful deprivation of liberty, which does not require special jus-
tification. Whenever the deprivation of liberty was in accordance with Article 5 
ECHR, other limitations on human rights resulting implicitly from the depriva-
tion of liberty were automatically considered to be justified, without assessing the 
compliance with the exception provisions laid down in the ECHR, for example 
in Article 8 §2 ECHR. This theory has been rejected by the ECtHR.108 Persons 
who are deprived of their liberty by the State preserve the rights and freedoms 
laid down in the ECHR except for the right to liberty,109 though it has been 
stressed that the context of deprivation of liberty inevitably influences the manner 
105. ECtHR 19 February 2015, no. 75450/12, §§99, 148 (M.S. v. Croatia, No. 2). See also 
ECtHR 17 January 2012, no. 36760/06, §122, GC (Stanev v. Bulgaria), where the ECtHR stresses 
that the guardianship was assigned to a State official. See also ECtHR 31 May 2016, no. 16270/12, 
§65 (Comoraşu v. Romania).
106. ECtHR 16 June 2005, no. 61603/00, §§89-91, 145 (Storck v. Germany): the responsibility 
of the State can also be engaged if the State fails to fulfil the positive obligation to protect civilians 
against deprivation of liberty by private individuals. This obligation will not be discussed in 
this study. The ECtHR stated in Belenko versus Russia that, despite the fact that the applicant’s 
daughter was involuntarily confined, she was not a detainee. It is not clear what the ECtHR meant 
by that when considering the State’s responsibility. ECtHR 18 December 2014, no. 25435/06, §71 
(Belenko v. Russia).
107. EComHR 15 December 1965, no. 1860/63 (X v. Germany). EComHR 7 February 1967, no. 
2375/64 (X. v. Germany). EComHR 11 July 1967, no. 2749/66 (K.H.C. v. UK).
108. ECtHR 21 February 1975, no. 4451/70, §44 (Golder v. UK). See also: Livingstone 2000.
109. Art. 1 ECHR determines after all that Member States must ensure to everyone in their 
jurisdiction the rights and freedoms laid down in the ECHR. ECtHR 20 January 2015, nos. 
14946/08, 21030/08, 24309/08, 24505/08, 26964/08, 26966/08, 27088/08, 27090/08, 27092/08, 
38752/08, 38778/08 and 38807/08, §101 (Mesut Yurtsever and others v. Turkey). ECtHR 14 June 
2016, no. 49304/09, §45 (Biržietis v. Lithuania). See also ECtHR 5 January 2010, no. 22933/02, 
§91 (Frasik v. Poland).
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and extent to which detainees may enjoy the rights laid down in the ECHR.110 
Restrictions on human rights of detainees must be justified111 and must be in ac-
cordance with the exception provisions in the ECHR, including the necessity of 
an infringement.112 A justification for an infringement can be found in the interest 
of security, such as preventing disorder and crime.113 The ordinary and reasona-
ble requirements of imprisonment must be taken into account, which means that 
wider measures of interference may be justified to prevent disorder or crime when 
detainees are involved than when persons at liberty are involved.114 
It is important to note that the ECtHR observes a margin of appreciation when 
examining complaints about restrictions on human rights of detainees in the in-
terest of preventing disorder or crime or protecting health, morals or rights and 
freedoms of others.115 
The ‘margin’ or ‘power’ of appreciation means that Member States have a cer-
tain latitude to evaluate particular situations and fulfil their obligations arising 
from the provisions enumerated in the ECHR.116 The ECHR leaves to each Mem-
ber State the task of securing the rights and liberties laid down in the ECHR.117 
This means that the ECtHR will give Member States such room by observing re-
serve in its examination. The margin of appreciation follows from the concept of 
subsidiarity of the ECHR;118 the purpose of the ECHR-system is to be a subsidi-
ary system to the national systems which safeguards human rights.119 The margin 
of appreciation-principle is furthermore based upon the idea that State authorities 
110. ECtHR 4 January 2008, no. 23800/06 (Shelley v. UK). The ECtHR referred to the principle 
of minimum restrictions as laid down in the EPR: “Restrictions placed on persons deprived of 
their liberty shall be the minimum necessary and proportionate to the legitimate objective for 
which they are imposed.” ECtHR 24 July 2012, no. 35972/05, §124 (Iacov Stanciu v. Romania). 
Appendix to recommendation Rec(2006)2 of the Committee of Ministers to Member States on the 
European Prison Rules, nos. 1-3.
111. ECtHR 6 October 2005, no. 74025/01, §69, GC (Hirst v. UK, No. 2).
112. ECtHR 21 February 1975, no. 4451/70, §§44-45 (Golder v. UK). ECtHR 18 June 1971, 
nos. 2832/66; 2835/66; 2899/66 (De Wilde, Ooms and Versyp (“Vagrancy”) v. Belgium). See also 
Smaers 1994, pp. 20-39. De Lange 2008, pp. 86-86, 209. Jacobs 2012, chapter 3, §4. Roscam 
Abbing 2013, pp. 5-19.
113. ECtHR 6 October 2005, no. 74025/01, §69, GC (Hirst v. UK, No. 2).
114. ECtHR 21 February 1975, no. 4451/70, §45 (Golder v. UK).
115. ECtHR 18 June 1971, nos. 2832/66; 2835/66; 2899/66, §93 (De Wilde, Ooms and Versyp 
(“Vagrancy”) v. Belgium).
116. Arai-Takahashi 2002, pp. 2-3. See also Greer 2000, p. 5.
117. ECtHR 7 December 1976, no. 5493/72, §§48-49 (Handyside v. UK).
118. ECtHR 23 July 1968, nos. 1474/62; 1677/62; 1691/62; 1769/63; 1994/63; 2126/64, §I.B.10 
(Case “Relating to certain aspects of the laws on the use of languages in education in Belgium” v. 
Belgium).
119. Gerards 2011, chapter 3.
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are in a better position than an international judge to determine which restric-
tions on human rights are necessary considering the national conditions.120 A third 
argument to leave a margin of appreciation to Member States, which has mainly 
been raised in literature, is that protection of human rights can be obtained in 
several ways, which does not always make it necessary to impose one particular 
application.121 
The margin of appreciation which is left to Member States diverges and de-
pends on a number of factors, such as the nature of the Convention rights in 
issue, its importance for the individual, the nature of the interference, the object 
pursued by the interference122 and the importance of the interests at stake.123 As 
these factors are fairly vague and not detailed, Gerards distinguishes three main 
groups of factors to determine the extent of the margin of appreciation: 1) fac-
tors relating to the common ground-argument, 2) factors relating to the better 
placed-argument, and 3) factors relating to the nature and importance of the right 
at issue.124 The ECtHR uses terms like ‘wide margin of appreciation’, ‘certain mar-
gin of appreciation’ and ‘narrow/limited margin of appreciation’ to indicate the 
extent of the room that is left to Member States. A wide margin of appreciation 
means that the ECtHR will examine the necessity of a restriction marginally, with 
reserve. As stressed by Gerards,125 if Member States are given a wide margin of ap-
preciation, the ECtHR will often apply a procedural approach, which means that 
the ECtHR will assess whether the matter has been carefully dealt with, without 
assessing the reasons to apply the restriction.126 
Member States have, for example, a wide margin of appreciation in relation to 
general preventive measures in the health care field, which means that Member 
States are not obliged to pursue any particular preventive health policy and are 
accorded room to manoeuvre regarding matters of health care policy. The reason 
for this wide margin of appreciation is that Member States are best placed to as-
sess priorities, use of resources and social needs. The ECtHR will therefore apply 
a marginal assessment of the manner in which the positive obligations regard-
ing general preventive measures in the health care field are fulfilled by Member 
120. ECtHR 7 December 1976, no. 5493/72, §48 (Handyside v. UK).
121. Gerards 2011, p. 186. With reference to Helfer 2008, p. 134 and Arai-Takahashi 2002, p. 
241.
122. ECtHR 4 December 2008, nos. 30562/04 and 30566/04, §102, GC (S. and Marper v. UK).
123. ECtHR 29 April 2002, no. 2346/02, §70 (Pretty v. UK).
124. Gerards 2011, pp. 192-225.
125. Gerards 2011, pp. 190-191.
126. See, for example, ECtHR 10 April 2007, no. 6339/05, §§91-92, GC (Evans v. UK). ECtHR 
9 June 2009, no. 75201/01, §§47-54 (Grušovnik v. Slovenia).
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States.127 If Member States are given a narrow margin of appreciation, the ECtHR 
will apply a strict examination of the reasons to impose the restriction and of the 
balance made between the conflicting interests.128 
2.4. Deprivation of liberty in a criminal justice context
In the previous section, the scope and meaning of deprivation of liberty has been 
discussed in general. The next question to be answered is what constitutes dep-
rivation of liberty in a criminal justice context. Article 5 §1 ECHR contains an 
exhaustive list129 of grounds authorising a State to deprive a person of his liberty:
ARTICLE 5: Right to liberty and security
“1. Everyone has the right to liberty and security of person. No one shall be de-
prived of his liberty save in the following cases and in accordance with a procedure 
prescribed by law:
(a) the lawful detention of a person after conviction by a competent court;
(b) the lawful arrest or detention of a person for non-compliance with the lawful 
order of a court or in order to secure the fulfilment of any obligation prescribed 
by law;
(c) the lawful arrest or detention of a person effected for the purpose of bring-
ing him before the competent legal authority on reasonable suspicion of having 
committed an offence or when it is reasonably considered necessary to prevent his 
committing an offence or fleeing after having done so;
(d) the detention of a minor by lawful order for the purpose of educational super-
vision or his lawful detention for the purpose of bringing him before the competent 
legal authority;
(e) the lawful detention of persons for the prevention of the spreading of infectious 
diseases, of persons of unsound mind, alcoholics or drug addicts or vagrants;
127. ECtHR 4 January 2008, no. 23800/06 (Shelley v. UK), EHRC 2008/61. 
128. See for example ECtHR 24 November 1993, nos. 13914/88; 15041/89; 15717/89; 15779/89; 
17207/90, §§35, 39, 42 (Informationsverein Lentia and others v. Austria). ECtHR 4 December 
2008, nos. 30562/04 and 30566/04, §§121-126, GC (S. and Marper v. UK).
129. ECtHR 15 March 2012, nos. 39692/09, 40713/09 and 41008/09, §60, GC (Austin and 
others v. UK). See with regard to the exhaustive list of grounds however: ECtHR 16 September 
2014, no. 29750/09, §104, GC (Hassan v. UK).
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(f ) the lawful arrest or detention of a person to prevent his effecting an unauthor-
ised entry into the country or of a person against whom action is being taken with 
a view to deportation or extradition.”130
In the Council of Europe’s human rights handbook No. 5 it is stated that only 
ground a, ground c and ground f are acknowledged by Article 5 as justifying dep-
rivation of liberty as part of a criminal procedure.131 Ground b may in my view 
also be relevant within a criminal justice context, for example if a condition at-
tached to a suspended sentence imposed for having committed an offence by 
a competent court is not fulfilled or if a witness is deprived of his liberty to be 
brought before a judge for questioning during criminal proceedings. It is therefore 
necessary to make a first demarcation. In this study deprivation of liberty within 
a criminal justice context relates to any deprivation of liberty of:
1) a person suspected of having committed a criminal offence;
2) a person convicted by a competent court of having committed a criminal 
offence.
The starting point is therefore the criminal offence and the fact that the person 
who is deprived of his liberty can be connected to that offence by a suspicion of 
having committed that offence, or by a conviction by a competent court of having 
committed the offence. This demarcation still leaves some questions unanswered. 
For instance, what is a criminal offence and what is the meaning of a convic-
tion by a competent court? In the following, these questions will be answered in 
view of the ECHR and by exploring ground a, b, c and f enumerated in Article 
5 ECHR. 
2.4.1. Reasonable suspicion of an offence
Article 5 §1 (c) ECHR determines that a person may be arrested and detained132 
with the purpose of 1) bringing him before the competent legal authority on rea-
sonable suspicion of having committed an offence, or 2) when it is reasonably 
considered necessary to prevent him committing an offence,133 or 3) to prevent 
130. Italic: ET.
131. Council of Europe 2002, p. 22. 
132. Both the term ‘arrest’ and detention’ are used in art. 5 ECHR. It has been stated that these 
terms are used interchangeably. In essence, these terms relate to any measure depriving a person 
of his liberty, regardless of the term used in the applicable domestic law. Council of Europe 2002, 
p. 17.
133. Deprivation of liberty to prevent a person from committing an offence is only allowed in 
connection with criminal proceedings and to prevent a concrete and specific offence. The purpose 
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fleeing after having done so. A police arrest for a suspicion of having committed 
a criminal offence will therefore constitute deprivation of liberty.134 But what con-
stitutes a criminal offence? This question cannot be entirely answered through an 
examination of Article 5 §1 ECHR. To answer this question it is useful to examine 
the scope of the phrase “criminal” mentioned in Article 6 ECHR (as in criminal 
charge), though it is noteworthy that a criminal charge is less broad than a suspi-
cion of having committed an offence seeing that a criminal charge means that the 
person concerned has received an official notification by the competent authority 
holding an allegation that he has committed a criminal offence.135
To examine whether a charge constitutes a criminal charge under Arti-
cle 6 ECHR, the ECtHR applies the so called Engel-criteria.136 Applying the 
Engel-criteria means that the ECtHR first ascertains how the offence is classified 
in the legal system of the respondent State. If the domestic law classifies an offence 
as criminal, the ECtHR will follow this qualification. This approach works one 
way only. If an offence is not qualified as criminal in the domestic law in ques-
tion, the ECtHR will subsequently examine the nature of the offence, and the 
nature and degree of severity of the penalty that can be imposed. A justification 
for this approach is that the applicability of the rights laid down in Article 6 and 
Article 7 ECHR would otherwise be subordinate to the will of the States to bring 
an offence within the criminal justice context.137 Fulfilment of the second or third 
criterion is sufficient to conclude that the case involves a criminal charge.138
As for the criterion involving the nature of an offence, which carries more 
weight than the first criterion (is the offence classified as criminal), relevant factors 
are whether the legal rule in question applies to all citizens (instead of a specific 
group), whether the proceedings in question were instigated by a public authority 
possessing statutory powers of enforcement, or whether the proceedings showed 
punitive elements, for example if the penalty can only be imposed after a finding 
of the measure is to bring the person in question before the competent legal authority. ECtHR 7 
March 2013, no. 15598/08, §§66-68 (Ostendorf v. Germany).
134. ECtHR 18 September 2014, no. 47837/06, §§32-34 (Rakhimberdiyev v. Russia).
135. ECtHR 20 October 1997, no. 20225/92, §42 (Serves v. France). See furthermore Leanza and 
Pridal 2014, p. 16 et seq.
136. ECtHR 8 June 1976, nos. 5100/71; 5101/71; 5102/71; 5354/72; 5370/72 (Engel and others 
v. The Netherlands).
137. ECtHR 8 June 1976, nos. 5100/71; 5101/71; 5102/71; 5354/72; 5370/72, §§81-82, 85 
(Engel and others v. The Netherlands). See also ECtHR 21 February 1984, no. 8544/79, §50 
(Öztürk v. Germany).
138. ECtHR 25 August 1987, no. 9912/82, §55 (Lutz v. Germany).
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of culpability.139 Also relevant is how the offence in question is qualified in the vast 
majority of the Member States.140 
The starting point to weigh the severity of the penalty in question is the maxi-
mum penalty that can be imposed and not the actual penalty inflicted.141 Another 
relevant factor is whether the penalty had a deterrent and punitive purpose.142 A 
penalty involving deprivation of liberty as punishment will in principle be re-
garded as falling within the criminal justice context, unless “the nature, duration 
or manner of execution cannot be appreciably detrimental”.143 Other relevant fac-
tors are whether the penalty involves payment of a significant amount of money, 
and whether detention by default is attached to the penalty in question,144 even if 
the penalty involves payment of a small amount of money.145
2.4.2. Conviction by a competent court
The term ‘conviction’ used in Article 5 §1 (a) ECHR means that it has been estab-
lished in accordance with the law that a criminal (or disciplinary)146 offence has 
been committed, the person in question has been found guilty,147 which includes 
establishing that he can be held criminally responsible,148 and a penalty or meas-
ure holding deprivation of liberty has been imposed.149 Deprivation of liberty 
after conviction by a competent court furthermore means that the deprivation 
must result from, follow and depend upon or occur by virtue of the conviction. 
There must exist a sufficient causal connection between the conviction and the 
deprivation of liberty.150 An example of deprivation of liberty after conviction by a 
139. ECtHR 10 June 1996, no. 19380/92, §56, GC (Benham v. UK).
140. ECtHR 21 February 1984, no. 8544/79, §53 (Öztürk v. Germany).
141. ECtHR 8 June 1976, nos. 5100/71; 5101/71; 5102/71; 5354/72; 5370/72, §85 (Engel and 
others v. The Netherlands).
142. ECtHR 21 February 1984, no. 8544/79, §53 (Öztürk v. Germany). ECtHR 24 February 
1994, no. 12547/86, §47 (Bendenoun v. France).
143. ECtHR 8 June 1976, nos. 5100/71; 5101/71; 5102/71; 5354/72; 5370/72, §82 (Engel and 
others v. The Netherlands).
144. ECtHR 24 February 1994, no. 12547/86, §47 (Bendenoun v. France).
145. ECtHR 23 October 1995, no. 15523/89, §28 (Schmautzer v. Austria). See also Emmerson, 
Ashworth and Macdonald 2012, chapter 4.
146. ECtHR 8 June 1976, nos. 5100/71; 5101/71; 5102/71; 5354/72; 5370/72, §68 (Engel and 
others v. The Netherlands).
147. ECtHR 6 November 1980, no. 7367/76, §100 (Guzzardi v. Italy).
148. ECtHR 26 April 2016, no. 10511/10, §107, GC (Murray v. The Netherlands).
149. ECtHR 24 June 1982, no. 7906/77, §35 (Van Droogenbroeck v. Belgium). See furthermore 
Spronken/De Vocht 2011 (T&C Sv), Appendix EVRM, art. 5 EVRM, 6.
150. ECtHR 2 March 1987, no. 9787/82, §42 (Weeks v. UK).
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competent court within a criminal justice context is imprisonment. A conviction 
by a competent court of having committed an offence and holding an order to 
place a person at the disposal of the Government combined with compulsory con-
finement in a secure institution considering his mental condition also falls within 
this category. Convictions containing such orders also fall within the ambit of Ar-
ticle 5 §1 (e) ECHR (persons of unsound mind).151 If the person cannot be held 
accountable on the ground of his mental incapacity and is therefore acquitted, the 
order will only fall within the ambit of Article 5 §1 (e) ECHR.152  
2.4.3. Court order and obligation prescribed by law
Arrest and detention pursuant to Article 5 §1 (b) ECHR relates to deprivation of 
liberty for not complying with a court order or not fulfilling an obligation pre-
scribed by law153 and aims to secure the fulfilment of the court order or obligation. 
It therefore does not have a punitive character.154 Not complying with a court or-
der implies that the person in question has had the opportunity to comply with 
the court order but failed to do so.155 This category may, despite its non-punitive 
character, fall within a criminal justice context as a court order may be connected 
with an investigation into a suspicion of having committed a criminal offence, 
for example a court order to place a suspect in a mental hospital for examination 
of his mental state to determine his criminal responsibility.156 Another example is 
deprivation of liberty for not complying with a court order to pay a fine, which 
falls within the ambit of Article 5 §1 (b) ECHR if it aims to secure the fulfilment 
of the fine.157 Though this ground for deprivation of liberty does not have a pu-
nitive character, deprivation of liberty to secure the fulfilment of a fine imposed 
151. ECtHR 5 November 1981, no. 7215/75, §39 (X. v. UK). ECtHR 2 September 1998, no. 
23807/94, §§10, 51 (Erkalo v. The Netherlands).
152. ECtHR 23 February 1984, no. 9019/80, §§10, 25 (Luberti v. Italy).
153. For example the obligation to follow orders given by police officers. ECtHR 24 March 2005, 
no. 77909/01, §38 (Epple v. Germany).
154. If deprivation of liberty with a punitive character would fall within the ambit of this 
provision, it would deprive the persons subjected to these measures of the fundamental guarantees 
of art. 5 §1 (a) ECHR. ECtHR 8 June 1976, nos. 5100/71; 5101/71; 5102/71; 5354/72; 5370/72, 
§69 (Engel and others v. The Netherlands). ECtHR 10 June 1996, no. 19380/92, §39 (Benham v. 
UK). ECtHR 25 September 2003, no. 52792/99, §36 (Vasileva v. Denmark). ECtHR 27 March 
2012, no. 17835/07, §29 (Lolova-Karadzhova v. Bulgaria).
155. ECtHR 29 November 2011, no. 30954/05, §49 (Beiere v. Latvia).
156. ECtHR 18 January 2001, nos. 27715/95 and 30209/96 (Berliński v. Poland). ECtHR 2 May 
2013, no. 28796/07, §§49-50 (Petukhova v. Russia). ECtHR 6 December 2016, no. 40979/04, 
§§32-34 (Trutko v. Russia).
157. EComHR 7 July 1977, no. 6289/73 (Airey v. Ireland).
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for a criminal offence can in my view be regarded as deprivation of liberty within 
a criminal justice context. 
Arrest and detention in order to secure the fulfilment of any obligation pre-
scribed by law refers to a specific and concrete obligation already incumbent on 
the person concerned.158 Though this provision does not specifically relate to the 
criminal justice context, it may nevertheless be relevant in that context. An ex-
ample is the obligation to carry an identity card and to show it to the police if 
requested for identification purposes.159 This may take place as part of a criminal 
investigation if the person concerned is suspected of having committed a crimi-
nal offence.
2.4.4. Extradition
A person may be deprived of his liberty if action is being taken in view of his 
extradition to another country, for example in connection with a suspicion of 
having committed a criminal offence or to serve a prison sentence. This will evi-
dently entail deprivation of liberty within a criminal justice context as it follows 
the qualification of ground a and c.160
2.5. Concluding remarks
Considering the principles that can be derived from the ECtHR’s case law and the 
definition already developed in literature,161 the right to liberty is the freedom to 
move (on the spot), and to come and go of one’s own volition. The State may re-
strict this liberty. Whether this restriction constitutes a restriction on the freedom 
of movement within the territory of a State (regulated by Article 2 P4 ECHR) or 
a deprivation of liberty (regulated by Article 5 ECHR) will in my view depend 
on the degree or intensity of the measure imposed. Deprivation of liberty means 
that a person’s liberty is completely or to a large extent taken from him,162 as the 
person concerned does not have the freedom to move (his body), or to go and 
stay where he wants to because he is 1) physically restrained, or 2) not able or not 
158. ECtHR 1 July 1961, no. 332/57 (Lawless v. Ireland, No. 3). ECtHR 6 November 1980, no. 
7367/76, §101 (Guzzardi v. Italy). ECtHR 22 February 1989, no. 11152/84, §36 (Ciulla v. Italy).
159. EComHR 9 September 1992, no. 16810/90 (Reyntjens v. Belgium).
160. ECtHR 15 October 2015, no. 43611/02 (Belozorov v. Russia and Ukraine). ECtHR 18 
December 1986, no. 9990/82 (Bozano v. France).
161. De Jong 2000, p. 103.
162. De Jong 2000, p. 103.
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free to leave a restricted space or area of his own volition. Not able to leave means 
that there are physical barriers (such as a locked cell, room or ward) to prevent 
a person from leaving. The ECtHR’s case law shows that placing a person under 
constant guard of State officials can also be regarded as such physical barrier.163 A 
person is also not free to leave if no physical barriers exist to prevent the person in 
question from leaving, but he nevertheless does not have a (reasonable) choice, for 
example because he will be brought back if he leaves the place in question,164 or he 
is obliged to submit himself to the measure in question.165 This line of reasoning 
implies in my view that a person is also deprived of his liberty if there is a threat of 
the use of force, such as being held at gunpoint. Furthermore, the ECtHR stresses 
that deprivation of liberty may take numerous forms.166 It may therefore vary in 
degree or intensity. Physically restraining a person as a result of which a person 
does not have the freedom to move his body differs for example from confinement 
of a person in a room, ward or restricted area, whereas confinement in a room, 
ward or restricted area also differs in intensity. In the latter situation, the person 
still has the possibility to move his body, though in a limited space. Deprivation 
of liberty also implies coercion;167 a person will only be deprived of his liberty if 
he has not validly consented to the restrictions involved but the restrictions are 
imposed on him by the State.168 To determine whether deprivation of liberty is 
present, objective (the regime imposed) and subjective factors (coercion, consent) 
have to be examined.169 Under the case law of the ECtHR, a foreseeable measure 
to stop and hold a person for a certain period of time to perform certain checks 
(such as a security check at airports or at the entrance of public buildings) does 
not constitute deprivation of liberty. According to this line of reasoning, persons 
who are subjected to these measures choose to travel by air or to visit these public 
buildings and therefore also accept the foreseeable security measures. Depriva-
tion of liberty will in these cases only exist if the time necessary to perform these 
checks is exceeded.170 This means a contrario, that if checks are not foreseeable 
(and thus not avoidable) and forced upon people, this will constitute deprivation 
of liberty.
163. ECtHR 16 September 2014, no. 51012/11, §§65-71 (Valerian Dragomir v. Romania).
164. ECtHR 22 October 2009, no. 1431/03, §29 (Trajče Stojanovski v. The Former Yugoslav 
Republic of Macedonia).
165. ECtHR 12 January 2010, no. 4158/05, §57 (Gillan and Quinton v. UK).
166. ECtHR 6 November 1980, no. 7367/76, §95 (Guzzardi v. Italy).
167. ECtHR 12 January 2010, no. 4158/05, §57 (Gillan and Quinton v. UK).
168. ECtHR 16 June 2005, no. 61603/00, §§75-76 (Storck v. Germany).
169. ECtHR 17 January 2012, no. 36760/06, §117, GC (Stanev v. Bulgaria).
170. ECtHR 11 October 2016, no. 53659/07, §§46-47 (Kasparov v. Russia).
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According to the ECtHR’s case law, deprivation of liberty under responsibility 
of the State furthermore means that it is enforced by State officials or in a State in-
stitution.171 If a person is deprived of his liberty in a private institution, the State’s 
responsibility is engaged if it is authorised by a court or any other State entity, or 
if the person concerned is brought back by State officials after escaping from the 
institution.172
Deprivation of liberty in a criminal justice context includes in my view any 
deprivation of liberty for a suspicion of having committed a criminal offence, or 
after conviction by a competent court of having committed a criminal offence. 
The criminal offence (and thus the substantive law instead of the procedural law) 
is therefore the starting point. To determine whether the offence in question can 
be regarded as criminal, the Engel-criteria developed by the ECtHR to examine 
whether a criminal charge has been issued will be used, namely 1) the qualification 
of the offence in domestic law, 2) the nature of the offence, and/or 3) the nature 
and degree of severity of the penalty that can be imposed.173 Deprivation of lib-
erty in connection with a conviction by a competent court does not only relate to 
imprisonment as principal sentence, but also encompasses deprivation of liberty 
by default of fulfilling the conditions set to a penalty imposed by the competent 
court for having committed a criminal offence. Considering the foregoing, dep-
rivation of liberty in a criminal justice context relates to deprivation of liberty of:
1) a person suspected of having committed a criminal offence;
2) a person convicted by a court and therefore held criminally liable for com-
mitting a criminal offence and sentenced to a penalty principally holding 
deprivation of liberty; 
3) a person convicted to a suspended sentence of committing a criminal offence 
and who is deprived of his liberty because he has not fulfilled one or more con-
dition(s) set to the suspended sentence;
4) a person convicted by a court of committing a criminal offence and who is 
being deprived of his liberty to secure the fulfilment of the court’s order, for 
example paying damages to the victim;
5) a person in view of his extradition in connection with circumstances listed un-
der section 1) or 2).
171. ECtHR 19 February 2015, no. 75450/12, §§99, 148 (M.S. v. Croatia, No. 2).
172. ECtHR 16 June 2005, no. 61603/00, §§89-91, 145 (Storck v. Germany).
173. ECtHR 8 June 1976, nos. 5100/71; 5101/71; 5102/71; 5354/72; 5370/72, §§81-82, 85 
(Engel and others v. The Netherlands).
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Deprivation of liberty in the Dutch 
criminal justice context
3.1. Introduction
The previous chapter has answered the question what constitutes deprivation of 
liberty of an adult suspected or convicted of1 having committed a criminal of-
fence within the meaning of the ECHR. The aim of this chapter is to determine, 
without claiming to be exhaustive, which Dutch means of coercion and criminal 
law penalties and measures in response to a suspicion or conviction of having 
committed a criminal offence constitute deprivation of liberty according to Dutch 
law and within the meaning of Article 5 ECHR and whether the Dutch legal 
framework meets the requirements under Article 5 ECHR. Answering these ques-
tions is necessary to determine the scope of the study as far as the situation in the 
Netherlands is concerned. This chapter will commence with some explanatory 
comments on the Dutch criminal justice system and the relevant legislation (sec-
tion 3.2.). Section 3.3. will be used to explore which Dutch means of coercion and 
criminal law penalties and measures in response to a suspicion or conviction of 
having committed a criminal offence constitute deprivation of liberty according 
to Dutch law and where discussions arise regarding this topic.2 It will be exam-
ined whether the principles on deprivation of liberty in Dutch law correspond 
with the case law of the ECtHR under Article 5 ECHR. The means of coercion, 
penalties and measures will be discussed in view of the categories laid down in 
Article 5 §1 ECHR which are or can be relevant in a criminal justice context, 
namely: ground c (reasonable suspicion of an offence), ground a (conviction by 
a competent court), ground b (court order and obligation prescribed by law) and 
1. And therefore held (partially) criminally liable for his conduct.
2. By taking into account Dutch law and parliamentary history, domestic case law and literature.
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ground f (extradition). The beginning and ending of the diverging forms of dep-
rivation of liberty will also be discussed where appropriate, as well as where or 
by whom these measures can be enforced. Section 3.4. will be used to explore 
the consequences of deprivation of liberty according to Dutch law and literature 
and whether these correspond with the principles arising from the ECHR. This 
chapter will close with concluding remarks on whether the principles emerging 
in Dutch law correspond with the principles arising from the ECHR and on the 
scope of this study in relation to the situation in the Netherlands, by following the 
principles arising from the ECHR. 
3.2. Preliminary remarks on the criminal justice system in 
the Netherlands
At present, the Dutch criminal justice system3 is regulated in several laws enacted 
by the Dutch Government together with the Dutch Parliament.4 The Dutch 
Criminal Code contains the definitions of the core offences and the penalties and 
measures that can be imposed by Dutch courts. A distinction is made between 
crimes and infractions. Several specific areas are regulated by special legislation, 
for example the 1928 Opium Act, the 1994 Road Traffic Act, the 1989 Weapons 
and Munitions Act, and the 1950 Economic Offences Act.5 
Dutch criminal law distinguishes penalties and measures.6 The basis of a pen-
alty is imposing harm on a person in retribution for having committed a crime 
and/or infraction,7 whereas the basis of a measure is 1) to protect society from 
the danger a person or object poses, or 2) to restore the negative consequences 
of an offence.8 The core difference between a penalty and a measure is that the 
relation between offence and penalty is much stronger than the relation between 
offence and measure.9 A penalty can only be imposed if the conduct of the sus-
pect falls within the statutory definition of an offence and the suspect can be held 
3. See also: Knigge and Wolswijk 2015. Keulen and Knigge 2016. Corstens (edited by Borgers) 
2014. De Hullu 2015.
4. Pursuant to Article 107 §1 in conjunction with Article 81 of the Dutch Constitution.
5. See also Tak 2008.
6. Thus following a two-pronged approach. See also: Bleichrodt and Vegter 2016, pp. 14-15. 
This distinction has been criticised in literature. For example Van der Landen 1992.
7. Jonkers, in: Het penitentiair recht, suppl. 32, III-I (February 1991).
8. Bleichrodt and Vegter 2016, pp. 40-42. See furthermore Pompe 1921, pp. 46-49.
9. Boone 2000, pp. 69-73.
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criminally liable.10 The aims of penalties are punishment of the offender (retribu-
tion) and general and special prevention.11 Measures aim to protect the safety of 
persons or property or to restore a state of affairs, and can therefore also be im-
posed if the offender cannot be held criminally liable for having committed an 
offence.12
Dutch criminal procedure is regulated in the Code of Criminal Procedure. It 
contains, inter alia, provisions on appointing the officials authorised to prosecute, 
provisions on the suspect’s rights and on the competence of the police, public 
prosecutor and the judiciary to impose coercive measures on suspects, such as the 
arrest of a suspect or the order to detain a suspect on remand.
The applicable principles when executing deprivation of liberty in a criminal 
justice context in the diverging institutions are laid down in several framework 
Acts,13 including: 1) the Custodial Institutions (Framework) Act and the Prison 
Rules,14 2) the Hospital Orders (Framework) Act and the attached regulations 
(Hospital Orders (Care) Regulations)15 and the Psychiatric Hospitals (Com-
pulsory Admissions) Act.16 The Official Instructions for the Police, the Royal 
Military Constabulary and Special Investigating Officers (hereinafter: Official In-
structions for the Police) contains the applicable principles if a person is lawfully 
deprived of his liberty by the police or by other law enforcement officials (such as 
the Royal Netherlands Marechaussee) who are bound by this guideline.17
10. Art. 351 Code of Criminal Procedure.
11. Ministry of Justice, Sancties in perspectief. Beleidsnota inzake de heroriëntatie op de toepassing 
van vrijheidsstraffen en vrijheidsbeperkende straffen bij volwassenen (Sanctions in perspective), 
Den Haag 2000, pp. 25-29. Kamerstukken II 2000/01, 27 419, no. 1, pp. 3-4. 
12. Bleichrodt and Vegter 2016, pp. 40-42. Tak 2008, p. 111. See, for example, art. 37 Criminal 
Code (placement in a psychiatric hospital is possible when the offender cannot be held criminally 
liable).
13. See also art. 11 Criminal Code. See furthermore: Bleichrodt and Vegter 2016. See with regard 
to Dutch prisons also: Boone and Moerings 2007.
14. This legislation is applicable to penal institutions.
15. This legislation is applicable to judicial (State-run or private) institutions where the hospital 
order with compulsory treatment can be executed.
16. Part of this Act is applicable (mainly rights of the person in question within the institution: 
the internal legal position) if a hospital order is imposed and the person in question is admitted in a 
non-judicial mental health care facility. Art. 51 §3 Psychiatric Hospitals (Compulsory Admissions) 
Act. At present, a bill has been introduced (Mandatory Mental Healthcare Act) which aims to 
replace the Psychiatric Hospitals (Compulsory Admissions) Act. Kamerstukken II 2009/10, 32 399, 
no. 2/3. See about the hospital order also: Hofstee 2003.
17. Art. 1 §4 in conjunction with chapter 6 Official Instructions for the Police.
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3.3. Deprivation of liberty in the Dutch criminal justice 
system
A first step to demarcate deprivation of liberty in the Dutch criminal justice sys-
tem is to examine whether it has been defined in Dutch law (including legislative 
history) or in case law. Article 15 §1 of the Dutch Constitution determines that 
any deprivation of liberty must have a lawful basis, though it does not define 
‘liberty’ or ‘deprivation of liberty’.18 The Dutch legislator has stated that dep-
rivation of liberty may take several forms and may take place in very diverging 
situations.19 A definition of deprivation of liberty can be found in the legislative 
history of the Custodial Institutions (Framework) Act. The explanatory memo-
randum states that the core of deprivation of liberty is to withdraw a person from 
everyday life in free society.20 
Another definition of deprivation of liberty can be found in Article 282 Crim-
inal Code, which penalises deliberately and unlawfully depriving another person 
of his liberty or deliberately and unlawfully keeping a person deprived of his lib-
erty, and the case law on this provision. Article 282 Criminal Code relates to the 
physical liberty of persons, the freedom to go and stay of one’s own volition.21 To 
fall within the ambit of this prohibition, the person in question must be unable 
to physically move himself to another place, for example because he is locked in, 
is not able to remove himself without the use of force, or cannot move forward 
because he is tied down. Only tying a person’s hands down does therefore not 
deprive this person of his liberty.22 Tying a person down and subsequently trans-
18. See also Strijards 1982, pp. 312 et seq.
19. Kamerstukken II 1975/76, 13 872, no. 3, p. 50. The legislator also stated (p. 48) that by 
rephrasing the article on deprivation of liberty in the Dutch Constitution, a stronger connection 
with art. 5 ECHR would be established. The term ‘vrijheidsontneming’ in art. 15 Dutch 
Constitution does have the same content as the term ‘deprivation of liberty’ in art. 5 ECHR. 
Supreme Court 9 December 1988, NJ 1990, 265.
20. Kamerstukken II 1994/95, 24 263, no. 3, p. 13. See also Kamerstukken II 1950/51, 1189, 
no. 5, p. 22: “Het essentiële element van de straf blijft de vrijheidsbeneming, het ontnemen van het 
grondrecht, dat de mens het liefste is: namelijk van de vrijheid om zich te bewegen waar hij wil en 
om in een zelfgekozen vorm deel te hebben aan de samenleving.” (Italic: ET).
21. Supreme Court 23 April 1985, NJ (Nederlandse Jurisprudentie) 1985, 891.
22. Noyon/Langemeijer/Remmelink, Wetboek van Strafrecht, art. 282, 1-2. See furthermore 
Court of Appeal ‘s-Gravenhage 6 November 2003, ECLI:NL:GHSGR:2003:AO5166: preventing 
a person from leaving a house by grabbing her and forbidding her to leave constitutes deprivation 
of liberty. Court of Appeal Arnhem 11 June 2004, ECLI:NL:GHARN:2004:AP8396: preventing 
a person from leaving through constant presence constitutes deprivation of liberty. District Court 
Rotterdam 12 December 2012, ECLI:NL:RBROT:2012:BY5960: person taken by police officers 
and dropped in a remote area constitutes unlawful deprivation of liberty.
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porting that person will however constitute deprivation of liberty.23 Deprivation 
of liberty pursuant to Article 282 Criminal Code does not necessarily require an 
absolute impossibility to physically move to another place. Forcing a person to 
stay at a certain location through mental coercion, such as the threat of firearm 
use, may suffice to conclude that deprivation of liberty is present.24 
3.3.1. Reasonable suspicion of an offence
Dutch criminal law authorises the arrest of a person suspected of having com-
mitted a criminal offence, either by the public prosecutor, assistant prosecutor or 
law enforcement officers such as police officers25 or, if caught red handed while 
committing an offence, by a citizen.26 The Dutch Supreme Court has passed a 
judgment about another coercive measure, which demarcates the scope and pur-
pose of an arrest. It states that measures ordered by an investigating judge to 
prevent a person from leaving during an inspection (schouw) or a search (doorzoe-
king) pursuant to Article 125 §1 Code of Criminal Procedure27 are not comparable 
to an arrest, seeing that the second paragraph of Article 125 explicitly authorises an 
arrest if the person in question does not fulfil the order.28 According to the Dutch 
Supreme Court, police arrest constitutes deprivation of liberty,29 which corre-
sponds with the ECtHR’s case law.30 An arrest performed by a citizen cannot be 
regarded as deprivation of liberty by the State considering the ECtHR’s case law: 
as from the moment law enforcement officials, such as police officers, are involved 
in the deprivation of liberty, for example by restraining the person in question, the 
State’s responsibility for the deprivation of liberty will be engaged.31
23. Supreme Court 3 January 1921, NJ 1921, 320, W. (Weekblad van het recht) no. 10 695. 
24. Supreme Court 9 April 1900, W. no. 7427. Supreme Court 15 May 1990, NJ 1990, 668. 
Court of Appeal Amsterdam 28 April 2005, ECLI:NL:GHAMS:2005:AU0891.
25. Art. 54 Code of Criminal Procedure (hereinafter: police arrest). Though specific conditions 
have been set. See also Tak 2012, p. 536 et seq.
26. Art. 53 §1 Code of Criminal Procedure.
27. If an investigating judge is not actually present during an inspection or search, he may 
authorise law enforcement officials to give such an order.
28. Supreme Court 10 March 2015, ECLI:NL:HR:2015:543.
29. Supreme Court 1 October 1991, NJ 1992, 60, LJN: AB7753. See also: Corstens (edited by 
Borgers) 2014, p. 424. Daamen, in: Handboek strafzaken, 6.1 (online dd 1 May 2015). Other 
authors do not list police arrest under the coercive measures leading to deprivation of liberty in the 
pre-trial phase. For example Bleichrodt and Vegter 2016, p. 91. Vegter 2009, p. 48. Alkema 1978, 
p. 57: Alkema refers to “politiële hechtenis”, without stating whether the phase of police arrest can 
be categorised under this definition. 
30. ECtHR 18 September 2014, no. 47837/06, §§32-34 (Rakhimberdiyev v. Russia).
31. ECtHR 16 June 2005, no. 61603/00, §§89-91 (Storck v. Germany).
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Dutch case law shows that police arrest commences as from the moment the 
person in question has been made clear that he has to accompany the police of-
ficers, either by making that clear through a verbal statement or by using force. 
The Dutch Supreme Court has stated that it will depend on the circumstances of 
the case, including the suspect’s attitude, whether a verbal statement that a person 
is arrested is sufficient to conclude that he is deprived of his liberty.32 This does 
not fully correspond with the ECtHR’s case law. As argued in section 2.3.4 on the 
basis of the ECHR and the principles developed by the CPT, a person is in my 
view deprived of his liberty as from the moment he is made clear that he has to 
remain with the police. A verbal statement holding such a message will therefore 
suffice to conclude that a person is deprived of his liberty, regardless of the per-
son’s attitude. The Supreme Court has also stressed that a police arrest continues 
as long as the person is being held by the police and does not end by the simple 
fact that the police has managed to grasp the suspect.33 This corresponds with 
the ECtHR’s case law. During the phase of giving chase, the person in question 
should in my view and based on the principles arising from the ECtHR’s case law 
be regarded as deprived of his liberty (section 2.3.4). In my view, deprivation of 
liberty will come to an end if a suspect actually manages to escape the police or 
other law enforcement officials.
Another means of coercion during the pre-trial phase is police custody.34 If 
a person is not taken into police custody, a police arrest may be extended for six 
hours to perform investigative measures.35 After police arrest and police custody, 
the investigative judge may order that a suspect is detained on remand.36 Deten-
tion on remand is in principle executed in a penal institution, namely a remand 
centre.37 An extended arrest by police officers, police custody,38 and detention on 
32. Supreme Court 1 October 1991, NJ 1992, 60, LJN: AB7753. See also Daamen, in: Handboek 
Strafzaken, 6.2.1. (online dd 1 May 2015).
33. Supreme Court 23 November 1931, NJ 1932, pp. 448-450.
34. Art. 57 Code of Criminal Procedure. 
35. Art. 61 Code of Criminal Procedure.
36. Art. 63 et seq Code of Criminal Procedure.
37. Art. 15 §1 in connection with art. 9 §2 (a) Custodial Institutions (Framework) Act. See also 
art. 15a Custodial Institutions (Framework) Act: a person held in detention on remand may be 
accommodated in a police cell for ten days.
38. Cf. Supreme Court 1 October 1991, NJ 1992, 60, LJN: AB7753. See also: Corstens 
(edited by Borgers) 2014, pp. 431, 435, 442. Bleichrodt and Vegter 2016, p. 91. Alkema 1978, 
p. 57. Interesting in this regard is also the scope of art. 191 Criminal Code, which contains the 
prohibition to release, or to help escape a person who is deprived of his liberty on public authority 
or pursuant to a court order. According to the legislative history, the grounds for deprivation of 
liberty pursuant to this provision must be widely interpreted, including a suspect’s (preliminary) 
arrest. Smidt and Schmidt 1891, pp. 195-196. See also Supreme Court 3 January 1984, NJ 1984, 
Death in State Custody DRUK.indd   78 13-Sep-17   2:39:59 PM
Deprivation of liberty in the Dutch criminal justice context  79
remand39 all constitute deprivation of liberty pursuant to Dutch law, which is in 
accordance with the ECtHR’s line of reasoning.40 
Dutch courts may suspend or adjourn detention on remand under certain 
conditions,41 meaning that an order to detain a suspect on remand is not actu-
ally executed.42 The suspect must be willing to fulfil the stipulated conditions.43 
The legislator seems to hold the view that if detention on remand is suspended 
or adjourned pursuant to Articles 80-88 Code of Criminal Procedure, the person 
in question is no longer deprived of his liberty, regardless which conditions have 
been stipulated.44 Dutch law does not contain an exhaustive account of special 
conditions that can be stipulated in case of a suspended or adjourned detention 
on remand. Some Dutch authors are of the opinion that the domestic courts have 
less room in stipulating conditions when suspending or adjourning detention on 
remand than when imposing a suspended sentence. Admission to an institution is 
in view of Melai and Groenhuijsen not allowed when suspending or adjourning 
detention on remand.45 The Dutch legislator holds however an opposing view.46 
Considering the legislative history, which states that the conditions set to a sus-
pended detention on remand must meet the purpose of detention on remand, 
for example preventing repetition of the offence in question,47 it is in my view 
conceivable that admission to a secure institution meets this purpose and could 
therefore be stipulated as a condition. Dutch case law also shows that admis-
sion to an institution where the hospital order with compulsory treatment can be 
375. Machielse, in: Wetboek van Strafrecht, art. 191, 6 (online dd 1 June 2010). The power to stop 
and establish someone’s identity (art. 52 Code of Criminal Procedure) is however not mentioned. 
See section 3.3.3.
39. Art. 133 Code of Criminal Procedure. Art. 1 (t) Custodial Institutions (Framework) Act.
40. ECtHR 17 January 2012, no. 36760/06, §117, GC (Stanev v. Bulgaria). 
41. Art. 80 Code of Criminal Procedure (suspension). Art. 88 Code of Criminal Procedure 
(adjournment).
42. Melai and Groenhuijsen, Wetboek van Strafvordering, 7 Karakteristieken bij: Wetboek van 
Strafvordering, art. 80 (online dd 1 June 2006).
43. Art. 80 §1 Code of Criminal Procedure.
44. Kamerstukken II 1968/69, 9994, no. 3, p. 8. Kamerstukken II 1968/69, no. 9994, no. 4, 
Appendix A to explanatory memorandum (Bijlage A van de Memorie van Toelichting). See also 
Kamerstukken II 2009/10, 32 319, no. 3, p. 8: a suspended prison sentence with an order to remain 
at a specific location (locatiegebod) constitutes a restriction on the freedom of movement. See also 
Frielink and de Vries-Leemans 2003: a suspended or adjourned detention on remand implies that 
actual deprivation of liberty is absent. Melai and Groenhuijsen, Wetboek van Strafvordering, 7 
Karakteristieken bij: Wetboek van Strafvordering, art. 80 (online dd 1 June 2006).
45. Melai and Groenhuijsen, Wetboek van Strafvordering, 12 Bijzondere voorwaarden bij: 
Wetboek van Strafvordering, art. 80.
46. Kamerstukken II 1994/95, 24 077, nos. 2-3, pp. 28-30, 55.
47. Kamerstukken II 1913/14, 286, no. 3, p. 85.
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enforced is in practice set as a condition to suspend detention on remand.48 Note-
worthy is that admission to a secure health care facility points towards deprivation 
of liberty within the meaning of Article 5 ECHR, depending on the actual regime 
imposed. The ECtHR’s case law shows that deprivation of liberty also requires a 
subjective element, the absence of a valid consent.49 Valid consent requires that 
the person concerned is capable to decide for himself.50 In my view, valid consent 
also requires that the person in question has an actual choice between being at lib-
erty in free society or admission to a secure institution. An actual choice is in my 
opinion not present if the person in question can choose between staying either 
in a remand centre or a secure health care facility, where both regimes constitute 
deprivation of liberty. Suspending or adjourning detention on remand under the 
condition that the suspect will be admitted to a secure health care facility will in 
my view therefore constitute deprivation of liberty within the meaning of Article 
5 ECHR, regardless of whether the detainee has agreed with that condition. The 
District Court Oost-Brabant also ruled that applying this condition in practice 
constitutes a deprivation of liberty.51
3.3.2. Conviction by a competent court
Article 9 §1 Criminal Code enumerates in order of severity the penalties that can 
be imposed on adult offenders, including imprisonment and custody.52 Imprison-
ment and custody are in principle both executed in prison.53 Prisons are (part of ) 
penal institutions.54 Dutch law explicitly states that the aforementioned penalties 
entail deprivation of liberty of the person in question.55 This corresponds with 
the case law of the ECtHR.56 The same applies to the custodial order for repeat 
48. District Court Oost-Brabant 21 November 2016, ECLI:NL:RBOBR:2016:6438.
49. ECtHR 17 January 2012, no. 36760/06, §117, GC (Stanev v. Bulgaria).
50. ECtHR 16 June 2005, no. 61603/00, §75 (Storck v. Germany). ECtHR 27 March 2008, no. 
44009/05, §§108-109 (Shtukaturov v. Russia).
51. District Court Oost-Brabant 21 November 2016, ECLI:NL:RBOBR:2016:6438.
52. Imprisonment can be imposed for crimes, whereas custody can be imposed for infractions. 
53. Art. 10 §1 Custodial Institutions (Framework) Act. See however Art. 15a Custodial 
Institutions (Framework) Act.
54. A penal institution is either allocated as remand centre, prison, or facility for systematically 
reoffending persons, but can also have multiple purposes, divided over several wards. Art. 8 §1 in 
conjunction with art. 9 Custodial Institutions (Framework) Act. An institution or ward can also be 
assigned as Penal Psychiatric Centre (PPC).
55. Art. 1 (s) Custodial Institutions (Framework) Act. See also: Bleichrodt and Vegter 2016, p. 
91 et seq. Vegter 2009, pp. 47-74.
56. ECtHR 22 February 1989, no. 11152/84, §34 (Ciulla v. Italy). ECtHR 17 January 2012, no. 
36760/06, §117, GC (Stanev v. Bulgaria).
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offenders,57 which is executed in special institutions for repeat offenders.58 Ac-
cording to Dutch law59 and in view of the case law of the ECtHR,60 this measure 
constitutes deprivation of liberty.
If a person is already held in detention on remand for the offence in question, 
an imposed prison sentence commences under Dutch law as from the day the 
court’s judgment is final. In all other cases, a prison sentence or custody starts the 
day the penalty is executed.61 Dutch penal institutions are categorised according 
to the degree of security, namely: extra high security level, extended security level, 
normal security level, low security level, and very low security level.62 Bleichrodt 
and Vegter state that if a person is serving a prison sentence in a penal institu-
tion with a very low security level, has daily activities outside the institution and 
is allowed to go on leave every weekend, he is not deprived of his liberty, though 
the imposed restrictions are in their view not just restrictions on the freedom of 
movement. They therefore distinguish a third category, between deprivation of 
liberty and restrictions on the freedom of movement.63 This view does not corre-
spond with the approach of the ECHR, in particular Article 5 ECHR and Article 
2 P4 ECHR, which only distinguishes deprivation of liberty or restrictions on the 
freedom of movement. The ECtHR has furthermore stressed that serving a prison 
sentence in an open prison will constitute deprivation of liberty.64
According to Dutch criminal law, detainees have under certain conditions a 
right to conditional release.65 The Public Prosecution Service may attach specific 
conditions to conditional release, such as a restraining order, a duty to report, 
the obligation to stay at a specific location at certain moments, or admission to 
a health care facility. Compliance with these conditions can be monitored elec-
tronically.66 Conditional release can be postponed if the detainee is not willing to 
57. Art. 38m Criminal Code.
58. Art. 38o Criminal Code. These institutions are (part of ) a penal institution. Art. 9 §1 
Custodial Institutions (Framework) Act.
59. Art. 1 (t) Custodial Institutions (Framework) Act.
60. ECtHR 17 January 2012, no. 36760/06, §117, GC (Stanev v. Bulgaria).
61. Art. 26 (a-b) Criminal Code.
62. Art. 13 §1 Custodial Institutions (Framework) Act. The legislator has however introduced a 
bill which will abolish the low security level and very low security level. Kamerstukken II 2015/16, 
33 844, no. 7, p. 1.
63. Bleichrodt and Vegter 2016, pp. 93-95. See also: Vegter 1989, p. 186. Bleichrodt 1996, p. 
247.
64. ECtHR 2 March 1987, no. 9787/82, §§20, 40 (Weeks v. UK). ECtHR 6 November 1980, no. 
7367/76, §95 (Guzzardi v. Italy). See also EComHR 9 May 1977, no. 7754/77 (X. v. Switzerland).
65. Art. 15 et seq Criminal Code.
66. Art. 15a §§2-5 Criminal Code.
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fulfil the conditions.67 The Dutch legislator stated that after conditional release 
the person in question is no longer deprived of his liberty, though the legislator 
did not provide arguments to substantiate this point of view.68 The case law of 
the ECtHR shows that whether a detainee regained his liberty will depend on the 
actual circumstances of the regime to which he is subjected after conditional re-
lease.69 A notable condition that can be stipulated in case of conditional release in 
the Netherlands is admission to a health care facility, which could, considering the 
objective factors, point towards deprivation of liberty depending on the regime 
imposed in that facility. The ECtHR’s case law shows that deprivation of liberty 
also requires a subjective factor, the absence of a valid consent.70 As discussed be-
fore, a valid consent should in my view also imply an actual choice between living 
at liberty in free society or admission to a secure institution. Such a choice is in 
my opinion absent if a detainee can be released from prison under the condition 
of admission to a secure health care facility. That a detainee has consented with 
this condition is in my view therefore not sufficient to conclude that he is no 
longer deprived of his liberty.
A detainee sentenced to imprisonment or custody may under certain con-
ditions be provided the possibility to participate in a penal program outside 
prison.71 A penal program aims to prepare the detainee for his return to society, 
though it has been stressed that it also aims to reduce the shortage of cells.72 Dur-
ing a penal program, the detainee stays at home or another approved location 
and must follow a program with activities specifically designed for the detainee in 
question. Detainees have some free time to spend during a penal program. Guide-
lines have been developed on how to determine the amount of free time to spend 
during a penal program. In general, the detainee must stay at home (or another 
approved location) between 23.00 and 06.00 o’clock unless he has been given 
permission to deviate from this principle.73 The participant in a penal program 
will in principle be electronically monitored during the first one third of the en-
tire length of the program.74 The governor of the penal institution, who proposes 
67. Art. 15d §1 (d) Criminal Code. The guideline on conditional release states that if a detainee 
does not agree with a condition, there is a ground for requesting the court to postpone or omit 
conditional release.
68. Kamerstukken II 2006/07, 30 513, no. 6, p. 7.
69. ECtHR 2 March 1987, no. 9787/82, §40 (Weeks v. UK).
70. ECtHR 17 January 2012, no. 36760/06, §117, GC (Stanev v. Bulgaria).
71. Art. 4 Custodial Institutions (Framework) Act. 
72. Boone 2000, p. 65.
73. Circular 18 May 2000, no. 5029466/00/DJI. Appendix 4. Custodial Institutions Agency 
2006, pp. 5, 529 et seq. See also Balogh and Jans 2009, pp. 9, 12.
74. Art. 7a Prison Rules.
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which detainees may participate in a program,75 may attach specific conditions 
for participation in a penal program.76 The detainee must be willing to partici-
pate in the program and to fulfil the stipulated conditions.77 The Dutch legislator 
has stated, without substantiating this view, that participation in a penal program 
constitutes deprivation of liberty pursuant to Article 15 Criminal Code, the pro-
vision which regulates conditional release.78 Bleichrodt and Vegter hold the view 
that a participant in a penal program is no longer deprived of his liberty; only the 
freedom of movement of the participant is in their view restricted.79 Notable in 
this regard is that the Dutch legislator introduced a bill that would replace the 
penal program with electronic detention.80 Though this bill has been rejected,81 
the legislator’s view on electronic detention is nevertheless interesting. Electronic 
detention means that the last phase of a penalty or measure entailing deprivation 
of liberty would be executed outside a penal institution, for example the person’s 
home, and he would be monitored electronically. The person in question would 
in principle have very limited opportunity to leave his residence and only at fixed 
times. The person concerned should nevertheless be provided the opportunity to 
prepare himself for his return to society. He would therefore be allowed to work 
or to take part in other useful activities. To establish whether the person in ques-
tion was actually present at the approved activity, for example his work, electronic 
monitoring or supervision by a probation officer could be applied. The legislator 
was of the opinion that a person held in electronic detention was not deprived of 
his liberty,82 which is striking considering the legislator’s earlier view that partici-
pation in a penal program constitutes deprivation of liberty pursuant to Article 15 
Criminal Code.83 Considering the ECtHR’s case law under Article 5 ECHR,84 it 
will in my view depend on the conditions set to participation in a penal program 
whether the person concerned is still deprived of his liberty within the meaning 
of Article 5 ECHR. If a participant is, for example, only allowed to leave his home 
to go to work or to participate in other activities and must stay at home during 
the remaining time, the participant is not free to go and stay of his own volition 
75. Art. 7 §1 Prison Rules.
76. Art. 9 §1 Prison Rules.
77. Art. 7 §6 Prison Rules.
78. Kamerstukken I 1997/98, 24 263, no. 62, p. 6. See also: Von Bergh, Siesling and Jacobs 2008, 
pp. 22-23.
79. Bleichrodt and Vegter 2016, p. 94. See also: Bleichrodt 1994.
80. Kamerstukken II 2013/14, 33 745, A.
81. Kamerstukken I 2014/15, 33 745, no. 2.
82. Kamerstukken II 2013/14, 33 745, no. 3, pp. 7, 8, 10, 11, 13.
83. Kamerstukken I 1997/98, 24 263, no. 62, p. 6.
84. ECtHR 2 March 1987, no. 9787/82, §40 (Weeks v. UK).
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but has to remain at home or at specifically approved locations (work, activities), 
which resembles house arrest.85 Under these conditions, the participant is in my 
view still deprived of his liberty.
Other penalties that can be imposed pursuant to Article 9 §1 Criminal Code 
are the community service or fine. The Dutch court must determine in its judg-
ment that if the community service is not (completely) fulfilled or the fine is not 
(completely) paid, the convicted person will be detained in default.86 Detention 
in default is also possible for not fulfilling the measure holding a restriction on 
the freedom of movement,87 laid down in Article 38v et seq Criminal Code, for 
example a restraining order, an obligation to report, or an obligation to remain 
at a certain location at specified times.88 Detention in default is in principle exe-
cuted in prison89 and is, pursuant to Dutch law, a penalty depriving a person of 
his liberty,90 which corresponds with the case law of the ECtHR.91 Considering 
that detention in default is determined by the court and considering its punitive 
character, it falls within the ambit of Article 5 §1 (a) ECHR.92 
85. Cf. ECtHR 2 August 2001, no. 44955/98, §§11, 17 (Mancini v. Italy). ECtHR 18 December 
2002, no. 24952/94, §50, GC (N.C. v. Italy). See with regard to house arrest also: Harteveld et al 
2004, p. 36.
86. Art. 22d Criminal Code (community service) and art. 24c Criminal Code (fine). Community 
service is not regarded as being in breach of art. 4 §2 ECHR as the convicted has the choice to 
refuse performing the community service. Refusing will however mean that he will be detained. 
Kamerstukken II 1999/00, 26 114, no. 20. Handelingen II 1999/00, 26 114, 2940. Supreme Court 
20 February 2007, ECLI:NL:HR:2007:AZ6168.
87. Art. 38w Criminal Code.
88. Such measures are also restrictions on the freedom of movement pursuant to the ECHR. 
EComHR 10 July 1976, no. 6780/74 and 6950/75, §§232-234, p. 163 (Cyprus v. Turkey): a curfew 
is a restriction on the freedom of movement. EComHR 22 February 1995, no. 22838/93 (Van den 
Dungen v. The Netherlands): a restraining order is a restriction on the freedom of movement. 
ECtHR 10 January 2013, no. 39327/06, §§9 and 30 (Zarochentsev v. Ukraine): a prohibition to 
leave town is a restriction of the freedom of movement. ECtHR 7 December 2006, no. 15007/02, 
§§83-85 (Ivanov v. Ukraine): obligation to ask permission to leave place of residence is a restriction 
on the liberty of movement. See also: Bleichrodt and Vegter 2016, pp. 322-326.
89. Art. 10 §1 in conjunction with art. 1 (s) Custodial Institutions (Framework) Act. 
Kamerstukken II 1994/95, 24 263, no. 3, p. 34.
90. Art. 1 (s) Custodial Institutions (Framework) Act.
91. ECtHR 22 February 1989, no. 11152/84, §34 (Ciulla v. Italy). ECtHR 17 January 2012, no. 
36760/06, §117, GC (Stanev v. Bulgaria).
92. See also Handelingen I 1999/00, 26 114, 1715-1716. Handelingen I 1999/00, 26 114, 1728.
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A criminal hospital order93 combined with compulsory treatment is a meas-
ure94 and can be executed in private or in State-run institutions.95 It constitutes 
deprivation of liberty according to Dutch law,96 which corresponds with the 
ECtHR’s case law.97 If the person concerned is at least partially held criminally 
responsible, such an order falls within the ambit of Article 5 §1 (a) ECHR.98 Per-
sons subjected to this measure may be authorised to leave the institution (whether 
or not unescorted) to prepare themselves for their return to society.99 Accord-
ing to Dutch law, the person is still deprived of his liberty during these leaves,100 
which is also in accordance with the case law of the ECtHR.101 Another measure 
that can be imposed under the Criminal Code is placement in a psychiatric hos-
pital. A condition to impose this measure is that the person in question cannot 
be held criminally responsible for having committed the offence in question and 
is a danger to himself, others or the general safety of people or goods.102 Impos-
ing this measure does therefore not constitute a ‘conviction by a court’ within the 
meaning of Article 5 §1 (a) ECHR, since it does not entail a finding of guilt. This 
also applies if a hospital order with compulsory treatment is imposed because the 
person cannot be held criminally responsible.103  
Questions about the presence of deprivation of liberty have been raised in 
relation to conditional hospital orders.104 These hospital orders are imposed on 
certain conditions105 and the person concerned must be willing to fulfil these 
93. Art. 37a Criminal Code.
94. Art. 37b Criminal Code. As stressed before, the Juridisch-Economisch Lexicon is used to 
translate Dutch legal terms. Despite the terminology used for the measure ‘TBS met bevel tot 
verpleging’, namely ‘hospital order with compulsory treatment’, this measure only brings along 
compulsory admission to an institution and not compulsory treatment.
95. Art. 37d Criminal Code.
96. Art. 1 (t) Custodial Institutions (Framework) Act.
97. ECtHR 24 July 2001, no. 32605/96 (Rutten v. The Netherlands). ECtHR 17 January 2012, 
no. 36760/06, §117, GC (Stanev v. Bulgaria).
98. ECtHR 2 September 1998, no. 23807/94, §§10, 51 (Erkalo v. The Netherlands). It will also 
fall within the ambit of art. 5 §1 (e) ECHR.
99. Art. 50 et seq Hospital Orders (Framework) Act.
100. Supreme Court 11 November 1907, W. no. 8618. Court of Appeal Arnhem 9 January 1907, 
W. no. 8502. See also Machielse, in: Wetboek van Strafrecht, art. 191, 7 (online dd 1 June 2010).
101. ECtHR 28 May 1985, no. 8225/78, §§24, 41-42 (Ashingdane v. UK). 
102. Art. 37 Criminal Code.
103. ECtHR 23 February 1984, no. 9019/80, §§10, 25 (Luberti v. Italy). ECtHR 26 April 2016, 
no. 10511/10, §107, GC (Murray v. The Netherlands).
104. Von Bergh, Siesling and Jacobs 2008, Summary IX. These authors concluded that pursuant 
to Dutch legislative history and jurisprudence, it is not possible to determine whether a conditional 
hospital order entails deprivation of liberty.
105. Art. 37a in connection with art. 38 Criminal Code. As stressed before, the Juridisch-Economisch 
Lexicon is used to translate Dutch legal terms. Despite the terminology used for the measure ‘TBS 
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conditions.106 A relevant factor to determine whether such an order brings along 
deprivation of liberty is which conditions are set. A condition that can be stip-
ulated is admission to a health care facility.107 Institutions assigned to execute 
hospital orders with compulsory treatment are also obliged to admit a person to 
whom a conditional hospital order is imposed with the condition of admission to 
a health care facility.108 The Dutch legislator stated that the criterion that the per-
son in question must be willing to be admitted to a facility corresponds with the 
criterion for voluntary placement in a psychiatric hospital pursuant to the Psychi-
atric Hospitals (Compulsory Admissions) Act.109 Von Bergh, Siesling and Jacobs 
stated that in view of the ECtHR’s case law, the meaning of willingness to fulfil 
a condition is not clear. They raised the question whether the willingness to fulfil 
a condition means that the person in question will not be deprived of his liber-
ty.110 To establish whether a person has been deprived of his liberty, the ECtHR 
requires in relation to the admission of a mentally disordered person in an institu-
tion that the person in question has not validly consented to the confinement in 
question.111 As discussed before, a valid consent should in my view also imply an 
actual choice between living at liberty in free society or admission to a secure in-
stitution. This choice is in my opinion absent if a hospital order with compulsory 
treatment will be imposed if the person in question is not willing to fulfil the con-
dition of admission to that same institution under a conditional hospital order. 
Either way, the person will be admitted to a secure institution. The same line of 
reasoning should in my view apply to a suspended penalty, such as a prison sen-
tence,112 which is suspended under the condition that the person will be admitted 
to a health care facility,113 because an actual choice between living at liberty in free 
society or admission to a secure institution is under these circumstances also ab-
sent. In the legislative history and literature it has been stated that if the convicted 
person fulfils this condition, he consents with admission114 and is therefore not 
met voorwaarden’, namely ‘conditional hospital order’, this measure means that conditions are set 
to the hospital order; it does not mean that the hospital order itself is suspended.
106. Art. 38 §5 Criminal Code.
107. Art. 38a §1 Criminal Code.
108. Art. 11 §1 Hospital Orders (Framework) Act.
109. Kamerstukken II 1994/95, 24 256, no. 3, pp. 9-10.
110. Von Bergh, Siesling and Jacobs 2008, p. 25. Strijards argues that a person can be deprived 
of his liberty even though the person concerned consents with the measure. Strijards 1982, pp. 
315-316
111. ECtHR 17 January 2012, no. 36760/06, §117, GC (Stanev v. Bulgaria).
112. Art. 14a in conjunction with art. 14b Criminal Code.
113. Art. 14c §2 Criminal Code. See also section 3.3.1. regarding suspension or adjourning 
detention on remand.
114. Kamerstukken II 2009/10, 32 319, no. 3, p. 2. Bleichrodt 1996, p. 76.
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deprived of his liberty under Article 5 ECHR. As an actual choice between living 
at liberty in free society or admission to a secure institution is absent, the fact that 
the person in question consented with the condition of admission to a health care 
facility can in my view not lead to the conclusion that no deprivation of liberty is 
present. In my view, if the objective factors point towards deprivation of liberty, 
for example if the person in question is not allowed to leave the health care facil-
ity of his own volition, admission to a secure institution constitutes under these 
conditions deprivation of liberty. 
3.3.3. Court order and obligation prescribed by law
An example laid down in Dutch law that constitutes deprivation of liberty in 
a criminal justice context falling within the ambit of Article 5 §1 (b) ECHR 
(non-compliance with a court order) is deprivation of liberty for not fulfilling 
the obligation imposed by the court to pay damages to the victim of a criminal 
offence.115 Imprisonment for fines is another coercive measure worth mentioning. 
The public prosecutor may obtain leave from the court to enforce imprisonment 
for not paying a fine (or another penalty) imposed by the public prosecutor for 
having committed a criminal offence.116 Imprisonment for fines is not a punitive 
coercive measure but a measure to secure fulfilment of the penalty in question. 
Imprisonment for fines can also be enforced pursuant to Article 28 Traffic Regula-
tions (Administrative Enforcement) Act. Though this Act is, according to Dutch 
law, qualified as part of administrative instead of criminal law, pursuant to the 
case law of the ECtHR, it falls within the definition of a criminal charge.117 Im-
prisonment for fines pursuant to Article 28 Traffic Regulations (Administrative 
Enforcement) Act constitutes deprivation of liberty within a criminal justice con-
text and falls within the ambit of Article 5 §1 (b) ECHR, non-compliance with a 
court order. 
Pursuant to Dutch legislation, a driver of a vehicle suspected of driving while 
intoxicated is obligated to submit to a breath test if ordered by a law enforcement 
official118 or to submit to a blood test if ordered by a(n) (assistant) public pros-
115. Art. 36f §§1, 8 in conjunction with art. 24c Criminal Code. This deprivation of liberty does 
not have a punitive character but aims to secure that the order to pay damages will be fulfilled. See 
EComHR 7 July 1977, no. 6289/73 (Airey v. Ireland). See also Spronken/De Vocht 2011, (T&C 
Sv), art. 5 EVRM, 7.
116. Pursuant to art. 578b in connection with art. 257a et seq Code of Criminal Procedure.
117. ECtHR 21 February 1984, no. 8544/79, §§50-56 (Öztürk v. Germany). See also Knigge and 
Wolswijk 2015, p. 13.
118. Art. 163 §§1-2 1994 Road Traffic Act.
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ecutor or specific authorised police officer, unless these tests are undesirable for 
medical reasons.119 At least twenty minutes must expire between the first contact 
with the suspect or after an order has been given to perform a preliminary breath 
test and the actual breath test.120 During the parliamentary preparation of the bill 
that introduced the use of a breath test, it was, to my knowledge, not discussed 
whether enforcing a breath test entails deprivation of liberty.121 Considering the 
case law of the ECtHR,122 enforcing these tests on persons who are suspected of 
driving while intoxicated means that these persons are deprived of their liberty. 
These tests are forced upon suspects, suspects are obliged to submit themselves to 
these tests123 and will face charges if they refuse.124 As these tests are enforced in 
connection with a suspicion of having violated Dutch criminal law, it constitutes 
in my view deprivation of liberty within a criminal justice context and to fulfil an 
obligation prescribed by law (Article 5 §1 (b) ECHR).
Every law enforcement official in the Netherlands is authorised to stop a sus-
pect and to establish his identity by asking him his (first) name(s), date and place 
of birth and his registered and actual address.125 The person who is being stopped 
pursuant to this provision is not obliged to cooperate and does not commit an of-
fence if he does not provide his identity and walks away.126 However, every person 
of 14 years and older is in the Netherlands, pursuant to Article 2 Compulsory iden-
tification Act, obliged to show his identity card if ordered by a law enforcement 
officer as meant in Article 8 Police Act 2012. Article 8 Police Act 2012 determines 
that law enforcement officers are authorised to order inspection of one’s identity 
card if necessary to fulfil their duties. Not fulfilling this obligation is a criminal 
offence (infraction) pursuant to Article 447e Criminal Code. The person in ques-
tion therefore has no reasonable choice between walking away or cooperating. 
This means that under the latter conditions, the person in question is deprived of 
his liberty within the meaning of Article 5 §1 (b) ECHR. Although a suspect is not 
obliged to provide his identity to a law enforcement officer pursuant to Article 52 
Code of Criminal Procedure, this position has barely any meaning considering the 
119. Art. 163 §§5-7 1994 Road Traffic Act.
120. Art. 6 Alcohol Testing Decree.
121. Kamerstukken 19 285.
122. ECtHR 12 January 2010, no. 4158/05, §57 (Gillan and Quinton v. UK).
123. Art. 163 §2 1994 Road Traffic Act.
124. Art. 176 §4 1994 Road Traffic Act.
125. Art. 52 Code of Criminal Procedure  in conjunction with art. 27a §1, first sentence Criminal 
Code.
126. Supreme Court 27 June 1927, NJ 1927, p. 926 (Weigering naamsopgave). Supreme Court 25 
June 1934, NJ 1934, p. 1038. Supreme Court 26 November 1957, NJ 1958, 356. It is however an 
offence to provide a false name. Art. 435 §4 Criminal Code.
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obligation laid down in Article 2 Compulsory identification Act.127 However, the 
legislator did, to my knowledge, not provide an answer as to whether the meas-
ure laid down in Article 52 Code of Criminal Procedure constitutes deprivation 
of liberty. Dutch literature contains diverging views on whether the power to stop 
a suspect and establish his identity under Article 52 Code of Criminal Procedure 
constitutes deprivation of liberty or not. Several authors have stressed that this 
measure does restrict the liberty of a suspect but does not deprive a person of his 
liberty.128 A comparable view can be found in Noyon/Langemeijer/Remmelink’s 
commentary on Article 282 Criminal Code, that makes it punishable to deliber-
ately and unlawfully deprive another person of his liberty or to deliberately and 
unlawfully keep a person deprived of his liberty. They stressed that a person is not 
always deprived of his liberty if he is grabbed and held. The restriction must have 
taken some time before it can be regarded as deprivation of liberty, though a re-
vised commentary stresses that some reserve with regard to the duration should be 
observed.129 The District Court Amsterdam stresses in response to this view that a 
person will be deprived of his liberty if forced in a car, transported to another lo-
cation for approximately 15 minutes and subsequently ill-treated after being forced 
out of the car.130 Even a couple of minutes may suffice to find a violation of Ar-
ticle 282 Criminal Code.131 Advocate-general Leijten put forward an interesting 
view, by stating that the argument that a situation must at least last a certain time 
(longer than a couple of minutes) to entail deprivation of liberty does not hold 
up. Leijten mentioned the example that if a person is forced into a car and he es-
capes after ten seconds, he was deprived of his liberty though he could not be kept 
deprived of his liberty.132 Noteworthy in this regard is that the ECtHR stresses that 
127. Daamen, in: Handboek strafzaken, 5.6 (online dd 23 July 2012).
128. Corstens (edited by Borgers) 2014, p. 421. Daamen, in: Handboek strafzaken, 5.1 (online 
dd 23 July 2012). Van der Hulst, in: Wetboek van Strafvordering, art. 52, notes 1-16 (online dd 27 
July 2016): this standard work does not state whether the power to stop and establish one’s identity 
entails deprivation of liberty or not. Minkenhof and Reijntjes 2009, pp. 141-144. De Jong 2000, 
pp. 179-180. Strijards 1982, p. 315. De Jong also concluded in 2000 that several Dutch authors 
have examined the intensity of spatial restrictions and the State supervision on the freedom of 
movement, and sometimes the duration of the restriction, to determine whether deprivation of 
liberty had indeed taken place. De Jong 2000, p. 174. She refers to Strijards 1982, p. 313. Alkema 
1978, p. 57. Advisory opinion Advocate-general Verburg Supreme Court 13 October 1987, NJ 
1988, 512 (Balyani), and commentary A.H.J. Swart.
129. Noyon/Langemeijer/Remmelink, Wetboek van Strafrecht, art. 282, 3. See furthermore: De 
Jong 2000, pp. 175-176.
130. District Court Amsterdam 31 December 1969, NJ 1970, 114.
131. Supreme Court 9 April 1900, W. no. 7427. Supreme Court 23 April 1985, NJ 1985, 891, 
LJN: AC8856.
132. Advisory opinion Advocate-general, Supreme Court 23 April 1985, NJ 1985, 891, LJN: 
AC8856.
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the purpose of imposing a measure is not relevant to establish whether the person 
was deprived of his liberty or not133 and that a short duration will not affect the 
conclusion that there has been a deprivation of liberty if other factors (for exam-
ple, duress) point towards deprivation of liberty.134 Buruma has categorised the 
power to stop and establish a suspect’s identity as a means of coercion entailing 
deprivation of liberty.135 When we consider the manner in which this measure can 
be implemented, it is noteworthy that law enforcement officials are authorised to 
use force to impose this power if justified considering the intended goal, the risks 
involved, and there being no other way to achieve that aim.136 Van Kempen holds 
the view that a person will be deprived of his liberty if force is used to execute the 
power to stop and establish a suspect’s identity. He concludes that the power to 
stop and establish a suspect’s identity does not necessarily fall within the ambit of 
Article 5 ECHR.137 Being authorised by law to take a person by force if that per-
son refuses to accompany State officials is in view of the ECtHR a relevant factor 
to determine whether or not a person has been deprived of his liberty.138 Consid-
ering the ECtHR’s case law, enforcing the power to stop and establish a suspect’s 
identity will, in my view, entail deprivation of liberty within the meaning of Ar-
ticle 5 ECHR, as it is permitted to use force to impose this measure139 and the 
persons involved do not have a freedom of choice, i.e. to avoid being subjected to 
this power.140 Whether, and, if so, under what ground enumerated in Article 5 §1 
ECHR such a deprivation of liberty is justified is however not clear. The grounds 
mentioned under section c do not necessarily apply, neither does the ground men-
tioned under section b apply as Article 52 Code of Criminal Procedure does not 
contain an obligation for the suspect to cooperate, but only authorises the police 
officer to stop a suspect and establish his identity. 
The Dutch Supreme Court furthermore defines an order pursuant to Article 125 
§1 Code of Criminal Procedure, holding measures ordered by an investigating 
judge to prevent a person from leaving during an inspection or a search, as a meas-
ure restricting the freedom of movement but not as a measure comparable to an 
133. ECtHR 15 March 2012, nos. 39692/09; 40713/09 and 41008/09, §58, GC (Austin and 
others v. UK).
134. ECtHR 7 January 2010, no. 25965/04, §317 (Rantsev v. Cyprus and Russia).
135. Buruma 2007, p. 537.
136. Art. 7 §1 Police Act 2012. See also Daamen, in: Handboek strafzaken, 5.4 (online dd 23 July 
2012).
137. Gruber, de Palacios and Van Kempen 2012, pp. 63-64. 
138. ECtHR 13 December 2016, no. 36188/09, §38 (Tiba v. Romania).
139. ECtHR 24 June 2008, no. 28940/95, §78 (Foka v. Turkey).
140. ECtHR 12 January 2010, no. 4158/05, §64 (Gillan and Quinton v. UK).
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arrest.141 Though an order pursuant to Article 125 §1 Code of Criminal Procedure 
may not entail an arrest,142 it nevertheless constitutes in my view deprivation of 
liberty in the meaning of Article 5 ECHR considering the ECtHR’s case law. The 
person in question is entirely deprived of the freedom to go and stay where he 
wants to as he is not free to leave the restricted area in question of his own voli-
tion, is under constant guard and faces the risk of an arrest and prosecution if he 
does not fulfil the order.143 Therefore, the measure has a highly coercive nature, 
which is another relevant factor under the ECHR to determine whether a meas-
ure constitutes deprivation of liberty.144 Problematic is whether enforcement of 
this measure would fall within the ambit of Article 5 §1 (b) ECHR, as this pro-
vision only allows deprivation of liberty for non-compliance with a lawful order 
of a court or to secure the fulfilment of any obligation prescribed by law. An or-
der pursuant to Article 125 Code of Criminal Procedure by an investigating judge 
would fall within the ambit of Article 5 §1 (b) ECHR, but this does not automat-
ically apply to an order given by a law enforcement officer as the latter cannot be 
regarded as a court.145
3.3.4. Extradition
Extradition in a criminal justice context is in the Netherlands regulated in the Ex-
tradition Act and in the Surrender of Persons Act. The first statute is applicable if 
extradition is requested by a non-Member State of the European Union and the 
second statute is applicable if a Member State of the European Union requests the 
Netherlands for extradition. Both Acts stipulate the conditions for extradition and 
regulates the procedure that has to be followed, including provisions on the (pro-
visional) arrest of the person concerned and the continued deprivation of liberty 
through police custody or detention on remand.146 The principles stated in section 
3.3.1. on police arrest, police custody, and detention on remand apply. Therefore, 
the measures that can be imposed pursuant to the aforementioned Acts constitute 
141. Supreme Court 10 March 2015, ECLI:NL:HR:2015:543.
142. See section 3.3.1.
143. Not fulfilling an order pursuant to art. 125 §1 Criminal Code will result in a violation of art. 
184 Criminal Code. See also: Wöretshofer 2011.
144. ECtHR 12 January 2010, no. 4158/05, §57 (Gillan and Quinton v. UK). See also ECtHR 
26 April 2016, no. 1443/10, §§194-195 (Amarandei and others v. Romania).
145. This will in my view be different if the investigating judge authorises the law enforcement 
officer to take measures.
146. Glerum and Rozemond 2008, pp. 139-244. Remmelink 1990. Sanders 2014. Strijards 1988.
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deprivation of liberty within a criminal justice context falling within the ambit of 
Article 5 §1 (f ) ECHR.
3.4. Consequences of deprivation of liberty by the State
Article 15 §4 Dutch Constitution prescribes that a person lawfully deprived of 
his liberty may be restricted in the exercise of his civil rights when necessary to 
execute deprivation of liberty.147 Article 2 §4 Custodial Institutions (Framework) 
Act determines that when executing a sentence or measure involving deprivation 
of liberty,148 only limitations necessary to fulfil the deprivation of liberty’s aim or 
in the interest of maintaining order or safety in the penal institution are allowed. 
When it comes to deprivation of liberty imposed as penalty (imprisonment) for 
having violated criminal law, the question arises as to what is the aim of depriva-
tion of liberty that necessitates imposing limitations? 
Two different views on the meaning of the term ‘imprisonment’ can be found 
in Dutch literature. Van Veen defended the view that imprisonment is primarily 
aimed at submitting the detainee to a regime and not to deprive the person’s phys-
ical liberty. He stated that, when imprisonment would be defined otherwise, open 
prisons or leave arrangements are inconceivable. In his view, deprivation of liberty 
serves the implementation of the regime.149 On the other hand, Kelk defended 
the view that a judicial decision to deprive a person of his liberty implies only the 
deprivation of that person’s physical liberty, either as such (imprisonment) or as 
the consequence of another purpose, for example detention on remand applied to 
ensure that the suspect will stay available on behalf of the judiciary.150 Kelk states 
that Van Veen’s view would basically mean re-introduction of the theory of im-
plied limitations which has been abandoned by the ECtHR.151 Van Zyl Smit also 
states that “sentenced offenders are sent to prison as punishment rather than for 
punishment”,152 therefore holding the view that the loss of liberty is the punish-
ment. Mevis correctly argues that Article 2 §4 Custodial Institutions (Framework) 
Act aims to protect the legal status of detainees against arbitrary and unforeseeable 
147. I.e. the principle of minimal restrictions.
148. For example detention on remand. See art. 1 section t Custodial Institutions (Framework) 
Act.
149. Van Veen 1987, pp. 600-604.
150. Kelk 2000, p. 21. Kelk 2008, pp. 11-12. Kelk (edited by Boone) 2015, §2.4.1. See also De 
Lange and Mevis 2009, pp. 384-385 and Kelk 1976, p. 15.
151. Kelk 2004, p. 269.
152. Van Zyl Smit 2007, p. 566. 
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infringements of their rights. He states that, since infringements must be explic-
itly regulated, the aim of deprivation of liberty can therefore be no more than 
locking the person concerned up and making sure he will stay inside.153 The Ap-
peal Commission of the Council for the Administration of Criminal Justice and 
Protection of Juveniles154 stresses that Article 15 §4 Dutch Constitution allows civil 
rights of detainees to be restricted insofar these rights are not compatible with 
deprivation of liberty. Though the organisation and order in the institution may 
be relevant factors when deciding to restrict the civil rights of a detainee, it should 
not be the only ground for restriction.155 De Lange and Mevis furthermore stress 
that Article 15 §4 Dutch Constitution contains a general basis for all restrictions 
on civil rights during deprivation of liberty, as opposed to the ECHR that requires 
each restriction on individual rights to be based upon law and to be necessary 
in view of (a) specific interest(s). In my view, they rightly argue that it would be 
better to abolish Article 15 §4 Dutch Constitution.156 Article 15 §4 Dutch Consti-
tution does, in my view, not provide sufficient legal guarantees as it is formulated 
in general and subjective terms. A better approach is in my view to explicitly lay 
down in law, such as the Custodial Institutions (Framework) Act, each possibility 
to restrict the rights of prisoners, as required under the ECHR.
3.5. Concluding remarks
Although the core of deprivation of liberty is evident in Dutch criminal law,157 
the actual perimeters of deprivation of liberty in a criminal justice context have 
not been clearly defined. This, for example, applies with regard to the power to 
stop and establish a suspect’s identity, the power to prevent persons from leaving 
during an inspection or search, or to perform a breath test. Noteworthy in this 
regard are also the diverging views of the legislator on electronic detention and 
participation in a penal program. There is in general a difference in the approach 
applied under the ECHR and in the Dutch criminal law. The ECtHR exam-
ines in each individual case (provided that the complaint gives cause for such an 
153. Mevis 2005, pp. 376-377.
154. This Council is, among others, Appeal Commission for complaints of detainees pursuant to 
the Custodial Institutions (Framework) Act and the Hospital Orders (Framework) Act (hereinafter 
referred to in footnotes as BrC).
155. BrC 06/05/1986 – no. SG-A 19/86.
156. De Lange and Mevis 2009, pp. 382-384.
157. Such as imprisonment, custody, admission to a facility pursuant to a hospital order with 
compulsory treatment.
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examination) whether the person in question was deprived of his liberty (therefore 
applying a substantive approach), whereas Dutch criminal law follows a proce-
dural approach. The Dutch Criminal Code, the Code of Criminal Procedure and 
other statutes contain the penalties and measures that can be enforced if a person 
is suspected or convicted of a criminal offence and in each individual case, it will 
be determined which penalties and measures are necessary and can be imposed 
considering the requirements set in law. As these penalties and measures are laid 
down in Dutch law, the requirements under Article 5 §1 ECHR are in my view 
observed, although questions arise as to whether the power to stop and establish a 
suspect’s identity falls within one of the grounds mentioned in Article 5 §1 ECHR 
if the suspect is subsequently released and not apprehended pursuant to Article 53 
or Article 54 Code of Criminal Procedure. This seems however a theoretical situ-
ation. Questions also arise in my view as for the ground to justify deprivation of 
liberty under Article 5 ECHR if a police officer takes measures to prevent persons 
from leaving the area where an inspection or search is performed pursuant to Ar-
ticle 125 §1 Code of Criminal Procedure.
Another aim of this chapter is to determine (without claiming to be exhaus-
tive) which Dutch means of coercion and criminal law penalties and measures 
in response to a suspicion or conviction of having committed a criminal offence 
constitute deprivation of liberty within the meaning of Article 5 ECHR. In view 
of the foregoing, this study relates, inter alia, to any situation where a person is 
deprived of his liberty in connection with a suspicion or after conviction of hav-
ing committed a criminal offence. Criminal offence is defined according to the 
definition of ‘criminal’ under Article 6 ECHR, although the Military Criminal 
Code is not included. This study therefore relates to detainees serving a prison 
sentence, persons held in detention on remand or persons placed in a secure in-
stitution pursuant to a hospital order combined with compulsory treatment, even 
if they are on (unescorted) leave or transported to a regular hospital. Persons held 
in a penal institution with a very low security level are included, just like partici-
pants in a penal program if the program resembles house arrest. This also applies 
to any person arrested on suspicion of having committed a criminal offence, from 
the moment the suspect is made clear that he has to remain with the police, for 
example by holding a person at gunpoint, and including the phase of giving chase, 
and to an extended police arrest or police custody. If the person is brought to hos-
pital and is constantly guarded by a police officer in connection with a suspicion 
of having committed a criminal offence, that person is deprived of his liberty and 
therefore included in this study. Also included are situations where persons are 
subjected to a power which is forced upon them by State officials because they 
are suspected of having committed a criminal offence, such as the power to stop 
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and establish one’s identity or if the suspect is ordered to provide his identity card 
for inspection pursuant to Article 2 Compulsory identification Act, suspects sub-
jected to a breath test, or suspects who are given an order pursuant to Article 125 
§1 Code of Criminal Procedure. Noteworthy is that some police tasks, for exam-
ple investigations into human trafficking, are performed by the Royal Netherlands 
Marechaussee.158 Any deprivation of liberty in a criminal justice context (not in-
cluding the Military Criminal Code and/or relating to the military police task) 
by officials of the Royal Netherlands Marechaussee is therefore also included in 
this study.
This study does not include (among others) conditional release, a suspended 
or adjourned detention on remand, or a conditional hospital order, unless the 
condition of admission to a secure institution is set and the applicable regime in 
that institution constitutes deprivation of liberty within the meaning of Article 
5 ECHR. The measure of placement in a psychiatric hospital and the measure 
holding a restriction on the freedom of movement are not included. Furthermore, 
the Dutch police also accommodates persons in a police cell to protect their own 
safety or the safety of others, which practice is based on the obligation of the po-
lice to provide assistance to those in need of help as laid down Article 3 Police 
Act 2012.159 Though the apparent unlawfulness of this practice raises questions in 
view of the requirements laid down in Article 5 ECHR,160 it is not included in 
this study.
158. Art. 141, section c Code of Criminal Procedure. Art. 4 §1 Police Act 2012.
159. The legislator has referred to this practice in several definitions. See for example art. 1 (j) 
Police Organisation Decree. Art. 1 §4 Official Instructions for the Police. Art. 1 (b) Supervisory 
Regulation governing the Care of Arrestees in Police Custody. See also: Van der Zalm 2015, p. 10.
160. Blaauw, Vegter and Monterie 2002, p. 51. Thoonen and Duijst 2014. 
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CHAPTER 4. 
Obligations arising from the Convention 
to avert premature death of detainees
4.1. Introduction
In chapter 2 and chapter 3, the scope of this study has been demarcated by ex-
amining what constitutes deprivation of liberty by the State in a criminal justice 
context (in the Netherlands) within the meaning of the ECHR. Deprivation of 
liberty by the State brings along the obligation of means to protect the health 
and life of detainees. In the present chapter, the obligations of Member States 
to prevent premature death of detainees by taking protective measures and pro-
viding healthcare will be expounded. Firstly, the relevant provisions laid down in 
the ECHR will be discussed (Article 2, Article 3 and Article 8 ECHR), just like 
the concept of negative and positive obligations. To discuss the aforementioned 
obligations, the following categories will be distinguished: protective measures to 
prevent death because of the State (section 4.2.), protective measures to prevent 
lethal violence by other detainees (section 4.3), healthcare and protective measures 
to avert premature death due to health issues (section 4.4.), and the obligations 
of Member States in relation to end of life decisions of detainees (section 4.5.), 
including refusal of treatment, hunger and/or thirst strike, other decisions to stop 
eating and drinking, suicide,1 and euthanasia and assisted suicide. The positive 
obligation of means to avert premature death of detainees by providing the neces-
sary healthcare and taking protective measures will be discussed in section 4.4 by 
setting forth preconditions to fulfil these obligations which can be deduced from 
the case law of the ECtHR. Noteworthy is that several principles are developed 
in soft law by the Committee of Ministers and the CPT which are adopted in the 
1. I.e. intentionally taking one’s own life with death as ultimate aim. See also Jacobs 2012, pp. 
16-23: difference between hunger strike, suicide and euthanasia. 
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ECtHR’s case law,2 either by explicitly examining a case in view of the princi-
ple in question or by referring to that principle under the relevant international 
documents. If so, these principles will be discussed simultaneously. Because some 
preconditions are shaped and elaborated in more detail in soft law though these 
do not emerge in the ECtHR’s case law, these recommendations will nevertheless 
be discussed under a separate heading. If differences in applicable principles are 
observed between deprivation of liberty in prisons3 or by law enforcement offi-
cials such as the police, I will firstly discuss the requirements that apply to prisons 
and subsequently those that apply to deprivation of liberty by law enforcement of-
ficials. A question that will be discussed in the last section of this chapter (section 
4.6) is whether there are any conflicting obligations and, if so, how these conflict-
ing obligations should be addressed in view of the ECtHR’s case law. 
Article 2 ECHR: The right to life
“1. Everyone’s right to life shall be protected by law. No one shall be deprived of 
his life intentionally save in the execution of a sentence of a court following his 
conviction of a crime for which this penalty is provided by law.
2. Deprivation of life shall not be regarded as inflicted in contravention of this 
Article when it results from the use of force which is no more than absolutely 
necessary:
(a) in defence of any person from unlawful violence;
(b) in order to effect a lawful arrest or to prevent the escape of a person lawfully 
detained;
(c) in action lawfully taken for the purpose of quelling a riot or insurrection.”
Article 2 ECHR is one of the most fundamental provisions of the Convention. 
Together with Article 3 ECHR, it enshrines one of the most basic values of the 
democratic societies constituting the Council of Europe.4 
Article 3 ECHR: Prohibition of torture
“No one shall be subjected to torture or to inhuman or degrading treatment or 
punishment.”
2. See also ECtHR 30 September 2010, no. 44917/08, §42 (Pakhomov v. Russia): “The 
European Prison Rules provide a framework of guiding principles for health services”. 
3. To ensure readability, only the term ‘prisons’ will be used, although this term should be read 
as including remand centres.
4. ECtHR 27 September 1995, no. 18984/91, §147, GC (McCann and others v. UK). ECtHR 
16 January 2014, no. 5269/08, §204 (Shchiborshch and Kuzmina v. Russia). In McGlinchey and 
others versus The United Kingdom, the ECtHR even states that Article 2 and Article 3 ECHR rank 
as the most fundamental provisions of the Convention. ECtHR 29 April 2003, no. 50390/99, §63. 
See with regard to the right to life also: Early et al 2016.
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Contrary to Article 2 ECHR, Article 3 ECHR is drawn up in absolute terms 
and does therefore not allow exceptions.5 Neither the circumstances nor the 
behaviour of the person in question can give cause for an exception to this prohi-
bition.6 A distinction is made between on the one hand torture and on the other 
inhuman and/or degrading treatment or punishment. The special stigma of ‘tor-
ture’7 refers to deliberately inflicting severe pain or suffering with the aim, inter 
alia, of obtaining information, punishing the person concerned or intimidating.8 
Torture therefore has a purposive element.9 An example of torture is “Palestinian 
hanging”, which means that the person is stripped naked and suspended by his 
arms behind his back.10 Another example is the combination of being subjected 
to a large number of blows to the body (including the genitals) and head, electric 
shocks, left naked on a concrete floor and being placed in baths of ice-cold water, 
while being blindfolded.11 The five techniques mentioned in Ireland versus The 
United Kingdom, namely 1) wall-standing, 2) hooding (putting a black or navy 
coloured bag over the detainees’ heads), 3) subjection to noise, 4) deprivation of 
sleep, and 5) deprivation of food and drinks, were not qualified as torture, but as 
inhuman and degrading treatment.12 Article 3 ECHR does not contain a defini-
tion of the phrase ‘inhuman and degrading’, nor has the ECtHR provided a clear 
definition of both elements. The ECtHR has stressed that inhuman can relate, 
inter alia, to treatment which is premeditated and applied for hours at a time 
and caused actual physical injury or intense physical or mental suffering. Degrad-
ing can relate, inter alia, to treatment that caused feelings of fear and inferiority 
5. Art. 15 §2 ECHR also states that no deviation from art. 3 ECHR is allowed in times of 
emergency.
6. ECtHR 6 April 2000, no. 26772/95, §119, GC (Labita v. Italy). ECtHR 9 January 2014, no. 
49072/11, §60 (Gorelov v. Russia). See also ECtHR 15 November 1996, no. 22414/93, §79, GC 
(Chahal v. UK).
7. ECtHR 18 December 1996, no. 21987/93, §63 (Aksoy v. Turkey). ECtHR 27 June 2000, 
no. 21986/93, §114, GC (Salman v. Turkey). ECtHR 13 July 2010, no. 45661/99, §§147-149 
(Carabulea v. Romania). ECtHR 13 December 2012, no. 39630/09, §197, GC (El-Masri v. The 
former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia).
8. Pursuant to art. 1 United Nations Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or 
Degrading Treatment or Punishment. ECtHR 27 June 2000, no. 22277/93, §85, GC (İlhan v. 
Turkey). ECtHR 27 June 2000, no. 21986/93, §114, GC (Salman v. Turkey). 
9. ECtHR 21 December 2000, no. 30873/96, §§78-79 (Egmez v. Cyprus). ECtHR 1 June 2010, 
no. 22978/05, §90, GC (Gäfgen v. Germany).
10. ECtHR 18 December 1996, no. 21987/93, §64 (Aksoy v. Turkey).
11. ECtHR 11 July 2000, no. 20869/92, §§79-80 (Dikme v. Turkey). See also ECtHR 21 February 
2017, no. 52796/08, §§47-48 (Ovakimyan v. Russia).
12. ECtHR 18 January 1978, no. 5310/71, §§96, 165-168 (Ireland v. UK).
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through which the person in question can feel humiliated or debased.13 To deter-
mine whether treatment falls within the ambit of Article 3 ECHR, the purpose of 
the treatment, for example humiliating the person concerned, is relevant, though 
the absence of such a purpose does not rule out a violation of Article 3 ECHR.14 
Considering that torture requires ‘intention’ and ‘purpose’, for example to make a 
person confess, the last-mentioned exception relates in my view only to inhuman 
and/or degrading treatment. This also applies to the minimum level of severity 
which is required to fall within the ambit of Article 3 ECHR. Relevant factors to 
determine whether treatment or punishment fulfils the minimum level of severity 
are the nature and context of the treatment, the manner and method in which the 
treatment is applied, the duration of the treatment, and its physical and mental 
effects. In some cases, the person’s gender, age and health condition are also rel-
evant.15 Noteworthy as for the effects on the person in question is that it should 
be kept in mind that a person suffering from mental problems may not be able to 
identify the harmful consequences of a treatment.16 As for the treatment of detain-
ees, the suffering and humiliation required under Article 3 ECHR must exceed 
the suffering or humiliation inevitably connected to a legitimate form of punish-
ment, such as deprivation of liberty.17 
Article 8:  The right to respect for private life18
“1. Everyone has the right to respect for his private and family life, his home and 
his correspondence.
13. ECtHR 6 April 2000, no. 26772/95, §120, GC (Labita v. Italy). ECtHR 17 January 2012, no. 
36760/06, §203, GC (Stanev v. Bulgaria). See for example ECtHR 11 July 2006, no. 54810/00, 
GC (Jalloh v. Germany): removal of drugs from applicant’s stomach by administration of emetics 
constituted inhuman and degrading treatment. ECtHR 18 July 2013, no. 22735/05, §54 (Nasakin 
v. Russia): force used led to injuries and aimed to debase the applicant, which constituted inhuman 
and degrading treatment. ECtHR 29 November 2007, nos. 9852/03 and 13413/04, §105 
(Hummatov v. Azerbaijan): when actual bodily injury or intense physical or mental suffering 
is absent, treatment may still be such that it can be characterised as degrading, for example if it 
debases an individual. 
14. ECtHR 4 July 2006, no. 59450/00, §118, GC (Ramirez Sanchez v. France). See with regard 
to the absence of a purpose for example ECtHR 16 December 1999, no. 24888/94, §71 (V. v. 
UK). ECtHR 19 April 2001, no. 28524/95, §74 (Peers v. Greece). ECtHR 14 November 2002, no. 
67263/01, §37 (Mouisel v. France).
15. ECtHR 26 October 2000, no. 30210/96, §91, GC (Kudła v. Poland). ECtHR 28 September 
2015, no. 23380/09, §86, GC (Bouyid v. Belgium).
16. ECtHR 3 April 2001, no. 27229/95, §113 (Keenan v. UK).
17. ECtHR 26 October 2000, no. 30210/96, §§92-93, GC (Kudła v. Poland). ECtHR 28 
February 2008, no. 37201/06, §135, GC (Saadi v. Italy). ECtHR 17 July 2014, nos. 32541/08 
and 43441/08, §116, GC (Svinarenko and Slyadnev v. Russia).
18. Only the right to respect for private life will be discussed.
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2. There shall be no interference by a public authority with the exercise of this 
right except  such as is in accordance with the law and is necessary in a democratic 
society in the interests of national security, public safety or the economic well-being 
of the country, for the prevention of disorder or crime, for the protection of health 
or morals, or for the protection of the rights and freedoms of others.”
Private life as laid down in Article 8 ECHR is a broad term covering several as-
pects.19 Medical information and the correspondence between a detainee and 
health care providers enjoy the protection of Article 8 ECHR.20 Article 8 ECHR 
also protects the mental health,21 and the physical, psychological and social 
identity and integrity of a person, like the right to personal autonomy and de-
velopment.22 Article 8 ECHR thus includes the right to self-determination.23 
Applying medical treatment without ‘informed consent’ of a competent24 patient 
will also interfere with that person’s physical integrity.25 This also applies to forced 
medical treatment on a person who no longer has the legal capacity to decide,26 
even if the treatment is not far-reaching.27 Article 8 ECHR may therefore provide 
protection if the minimum level of severity required under Article 3 ECHR is not 
obtained.28 The obligation to submit to a urine test enforced by prison authorities 
also falls within the ambit of Article 8 ECHR.29 Another aspect of a person’s right 
19. These aspects will not be discussed exhaustively.
20. ECtHR 17 July 2008, no. 20511/03, §35 (I. v. Finland). ECtHR 25 November 2008, no. 
23373/03, §34 (Biriuk v. Lithuania). ECtHR 2 June 2009, no. 36936/05, §§47-48 (Szuluk v. 
UK).
21. ECtHR 14 October 2010, no. 55164/08, §60 (A. v. Slovakia). ECtHR 7 July 2011, no. 
39229/03, §82 (Fyodorov and Fyodorova v. Ukraine). See also ECtHR 26 March 1985, no. 
8978/80, §22 (X. and Y. v. The Netherlands).
22. ECtHR 10 April 2007, no. 6339/05, §71, GC (Evans v. UK). ECtHR 26 November 2009, 
no. 25282/06, §165 (Dolenec v. Croatia).
23. ECtHR 3 November 2011, no. 57813/00, §80 (S.H. and others v. Austria). 
24. I.e. being capable of making one’s own health care decisions. The basic assumption in most 
Western countries is that adult persons are competent. Jacobs 2012, pp. 59-65.
25. ECtHR 8 November 2011, no. 18968/07, §105 (V.C. v. Slovakia).
26. ECtHR 5 July 1999, no. 31534/96, §§62-72 (Matter v. Slovakia).
27. EComHR 4 December 1978, no. 8239/78 (X. v. The Netherlands). EComHR 13 December 
1979, no. 8278/78 (X. v. Austria). EComHR 10 December 1984, no. 10435/83 (Acmanne and 
others v. Belgium).
28. ECtHR 26 September 2006, no. 12350/04, §43 (Wainwright v. UK). ECtHR 25 March 
1993, no. 13134/87, §36 (Costello-Roberts v. UK). ECtHR 16 December 1997, no. 20972/92, 
§63 (Raninen v. Finland). ECtHR 6 February 2001, no. 44599/98, §46 (Bensaid v. UK). ECtHR 
1 June 2004, no. 8704/03 (Van der Graaf v. The Netherlands). ECtHR 4 January 2008, no. 
23800/06 (Shelley v. UK). ECtHR 13 May 2008, no. 52515/99, §71 (Juhnke v. Turkey). See with 
regard to force-feeding section 4.5.2.
29. EComHR 6 April 1994, no. 21132/93 (Peters v. The Netherlands).
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to respect for private life is the right to decide how and when the individual’s own 
life will end, provided that this person is capable of freely reaching a decision on 
this matter and is acting accordingly.30 
Article 8 ECHR aims to protect persons against arbitrary interferences of the 
aforementioned rights by Member States. Member States are only allowed to inter-
fere with these rights when the requirements enumerated in §2 of Article 8 ECHR 
have been met. Every interference must be “in accordance with the law” (which 
also requires a basis in domestic law) and must be “necessary in a democratic so-
ciety” in view of one or more of the aims laid down in the second paragraph of 
this Article. Necessity means that there is “a pressing social need” which is propor-
tionate to one or more of the legitimate aims the Member State pursues. Member 
States have a margin of appreciation in determining the necessity of an interfer-
ence.31 Normal restrictions and limitations inherent in prison life and discipline 
during lawful deprivation of liberty are not matters that would constitute a viola-
tion of Article 8 ECHR.32 These restrictions are either not considered to interfere 
with the detainee’s private and family life (such as being handcuffed during trans-
fer from prison to hospital)33 or these interferences are regarded to be justified.34
As becomes clear from the text of Article 2, Article 3 and Article 8 ECHR, these 
provisions contain in the first place negative obligations for Member States. This 
means that Member States must refrain from conduct which may lead to a breach 
of the rights and freedoms laid down in the Convention. Member States have 
pursuant to the ECHR also numerous positive obligations, which means that 
Member States are obliged to act, therefore to take necessary measures to safe-
guard a right or freedom.35 Two important categories of positive obligations have 
been stressed by Van Kempen. He distinguishes, inter alia, dependent positive 
obligations that exist because the Member State has not respected a negative obli-
gation, for example deprivation of liberty that brings along the positive obligation 
to safeguard the health and life of detainees. He also distinguishes positive ob-
ligations that aim to ensure that negative obligations are fulfilled, for example 
the positive obligation to register time, location and reasons for deprivation of 
30. ECtHR 20 January 2011, no. 31322/07, §51 (Haas v. Switzerland).
31. ECtHR 1 June 2004, no. 8704/03 (Van der Graaf v. The Netherlands). See also ECtHR 8 
November 2011, no. 18968/07, §139 (V.C. v. Slovakia).
32. ECtHR 16 May 2002, no. 39474/98, §105 (D.G. v. Ireland).
33. ECtHR 16 December 1997, no. 20972/92, §64 (Raninen v. Finland).
34. EComHR 1 October 1990, no. 15817/89 (Wakefield v. UK). 
35. Council of Europe 2007, p. 7. See also: Lavrysen 2016, chapter 2. Mowbray 2004. Vande 
Lanotte and Haeck 2005, pp. 99-105.
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liberty by the State.36 Positive obligations can furthermore be distinguished in ob-
ligations to take legislative and operational measures. As for legislative measures, 
Member States must have legislation that aims to protect the rights and freedoms 
laid down in the ECHR. Operational measures oblige Member States to act in an 
individual case and to take preventive measures to protect the life37 or physical 
integrity38 of an identified individual, for example against the conduct of a third 
person39 in domestic violence cases.40 This obligation must be interpreted in such 
a way that it does not impose an impossible or disproportionate burden on the 
authorities. Not every claimed risk obliges Member States to act. The difficulties 
involved in policing modern societies, the unpredictability of human conduct, 
the choices that have to be made on priorities and resources and the limitations 
on the exercise of police powers considering other rights and freedoms of civilians 
(for example those laid down in Article 5 and Article 8 ECHR) must be taken into 
account.41 Member States have a positive obligation to take measures (and there-
fore an operational obligation in an individual case) if the State authorities know, 
or should know, of the existence of a real and immediate risk to the life or health 
of (an) identified individual(s). If this condition is fulfilled, the State authorities 
must take all reasonably expected measures to avoid that particular risk.42 The 
State authorities must take the measures which have a real prospect of averting the 
risk or limiting the harm.43 
36. Van Kempen 2008b, pp. 16-20.
37. Under art. 2 ECHR: ECtHR 9 June 1998, no. 14/1997/798/1001, §36 (L.C.B. v. UK). 
ECtHR 28 October 1998, no. 23452/94, §115, GC (Osman v. UK). ECtHR 10 January 2012, no. 
13462/06, §§82-83 (Česnulevičius v. Lithuania).
38. Under art. 3 ECHR: ECtHR 16 July 2013, no. 61382/09, §§43-46 and 49 (B. v. Moldova). 
ECtHR 16 July 2013, no. 74839/10, §§40-43, 47 (Mudric v. Moldova). 
39. ECtHR 16 July 2013, no. 61382/09, §§43-46, 49 (B. v. Moldova). ECtHR 16 July 2013, no. 
74839/10, §§40-43, 47 (Mudric v. Moldova). 
40. ECtHR 28 January 2014, no. 26608/11, §§36, 43-45 (V.M. and C.M. v. Moldova). ECtHR 
16 July 2013, no. 61382/09, §§43, 49, 51 (B. v. Moldova). ECtHR 16 July 2013, no. 74839/10, 
§§40, 47 (Mudric v. Moldova). ECtHR 23 September 1998, no. 25599/94, §22 (A. v. UK).
41. ECtHR 28 October 1998, no. 23452/94, §§115-116, GC (Osman v. UK). See also ECtHR 1 
June 2006, no. 39922/03, §97 (Taïs v. France).
42. See with regard to the positive obligation under Article 2 ECHR: ECtHR 28 October 1998, 
no. 23452/94, §§115-116, GC (Osman v. UK). ECtHR 14 March 2002, no. 46477/99, §§54-77 
(Paul and Audrey Edwards v. UK). ECtHR 17 December 2009, no. 4762/05, §§99-100 (Mikayil 
Mammadov v. Azerbaijan). ECtHR 21 December 2010, no. 45744/08, §61 (Jasinskis v. Latvia). 
See with regard to the positive obligation under Article 3 ECHR: ECtHR 10 February 2011, no. 
44973/04, §§83-84 (Premininy v. Russia). ECtHR 27 November 2012, no. 29474/09, §§52-53 
(Tautkus v. Lithuania). ECtHR 28 January 2014, no. 35810/09, §§144, 149 (O’Keeffe v. Ireland).
43. ECtHR 10 February 2011, no. 44973/04, §§83-84 (Premininy v. Russia). 
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4.2. Protective measures to prevent death because of the State
Member States must prevent that detainees die because of the State. This en-
compasses negative and positive obligations. The negative obligation (and basic 
principle) laid down in Article 2 ECHR is that no one shall be deprived of his 
life intentionally. The right to life is however not absolute.44 Article 2 §1 ECHR 
does not contain an abolition of the death penalty, though this abolition has been 
laid down in Article 1 P6 ECHR. Article 2 §2 ECHR furthermore prescribes the 
circumstances where deprivation of life shall not be regarded as contravening the 
Convention, namely if the use of force is absolutely necessary to defend oneself 
or others against unlawful violence, to effect a lawful arrest or prevent an escape 
of a person lawfully detained or in action taken with the purpose to quell a riot 
or insurrection. Article 2 ECHR does not only include situations of deliberately 
taking a person’s life, but also situations where lawful force is used to attain one of 
the goals mentioned in §2, which leads to the unintended death of the person in 
question. Deadly force used by State officials (such as police officers) must meet 
two requirements: the force used must be 1) absolutely necessary to 2) achieve one 
of the goals enumerated in art. 2 §2 ECHR. “Absolutely necessary” refers to a 
more compelling test than normally applied under §2 of the Articles 8-11 ECHR. 
The force used must be ‘strictly proportionate’ to the achieved goal.45 As for Ar-
ticle 3 ECHR, this article does not allow a balance between the physical integrity 
of a person and the use of force to maintain public order,46 although a relevant 
factor is whether the conduct of the person in question made recourse to physical 
force strictly necessary.47 Article 3 ECHR prohibits the use of force (for exam-
ple to arrest a person) if that force is not necessary nor proportional (absolutely 
necessary).48
Article 2 §1 ECHR prescribes that the right to life must be protected by law. 
This means that Member States have the obligation to draw up legislation and 
44. Art. 15 §2 ECHR prescribes that derogation from art. 2 ECHR is not allowed in times of 
emergency, except for deaths due to lawful acts of war.
45. ECtHR 27 September 1995, no. 18984/91, §§148-149, GC (McCann and others v. UK). 
ECtHR 24 March 2011, no. 23458/02, §§175-176, GC (Giuliani and Gaggio v. Italy).
46. ECtHR 20 March 2012, nos. 4572/06 and 5684/06, §58 (Pekaslan and others v. Turkey). 
ECtHR 23 July 2013, no. 42606/05, §56 (Izci v. Turkey).
47. ECtHR 28 July 1999, no. 25803/94, §99, GC (Selmouni v. France).
48. ECtHR 12 April 2007, no. 48130/99, §63 (Ivan Vasilev v. Bulgaria). See also ECtHR 24 
September 2013, no. 74010/11, §41 (Dembele v. Switzerland). ECtHR 10 November 2015, no. 
8077/08, §80 (Şakir Kaçmaz v. Turkey).
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regulations that aim to protect the right to life.49 Member States have the primary 
duty to protect the right to life by setting up a criminal law system aimed at deter-
ring the commission of offences against the person. This system must be backed 
up with a law enforcement system to prevent, suppress and sanction breaches of 
the provisions that aim to protect the right to life.50 Member States also have the 
obligation to sufficiently regulate policing operations and to have a system with 
adequate and effective safeguards against arbitrariness and abuse of force by State 
officials.51 
Operational obligations to prevent deadly force by State officials are sufficient 
training of State officials in (preventing) the use of force52 and to plan and con-
trol policing operations in a manner that minimises risks on the use of lethal force 
as much as possible.53 If a person with severe mental problems shows aggres-
sive behaviour and is approached by the police, the presence of medically and/
or psychiatrically trained personnel is important.54 The ECtHR also stresses the 
importance of arranging an ambulance to be present during a police operation in-
volving a large number of police officers and an unknown number of suspects to 
provide timely first aid.55 Other means to prevent (lethal) ill-treatment by State 
officials in prison and during police custody is to implement effective complaints 
and inspection procedures (with the power to visit the establishments regularly 
and to hear detainees) and the possibility of confidential access to an appropriate 
authority. The right to be immediately examined and, if necessary, treated by a 
physician after force has been used is another means, just like clear disciplinary 
procedures (including the right to be heard and to lodge an appeal with a higher 
authority), accompanied by effective safeguards, sufficient staffing levels and en-
suring positive staff-detainee relations.56
49. Such legislative obligations also exist to implement the prohibition of torture and inhuman or 
degrading treatment or punishment and to protect the right to respect for private life.
50. ECtHR 28 October 1998, no. 23452/94, §115, GC (Osman v. UK). See also ECtHR 30 
November 2004, no. 48939/99, §89, GC (Öneryildiz v. Turkey). ECtHR 26 March 2013, no. 
73175/10, §48 (Rappaz v. Switzerland).
51. ECtHR 20 December 2004, no. 50385/99, §§57-58, GC (Makaratzis v. Greece).
52. ECtHR 21 June 2011, no. 31151/08, p. 12 (Obiora v. Norway). ECtHR 20 December 2004, 
no. 50385/99, §70, GC (Makaratzis v. Greece).
53. ECtHR 6 October 2015, no. 15397/02, §173 (Kavaklioğlu and others v. Turkey).
54. ECtHR 16 January 2014, no. 5269/08,  §§229-241 (Shchiborshch and Kuzmina v. Russia). 
See also ECtHR 16 December 2008, no. 58478/00, §118 (Rupa v. Romania).
55. ECtHR 23 February 2010, nos. 28975/04 and 33406/04, §§55, 64-66 (Wasilewska and 
Kałucka v. Poland). 
56. ECtHR 10 February 2011, no. 44973/04, §54 (Premininy v. Russia). See also: CPT/Inf/E 
(2002) 1 – Rev. 2015, CPT Standards, pp. 19, 22. Prevention of torture and ill-treatment is one of 
the aims of committees like the CPT.
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A positive operational obligation is that Member States must adequately secure 
the physical and psychological integrity and well-being of detainees, to prevent 
torture and inhuman and degrading treatment57 or to prevent premature death of 
detainees.58 The State authorities must therefore ensure that detainees are held in 
a safe environment. This means, among others, that State authorities have an ob-
ligation of means to ensure a safe environment during labour, sports and transport 
and to prevent drug trafficking in prison to protect detainees addicted to drugs. A 
margin of appreciation has been left to the Member States as for the kind of meas-
ures applied, for example using sniffer dogs, performing body searches, inspecting 
parcels and using electromagnetic detectors to check detainees, visitors and em-
ployees for contraband.59 The ECtHR has also referred to60 the CPT Standards 
that the prison health care services should supervise the quantity, quality, prepa-
ration and distribution of food and conditions of hygiene.61 This is, for example, 
important to prevent food poisoning among detainees.
4.3. Protective measures to prevent lethal violence by other 
detainees
Another risk to the life of detainees is violence by fellow detainees. A first obliga-
tion which aims to prevent such lethal incidents is that Member States must have 
and apply an adequate legal framework that affords protection against acts of vi-
olence by private individuals.62 As for operative measures, a basic precaution to 
prevent that detainees carry dangerous objects is performing a body search after 
apprehension.63 The ECtHR furthermore stresses that screening of newly arrived 
detainees on admission in prison should include an assessment of whether it is 
advisable to place a detainee in a shared cell considering the risk of violence be-
tween detainees.64 As for the risk of violence between detainees, State authorities 
57. ECtHR 26 October 2000, no. 30210/96, §94, GC (Kudła v. Poland). ECtHR 10 February 
2011, no. 44973/04, §90 (Premininy v. Russia).
58. ECtHR 1 February 2005, no. 43991/02, p. 16 (Fonseca Mendes v. Spain).
59. ECtHR 8 April 2014, no. 29100/07, §46 (Marro and others v. Italy).
60. ECtHR 24 July 2012, no. 35972/05, §121 (Iacov Stanciu v. Romania).
61. CPT/Inf (93)12, 3rd General Report. See also: CPT/Inf/E (2002) 1 – Rev. 2015, CPT 
Standards, p. 43.
62. ECtHR 16 July 2013, no. 61382/09, §§43-46, 49 (B. v. Moldova). ECtHR 16 July 2013, no. 
74839/10, §§40-43, 47 (Mudric v. Moldova). 
63. ECtHR 29 November 2007, no. 16275/02, §51 (Gülşenoğlu v. Turkey).
64. ECtHR 14 March 2002, no. 46477/99, §62 (Paul and Audrey Edwards v. UK), 
NJCM-Bulletin (28) 2003, no. 5, pp. 641-652 (with commentary from M. Boone). ECtHR 27 
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are obliged to exchange information about a detainee’s medical history and per-
ceived dangerousness.65 A group of detainees that are likely to be exposed to 
violence by other detainees are detainees charged with, or convicted of, sexual of-
fences (towards minors).66 This factor should bring along extra vigilance by State 
authorities. Indications of inter-prisoner violence must urge the State authorities 
to take specific security and surveillance measures and, if appropriate, disciplinary 
measures.67
The ECtHR has furthermore referred to68 the CPT-standards regarding 
inter-prisoner violence. The CPT stresses that prison staff should be placed in 
a position that enables them to exercise their authority and supervisory tasks in 
an appropriate manner. This implies sufficient staffing levels. Prison staff must 
be alert to signs that things threatens to go wrong and should be resolved and 
properly trained to intervene if necessary. The staff should also have appropriate 
interpersonal communication skills. Prison management must be fully prepared 
to support the staff in exercising their authority, which may require specific secu-
rity measures.69 Article 3 ECHR also obliges the State authorities to effectively 
investigate inter-prisoner violence.70 
4.4. Healthcare and protective measures to avert premature 
death due to health issues
4.4.1. Preliminary remarks 
As for healthcare to prevent premature death of detainees, both legislative and 
operational obligations arise from the ECHR. Member States are under Article 2 
ECHR obligated to draw up legislation that compels hospitals (public and private) 
to take appropriate measures aimed at protecting the life of patients. If the State 
has made such adequate arrangements, Member States cannot be held account-
able under the ECHR for mistakes made by, or negligent conduct of, individual 
November 2012, no. 29474/09, §§53, 34 (Tautkus v. Lithuania). ECtHR 10 February 2011, no. 
44973/04, §87 (Premininy v. Russia). See also: Roscam Abbing 2013, p. 15.
65. ECtHR 14 March 2002, no. 46477/99, §61 (Paul and Audrey Edwards v. UK).
66. ECtHR 3 March 2015, no. 23692/09, §90 (M.C. v. Poland).
67. ECtHR 10 February 2011, no. 44973/04, §§86, 88 (Premininy v. Russia).
68. ECtHR 10 February 2011, no. 44973/04, §54 (Premininy v. Russia). See also: CPT/Inf/E 
(2002) 1 – Rev. 2015, CPT Standards, p. 23.
69. CPT/Inf/E (2002) 1 – Rev. 2015, CPT Standards, p. 23.
70. ECtHR 10 February 2011, no. 44973/04, §§74, 92 (Premininy v. Russia).
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health care providers during the treatment of a patient.71 As will be discussed in 
the following, this is different when healthcare for detainees is concerned. Fur-
thermore, the duty to make health care regulations is especially stringent where 
the patients’ capacity to look after themselves is limited, for example due to their 
mental condition.72 The obligation to draw up adequate health care provisions 
includes regulations that clearly elaborate the conditions under which refusal of 
treatment is valid and binding for medical professionals. Member States must en-
sure that the domestic law provides for a fair and proper procedure to establish the 
capacity of the patient to decide on medical treatment, including informed con-
sent to treatment.73 The obligation to draw up legislation to secure the quality of 
healthcare also follows from Article 8 ECHR, since this article aims to protect the 
physical integrity of individuals.74 As for the obligation to draw up legislation to 
secure the quality of healthcare, the ECtHR stresses that it only examines whether 
the implementation of the domestic law in the individual case was in compliance 
with the ECHR. It does not examine legislation in abstracto.75 This implies in 
my opinion two things: if the Member State has acted in accordance with the 
principles arising from the ECHR in the case concerned, although these prin-
ciples were not laid down in law, this will not necessarily mean that the ECHR 
has been violated. On the other hand, the existence of a legal framework that ob-
serves the requirements arising from the ECHR does not necessarily mean that 
this legal framework is applied in practice. If not, this may lead to a violation of 
the ECHR. Though the case law of the ECtHR does not set any more detailed re-
quirements with regard to legislation on healthcare during deprivation of liberty, 
an important step to ensure that operational obligations are fulfilled is developing 
legislation that observes these requirements.76
A positive operational obligation for Member States arising from Article 2, Arti-
cle 3 and Article 8 ECHR towards detainees, is the obligation to secure the health 
and well-being of detainees.77 This obligation exists because detainees fall under 
71. ECtHR 17 January 2002, no. 32967/96, §49, GC (Calvelli and Ciglio v. Italy). ECtHR 4 
May 2000, no. 45305/99 (Powell v. UK).
72. ECtHR 17 July 2014, no. 47848/08, §130, GC (Centre for legal resources on behalf of Valentin 
Cȃmpeanu v. Romania).
73. ECtHR 5 December 2013, no. 45076/05, §§84-90 (Arskaya v. Ukraine). ECtHR 10 January 
2017, no. 81270/12, §84 (Ioniţă v. Romania).
74. ECtHR 25 September 2012, no. 19764/07, §82 (Spyra and Kranczkowski v. Poland). 
75. ECtHR 11 May 2010, no. 33798/05, §39 (Ruža v. Latvia).
76. See also Van Kempen 2012, p. 46.
77. ECtHR 26 October 2000, no. 30210/96, §94, GC (Kudła v. Poland). ECtHR 27 July 2004, 
no. 57671/00, §27 (Slimani v. France). ECtHR 9 December 2008, no. 77766/01, §91 (Dzieciak 
v. Poland). 
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the control of the State and therefore depend on the State authorities to make 
arrangements in this regard.78 A distinction must be made between the question 
1) whether a positive obligation exists according to Article 2, Article 3, or Article 
8 ECHR, and 2) whether these provisions are applicable in a particular case.79 
Moreover, the question arises under which circumstances healthcare provided to a 
detainee can be attributed to the State considering the diverging health care pro-
viders that can be involved.
Article 2 ECHR obliges States to protect the life of detainees80 by providing 
them with the healthcare necessary to preserve their life and try to prevent a le-
thal outcome.81 The authorities are under Article 2 ECHR obligated to act if they 
are aware, or ought to be aware, of the (severity of ) health problems of a detain-
ee.82 Knowledge about the detainee’s medical condition can be obtained through 
a diagnosis during deprivation of liberty or if the detainee informs the State au-
thorities about his condition. Information about a detainee’s health condition can 
also reach the State authorities through other channels, such as family members.83 
“Should know” about the medical condition of a detainee refers, for example, to 
the situation where prison management is informed by a family member about 
the detainee’s condition, but it is not clear whether this information reached the 
medical staff,84 or to a lack of sufficient medical supervision to diagnose any 
illnesses.85 The authorities must do everything reasonably possible, in good faith 
and in a timely manner. Not decisive is whether the authorities’ efforts could in 
principle avert the fatal outcome.86 In this regard it is important to make a dis-
tinction between the situation where healthcare may prevent a lethal outcome by 
78. ECtHR 26 November 2009, no. 25282/06, §170 (Dolenec v. Croatia). See also Van Kempen 
2008, pp. 21, 32. Mevis 2005, p. 377. Jacobs 2012, pp. 104-105, 197.
79. ECtHR 20 December 2004, no. 50385/99, §55, GC (Makaratzis v. Greece). ECtHR 9 
November 2010, no. 37138/06, §121 (Farhad Aliyev v. Azerbaijan). ECtHR 12 November 2013, 
no. 1529/10, §53 (P. v. UK).
80. ECtHR 9 December 2008, no. 77766/01, §§89-90 (Dzieciak v. Poland). ECtHR 17 July 
2014, no. 47848/08, §131, GC (Centre for legal resources on behalf of Valentin Cȃmpeanu v. 
Romania).
81. ECtHR 1 June 2006, no. 39922/03, §98 (Taïs v. France). ECtHR 16 November 2006, no. 
52955/99, §58 (Huylu v. Turkey). ECtHR 21 December 2010, no. 45744/08, §60 (Jasinskis v. 
Latvia).
82. ECtHR 24 February 2009, no. 63258/00, §58 (Gagiu v. Romania). ECtHR 16 November 
2006, no. 52955/99, §60 (Huylu v. Turkey).
83. ECtHR 14 March 2013, no. 28005/08, §§116-125 (Salakhov and Islyamova v. Ukraine).
84. ECtHR 18 December 2008, no. 29971/04, §106 (Kats and others v. Ukraine).
85. ECtHR 14 March 2013, no. 28005/08, §127 (Salakhov and Islyamova v. Ukraine).
86. ECtHR 11 February 2016, no. 15509/12, §81 (Karpylenko v. Ukraine).
Death in State Custody DRUK.indd   109 13-Sep-17   2:40:01 PM
110 Chapter 4 
breaking through the course of events87 and the situation where errors are made 
in the provided healthcare and these errors lead to the patient’s death. The first 
situation explicitly relates to the positive obligation (of means) to try to prevent 
a fatal outcome by providing the requisite medical assistance. In the latter situa-
tion, a causal connection between the provided inadequate healthcare and death 
is required to establish a violation of Article 2 ECHR.88 Article 3 ECHR obliges 
State authorities to ensure that detainees are detained in conditions where their 
human dignity is maintained and that the health and well-being of detainees is 
adequately secured by providing the requisite medical assistance.89 The positive 
obligation to provide the necessary healthcare arising from Article 3 ECHR re-
quires national authorities to do everything that can reasonably be expected of 
them considering the health condition of the detainee.90 A serious deterioration of 
the detainee’s health condition will inevitably lead to doubts about the adequacy 
of the provided medical care.91 The mere fact that the detainee’s state of health 
has deteriorated is however not sufficient to find a violation of the State’s positive 
obligation if it can be established that the authorities acted in a timely fashion and 
provided all reasonably possible medical treatment to try to prevent development 
of the illness.92 Relevant is whether the deterioration of the detainee’s health was 
the consequence of a lack of medical care.93 It is not always essential that the lack 
of requisite medical assistance resulted in a medical emergency or otherwise led to 
severe or prolonged pain in order to establish that a detainee had been subjected 
to treatment incompatible with Article 3 ECHR. That medical assistance was not 
available to a detainee who was in need for, and requested, medical assistance, 
may under certain circumstances suffice to conclude that this treatment leads to a 
87. Such as the consequences of illnesses, alcohol and drugs withdrawal or injuries. ECtHR 18 
December 2008, no. 29971/04 (Kats and others v. Ukraine). ECtHR 27 November 2014, no. 
1157/10 (Karsakova v. Russia). ECtHR 1 June 2006, no. 39922/03 (Taïs v. France).
88. ECtHR 2 September 2010, no. 71420/01, §124 (Bekirski v. Bulgaria). ECtHR 14 March 
2013, no. 28005/08, §111 (Salakhov and Islyamova v. Ukraine). Or a causal connection between 
the deprivation of liberty and the death of a detainee. ECtHR 17 January 2017, no. 76512/11, 
§§37-41 (Gengoux v. Belgium).
89. ECtHR 26 October 2000, no. 30210/96, §94, GC (Kudła v. Poland). ECtHR 31 March 
2015, no. 29736/06, §§80-81 (Davtyan v. Armenia).
90. ECtHR 16 April 2015, no. 63054/13, §90 (Papastavrou v. Greece). See also ECtHR 18 
December 2012, no. 1871/08, §42 (Jeladze v. Georgia).
91. ECtHR 21 June 2007, no. 57953/00, §99 (Bitiyeva and X. v. Russia). ECtHR 22 November 
2011, no. 35254/07, §72 (Makharadze and Sikharulidze v. Georgia).
92. ECtHR 10 April 2012, no. 30909/06, §30 (Panaitescu v. Romania).
93. ECtHR 21 December 2010, no. 36435/07, §51 (Raffray Taddei v. France). ECtHR 27 
November 2014, no. 18785/13, §69 (Koutalidis v. Greece). Or, in line with the above principles 
arising from Article 2 ECHR, errors made in the provided healthcare.
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violation of Article 3 ECHR considering its degrading character.94 If the physical 
and moral integrity will otherwise be adversely affected, the State must take ac-
tion in line with Article 8 ECHR, for example by providing adequate psychiatric 
treatment to detainees in need of psychiatric supervision.95
The case law of the ECtHR shows that Article 2 ECHR is in principle only 
applicable if the person concerned has died.96 If the person in question did not 
die, the complaint will only in exceptional cases fall within the ambit of Article 
2 ECHR,97 namely if the risk was real and immediate98 and of a life-threatening 
nature,99 or the injury was life-threatening.100 With regard to healthcare for de-
tainees, Article 3 ECHR is only applicable if the detainee suffered from any serious 
ailments posing major health risks requiring special medical attention.101 If State 
authorities do not provide healthcare to detainees or if there is a deficiency in the 
provided healthcare, this may constitute an inhuman and/or degrading treatment 
within the meaning of Article 3 ECHR,102 provided that the minimum level of 
severity is obtained.103 Article 8 ECHR is in these cases applicable if (a lack of ) 
94. ECtHR 15 June 2010, no. 34334/04, §§114-115 (Ashot Harutyunyan v. Armenia): the 
treatment of the detainee “must have given rise to considerable anxiety and distress on the part of 
the applicant”. See also ECtHR 31 March 2015, no. 29736/06, §88 (Davtyan v. Armenia).
95. ECtHR 26 November 2009, no. 25282/06, §§128, 170-180 (Dolenec v. Croatia). 
96. ECtHR 1 June 2006, no. 39922/03, §§57, 81 (Taïs v. France). ECtHR 14 December 2006, 
no. 4353/03, §68 (Tarariyeva v. Russia). ECtHR 18 December 2008, no. 29971/04, §§101-112 
(Kats and others v. Ukraine). ECtHR 24 February 2009, no. 63258/00, §§46, 54 (Gagiu v. 
Romania). ECtHR 22 November 2011, no. 35254/07, §70 (Makharadze and Sikharulidze v. 
Georgia). ECtHR 14 March 2013, no. 28005/08, §107 (Salakhov and Islyamova v. Ukraine).
97. ECtHR 27 June 2000, no. 22277/93, §76, GC (İlhan v. Turkey). ECtHR 20 December 2004, 
no. 50385/99, §51, GC (Makaratzis v. Greece). ECtHR 12 November 2013, no. 1529/10, §52 (P. 
v. UK). In the following cases, the ECtHR has assessed the case under art. 2 ECHR although the 
person in question had not died: ECtHR 9 June 1998, no. 14/1997/798/1001, §§36-41 (L.C.B. 
v. UK). ECtHR 28 October 1998, no. 23452/94, §§115-122, GC (Osman v. UK). ECtHR 2 
September 1998, no. 22495/93, §§92-108 (Yaşa v. Turkey).
98. ECtHR 28 October 1998, no. 23452/94, §116 (Osman v. UK).
99. ECtHR 7 February 2012, no. 20134/05, §130 (Alimuçaj v. Albania).
100. ECtHR 12 November 2013, no. 1529/10, §§57-58 (P. v. UK). ECtHR 2 February 2016, no. 
3648/04, §§67-68 (Cavit Tinarlioğlu v. Turkey).
101. ECtHR 9 November 2010, no. 37138/06, §121 (Farhad Aliyev v. Azerbaijan). Although the 
complaint about the healthcare was in McGlinchey and others versus United Kingdom examined 
under art. 3 ECHR, whereas the detainee in question had died. ECtHR 29 April 2003, no. 
50390/99, §§42-58 (McGlinchey and others v. UK).
102. ECtHR 27 June 2000, no. 22277/93, §87, GC (İlhan v. Turkey). ECtHR 25 February 2014, 
no. 19696/10, §51 (Gheorghe Predescu v. Romania). ECtHR 9 September 2014, no. 33955/07, 
§67 (Carrella v. Italy). ECtHR 11 December 2014, no. 42184/09, §§134, 149-150 (Kushnir v. 
Ukraine).
103. ECtHR 26 October 2000, no. 30210/96, §§82-100, GC (Kudła v. Poland). ECtHR 29 April 
2008, no. 26057/04 (Ivanova-Sokolova v. Bulgaria). ECtHR 9 November 2010, no. 37138/06, 
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treatment will adversely affect the physical and/or moral integrity but does not 
involve major health risks.104 The applicability of Article 2, Article 3 or Article 8 
ECHR depends therefore on the (possible) effects on the detainee in question.105 
As for the State’s responsibility for acts and omissions of medical staff, several 
situations can be distinguished. Firstly, the situation where medical staff actually 
work in prisons or in police stations/custody suites, whether or not under the 
authority of prison or police authorities, or in a prison hospital. Secondly, the 
situation where medical staff work in a hospital and become involved in the treat-
ment of a detainee after admission to hospital. The State’s responsibility is directly 
engaged if a detainee dies in a prison hospital.106 Following this line of reasoning, 
the same applies to acts and omissions of medical staff working in prison or police 
cells.107 Cooperation of medical and custodial staff in prison is the responsibil-
ity of the domestic authorities, regardless of whether the medical staff fall under 
the authority of the penitentiary staff.108 However, the decision of a (non-prison) 
hospital’s physician not to admit a person into hospital cannot be imputed to the 
State authority involved (i.e. the police).109 This may be different if the civilian 
hospital is state owned. In Tarariyeva versus Russia, the ECtHR concludes that 
the provided healthcare in a civilian state hospital was inadequate and the State’s 
responsibility under the Convention was engaged.110 In Salakhov and Islyamova 
versus Ukraine, it has been stressed that it was not crucial that the hospital was a 
public institution as the person in question was deprived of his liberty by the State 
at the time and thus obliged to provide him with adequate medical care. Though 
the ECtHR stresses that it was not its task to assess the medical treatment pro-
vided by civil doctors, it concludes that Article 3 ECHR had been violated due to 
§132 (Farhad Aliyev v. Azerbaijan). ECtHR 15 May 2012, no. 23893/03, §138 (Kaverzin v. 
Ukraine). ECtHR 21 June 2016, no. 48023/06, §§101-103 (Vasenin v. Russia).
104. ECtHR 26 November 2009, no. 25282/06, §128 (Dolenec v. Croatia). 
105. Though the ECtHR also stresses that traditionally, the issue of healthcare in detention is 
examined under art. 3 ECHR and not under art. 8 ECHR. ECtHR 23 October 2014, no. 28403/05, 
§135 (Vintman v. Ukraine). See furthermore ECtHR 3 April 2001, no. 27229/95 (Keenan v. UK), 
where the detainee died due to suicide and the ECtHR found no violation of art. 2 ECHR as the 
authorities responded in a reasonable way to the detainee’s conduct, though it did find a violation 
of art. 3 ECHR, considering the lack of effective monitoring of the detainee’s condition, the lack 
of informed psychiatric input in his assessment and treatment, and the imposition of a disciplinary 
punishment. This judgment shows in my view an inconsistency.
106. ECtHR 22 November 2011, no. 35254/07, §87 (Makharadze and Sikharulidze v. Georgia).
107. ECtHR 9 March 2004, no. 61827/00, §71 (Glass v. UK).
108. ECtHR 4 February 2016, no. 58828/13, §46 (Isenc v. France). ECtHR 19 February 2015, 
no. 10401/12, §58 (Helhal v. France). ECtHR 19 July 2012, no. 38447/09, §82 (Ketreb v. France).
109. ECtHR 1 June 2006, no. 39922/03, §§96-104 (Taïs v. France).
110. ECtHR 14 December 2006, no. 4353/03, §§74, 81-85 (Tarariyeva v. Russia).
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inadequate medical care provided to the detainee in hospital by referring to the 
acknowledgement of the domestic authorities that the provided medical assistance 
could not be regarded as timely and adequate.111 
To sum up, Member States have an obligation of means to provide the healthcare 
reasonably possible in the circumstances if they have knowledge, or should know, 
about 1) health risks to the life of a detainee, 2) major health risks of a detainee, or 
3) risks adversely affecting the physical and moral integrity of a detainee. Exami-
nation of the ECtHR’s case law reveals several preconditions to fulfil the Member 
States’ obligation to provide healthcare to detainees and to take protective meas-
ures. These preconditions will be discussed below. 
4.4.2. Appropriate environment 
There is no general obligation to release a detainee on health grounds or to trans-
fer him to a hospital even if his condition is difficult to treat during deprivation 
of liberty.112 Compatibility of the detainee’s health condition and continued dep-
rivation of liberty depends on the State’s ability to provide relevant treatment of 
the requisite quality during deprivation of liberty.113 If a detainee is not released 
although his condition is difficult to treat during deprivation of liberty, a lack of 
healthcare or otherwise providing inadequate healthcare may lead to a violation 
of Article 3 ECHR114 and if the detainee subsequently dies, a violation of Article 
2 ECHR.
Furthermore, the ECtHR refers to115 the recommendation that the medical 
service in prison should pursue to identify and treat physical (next to mental) 
illnesses of detainees.116 The ECtHR stresses that screening of newly arrived de-
tainees on admission in prison should serve to identify detainees who should be 
111. ECtHR 14 March 2013, no. 28005/08, §§142-147 (Salakhov and Islyamova v. Ukraine).
112. ECtHR 16 June 2005, no. 22682/02 (Reggiani Martinelli v. Italy). ECtHR 27 July 2010, 
no. 15952/09, §35 (Rokosz v. Poland).
113. ECtHR 4 October 2011, no. 47729/08, §79 (Goginashvili v. Georgia). ECtHR 30 April 
2013, no. 49872/11, §210 (Tymoshenko v. Ukraine). The ECtHR considers three factors when 
assessing the compatibility of the detainee’s health with his stay in detention: 1) the detainee’s 
medical condition, 2) the adequacy of the medical assistance and care provided in detention, and 
3) the advisability of maintaining the detention in view of the detainee’s state of health. ECtHR 
16 June 2005, no. 22682/02 (Reggiani Martinelli v. Italy). ECtHR 27 July 2010, no. 15952/09 
(Rokosz v. Poland). ECtHR 24 March 2015, no. 38510/06, §48 (Stettner v. Poland).
114. ECtHR 24 January 2012, no. 57541/09, §§76-77 (Valeriy Samoylov v. Russia). 
115. ECtHR 1 September 2016, no. 62303/13, §33 (Wenner v. Germany).
116. EPR, 40.4. 
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placed under medical supervision for their own welfare.117 A medical screening is 
in view of the ECtHR a minimum precautionary measure.118 This means, in my 
opinion, that Member States are under the ECHR obliged to screen newly arrived 
detainees to detect health risks. This obligation derives from the Member States’ 
duty to protect detainees, who find themselves in a vulnerable position.119 
There are several instruments to detect the diverging health risks for detainees, 
for example a screening for tuberculosis or an interview on admission in prison 
(including screening for a suicide risk). Member States are under the ECHR ob-
ligated to perform systematic screening for contagious diseases on admission to 
prison.120 Detainees who are suspected of being infected with a contagious disease 
should be isolated for as long as necessary considering the period of infection and 
should be provided with the appropriate treatment.121 The ECtHR has under the 
relevant international documents referred to122 the CPT standards, holding that, 
save for exceptional circumstances, a medical examination by a member of the 
medical service should be performed on the day of admission, especially when the 
detainee is admitted to a remand centre. If the screening is performed by a nurse, 
the nurse should report to the physician.123 With regard to the obligation to en-
117. ECtHR 14 March 2002, no. 46477/99, §62 (Paul and Audrey Edwards v. UK), 
NJCM-Bulletin (28) 2003, no. 5, pp. 641-652 (with commentary from M. Boone). ECtHR 27 
November 2012, no. 29474/09, §§53, 34 (Tautkus v. Lithuania). See also Roscam Abbing 2013, 
p. 15.
118. ECtHR 4 February 2016, no. 58828/13, §§39, 45 (Isenc v. France): this case involved a 
suicide.
119. ECtHR 14 March 2002, no. 46477/99, §56 (Paul and Audrey Edwards v. UK).
120. ECtHR 14 December 2010, no. 25153/04, §51 (Dobri v. Romania). See furthermore ECtHR 
24 February 2009, no. 9870/07, §§69-70 (Poghossian v. Georgia). ECtHR 22 June 2010, no. 
10921/03, §33 (Gavriliţă v. Romania). See also ECtHR 30 September 2010, no. 44917/08, §§64, 
43-45 (Pakhomov v. Russia): medical assessment of detainee known with tuberculosis infection in 
compliance with Recommendation no. R (93) 6 on Control of Transmissible Diseases in Prisons. 
ECtHR 18 December 2012, no. 1871/08, §44 (Jeladze v. Georgia). 
121. ECtHR 3 March 2009, no. 23204/07, §86 (Ghavtadze v. Georgia). See also ECtHR 12 June 
2008, no. 39780/06, §58 (Kotsaftis v. Greece). EPR, 42.3, section f. 
122. ECtHR 18 December 2012, no. 1871/08, §31 (Jeladze v. Georgia): reference to CPT 
Standards 2010. ECtHR 10 July 2014, no. 8589/08, §66 (M.S. v. Russia) and ECtHR 5 February 
2013, no. 46108/11, §65 (Mkhitaryan v. Russia): reference to 3rd General Report CPT. ECtHR 5 
February 2015, no. 46404/13, §53 (Khloyev v. Russia): reference to EPR.
123. CPT/Inf/E (2002) 1 – Rev. 2015, CPT Standards, p. 39. This includes an interview and, 
if necessary, physical examination. The CPT acknowledges that a medical screening performed 
by a fully qualified nurse could be regarded as a more efficient use of available resources. See also 
Recommendation No. R (98) 7, I.A.1. EPR, 42.1. Recommendation No. R (93)6, I.A.2.
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sure an appropriate environment, Member States must protect detainees against 
health risks like passive smoking.124
Detainees suffering from mental problems are extra vulnerable.125 This calls 
for special protection.126 The ECtHR has referred to127 the recommendations that 
special attention should be given to screening for mental problems, the psycho-
logical adaptation to prison, symptoms of withdrawal, (infectious illnesses) and 
chronic conditions,128 and that State authorities should take action to diagnose 
mental problems as soon as possible.129 Detainees with a mental disorder are often 
more susceptible to feelings of inferiority and powerlessness, which calls for in-
creased vigilance in the assessment whether the ECHR has been complied 
with.130 Particular conditions, such as psychosis, pose an especially high risk that 
the person concerned will suffer from that condition.131 Member States must 
also take into account that detainees with mental problems may not be able to 
complain coherently or at all about how they are being affected by a particular 
treatment.132 Though the ECtHR has stressed the non-binding character of rec-
ommendations,133 it has several times referred to Recommendation No. R (98)7, 
more specifically the provisions on psychiatric symptoms, mental disturbance and 
124. ECtHR 13 September 2005, no. 35207/03, §§85, 89 (Ostrovar v. Moldova). ECtHR 14 
September 2010, no. 37186/03, §§60-65 (Florea v. Romania). ECtHR 25 January 2011, no. 
38427/05, §§47-55 (Elefteriadis v. Romania), EHRC 2011/70, with commentary from G. de 
Jonge.
125. ECtHR 1 June 2010, no. 28326/05, §62 (Jasińska v. Poland). ECtHR 6 December 2011, no. 
8595/06, §71 (De Donder and de Clippel v. Belgium). ECtHR 19 July 2012, no. 38447/09, §74 
(Ketreb v. France). ECtHR 2 February 2016, no. 65158/09, §91 (Drăgan v. Romania). ECtHR 14 
June 2016, no. 60103/11, §64 (Stepanian v. Romania).
126. ECtHR 16 October 2008, no. 5608/05, §§84, 109 (Renolde v. France). See also ECtHR 
22 November 2016, no. 1967/14, §48 (Hiller v. Austria) with regard to persons who are placed 
involuntarily in psychiatric institutions.
127. ECtHR 20 January 2009, no. 28300/06, §62 (Sławomir Musiał v. Poland). See for the latter 
recommendation: ECtHR 26 April 2016, no. 10511/10, GC, §67 (Murray v. The Netherlands).
128. Recommendation No. R (98) 7, I.A.1. See also EPR, 42.3.
129. Recommendation Rec (2003)23, 27. See also Recommendation No. R (98)7, I.A.5: access to 
psychiatric consultation and counselling should be secured. Larger penal institutions should have a 
psychiatric team at its disposal. If not (as in smaller institutions), it must be ensured that consults 
with a psychiatrist are possible.
130. ECtHR 20 January 2009, no. 28300/06, §96 (Sławomir Musiał v. Poland). See also ECtHR 
24 September 1992, no. 10533/83, §82 (Herczegfalvy v. Austria).
131. ECtHR 25 February 2014, no. 19696/10, §46 (Gheorghe Predescu v. Romania).
132. ECtHR 30 July 1998, no. 25357/94, §66 (Aerts v. Belgium). ECtHR 16 October 2008, no. 
5608/05, §120 (Renolde v. France). ECtHR 19 July 2012, no. 38447/09, §§109-110 (Ketreb v. 
France). 
133. ECtHR 11 July 2006, no. 33834/03, §72 (Rivière v. France). ECtHR 20 January 2009, no. 
28300/06, §96 (Sławomir Musiał v. Poland).
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major personality disorders. These provisions recommend (among others) that 
prisoners suffering from serious mental problems should be kept and cared for 
in a hospital facility, which is adequately equipped and has appropriate trained 
personnel.134 The ECtHR also refers135 to the recommendation that there should 
be specialised prisons or units under medical control to observe and treat detain-
ees who have mental problems but do not necessarily have to be transferred to 
a psychiatric hospital/unit. Staff also need to be trained in recognising signs of a 
possible risk of self-harm.136 These detainees should be provided with appropriate 
treatment and medical supervision.137 Holding a person with mental problems in 
an establishment not suitable for incarceration of persons with these kind of prob-
lems raises a serious issue under the ECHR, in particular Article 3 ECHR.138 If a 
person is deprived of his liberty because of his unsound mind and (among others) 
to receive the requisite mental treatment, the detainee should be detained in an 
appropriate mental health facility. If not, Article 3 ECHR139 or Article 5 ECHR 
may be violated.140 Special measures need to be taken to ensure that detainees with 
severe mental problems and a suicide risk are treated with human dignity.141 The 
134. ECtHR 16 October 2008, no. 5608/05, §64 (Renolde v. France). ECtHR 25 February 2014, 
no. 19696/10, §32 (Gheorghe Predescu v. Romania). Recommendation No. R (98) 7, D.55. See 
also CPT/Inf/E (2002) 1 – Rev. 2015, CPT Standards, p. 41: a hospital facility could be a civil 
psychiatric hospital or a special psychiatric unit within the prison system. The CPT stresses that a 
psychiatric unit within prison has the advantage that psychiatric care can be provided in optimum 
conditions of security. See furthermore EPR, 12.1. 
135. ECtHR 27 January 2015, nos. 36925/10, 21487/12, 72893/12, 73196/12, 77718/12 and 
9717/13, §144 (Neshkov and others v. Bulgaria).
136. EPR, 47.1-47.2 and Commentary to EPR, p. 21.
137. ECtHR 6 September 2016, no. 73548/13, §§107-108, 112, 114 (W.D. v. Belgium). See 
also ECtHR 3 November 2011, no. 32010/07, §§71-75 (Cocaign v. France). ECtHR 1 December 
2016, no. 45115/09, §42 (Trapeznikova and others v. Russia). See also EPR, 47.2: the prison’s 
medical service must ensure that psychiatric treatment is provided to all detainees in need of such 
treatment.
138. ECtHR 20 January 2009, no. 28300/06, §§94-98 (Sławomir Musiał v. Poland).
139. ECtHR 10 January 2013, no. 43418/09, §§88-102 (Claes v. Belgium). ECtHR 9 January 
2014, no. 22283/10, §§58-69 (Lankester v. Belgium).
140. ECtHR 2 October 2012, no. 22831/08, §§89-101 (L.B. v. Belgium). ECtHR 10 January 
2013, no. 43653/09, §§74-91 (Dufoort v. Belgium). ECtHR 10 January 2013, no. 53448/10, 
§§67-83 (Swennen v. Belgium). ECtHR 9 January 2014, no. 22283/10, §§84-96 (Lankester v. 
Belgium). ECtHR 3 February 2015, nos. 49484/11, 53703/11, 4710/12, 15969/12, 49863/12 and 
70761/12, §§61-69 (Smits and others v. Belgium). ECtHR 3 February 2015, nos. 49861/12 and 
49870/12, §§42-50 (Van der Velde and Soussi v. Belgium and the Netherlands). See, a contrario: 
ECtHR 27 January 2015, no. 43368/08, §§48-50 (Papillo v. Switzerland).
141. ECtHR 11 July 2006, no. 33834/03, §75 (Rivière v. France). ECtHR 16 October 2008, no. 
5608/05, §128 (Renolde v. France).
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ECtHR also referred to142 the CPT Standards that training of certain members of 
the custodial staff may contribute to early detection of psychiatric problems143 and 
the recommendation that if a detainee with mental problems, whose mental con-
dition is incompatible with deprivation of liberty in prison, is nevertheless kept 
in a prison, special measures needs to be taken to meet the detainee’s status and 
needs.144 Detainees with addictions also need to receive extra attention, especially 
during the first days of deprivation of liberty.145 The terminal phase of an illness 
also brings along extra vulnerability. As for care during this terminal phase, the 
decision to transfer persons with a short term fatal prognosis to an outside hospi-
tal should be taken on medical grounds. Before realising this transfer, the detainee 
should be provided with optimum nursing care within the prison health care 
centre. Measures should be taken for periodic respite care in an outside hospice. 
The authorities should examine the possibility to pardon on medical grounds or 
to early release.146 Extra vulnerability may also result from epilepsy, which may 
require extra precautions to prevent injuries sustained during an epileptic fit.147
State authorities must take into account any mental problem(s) of the detainee 
concerned when enforcing and executing disciplinary punishments. In particular, 
one must take into account whether the health condition of a detainee is compat-
ible with a punishment, for example considering a suicide risk. Medical personnel 
must be involved during or prior to the decision to enforce a disciplinary punish-
ment on a detainee with mental problems and there should be special (medical) 
supervision during the execution of the punishment to ensure that the health con-
dition of the detainee is compatible with the enforced punishment.148 
Close confinement of mental patients should only be used if it cannot be 
avoided and should be reduced to an absolute minimum. The use of this measure 
should be replaced as soon as possible by one-to-one continuous nursing care.149 
The ECtHR also refers to150 the recommendations that physicians and nurses must 
142. ECtHR 10 February 2011, no. 44973/04, §54 (Premininy v. Russia). See for the latter 
recommendation: ECtHR 26 April 2016, no. 10511/10, GC, §69 (Murray v. The Netherlands).
143. CPT/Inf/E (2002) 1 – Rev. 2015, CPT Standards, p. 41.
144. EPR, 12.2. 
145. ECtHR 25 January 2011, no. 26246/05, §67 (Iorga and others v. Romania).
146. ECtHR 5 March 2013, no. 44084/10, §§70, 130 (Gülay Çetin v. Turkey). Recommendation 
No. R (98)7, III.C.51.
147. ECtHR 24 July 2012, no. 38719/09, §§56-59 (Wenerski v. Poland, No. 2).
148. ECtHR 19 July 2012, no. 38447/09, §§87-99 (Ketreb v. France). See also ECtHR 16 
October 2008, no. 5608/05, §§106-109 (Renolde v. France).
149. ECtHR 16 October 2008, no. 5608/05, §108 (Renolde v. France). Recommendation No. R 
(98)7, III.D.56.
150. ECtHR 4 July 2006, no. 59450/00, §85 (Ramirez Sanchez v. France).
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pay particular attention to the health condition of isolated detainees and need to 
visit these detainees on a daily basis. They also need to provide them with prompt 
medical assistance when requested by that detainee or on request of the staff.151 
The physician must inform the governor if he is of the opinion that the physical 
or mental health of a detainee is being seriously put at risk by continuation of 
detention or by the conditions of detention, including conditions of isolation.152 
The obligation to protect the health and life of the detainee overrules in these cir-
cumstances the obligation to keep medical information of a detainee confidential. 
Detainees with a HIV-infection should not be isolated for that reason alone.153 
In case of deprivation of liberty by law enforcement officials, such as the po-
lice, the ECHR also requires extra attention for vulnerable persons. The ECtHR 
stresses the importance of performing a medical examination if a person with 
mental problems is deprived of his liberty by the police. A psychiatrist should as-
sess the compatibility of the detainee’s mental health condition with prolonged 
detention and should assess whether, and if so, what, therapeutic measures should 
be taken.154 A medical examination before a person is placed in police custody is 
one of the fundamental safeguards against ill-treatment of detainees.155 A medical 
examination is also important to discharge the burden of providing a plausible 
explanation for injuries found and to determine whether the person concerned 
is fit to be questioned during police custody.156 Systematic medical screening on 
admission at a police station to establish a detainee’s health condition and iden-
tify detainees with health risks is, however, not required pursuant to the ECtHR’s 
case law.
CPT Standards, Recommendations Committee of Ministers and WMA 
Declarations
The commentary to the European Prison Rules (hereinafter: EPR) states that the 
task of the physician commences as soon as a detainee enters prison. Several rea-
sons are provided for performing a medical examination on admission to prison, 
151. EPR, 43.2. 
152. ECtHR 16 October 2008, no. 5608/05, §108 (Renolde v. France). EPR, 43.3. See also WMA 
2014.
153. ECtHR 9 July 2015, no. 20378/13, §§70-72 (Martzaklis and others v. Greece): this may be 
different if a detainee has full blown aids considering the detainee’s vulnerability in this stage. EPR, 
42.3, section g.
154. ECtHR 16 December 2008, no. 58478/00, §§133, 170, 175 (Rupa v. Romania).
155. ECtHR 18 September 2008, no. 33086/04, §42 (Türkan v. Turkey). See also ECtHR 21 
December 2010, no. 45744/08, §39 (Jasinskis v. Latvia).
156. ECtHR 13 July 2010, no. 45661/99, §112 (Carabulea v. Romania). See also ECtHR 4 
September 2014, no. 40514/06, §58 (Rudyak v. Ukraine).
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namely: 1) identifying any pre-existing medical condition and providing appro-
priate treatment, 2) providing appropriate support to persons who suffer from 
the effects of  drugs withdrawal, 3) identifying any traces of violence a person has 
sustained before admission to prison,157 and 4) to assess the detainee’s mental con-
dition and to provide appropriate support to detainees who may be vulnerable 
to self-harm.158 The WMA recommends that the detainee’s health status should 
be reviewed within 24 hours after admission (including when transferred from 
another prison).159 In view of the CPT, systematic medical screening on admis-
sion should be performed in all places where persons may be deprived of their 
liberty for a prolonged period (more than a few days).160 Police custody does not 
fall within this category. No reasons are provided for not recommending a sys-
tematic screening on admission in police custody. In my view, a screening on 
admission in police custody is justified for several reasons: not seldom is an appre-
hension accompanied by police force, the detainee under the influence of alcohol 
and/or drugs and/or anxious due to the deprivation of liberty. Such factors bring 
along extra vulnerability.161 The vulnerable position of intoxicated persons has 
also been stressed by the CPT: a range of serious medical conditions (for example 
internal bleeding or diabetes) may be concealed by, or mistaken for, a state of in-
toxication.162 This extra vulnerability and the fact that the custodial staff are not 
medically trained in recognising health problems justify in my view a screening on 
admission in police custody. It has furthermore been recommended that if a de-
tainee held in detention on remand is being transferred back to the remand centre 
(for example after having stayed elsewhere in connection with the criminal inves-
tigation), the detainee should be physically examined on request of that detainee 
by a physician, or in exceptional circumstances, by a qualified nurse.163 
Furthermore, realising a transfer to a psychiatric unit should have the highest 
priority if it is, from a medical perspective, necessary to place the detainee in such 
157. EPR, 42.3, section c. See also CPT/Inf/E (2002) 1 – Rev. 2015, CPT Standards, p. 44. 
The ECtHR refers to these arguments in the communicated case: ECtHR 14 January 2016, no. 
13168/15 (Mihai v. Romania).
158. Commentary to the EPR, pp. 18-19.
159. WMA 2011.
160. CPT/Inf/E (2002) 1 – Rev. 2015, CPT Standards, p. 98.
161. See for the risks regarding intoxications during deprivation of liberty by the police for 
example: Thoonen, Kubat and Duijst 2015. Van Laere and Barends 2002. Aasebø, Orskaug and 
Erikssen 2016.
162. CPT/Inf (93) 8, Finland, p. 22.
163. Recommendation Rec(2006)13 of the Committee of Ministers to Member States on the use 
of remand in custody, the conditions in which it takes place and the provision of safeguards against 
abuse, 36.2.
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a unit. Violent detainees with mental problems should be kept under close super-
vision and nursing support. If considered necessary, supervision and support may 
be combined with sedatives.164  The WMA furthermore recommends that the 
use of isolation should be time-limited by law and that prolonged isolation against 
the detainee’s wishes should be avoided. Adverse health consequences of isolation 
should lead to immediate cessation of isolation.165
4.4.3. Access to healthcare 
Access to health care providers and the role of custodial staff
The ECtHR has referred to166 recommendation No. R (98) 7 holding that pris-
oners should at any time have access to a physician or fully qualified nurse from 
the moment they enter prison.167 The ECtHR has however also referred to168 the 
CPT-standards recommending that detainees should always be able to access a 
physician.169 It is therefore not clear whether access to a physician or nurse should 
be ensured at all times. The ECtHR also referred to170 the CPT Standards that the 
medical service in prison must at least be able to offer outpatient consults on a 
regular basis and to provide first aid. A physician should always be on call in view 
of emergency treatment and there should always be a person present in prison 
competent to provide first aid, preferably a qualified nurse.171 
Persons deprived of their liberty by the police have in view of the ECtHR a 
right of access to a physician.172 By referring to173 the CPT Standards that detain-
ees in police custody should be informed about their rights, including the right 
164. CPT/Inf/E (2002) 1 – Rev. 2015, CPT Standards, p. 41.
165. WMA 2006b; 2014.
166. ECtHR 29 April 2008, no. 26057/04 (Ivanova-Sokolova v. Bulgaria). ECtHR 20 January 
2009, no. 28300/06, §62 (Sławomir Musiał v. Poland).
167. Recommendation No. R (98) 7, I.A.1 and I.A.4. 
168. ECtHR 2 June 2009, no. 36936/05, §34 (Szuluk v. UK). ECtHR 15 June 2010, no. 
34334/04, §83 (Ashot Harutyunyan v. Armenia). ECtHR 24 July 2012, no. 35972/05, §121 (Iacov 
Stanciu v. Romania).
169. CPT/Inf/E (2002) 1 – Rev. 2015, CPT Standards, p. 39: detainees should have access to a 
physician at any time, regardless the applied regime. 
170. ECtHR 15 December 2015, no. 32917/13, §36 (Khalvash v. Russia).
171. CPT/Inf/E (2002) 1 – Rev. 2015, CPT Standards, p. 39. See also Recommendation No. R 
(98) 7, I.A.4.
172. ECtHR 24 July 2014, no. 46956/09, §116 (Lyapin v. Russia). ECtHR 5 February 2015, no. 
57519/09, §54 (Razzakov v. Russia). ECtHR 9 February 2016, no. 40852/05, §64 (Shlychkov v. 
Russia).
173. ECtHR 11 December 2008, no. 4268/04, §45 (Panovits v. Cyprus).
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of access to a physician, the ECtHR also stresses the importance of informing de-
tainees about their rights.174
When deprived of his liberty, the person in question is deprived of the pos-
sibility to call in medical assistance himself.175 Actually facilitating the detainee’s 
access to healthcare is therefore crucial. The custodial staff have an important role 
in providing this access.176 Detainees depend on the custodial staff to notify a 
nurse, physician or an ambulance if no facilities are available to secure direct ac-
cess to health care personnel (for example a phone line). The custodial staff must 
display adequate diligence in light of the detainee’s health condition as far as they 
know, or ought to know, about any risk.177 This means, inter alia, that if the cus-
todial staff receives information that the detainee might have sustained a trauma 
prior to the deprivation of liberty, they should seek medical advice. If a detainee 
cannot be woken, an ambulance must be notified immediately.178 If a detainee 
tries to make contact with the custodial staff while locked in his cell, the ECtHR 
expects the custodial staff to respond.179 The ECtHR has also repeatedly referred 
to the CPT standards,180 holding that police custody officers and prison officers 
should not try to filter requests for a medical examination but should notify a 
physician immediately.181 The argument that police officers could not be criticised 
for not recognising the medical emergency of a detainee because they are not 
medically trained, does not hold if it turns out that the police officers did realise 
that the detainee’s condition deteriorated.182 The foregoing shows that it is not the 
responsibility of (non-medically trained) custodial staff to examine and assess (the 
development of ) the detainee’s state of health. The custodial staff must ensure that 
medical personnel are notified in time,183 which requires that the condition of a 
detainee is monitored throughout the deprivation of liberty.184 The ECtHR does 
however expect that prison officers are trained in providing non-complex first aid, 
174. CPT/Inf/E (2002) 1 – Rev. 2015, CPT Standards, p. 6.
175. ECtHR 26 November 2009, no. 25282/06, §170 (Dolenec v. Croatia). 
176. ECtHR 1 June 2006, no. 39922/03, §102 (Taïs v. France).
177. ECtHR 21 December 2010, no. 45744/08, §61 (Jasinskis v. Latvia).
178. ECtHR 21 December 2010, no. 45744/08, §67 (Jasinskis v. Latvia).
179. Any disability of a detainee must be taken into account. ECtHR 21 December 2010, no. 
45744/08, §§62-67 (Jasinskis v. Latvia).
180. ECtHR 2 June 2009, no. 36936/05, §34 (Szuluk v. UK). ECtHR 24 July 2012, no. 
35972/05, §121 (Iacov Stanciu v. Romania). ECtHR 27 January 2015, nos. 36925/10, 21487/12, 
72893/12, 73196/12, 77718/12 and 9717/13, §§73, 255-256 (Neshkov and others v. Bulgaria).
181. CPT/Inf/E (2002) 1 – Rev. 2015, CPT Standards, pp. 11, 39.
182. ECtHR 13 June 2002, no. 38361/97, §§126-127 (Anguelova v. Bulgaria). 
183. ECtHR 13 June 2002, no. 38361/97, §§129-131 (Anguelova v. Bulgaria). ECtHR 13 July 
2010, no. 45661/99 §§122-126 (Carabulea v. Romania).
184. ECtHR 1 June 2006, no. 39922/03, §102 (Taïs v. France).
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especially if legislation requires these officers to provide first aid, for example when 
confronted with a suicide attempt.185 In my view, the foregoing principles show 
that the detainee’s access to healthcare must be ensured at all times. It will depend 
on the detainee’s condition whether access to a physician or a nurse must be en-
sured. This assessment should always be made by health care personnel.  
Facilities
By referring to the recommendations of the Committee of Ministers,186 the EC-
tHR stresses the importance that State authorities ensure that there is sufficient 
medical, nursing and technical staff working in institutions where persons are 
being deprived of their liberty.187 The ECtHR has also referred to188 the EPR that 
recommend that prisoners are given all necessary medical, surgical and psychiat-
ric care (including those available in the community).189 Reference is also made 
to190 the CPT Standards that stresses that, compared to the general population in 
free society, the prison population shows a high incidence of psychiatric symp-
toms. Therefore, the CPT requires that the medical service of every prison has a 
psychiatrist and that a number of nurses have been trained on this field. The au-
thorities must make sure that therapies (pharmaceutical, psychotherapy, activities) 
are available on a regular basis.191 
The ECtHR has also referred to192 the EPR holding that persons detained in 
prison should be examined whenever necessary.193 Member States are obliged to 
ensure that examinations and treatment prescribed by the physician are actually 
carried out and provided.194 If a specific medical treatment cannot be provided 
within the prison system, the authorities must take sufficient and prompt steps 
185. ECtHR 14 February 2012, no. 9296/06, §102 (Shumkova v. Russia).
186. Recommendation No. R (98) 7, I.A.2 and I.B.11.
187. ECtHR 29 April 2008, no. 26057/04 (Ivanova-Sokolova v. Bulgaria). The CPT recommends 
two fulltime equivalent posts of physicians on a population of 600 prisoners. CPT/Inf (2012) 21, 
Netherlands, pp. 24-25.
188. ECtHR 4 July 2006, no. 59450/00, §83 (Ramirez Sanchez v. France).
189. EPR, 40.5.
190. ECtHR 10 February 2011, no. 44973/04, §54 (Premininy v. Russia).
191. CPT/Inf/E (2002) 1 – Rev. 2015, CPT Standards, p. 41. See also Recommendation No. R 
(98)7, I.A.5: access to psychiatric consultation and counselling should be secured. Larger penal 
institutions should have at its disposal a psychiatric team. If this is not available (as in smaller 
institutions), it must be ensured that consults with a psychiatrist are possible.
192. ECtHR 27 January 2015, nos. 36925/10, 21487/12, 72893/12, 73196/12, 77718/12 and 
9717/13, §144 (Neshkov and others v. Bulgaria).
193. EPR, 42.2.
194. ECtHR 22 December 2008, no. 46468/06, §§154-158 (Aleksanyan v. Russia). ECtHR 24 
February 2009, no. 63258/00, §§61-62 (Gagiu v. Romania). ECtHR 22 November 2011, no. 
35254/07, §84 (Makharadze and Sikharulidze v. Georgia).
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to investigate whether the treatment can be provided outside the prison system.195 
If this is possible, the prison authorities must ensure that the detainee is actually 
transferred to hospital.196 The ECtHR has frequently referred to197 the CPT Stand-
ards holding that prison physicians should have the possibility to refer detained 
patients to a specialist. Direct support of a fully-equipped hospital, either a civil 
or a prison hospital, should be available. If a detainee has to be admitted to hos-
pital or examined by a specialist outside prison, the transport must be arranged 
as promptly as possible and must be compatible with the health condition of the 
detainee.198 That a detainee had been advised to undergo particular surgery prior 
to the deprivation of his liberty does not dispense the prison authorities from pro-
viding this surgery to the detainee while in detention and in good time. On the 
contrary, this should alert the prison authorities to act with greater expediency to 
prevent the surgery becoming overdue.199 
The State authorities must also create the necessary circumstances in which 
the prescribed treatment can be provided.200 This means that the facilities to ad-
minister prescribed treatment must be present. A prison hospital which performs 
surgery must, for example, have the facilities to perform surgery and to treat 
post-operative complications.201 If necessary medication is not available to the 
detained patient, the overall quality of the healthcare is called into question.202 
The unavailability of necessary healthcare will only raise an issue under Article 3 
ECHR if that shortage has actual negative effects on the detainee’s state of health 
or causes suffering of certain intensity.203 This means that if the detainee does not 
depend on the prison pharmacy for necessary medication (e.g. because his fam-
ily provides him with this medication and the detainee is allowed to take them), 
the detainee cannot claim to have been affected by the shortage in the prison 
195. ECtHR 1 April 2010, no. 37463/04, §§80-85 (Akhmetov v. Russia).
196. ECtHR 27 November 2014, no. 1157/10, §§8, 51-53 (Karsakova v. Russia).
197. ECtHR 14 December 2006, no. 4353/03, §67 (Tarariyeva v. Russia). See also ECtHR 5 
February 2015, no. 46404/13, §53 (Khloyev v. Russia): reference to EPR, 46.1.
198. CPT/Inf/E (2002) 1 – Rev. 2015, CPT Standards, pp. 39-40. See also Recommendation No. 
R (98) 7, I.A.7.
199. ECtHR 15 January 2015, no. 58530/08, §93 (Nogin v. Russia).
200. ECtHR 7 November 2006, no. 30649/05, §117 (Holomiov v. Moldova). ECtHR 29 
November 2007, nos. 9852/03 and 13413/04, §116 (Hummatov v. Azerbaijan). ECtHR 18 
December 2008, no. 30628/02, §74 (Ukhan v. Ukraine). ECtHR 23 July 2013, no. 4458/10, §63 
(Mikalauskas v. Malta).
201. ECtHR 14 December 2006, no. 4353/03, §§87-88 (Tarariyeva v. Russia).
202. ECtHR 22 November 2011, no. 35254/07, §80 (Makharadze and Sikharulidze v. Georgia).
203. ECtHR 15 November 2007, no. 30983/02, §§72-73 (Grishin v. Russia). ECtHR 27 
May 2010, no. 13772/05, §176 (Lebedev v. Russia). ECtHR 23 July 2013, no. 4458/10, §63 
(Mikalauskas v. Malta). 
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pharmacy.204 State authorities should therefore not deny detainees the possibility 
to receive necessary healthcare from other sources than through the prison’s health 
care service (for example a detainee’s own physician) if that care is not provided by 
the prison authorities, although security reasons may restrict the options.205 Fur-
thermore, State authorities should not shirk their obligations to provide healthcare 
by charging fellow detainees with certain tasks, such as administering first aid206 
or medication,207 or supporting a disabled detainee.208 Furthermore, necessary 
healthcare should not be refused on the basis of rude behaviour of a detainee or 
a violation of prison rules and discipline,209 though not observing recommenda-
tions of health care personnel by a detainee and his refusal to receive treatment are 
nevertheless relevant factors when determining whether Article 3 ECHR has been 
breached due to a lack of healthcare.210 
Relationship of trust
Another factor that serves access to healthcare is the relationship of trust between 
patient and health care provider. Necessary for a good relationship between a 
detained patient and medical staff are medical confidentiality, professional inde-
pendence of healthcare staff and the patient’s informed consent. Patients may be 
restrained in seeking healthcare (or in revealing relevant information), which may 
have negative consequences on that person’s health, if secrecy is not guaranteed,211 
if health care staff do not have an independent position in relation to the penal 
authorities, or if patients have been forcibly treated in the past. 
The ECtHR has referred to212 the CPT standards that medical confidentiality 
should be secured in prison as it is observed in free society. Medical examinations 
204. ECtHR 10 July 2007, no. 6293/04 (Mirilashvili v. Russia).
205. ECtHR 22 December 2008, no. 46468/06, §§155-156 (Aleksanyan v. Russia). ECtHR 4 
October 2005, no. 3456/05, §82 (Sarban v. Moldova).
206. ECtHR 3 February 2009, no. 23052/05, §74 (Kaprykowski v. Poland).
207. ECtHR 25 January 2011, no. 26246/05, §69 (Iorga and others v. Romania).
208. ECtHR 18 December 2008, no. 30628/02, §82 (Ukhan v. Ukraine). This will be different 
if the detainee refuses assistance of nurses and is voluntarily assisted in his daily routine by other 
detainees specifically chosen for that role. ECtHR 17 April 2012, no. 61254/09, §40 (Turzyński 
v. Poland).
209. ECtHR 11 March 2004, no. 40653/98, §85 (Iorgov v. Bulgaria). ECtHR 29 April 2008, no. 
26057/04 (Ivanova-Sokolova v. Bulgaria).
210. ECtHR 29 May 2012, no. 37862/02, §44 (Epners-Gefners v. Latvia).
211. ECtHR 2 June 2009, no. 36936/05, §§47-48 (Szuluk v. UK). ECtHR 23 February 2016, no. 
40378/06, §38 (Y.Y. v. Russia).
212. ECtHR 2 June 2009, no. 36936/05, §§47-48 (Szuluk v. UK). ECtHR 17 March 2009, no. 
15828/03, §80 (Salmanoğlu and Polattaş v. Turkey). ECtHR 1 February 2011, no. 23909/03, §94 
(Desde v. Turkey).
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in police custody and in prison should be performed out of the hearing and 
preferably out of sight of custodial staff. Medical confidentiality should also be 
observed when a prisoner wants to approach the prison’s health care services, for 
example by using sealed envelopes.213 The ECtHR has also referred to the recom-
mendation of the CPT that medical confidentiality should be observed regarding 
detainees infected with HIV/AIDS.214
Health care professionals should not compromise their professional independ-
ence, for example by contractual considerations.215 The ECtHR has also referred 
to216 the recommendations of the CPT and the Committee of Ministers that 
stresses the importance of professional independence of the health care staff work-
ing in prison,217 which can be guaranteed by aligning them as closely as possible 
with the mainstream of healthcare in the community at large.218
The relationship of trust between a detained patient and health care provid-
ers may also be compromised if medical treatment or examinations are forced 
upon the patient. The patient’s involvement in the choice of healthcare, his con-
sent in that respect, and the access to information that enables the patient to 
assess the health risk to which the patient is exposed falls within the scope of Ar-
ticle 8 ECHR.219 The ECtHR has referred to220 the CPT standards holding the 
importance of a patient’s informed consent before any medical examination is 
performed or treatment is provided. Informed consent is (next to medical con-
fidentiality) essential for the relationship of trust between physician and patient. 
This relationship is especially of importance in prison, where detainees do not 
have the freedom to choose their own physician. Every detained patient who 
is capable to decide for himself should be free to refuse treatment or any other 
medical intervention. Deviations should be clearly and strictly defined in law and 
should only be possible in exceptional circumstances which are applicable to the 
213. CPT/Inf/E (2002) 1 – Rev. 2015, CPT Standards, pp. 6, 12, 38, 42-43. See also 
Recommendation No. R (98)7, C.13. Recommendation No. R. (93)6, 8. Recommendation CM/
Rec(2012)5, 32.
214. ECtHR 18 November 2008, no. 871/02, §67 (Savenkovas v. Lithuania).
215. ECtHR 22 July 2008, no. 30009/03, §54 (Osman Karademir v. Turkey). ECtHR 17 March 
2009, no. 15828/03, §80 (Salmanoğlu and Polattaş v. Turkey). Or by fulfilling a double role: 
ECtHR 10 January 2013, no. 53448/10, §56 (Swennen v. Belgium). ECtHR 9 July 2009, no. 
39364/05, §53 (Khider v. France). See with regard to this matter also: Tomaševski 1992, p. 139.
216. ECtHR 25 February 2014, no. 19696/10, §32 (Gheorghe Predescu v. Romania). ECtHR 11 
March 2004, no. 40653/98, §50 (Iorgov v. Bulgaria).
217. CPT/Inf/E (2002) 1 – Rev. 2015, CPT Standards, pp. 46-47. Recommendation No. R (98)7, 
Section I, D. 
218. CPT/Inf (97) 1 [Part 1], Bulgaria, p. 51. See also Pont 2013, pp. 29-33.
219. ECtHR 5 October 2006, no. 75725/01 (Trocellier v. France).
220. ECtHR 2 June 2016, no. 59620/14, §100 (Yunusova and Yunusov v. Azerbaijan).
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population as a whole.221 The ECtHR has also referred to222 the recommendation 
of the Committee of Ministers holding that informed consent should neverthe-
less be obtained if medical duties and the interest of security do not correspond. 
Any derogation from the principle of a patient’s freedom of consent should have 
a legal basis and should be based upon the same principles applicable in free so-
ciety.223 The ECtHR has furthermore referred to224 the recommendations of the 
Committee of Ministers holding that informed consent should be obtained in 
case of detainees with mental problems.225
CPT Standards, Recommendations Committee of Ministers and WMA 
Declarations
The physician should only provide medical data to other members of the med-
ical team and only in exceptional cases to prison management, if this is strictly 
necessary for the treatment and care of the detainee or to examine the detainee’s 
or staff’s health. Medical ethics and legal provisions should be taken into account 
when sharing information and normally the patient should give his consent. With 
regard to the disclosure of information, the principles applicable in the general 
community should apply. Information about a detainee’s HIV/AIDS status may 
only be shared with other members of the medical team and, exceptionally, with 
prison management, if this is strictly necessary for the treatment and care of the 
detainee or in order to examine the health of the detainees and staff, with due re-
gard to medical ethics and legal provisions.226 The medical file should not be part 
of the general prison file.227 
The health care staff in prison can be faced with ethical questions and choices 
if their duty to care comes in conflict with considerations of prison management 
and security. The CPT states that only medical criteria should be taken into ac-
count when making clinical decisions, regardless of the physician’s formal position. 
Physicians working in prison should not be asked to examine whether a prisoner 
is fit to undergo punishment, to perform body searches or other examinations 
221. CPT/Inf/E (2002) 1 – Rev. 2015, CPT Standards, p. 42. See also WMA 2011; 2015: 
detainees should have the same rights as other patients, as laid down in the WMA Declaration of 
Lisbon. See furthermore section 4.5.
222. ECtHR 5 April 2005, no. 54825/00, §64 (Nevmerzhitsky v. Ukraine). 
223. Recommendation No. R (98)7, C.I.15-16.
224. ECtHR 11 July 2006, no. 33834/03, §31 (Riviere v. France).
225. Recommendation No. R (98)7, C.I.15. See also ECtHR 11 July 2006, no. 33834/03, §31 
(Riviere v. France): reference to Recommendation No. R (98)7, C.1.14.
226. Recommendation No. R. (93)6, I.A.8. See also WMA 2006b: physicians should observe 
special care to ensure that all personal medical information is treated confidentially.
227. Commentary to the EPR, p. 20.
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requested by an authority, except if an emergency arises and no other physician 
is available. Performing these tasks can undermine the relationship between phy-
sician and patient.228 The European Prison Rules do not fully correspond with 
these principles as these rules prescribe that if a health care provider performs a 
medical examination, he should pay attention to each detainee’s fitness to work 
and exercise.229 The ECtHR has referred to these latter recommendations.230 The 
Committee of Ministers recommend that the medical staff operates with com-
plete independence, with due regard to their qualifications and competences. The 
primary concern of the physician should at all times be the detainee’s health care 
needs.231 The prison physician’s professional duty still exists even if the detainee 
does not follow medical advice, expresses threats or uses violence.232 The CPT 
states that, in view of the professional independence of the health care staff in 
prison, they should preferably be attached to the Ministry of Health instead of 
the Ministry of Justice.233 
4.4.4. Quality of healthcare
Under Article 2 ECHR, Member States have the obligation to provide detainees 
with the healthcare necessary to safeguard their life.234 Under Article 3 ECHR, 
Member States must protect the health and well-being of detainees by providing, 
among others, the requisite medical assistance.235 A relevant factor to establish the 
necessity is whether the person in question followed the treatment prior to the 
deprivation of liberty.236 Member States have a margin of discretion to define the 
228. CPT/Inf/E (2002) 1 – Rev. 2015, CPT Standards, pp. 46-47. See also CPT/Inf (2008)2, 
Kingdom in Europe, Aruba, and the Netherlands Antilles, p. 134. See furthermore WMA 2006b: 
physicians must have full clinical independence to decide on the care of detainees for whom they 
have medical responsibility and body cavity searches should not be performed by the physician who 
will subsequently provide healthcare to the detainee. The WMA stresses however that body cavity 
searches should only be performed by persons with appropriate medical training to protect the 
detainee’s health. See also WMA 2014: physicians should never participate in the decision-making 
process regarding isolation.
229. EPR, 42.3, section i.
230. ECtHR 24 July 2012, no. 35972/05, §124 (Iacov Stanciu v. Romania).
231. Recommendation No. R (98)7, I.D.19-20.
232. CPT/Inf/E (2002) 1 – Rev. 2015, CPT Standards, p. 47.
233. CPT/Inf (96) 1, Kingdom of the Netherlands, Netherlands Antilles, p. 43. CPT/Inf (2017) 
1 – Netherlands, p. 30.
234. ECtHR 11 February 2016, no. 15509/12, §79 (Karpylenko v. Ukraine).
235. ECtHR 26 October 2000, no. 30210/96, §94, GC (Kudła v. Poland).
236. ECtHR 10 May 2007,  no. 14437/05, §§48-49 (Modarca v. Moldova).
Death in State Custody DRUK.indd   127 13-Sep-17   2:40:02 PM
128 Chapter 4 
manner in which they fulfil the obligation to provide detainees with the requisite 
medical assistance, such as the choice of an appropriate medical facility.237
The ECtHR examines the required standard of healthcare in prison on a 
case-by-case basis.238 The provided healthcare must be compatible with the hu-
man dignity of a detainee and must take into account  the practical demands of 
imprisonment,239 such as security concerns.240 Security concerns may, for example, 
require that measures are taken to ensure an operation in an ordinary hospital to 
be performed, which may lead to operational problems and some delay.241 If the 
treatment in question can be provided in prison, the ECHR does not require that 
the detainee is treated in an ordinary hospital rather than in prison, though such 
an approach is not objectionable.242 The ECtHR’s case law on the applicability 
of the principle of equivalence of healthcare in prison with that in the outside 
community shows some diverging views. The ECtHR explicitly stressed that it 
does not always adhere to this principle, at least when the case involved medical 
assistance to convicted prisoners (as opposed to persons detained on remand).243 
More recent case law shows that the ECtHR expects Member States to ensure 
that detainees are treated with due regard of their human rights and that in this 
regard no distinction is made between detainees held in detention on remand and 
persons deprived of their liberty after conviction.244 Member States must pro-
vide detainees with appropriate medical treatment comparable to the quality of 
healthcare to which the Member States have committed themselves to provide to 
the entire population. This does not mean that detainees should be provided with 
the same medical treatment which is available in the best health establishments in 
free society.245 As rightly stressed by Roscam Abbing, in the community at large 
237. ECtHR 5 April 2011, no. 2974/05, §79 (Vasyukov v. Russia).
238. ECtHR 21 October 2014, no. 9443/10, §38 (Marian Chiriţă v. Romania). ECtHR 30 
September 2010, no. 44917/08, §63 (Pakhomov v. Russia). ECtHR 5 January 2016, no. 55104/13, 
§55 (Catalin Eugen Micu v. Romania).
239. ECtHR 5 February 2015, no. 46404/13, §79 (Khloyev v. Russia). See with regard to the latter 
criterion also: ECtHR 29 September 2005, no. 24919/03, §186 (Mathew v. The Netherlands).
240. ECtHR 1 September 2016, no. 62303/13, §74 (Wenner v. Germany).
241. ECtHR 17 January 2008, no. 33138/06, §41 (Pilčić v. Croatia). ECtHR 20 January 2009, 
no. 44369/02, §63 (Wenerski v. Poland).
242. ECtHR 29 September 2005, no. 24919/03, §193 (Mathew v. The Netherlands).
243. ECtHR 22 December 2008, no. 46468/06, §139 (Aleksanyan v. Russia). ECtHR 30 
September 2010, no. 44917/08, §62 (Pakhomov v. Russia). ECtHR 14 January 2010, no. 3267/03, 
§59 (Moskalyuk v. Russia). See about equivalence of care in the ECtHR’s case law also: Hagens 
2011, pp. 207-209. See furthermore: Birmingham, Wilson and Adshead 2006.
244. ECtHR 5 March 2013, no. 44084/10, §130 (Gülay Çetin v. Turkey).
245. ECtHR 15 December 2015, no. 30575/08, §94 (Ivko v. Russia). ECtHR 2 February 2016, 
no. 65158/09, §83 (Drăgan v. Romania). 
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there are also differences in the quality of health services and variations in medical 
professional practices.246 Furthermore, detainees do not have the right to receive 
better healthcare than that provided in free society, which means that detainees 
can also be confronted with general queues.247 Member States are under Article 3 
ECHR also not obliged to comply with every wish and preference of the detainee 
regarding his medical treatment. A detainee will have to accept restrictions re-
sulting from the practical demands of legitimate deprivation of liberty,248 whereas 
medical authorities decide on the therapeutic methods to be used.249 The ECtHR 
furthermore accepts that advances in medical science and social and economic dif-
ferences between countries entail that the level of treatment available in diverging 
countries may vary considerably. Member States are therefore required to provide 
all medical care that their resources might permit.250 The ECtHR also accepts that 
the resources of medical facilities in prison are limited compared to those of civil 
clinics. Nevertheless, this must not adversely affect the detainee’s state of health 
or cause him suffering.251 Financial or logistical difficulties cannot relieve Mem-
ber States of the obligation to organise their penal system in such a way that the 
health and well-being of detainees is secured.252 All reasonably possible medical 
measures must be applied to try to prevent development of the disease in ques-
tion.253 The foregoing shows in my view that although detainees do not have the 
right to receive better healthcare than that provided in free society and that the 
authorities must provide detainees all medical care that their resources might per-
mit, a lack of reasonably possible healthcare will lead to a violation of Article 2 
ECHR (namely if the detainee dies or a life-threatening situation occurs) or Arti-
cle 3 ECHR (if it adversely affects the detainee’s state of health or causes suffering 
which fulfils the minimum level of severity), regardless of whether healthcare in 
free society is of poor quality. The fact that free civilians are provided with poor 
healthcare does in my view not justify that detainees are subjected to inhuman 
and/or degrading treatment. The principle of equivalence of healthcare is not 
246. Roscam Abbing 2013, p. 14. Roscam Abbing added that these differences are as such 
acceptable.
247. ECtHR 19 April 2016, no. 41252/12, §81 (Bagdonavičius v. Lithuania). See also: ECtHR 
29 May 2012, no. 37862/02, §45 (Epners-Gefners v. Latvia).
248. ECtHR 29 September 2005, no. 24919/03, §186 (Mathew v. The Netherlands).
249. ECtHR 24 September 1992, no. 10533/83, §82 (Herczegfalvy v. Austria).
250. ECtHR 22 December 2008, no. 46468/06, §148 (Aleksanyan v. Russia). See also: ECtHR 27 
May 2008, no. 26565/05, §44 (N. v. UK).
251. ECtHR 15 November 2007, no. 30983/02, §76 (Grishin v. Russia). ECtHR 22 December 
2008, no. 46468/06, §139 (Aleksanyan v. Russia).
252. ECtHR 8 January 2013, no. 56027/10, §88 (Reshetnyak v. Russia). See also EPR, 4. 
253. ECtHR 10 April 2012, no. 30909/06, §30 (Panaitescu v. Romania).
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discussed in the ECtHR’s case law with regard to healthcare provided during dep-
rivation of liberty by law enforcement officials such as the police. 
The ECtHR has also formulated more specific requirements on healthcare in 
prison. Adequate healthcare in prison means that diagnosis and care are prompt 
and accurate. If necessary considering the detainee’s health condition, medical su-
pervision must be regular and systematic. A therapeutic strategy aimed at curing 
the illness instead of addressing it on a symptomatic basis must be developed.254 
The detainee’s condition must also be evaluated thoroughly.255 The ECtHR em-
phasises the importance to act if the health condition of a detainee does not 
improve or stabilise, for example by transferring the detainee to hospital or by 
otherwise calling in more expertise considering the specific health condition.256 As 
for a prompt response, relevant factors are whether the detainee had been tested 
(in time)257 or whether the medical staff were negligent in establishing the diag-
nosis in time,258 just like whether medical treatment259 or aid had been provided 
in a timely fashion.260 
A prescribed and provided treatment must be effective considering the health 
condition of the person in question and the diagnosis.261 Medical standards are 
relevant in this regard, for example standards of the World Health Organization.262 
254. ECtHR 12 January 2016, no. 2763/13, §69 (Khayletdinov v. Russia). ECtHR 2 february 
2016, no. 65158/09, §84 (Drăgan v. Romania).
255. ECtHR 27 November 2014, no. 51857/13, §93 (Amirov v. Russia). ECtHR 23 May 2013, 
no. 44187/04, §65 (E.A. v. Russia). ECtHR 13 November 2012, no. 24677/10, §102 (Koryak v. 
Russia).
256. ECtHR 29 April 2003, no. 50390/99, §57 (McGlinchey and others v. UK).
257. ECtHR 22 November 2011, no. 35254/07, §§79, 90-93 (Makharadze and Sikharulidze 
v. Georgia). ECtHR 31 March 2015, no. 29736/06, §§82-90 (Davtyan v. Armenia). ECtHR 18 
December 2012, no. 1871/08, §44 (Jeladze v. Georgia).
258. ECtHR 3 February 2011, no. 8532/06, §§79-81 (Geppa v. Russia). ECtHR 5 February 2015, 
no. 46404/13, §86 (Khloyev v. Russia).
259. ECtHR 22 November 2011, no. 35254/07, §§80, 90 (Makharadze and Sikharulidze v. 
Georgia). ECtHR 15 May 2012, no. 23893/03, §143 (Kaverzin v. Russia).
260. ECtHR 27 June 2000, no. 22277/93, §87, GC (İlhan v. Turkey). ECtHR 14 February 2012, 
no. 9296/06, §§96, 104 (Shumkova v. Russia).
261. ECtHR 22 November 2011, no. 35254/07, §§77-80 (Makharadze and Sikharulidze 
v. Georgia). ECtHR 24 February 2009, no. 9870/07, §59 (Poghossian v. Georgia). ECtHR 21 
December 2010, no. 36435/07, §59 (Raffray Taddei v. France). 
262. ECtHR 26 November 2009, no. 25282/06, §170 (Dolenec v. Croatia). ECtHR 30 September 
2010, no. 44917/08, §§67-68 (Pakhomov v. Russia). ECtHR 19 November 2013, no. 37546/06, 
§50 (Fedosejevs v. Latvia). ECtHR 11 December 2014, no. 42184/09, §139 (Kushnir v. Ukraine). 
ECtHR 11 February 2016, no. 15509/12, §§83, 88 (Karpylenko v. Ukraine).
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Criteria prescribed in medical guidelines must be fulfilled,263 the applicable reg-
ulations and procedures must be respected and scientifically tested treatment 
methods must be used. The medical substances given and the equipment used 
should be approved.264 If discussions arise in relation to the most suitable therapy, 
Member States have a margin of appreciation with regard to the choice between 
the diverging options. The standards set by the ECtHR regarding medical care 
in prison must nevertheless be fulfilled. The detainee’s state of health and his 
background should be taken into account when deciding on the best suitable 
treatment option for that detainee.265 As for the examination by the ECtHR, it 
has stressed that “(…) it is not its task to rule on matters lying exclusively within 
the field of expertise of medical specialists and to establish whether the applicant 
in fact required such treatment during the relevant period (…) and whether the 
choice of treatment methods appropriately reflected the applicant’s needs”.266 The 
view of medical experts is relevant to examine the question whether the detainee 
had received adequate healthcare.267 
Medical care (for example prescribing medication) must be provided by qual-
ified268 and adequately trained personnel.269 The ECtHR has referred to270 the 
CPT Standards holding that the specific features of medical care in detention 
may justify an acknowledgement as a professional expertise, both for physicians 
and nurses.271 Such an acknowledgement can in my view have the form of a reg-
istration. Furthermore, the medical care must be complete272 and sufficiently 
263. ECtHR 22 November 2011, no. 35254/07, §§77-80 (Makharadze and Sikharulidze v. 
Georgia): treatment of tuberculosis.
264. ECtHR 18 December 2014, no. 25435/06, §72 (Belenko v. Russia).
265. ECtHR 1 September 2016, no. 62303/13, §§61-81 (Wenner v. Germany).
266. ECtHR 22 October 2015, no. 5212/13, §50 (Savinov v. Ukraine). See however also ECtHR 
1 September 2016, no. 62303/13 (Wenner v. Germany): drug substitution treatment could be 
regarded as the requisite medical treatment for the applicant. 
267. ECtHR 14 December 2006, no. 4353/03, §81 (Tarariyeva v. Russia). ECtHR 18 December 
2014, no. 25435/06, §72 (Belenko v. Russia).
268. ECtHR 10 January 2012, no. 13462/06, §88 (Česnulevičius v. Lithuania). ECtHR 3 
February 2009, no. 23052/05, §§73-75 (Kaprykowski v. Poland): the prison physician changed 
the detainee’s medication, though the medication was prescribed by a medical specialist. See also 
ECtHR 5 February 2013, no. 46108/11, §77 (Mkhitaryan v. Russia). See furthermore ECtHR 5 
March 2013, no. 44084/10, §§111-112 (Gülay Çetin v. Turkey): care for terminally ill detainees 
should be provided by qualified personnel.
269. ECtHR 14 March 2002, no. 46477/99, §§62, 64 (Paul and Audrey Edwards v. UK).
270. ECtHR 6 February 2014, no. 2689/12, §44 (Semikhvostov v. Russia).
271. CPT/Inf/E (2002) 1 – Rev. 2015, CPT Standards, p. 47.
272. ECtHR 5 February 2015, no. 46404/13, §86 (Khloyev v. Russia). ECtHR 27 November 
2014, no. 51857/13, §93 (Amirov v. Russia).
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frequent.273 Evaluating treatment provided to a detained patient is also impor-
tant.274 In case of a serious illness, an adequate assessment of the detainee’s state of 
health by a medical specialist in the disease in question is regarded as essential.275 
Medical personnel supervising a prescribed treatment must have the required ex-
pertise to supervise.276 Nevertheless, the ECtHR does not rule out the possibility 
that a detainee with specific health problems is provided medical assistance by a 
medical professional who does not have the credentials or a diploma in the rele-
vant field of medicine.277 Though no reasons for this exception have been provided 
by the ECtHR, this exception can in my view be explained considering the mini-
mum level of severity required to find a violation of Article 3 ECHR. If the health 
condition of a detainee is not affected by the fact that he is treated by a medical 
professional who does not have the required credentials or diploma, the minimum 
level will not be reached. 
CPT Standards and Recommendations Committee of Ministers
More detailed recommendations on the required qualifications of medical per-
sonnel working in prison have been given by the Committee of Ministers. Prison 
physicians should have experience in general medicine and psychiatry. Medical 
personnel working in prison should be sufficiently trained, especially regarding 
the functioning of the penitentiary system and the manner in which this system 
affects medical care for detainees.278 Specialist knowledge on the specific pathology 
of the prison population is recommended. Prison physicians and nurses should 
also adapt their treatment methods to the detention conditions.279 A medical au-
thority, and not the bodies responsible for security or administration, should 
assess the quality and effectivity of the healthcare and should manage the availa-
ble resources.280 
273. ECtHR 21 December 2010, no. 36435/07, §51 (Raffray Taddei v. France). ECtHR 19 
February 2015, no. 10401/12, §48 (Helhal v. France).
274. ECtHR 18 December 2008, no. 30628/02, §80 (Ukhan v. Ukraine).
275. ECtHR 1 September 2016, no. 62303/13, §56 (Wenner v. Germany). See also ECtHR 9 
January 2014, no. 66583/11, §§68, 74 (Budanov v. Russia).
276. ECtHR 22 November 2011, no. 35254/07, §81 (Makharadze and Sikharulidze v. Georgia).
277. ECtHR 5 February 2013, no. 41828/10, §86 (Gurenko v. Russia).
278. Recommendation No. R (98)7, II.D.34-35.
279. CPT/Inf/E (2002) 1 – Rev. 2015, CPT Standards, p. 47.
280. CPT/Inf/E (2002) 1 – Rev. 2015, CPT Standards, p. 46. Recommendation No. R (98)7, 
I.D.21. See also: International Centre for Prison Studies 2004, pp. 10-11.
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4.4.5. Continuity of healthcare 
Continuity of healthcare in case an individual moves between the community and 
prison or within the prison system is fundamental for a successful treatment of 
a patient.281 The ECtHR stresses the importance of a continuous supply of med-
ication.282 It also refers to283 the recommendations that the medical staff should 
pay particular attention to continuation of existing medical treatment284 and that 
the health care provider should also make arrangements to ensure continuation 
of the necessary medical and psychiatric treatment after release, provided that the 
detainee in question consents that such arrangements are made.285 If a detainee 
returns to prison from hospital, the authorities have the obligation to provide 
the appropriate follow-up care, for example performing check-ups. This obliga-
tion applies regardless of whether the detainee takes the initiative.286 A transfer to 
another penal facility, that takes several weeks, is not a valid reason to interrupt 
medical treatment.287 As for the issue of allowing a second opinion by a physician 
of the detainee’s own choice, the ECtHR stresses that this should as a rule be re-
spected, whereas any additional costs may come at the detainee’s own expense.288 
CPT Standards and Recommendations Committee of Ministers 
The medical staff should arrange that existing and necessary medical treatment 
will be continued during deprivation of liberty, provided that the prison physician 
prescribes continuation and, if possible, after consultation between the prison 
physician and the detainee’s own physician.289 The CPT furthermore stresses that 
prisoners cannot freely choose their own physician.290 Contrary to the EPR,291 rec-
ommendation No. R (98) 7 of the Committee of Ministers makes a distinction 
between remand- and sentenced prisoners. The first category should be entitled 
to ask a consult with their own physician or another outside physician at their 
281. ECtHR 12 January 2016, no. 2763/13, §73 (Khayletdinov v. Russia).
282. ECtHR 9 July 2015, no. 20378/13, §68 (Martzaklis and others v. Greece).
283. ECtHR 22 March 2016, no. 44694/13, §50 (Kolesnikovich v. Russia). See with regard to the 
latter recommendation: ECtHR 24 July 2012, no. 35972/05, §124 (Iacov Stanciu v. Romania).
284. EPR, 42.3 section b.
285. EPR, 42.3, section j. 
286. ECtHR 14 December 2006, no. 4353/03, §80 (Tarariyeva v. Russia). See also CPT/Inf/E 
(2002) 1 – Rev. 2015, CPT Standards, p. 39.
287. ECtHR 14 January 2010, no. 3267/03, §§65-66 (Moskalyuk v. Russia). ECtHR 13 November 
2012, no. 24677/10, §105 (Koryak v. Russia).
288. ECtHR 29 September 2005, no. 24919/03, §187 (Mathew v. The Netherlands).
289. Recommendation Rec (2006)13, 37.1. 
290. CPT/Inf/E (2002) 1 – Rev. 2015, CPT Standards, p. 42.
291. EPR, 10.1.
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own expense. Sentenced prisoners should be entitled to seek a second opinion. 
The prison physician should give this proposition sympathetic consideration, 
though any decision on the merits of this request is ultimately the responsibility 
of the prison physician.292 Recommendation Rec 2006(13) recommends that re-
mand prisoners should have the opportunity to consult their own physician or to 
be treated by their own physician if this is medically necessary and at their own 
expense.293 
The CPT has stated that a safeguard for continuity of care during police 
custody is access to the detainee’s own physician.294 It recommends to formally ac-
knowledge the detainee’s right of access to a physician by giving it a legal basis,295 
including the right to be examined by a physician of the detainee’s own choice.296 
4.4.6. (Medical) record and transfer of information
The ECtHR stresses the importance of obtaining the medical history of a detainee 
if the prison authorities are informed by the detainee of particular medical prob-
lems.297 A medical file must be compiled for each patient detained in prison.298 
A comprehensive medical record is important to ensure continuity of care299 and 
to monitor the condition of a detained patient.300 By keeping a comprehensive 
medical file, other health care providers who become involved in the detain-
ee’s treatment can take note of the necessary information, which is especially of 
292. Recommendation No. R (98) 7, I.C.17. The ECtHR referred to this recommendation in 
ECtHR 16 November 2006, no. 52955/99, §53 (Huylu v. Turkey). However, in ECtHR 5 March 
2013, no. 44084/10, §130 (Gülay Çetin v. Turkey), the ECtHR stresses that no distinction should 
be made between these two groups in relation to the possibilities of release considering a terminal 
illness.
293. The authorities should give reasons for refusing such a request. Recommendation Rec 
(2006)13, 37.2, 37.3, 37.4.
294. CPT/Inf (2012) 21, Netherlands, p. 18. CPT/Inf (2008)2, Kingdom in Europe, Aruba and 
the Netherlands Antilles, p. 19. 
295. CPT/Inf (96) 1, Kingdom of the Netherlands. Netherlands Antilles, p. 22.
296. CPT/Inf/E (2002) 1 – Rev. 2015, CPT Standards, p. 11. The ECtHR refers to this 
recommendation in ECtHR 18 December 2012, nos. 28923/09 and 67599/10, §99, communicated 
case (Azzolina and others v. Italy, Kutschkau and others v. Italy).
297. ECtHR 24 May 2016, no. 17564/06, §73 (Sadretdinov v. Russia).
298. ECtHR 14 December 2006, no. 4353/03, §§76, 67 (Tarariyeva v. Russia). See also ECtHR 
26 October 2006, no. 59696/00, §83 (Khudobin v. Russia). ECtHR 22 December 2008, no. 
46468/06, §147 (Aleksanyan v. Russia). ECtHR 7 February 2012, no. 20134/05, §135 (Alimuçaj 
v. Albania). ECtHR 24 July 2012, no. 35972/05, §170 (Iacov Stanciu v. Romania). ECtHR 23 
July 2013, no. 4458/10, §63 (Mikalauskas v. Malta).
299. ECtHR 27 January 2011, no. 10907/04, §54 (Iordanovi v. Bulgaria).
300. ECtHR 3 April 2001, no. 27229/95, §114 (Keenan v. UK).
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importance if the detainee does not provide this information himself or is not able 
to do so.301 The medical file must contain diagnostic information, an ongoing re-
cord of the evolution of the patient’s health condition and the performed special 
examinations.302 The medical record must also contain sufficient detailed infor-
mation about the prescribed and actually administered treatment, by whom and 
when the treatment was provided, and in what manner supervision is being held 
on the detainee’s health.303 It is important that handwritten notes in the medical 
file are legible, and that notes are made systematically and are complete. Names 
and doses of medication must be recorded, just like the frequency and duration of 
the treatment. The evaluation of the effectiveness of provided treatment must also 
be recorded.304 Changes in the detainee’s behaviour need to be recorded, just like 
requests for a physician, comments regarding drug use and suicidal expressions.305 
The ECtHR explicitly emphasises the importance of a complete medical record 
with regard to detainees with a suicide risk.306
If a risk for the life of others is concerned, the State authorities must in any 
event exchange necessary information about a detainee’s medical history and per-
ceived dangerousness.307 Such an interference with the detainee’s private life must 
have a basis in domestic law. Necessary information in view of a suicide risk 
regarding an individual detainee must be exchanged between the involved staff 
members (medical and custodial) within a prison. This means that there must 
exist a system through which necessary information about risks for a detainee’s 
health condition can be exchanged with the staff involved.308 It is also important 
that the complete medical file of a detainee is transferred from a civilian hospital 
to a prison hospital, especially detailed information on the performed treatment/
surgery in a situation of urgency.309 It follows in my view from the ECtHR’s case 
law that the medical record must be forwarded to the physicians in the receiving 
301. ECtHR 27 January 2011, no. 10907/04, §54 (Iordanovi v. Bulgaria).
302. ECtHR 14 December 2006, no. 4353/03, §§76, 67 (Tarariyeva v. Russia). CPT/Inf/E (2002) 
1 – Rev. 2015, CPT Standards, p. 40.
303. ECtHR 22 December 2008, no. 46468/06, §147 (Aleksanyan v. Russia). See also ECtHR 
14 December 2006, no. 4353/03, §§76, 80 (Tarariyeva v. Russia). ECtHR 18 December 2008, 
no. 30628/02, §79 (Ukhan v. Ukraine). ECtHR 10 June 2010, no. 1555/04, §138 (Zakharkin v. 
Russia). ECtHR 15 June 2010, no. 34334/04, §§107, 110, 112 (Ashot Harutyunyan v. Armenia). 
ECtHR 24 May 2007, no. 52058/99, §§87-88 (Gorodnitchev v. Russia).
304. ECtHR 18 December 2008, no. 30628/02, §§79-80 (Ukhan v. Ukraine).
305. ECtHR 7 January 2003, no. 57420/00 (Younger v. UK).
306. ECtHR 3 April 2001, no. 27229/95, §114 (Keenan v. UK).
307. ECtHR 14 March 2002, no. 46477/99, §61 (Paul and Audrey Edwards v. UK).
308. ECtHR 19 July 2012, no. 38447/09, §82 (Ketreb v. France).
309. ECtHR 14 December 2006, no. 4353/03, §§83, 86, 88 (Tarariyeva v. Russia). 
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institution if the detainee is transferred to safeguard the detainee’s own health.310 
The ECtHR has also referred to311 the recommendation that when forwarding a 
detainee’s medical file in case of a transfer, confidentiality should be ensured. The 
detainee should be informed about the fact that his medical record will be for-
warded in case of a transfer to the physicians in the receiving institution and the 
detainee should be entitled to object to the transfer, in accordance with national 
legislation.312 The ECtHR’s case law does not explicitly answer the question how 
to deal with an objection to exchange information. In Chave née Jullien versus 
France, the applicant complained about the continued presence of information 
about her confinement in a psychiatric institution. The European Commission 
stressed that storing information about a person who was compulsory admitted 
to a psychiatric hospital constitutes an interference with that person’s right to re-
spect for private life. The justification of such an interference is the protection of 
health, namely the rights of the patients themselves, especially in cases of com-
pulsory placement (reduce the risk of arbitrary confinement), and the efficient 
running of the public hospital service. The Commission stressed that Member 
States enjoy a margin of appreciation to determine the necessity of the interfer-
ence, the scope of which depends on the nature of the legitimate aim pursued and 
on the specific nature of the interference in question. To determine whether the 
interference is proportionate to the legitimate aim pursued, the interest of pro-
tecting health must be weighed against the seriousness of the infringement on the 
person’s right to respect for private life. As the State in question did provide ad-
equate and effective guarantees against abuse (the information was protected by 
the duty of medical confidentiality and not accessible to the public but only to an 
exhaustively listed categories of persons outside the institution involved), the in-
terference was not disproportionate to the legitimate aim pursued.313 This decision 
shows that Member States have a margin of appreciation in determining whether 
it is nececcary to interfere with a patient’s private life by not meeting a request to 
destroy a medical file (or an objection to exchange information). This implies that 
patients (including detained patients) have the right to have their medical file de-
stroyed, or object to an exchange of information, though this right is not absolute 
and may be outweighed by one or more of the interests mentioned in Article 8 §2 
ECHR. The foregoing decision also shows that an important factor with regard to 
310. ECtHR 14 December 2006, no. 4353/03, §§67, 76 (Tarariyeva v. Russia) and ECtHR 
15 June 2010, no. 34334/04, §83 (Ashot Harutyunyan v. Armenia): (explicit) reference to third 
general report CPT. See CPT/Inf/E (2002) 1 – Rev. 2015, CPT Standards, p. 40.
311. ECtHR 10 February 2004, no. 42023/98, §94 (Naoumenko v. Ukraine).
312. Recommendation No. R (98) 7, I.C.18. 
313. EComHR 9 July 1991, no. 14461/88 (Chave née Jullien v. France).
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the proportionality of an interference is whether there exist adequate safeguards 
against abuse of information.
As for police custody, the ECtHR has referred to314 the CPT Standards holding 
that the results of all medical examinations, relevant statements by the detainee 
and the conclusions of the physician should be recorded by the physician and 
made available to the detainee and his lawyer.315
CPT Standards 
It has been recommended that medical files in prison are kept according to profes-
sional standards316 and that the various health care providers in prison (physician, 
psychiatrist, nurse) keep one comprehensive medical file for each individual pa-
tient, which is accessible to other medical staff.317 The medical file should contain 
an admission form to record the medical history and the results of the first medi-
cal examination on admission.318 
The police should compel for each police custody detainee a single and com-
prehensive custody record, where all aspects of custody and all actions taken 
regarding the detainee are registered, such as signs of injury, mental illness etcet-
era.319 The date and time of the requests to consult a physician, the moment the 
physician is actually called and the moment the physician’s visit has taken place 
should be recorded in the police records.320 
4.4.7. Medication safety
Penitentiary authorities have the obligation to supervise that treatment, including 
distribution of medication, is correctly administred and followed.321 The ECtHR 
has under the relevant international documents referred to322 the recommendations 
314. ECtHR 9 February 2016, no. 40852/05, §47 (Shlychkov v. Russia).
315. CPT/Inf/E (2002) 1 – Rev. 2015, CPT Standards, p. 6.
316. CPT/Inf (2002) 30, Kingdom in Europe and the Netherlands Antilles, p. 63.
317. CPT/Inf (2008) 2, Kingdom in Europe, Aruba, and the Netherlands Antilles, p. 43.
318. CPT/Inf (96)27, Aruba, pp. 37-38. See also CPT/Inf/E (2002) 1 – Rev. 2015, CPT 
Standards, p. 98.
319. CPT/Inf/E (2002) 1 – Rev. 2015, CPT Standards, p. 7.
320. CPT/Inf/(2008) 2, Kingdom in Europe, Aruba, and the Netherlands Antilles, p. 71.
321. ECtHR 17 January 2017, no. 76512/11, §54 (Gengoux v. Belgium).
322. ECtHR 14 December 2006, no. 4353/03, §67 (Tarariyeva v. Russia). ECtHR 26 October 
2006, no. 59696/00, §56 (Khudobin v. Russia). ECtHR 30 July 2009, no. 10638/08, §92 (Alekhin 
v. Russia). ECtHR 5 April 2011, no. 2974/05, §44 (Vasyukov v. Russia). ECtHR 27 January 2011, 
no. 41833/04, §74 (Yevgeniy Alekseyenko v. Russia). ECtHR 14 January 2010, no. 3267/03, §39 
(Moskalyuk v. Russia). ECtHR 14 March 2013, no. 28005/08, §87 (Salakhov and Islyamova v. 
Ukraine). ECtHR 27 November 2014, no. 51857/13, §60 (Amirov v. Russia).
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of the CPT holding that appropriate supervision should be held on the pharmacy 
and distribution of medication and that medication should always be prepared by 
qualified staff, such as a pharmacist, nurse etcetera.323 Distribution of medication 
by unqualified warders constitutes in view of the ECtHR a shortcoming in the 
medical assistance for detainees, though this shortcoming was not by itself suffi-
cient to reach the minimum level of severity required under Article 3 ECHR.324 
In my view, this will be different if an error is made in the distribution of medica-
tion by unqualified personnel which poses a major health risk for the detainee.325 
Article 2 ECHR will under these conditions be breached if the error leads to the 
detainee’s death,326 whereas Article 8 ECHR will be breached if such an error has 
a sufficient adverse effect on the detainee’s health condition.327
CPT Standards and Recommendations Committee of Ministers
Additional guidelines for medication safety can be found in the CPT Standards 
and the Recommendations of the Committee of Ministers. The medical profes-
sion should have exclusive responsibility to prescribe medication.328 In view of the 
CPT, medication should preferably be distributed by healthcare staff.329 
4.4.8. Evaluation of healthcare
Another precondition to prevent premature death during deprivation of liberty is 
a system to examine the provided healthcare and possible errors, which is of im-
portance to prevent similar errors in healthcare in the future and to contribute to 
safe healthcare.330 The ECtHR has also referred to331 the CPT Standards stating 
that health care teams should keep daily registers of incidents with regard to pa-
tients. Such registers can provide an overall view of the health care situation in the 
institution and of specific problems that may arise.332
323. CPT/Inf/E (2002) 1 – Rev. 2015, CPT Standards, p. 40. See also CPT/Inf (2017) 1 – 
Netherlands, p. 16.
324. ECtHR 9 November 2010, no. 37138/06, §§131-132 (Farhad Aliyev v. Azerbaijan).
325. ECtHR 9 November 2010, no. 37138/06, §121 (Farhad Aliyev v. Azerbaijan).
326. ECtHR 14 March 2013, no. 28005/08, §111 (Salakhov and Islyamova v. Ukraine).
327. ECtHR 26 November 2009, no. 25282/06, §§128, 170-180 (Dolenec v. Croatia).
328. Recommendation No. R (98)7, III.B.49.
329. CPT/Inf (2012) 21, The Netherlands, p. 25.
330. ECtHR 27 June 2006, no. 11562/05, §117 (Byrzykowski v. Poland). ECtHR 22 November 
2011, no. 35254/07, §89 (Makharadze and Sikharulidze v. Georgia). ECtHR 14 March 2013, no. 
28005/08, §193 (Salakhov and Islyamova v. Ukraine).
331. ECtHR 26 October 2006, no. 59696/00, §56 (Khudobin v. Russia).
332. CPT/Inf/E (2002) 1 – Rev. 2015, CPT Standards, p. 40.
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4.5. Obligations of Member States versus end of life decisions 
of detainees
Several conflicts may arise between the obligations of Member States to protect 
the life of detainees and the wish of detainees to end or not continue their life, i.e. 
end of life decisions. A first example of such an end of life decision is a detainee’s 
refusal to receive particular medical examination or treatment, including the wish 
not to be resuscitated if the need arises. This refusal may place the State in the 
dilemma that intervention may prevent the death of the detainee, but interven-
tion will also mean acting against the detainee’s wishes and, therefore, his right to 
self-determination and his right to respect his physical integrity. The consequence 
of following the detainee’s wishes is that nature will take its course, which may 
lead to the death of a detainee. Another example is that a detainee starts a hunger 
and/or thirst strike, which means that a detainee refuses food and/or liquids as a 
form of protest.333 In this situation, the same dilemma will (if the detainee per-
sists) arise as with refusing medical treatment or examination: intervention may 
prevent the death of the detainee but means acting against the detainee’s wishes, 
and therefore his right to self-determination, and his right to respect his physical 
integrity. On the other hand, respecting the detainee’s wishes will ultimately have 
a lethal outcome. A detainee may also decide to refuse food and/or liquids with 
death as the ultimate aim, therefore to hasten the end of one’s own life.334 Though 
the aim diverges, the dilemma for the State authorities involved is the same as 
with a hunger and/or thirst strike. Furthermore, State authorities may also ob-
serve indications that a detainee is going to attempt to take his own life. In such 
situations, the State is confronted with the dilemma that non-intervention will 
mean that a detainee may take his own life, whereas intervention may mean that 
the State acts against the detainee’s wishes and may interfere with the detainee’s 
physical integrity. Lastly, a detainee may also request for euthanasia or assisted 
suicide.335 Fulfilling such a request means that the detainee’s life will be actively 
ended or the detainee will receive assistance to end his own life, whereas the State 
has an obligation to protect the health and life of detainees. In the aforemen-
tioned situations, a conflict arises between the obligations of the State and the 
333. Jacobs 2012, p. 17: “(…) the term hunger strike is defined as a determined effort by a 
mentally competent person who has indicated that he refuses food as a form of protest.”
334. See also Jacobs 2012, pp. 17-20. Williams 2001.
335. In 2014 and 2015 the media reported about a person detained in Belgium who 
had requested for euthanasia. See, for example: http://www.nrc.nl/nieuws/2015/01/06/
belgische-gevangene-mag-toch-geen-euthanasie-plegen/. Last accessed: 22 April 2017.
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wishes and/or acts of the detainee in question. These conflicts will be discussed in 
the following. 
A preliminary question that can be raised with regard to these conflicts, is 
whether it makes a difference that the detainee in question is held in pre-trial de-
tention (i.e. there is no final conviction of a criminal offence) or is deprived of 
his liberty after a final conviction of a criminal offence? Several arguments can be 
produced in relation to these two phases. On the one hand, one may state that 
persons held in pre-trial detention should be offered extra protection considering 
the presumption of innocence. The negative consequences of pre-trial detention 
should be as limited as possible considering that these persons must be presumed 
innocent until proved guilty according to law. This argument may however work 
both ways: it may refer to the infringements made on the detainee’s rights and 
freedoms (that should be as limited as possible), or to the efforts to protect the 
health and life of these detainees (that should be greater during the pre-trial phase 
considering the status of these detainees). On the other hand, there are arguments 
relating to the purpose of the deprivation of liberty. For example, the argument 
that persons held in pre-trial detention are deprived of their liberty to stay availa-
ble for the investigation, therefore to live to stand trial so that justice can be done, 
whereas it has also been argued that persons who are deprived of their liberty in 
relation to a final conviction of a criminal offence should be kept alive to en-
sure that they live to serve their punishment.336 The ECtHR stresses that Member 
States must ensure that detainees are treated in a manner in which their human 
rights are respected and that in this regard no distinction should be made between 
detainees held in detention on remand or persons deprived of their liberty after 
conviction.337 Therefore, no distinction is made in the following between persons 
held in detention on remand or after conviction.
4.5.1. Refusal of treatment
The conflict that arises if a detainee refuses medical treatment or examination is 
that the State authorities have the obligation to protect the health and life of de-
tainees, and there is an actual possibility to protect it, though intervention means 
that the State authorities act against the detainee’s wishes. Non-intervention may 
bring along a risk to the detainee’s health and/or life or that of others. Examina-
tion of the rights of the detainee and the obligations of Member States show that 
Article 8, Article 2 and Article 3 ECHR are relevant in this regard.
336. Jacobs 2012, chapter 4.
337. ECtHR 5 March 2013, no. 44084/10, §130 (Gülay Çetin v. Turkey).
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Article 8 ECHR contains the right to private life and protects (among others) 
the physical integrity of a person338 and the right to self-determination.339 The 
notion of private life also covers the right of access to information about one’s 
own health.340 The freedom to conduct one’s life according to one’s own choices 
covers the opportunity to engage in activities which may be physically or morally 
harmful or dangerous for the person in question. As for medical assistance, vital 
to the principle of the right to self-determination and personal autonomy is the 
freedom to accept or refuse specific medical treatment or to select an alternative 
form of treatment.341 This also applies to medical treatment that might prolong 
the patient’s life.342 Imposing medical treatment or examination without the in-
formed consent of a mentally competent adult patient interferes with his right to 
physical integrity343 and will breach Article 8 ECHR, unless the interference is jus-
tified under the second paragraph of this provision.344 One of the central factors to 
determine the validity of a patient’s refusal to undergo medical treatment is his ca-
pacity (competence) to make that decision.345 Article 8 §2 ECHR determines that 
interference with the rights laid down in the first paragraph of that Article must 
be in accordance with the law (i.e. must have some basis in domestic law),346 must 
be necessary in a democratic society and must pursue one (or more) of the aims 
laid down in the second paragraph, including protection of health. Necessary in 
a democratic society means that the interference corresponds to a pressing social 
need and it is proportionate to the legitimate aim(s) pursued. Member States 
have a margin of appreciation in determining the necessity.347 The extent of the 
Member States’ margin of appreciation varies in accordance with the nature of the 
issues and the importance of the interests at stake.348 An example of such interests 
are risks for the life of the detainee or of others. 
338. ECtHR 29 April 2002, no. 2346/02, §61 (Pretty v. UK).
339. ECtHR 3 November 2011, no. 57813/00, §80 (S.H. and others v. Austria). 
340. ECtHR 26 May 2011, no. 27617/04, §§196-197 (R.R. v. Poland).
341. ECtHR 10 June 2010, no. 302/02, §§135-136 (Jehovah’s Witnesses of Moscow and others v. 
Russia).
342. ECtHR 29 April 2002, no. 2346/02, §63 (Pretty v. UK). ECtHR 5 December 2013, no. 
45076/05, §69 (Arskaya v. Ukraine).
343. ECtHR 8 November 2011, no. 18968/07, §105 (V.C. v. Slovakia). ECtHR 13 May 2008, 
no. 52515/99, §82 (Juhnke v. Turkey). 
344. ECtHR 13 May 2008, no. 52515/99, §76 (Juhnke v. Turkey): the ECtHR refers to the 
subject’s free, informed and express consent.
345. ECtHR 5 December 2013, no. 45076/05, §69 (Arskaya v. Ukraine).
346. ECtHR 22 July 2003, no. 24209/94, §41 (Y.F. v. Turkey).
347. ECtHR 5 July 1999, no. 31534/96, §§65-66 (Matter v. Slovakia).
348. ECtHR 29 April 2002, no. 2346/02, §70 (Pretty v. UK).
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The ECtHR has referred to349 the recommendations of the Committee of Min-
isters holding that if a detainee refuses treatment, the detained patient must be 
provided with full information about likely benefits of medication and possible 
therapeutic alternatives. The physician must also warn the detainee about the 
risk of refusing the proposed treatment. The detainee’s full understanding of his 
situation should be ensured.350 The ECtHR also stresses that if a detainee refuses 
medical treatment and examinations and there is no evidence of coercion or ma-
nipulation, the detainee has been sufficiently informed about the risks and there 
are no indications that the progress of his illness endangers himself or others, State 
authorities have no choice than to accept the detainee’s refusal of medical assis-
tance.351 Under these circumstances, State authorities do not have a margin of 
appreciation but have to accept the detainee’s refusal. 
What if the detainee endangers his own health and life? The Vasyukov judg-
ment suggests that if the detainee endangers his own life, State authorities may 
intervene.352 As stressed by Jacobs,353 Article 2 and Article 3 ECHR are relevant 
to determine the scope of the margin of appreciation in relation to forced treat-
ment of detainees. Article 2 and Article 3 ECHR are important in relation to the 
question whether Member States have the obligation or room to apply proposed 
treatment or examination against the detainee’s wishes. Member States have the 
positive obligation to protect the life and well-being of detainees by providing the 
requisite medical assistance. It is however important to take into account the basic 
idea behind the existence of positive obligations. This has previously been argued 
by (among others) Jacobs, who studied the conflicting interests if a detainee starts 
a hunger and/or thirst strike. She stresses that Member States have positive ob-
ligations to ensure that people can exercise their human rights while deprived of 
their liberty. These positive obligations protect detainees’ rights and compensate 
or repair human rights which are jeopardised by the deprivation of liberty. The 
detainee’s right to receive the requisite healthcare should not be altered into an 
obligation of Member States to apply healthcare against the wishes of the detainee 
in question.354 Considering the Horoz judgment (and the principles discussed in 
349. ECtHR 25 February 2014, no. 19696/10, §32 (Gheorghe Predescu v. Romania).
350. Recommendation No. R (98)7, III.E.60. See also ECtHR 14 February 2017, no. 24421/11, 
§48 (Karakhanyan v. Russia).
351. ECtHR 5 April 2011, no. 2974/05, §79 (Vasyukov v. Russia). See also Mertens 2012, p. 226 
(quoting John Stuart Mill): the only justification to interfere with a person’s freedom against his 
will is preventing harm to others.
352. ECtHR 5 April 2011, no. 2974/05, §79 (Vasyukov v. Russia).
353. Jacobs 2012, pp. 198-200, 216.
354. Jacobs 2012, p. 315. See also Hagens 2011, p. 217. Van Kempen 2008, p. 43. Concurring opinion 
of judge Bonello ECtHR 21 January 1999, no. 26103/95 (Geyseghem v. Belgium). Mertens 2012, p. 226.
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the foregoing paragraph), where the ECtHR stresses that the State authorities 
could not be blamed for respecting the detainee’s refusal of intervention during 
the detainee’s hunger strike that eventually led to his death as the authorities pro-
vided the appropriate care,355 respecting the detainee’s refusal to receive proposed 
treatment leading to the death of that detainee does in my view not constitute a 
violation of Article 2 ECHR, provided that there is no evidence of coercion or 
manipulation, the detainee was capable to decide for himself (competent) and 
was sufficiently informed about the risks. This means that if a competent detainee 
refuses treatment and only endangers his own life, Member States have a wide 
margin of appreciation to decide how to deal with this case and no obligation to 
interfere exists.356
What if the person in question is not, or no longer, capable to decide for him-
self? The ECtHR adheres to the concept of representation of persons not able to 
consent, for example minors or adults who are not able to decide for themselves, 
including consent to a medical intervention,357 as laid down in Article 6 of the 
Council of Europe Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Dignity 
of the Human Being with regard to the Application of Biology and Medicine. 
This provision states that intervention may only be carried out on an incompetent 
patient if it is in his direct benefit and with authorisation of his representative, or 
an authority, person or body provided for by law. Furthermore, the ECtHR has 
referred to358 the recommendations of the Parliamentary Assembly holding that 
the Committee of Ministers should encourage Member States to protect the right 
to self-determination of terminally ill and dying persons, among others by ensur-
ing that, if the person in question is no longer capable to decide, their advance 
directive containing a refusal to receive specific medical treatment is observed.359 
As the ECtHR has also referred to360 the recommendation of the Committee of 
Ministers holding that any derogation from the principle of a patient’s freedom 
355. ECtHR 31 March 2009, no. 1639/03, §§28-30 (Horoz v. Turkey). See for an examination 
under Article 3 ECHR: ECtHR 23 February 2010, no. 48497/06, §59 (Đermanovic v. Serbia). See 
also Jacobs 2012, pp. 194-195. 
356. Jacobs 2012, p. 200.
357. ECtHR 29 March 2016, no. 3853/14, §82 (A.V. v. Estonia). ECtHR 9 March 2004, no. 
61827/00, §58 (Glass v. UK). ECtHR 23 March 2010, nos. 45901/05 40146/06, §77 (M.A.K. 
and R.K. v. UK).
358. ECtHR 19 July 2012, no. 497/09, §25 (Koch v. Germany).
359. Recommendation 1418 (1999), Protection of the human rights and dignity of the terminally 
ill and the dying. See also ECtHR 5 June 2015, no. 46043/14, §59 (Lambert v. France): reference 
to Article 9 Convention on Human Rights and biomedicine holding that patients’ previously 
expressed wishes should be taken into account. See about advance directives during imprisonment 
also: Elger 2014, pp. 101-119.
360. ECtHR 5 April 2005, no. 54825/00, §64 (Nevmerzhitsky v. Ukraine). 
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of consent during deprivation of liberty should have a legal basis and should 
be based upon the same principles applicable in free society,361 a representative 
should therefore be involved in the treatment of incompetent detainees, the de-
tainee’s direct benefit and any advance directives should be taken into account in 
the decision making process.362
The ECtHR’s case law shows two other factors that must be taken into ac-
count, namely whether the detainee’s refusal of treatment is the result of coercion 
or manipulation or action is required to prevent a risk for the health of others 
(staff, other detainees etcetera), for example if (there is a suspicion that) a detainee 
suffers from a contagious disease.363 In my view, it follows from the ECtHR’s case 
law that under these circumstances, State authorities have the obligation to act.364 
As for forced treatment, it is important to note that treatment which is necessary 
from a therapeutic point of view can in principle not be regarded as inhuman or 
degrading within the meaning of Article 3 ECHR. The medical necessity needs to 
be established convincingly. Whether medical treatment is necessary and whether 
this should be provided under duress must be assessed by medical authorities. 
Furthermore, procedural safeguards must exist to take the decision to apply forced 
treatment and these guarantees need to be complied with. The manner in which 
the treatment is actually administered and the suffering involved are also relevant 
when assessing whether Article 3 ECHR has been breached.365 Other relevant fac-
tors are whether the health condition of that person has deteriorated and whether 
the treatment has permanent consequences for the detainee.366 Article 8 §2 ECHR 
requires that forced medical treatment is in accordance with the law, pursues one 
or more legitimate aim(s) as laid down in paragraph 2 (including the protection 
of health) and is necessary in a democratic society, i.e. corresponds with a pressing 
social need and is proportionate to the legitimate aim(s) pursued.367
361. Recommendation No. R (98)7, I.C.15-16.
362. See however also ECtHR 24 September 1992, no. 10533/83, §81 (Herczegfalvy v. Austria): 
involvement representative in decision making process not taken into account. See furthermore 
section 4.5.2.
363. ECtHR 5 April 2011, no. 2974/05, §79 (Vasyukov v. Russia).
364. ECtHR 28 October 1998, no. 23452/94, §116, GC (Osman v. UK). ECtHR 14 March 
2002, no. 46477/99, §57 (Paul and Audrey Edwards v. UK).
365. ECtHR 24 September 1992, no. 10533/83, §82 (Herczegfalvy v. Austria). ECtHR 10 
February 2004, no. 42023/98, §112 (Naoumenko v. Ukraine). ECtHR 5 April 2005, no. 54825/00, 
§§93-96 (Nevmerzhitsky v. Ukraine).
366. ECtHR 11 July 2006, 54810/00, §§69, 72-74, GC (Jalloh v. Germany). EComHR 20 
October 1997, no. 33977/96 (Ilijkov v. Bulgaria).
367. ECtHR 3 July 2012, no. 34806/04, §§212-213 (X. v. Finland).
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4.5.2. Hunger and/or thirst strike368
The conflict that arises if a detainee starts and persists in a hunger and/or thirst 
strike is that the State authorities have the obligation to protect the health and 
life of a detainee, though intervention (for example force-feeding) will mean that 
the State act against the detainee’s wishes. Non-intervention will on the other 
hand ultimately have a lethal outcome. The conflict between the detainee’s right 
to physical integrity and self-determination and the Member State’s positive ob-
ligation under Article 2 ECHR if a detainee starts and persists in a hunger and/
or thirst strike is not solved by the Convention itself.369 Though Member States 
have the obligation to protect the life of detainees, this obligation does not entail 
that Article 2 ECHR will be violated if State authorities do not intervene during 
a hunger and/or thirst strike of a competent detainee, provided that the author-
ities carefully assess the situation and act with care.370 Jacobs, who performed an 
in-depth study of the aforementioned conflicting interests, concludes that positive 
obligations exist to ensure that people can exercise their human rights while in 
custody and Member States do not have an obligation under Article 2 ECHR to 
intervene if a competent prisoner or detainee371 refuses food or liquids even if this 
leads to the death of the prisoner or detainee. Jacobs concludes that the basic prin-
ciple must be that prisoners and detainees have the right to go on hunger strike 
and no intervention is allowed if the detainee has made an informed refusal to a 
specific treatment, such as the application of food and/or fluids.372 Member States 
do have the obligation to offer adequate medical treatment and assistance if a de-
tainee is on a hunger and/or thirst strike.373 The foregoing means, among others, 
that the medical personnel must ensure that the detainee understands the medical 
consequences of a hunger and/or thirst strike. They also need to verify that the 
detainee’s decision to go on hunger and/or thirst strike is taken voluntarily and 
368. See for an in-depth study on force-feeding of prisoners and detainees on hunger strike: Jacobs 
2012.
369. EComHR 9 May 1984, no. 10565/83 (X. v. Germany). ECtHR 5 April 2005, no. 54825/00, 
§93 (Nevmerzhitsky v. Ukraine). ECtHR 19 June 2007, no. 12066/02, §76 (Ciorap v. Moldova).
370. ECtHR 26 March 2013, no. 73175/10, §51 (Rappaz v. Switzerland). ECtHR 31 March 
2009, no. 1639/03, §§28-30 (Horoz v. Turkey).
371. Jacobs makes a distinction between prisoners and detainees.
372. Jacobs 2012, pp. 315, 318-321. Jacobs proposes however that one exception to the basic rule 
must be accepted. Jacobs 2012, pp. 321-340.
373. ECtHR 5 April 2005, no. 54825/00, §§100-106 (Nevmerzhitsky v. Ukraine). ECtHR 
26 March 2013, no. 73175/10, §62 (Rappaz v. Switzerland). ECtHR 10 November 2005, no. 
22913/04, §82 (Tekin Yildiz v. Turkey). ECtHR 31 March 2009, no. 1639/03, §§28-30 (Horoz 
v. Turkey). ECtHR 22 November 2011, no. 35254/07, §82 (Makharadze and Sikharulidze v. 
Georgia). See also Jacobs 2012, pp. 194-195. 
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is not the result of mental impairment or any other outside pressure. Continu-
ing communication between the detainee and the medical staff during the strike 
is important. The medical staff must verify on a daily basis whether the detainee 
persists in continuation of the strike. It is crucial to find out the true reasons and 
intentions for the strike. If these reasons involve serious medical mismanagement, 
Member States must immediately start negotiations with the detainee to find a 
suitable solution, subject to the limitations of a lawful detention.374 The ECtHR 
has also referred to375 the recommendation that a detainee on hunger strike should 
only be clinically assessed with the express permission of the detainee, unless the 
detainee suffers from severe mental problems requiring a transfer to a psychiatric 
facility. The physician should report to the appropriate authority if, in his view, 
the hunger striker’s condition is becoming significantly worse. He should also take 
action in accordance with national legislation, including professional standards.376 
Though the ECtHR has referred to both the WMA Declaration of Tokyo and 
the Declaration of Malta (holding the principle not to intervene when a compe-
tent, informed detainee voluntarily persists in a hunger and/or thirst strike), the 
case law also shows that the ECtHR is not principally opposed to force-feeding 
of detainees.377 Noteworthy is that the ECtHR examines force-feeding of de-
tainees under Article 3 ECHR and (in general) not under Article 8 ECHR.378 
Force-feeding of detainees will not breach Article 3 ECHR if 1) it is aimed at sav-
ing the life of the detainee and is necessary from a medical perspective, which 
necessity is convincingly shown to exist, 2) there are procedural guarantees to 
decide on force-feeding, which have been met in the individual case, and 3) the 
manner in which the force-feeding is applied will not trespass the minimum level 
of severity required under Article 3 ECHR.379 Repeated force-feeding of a de-
tainee not prompted by valid medical reasons but applied with the aim of forcing 
the detainee to stop his protest and in such a manner that it caused great physical 
pain and humiliation constitutes torture pursuant to Article 3 ECHR.380 In Hercze-
gfalvy versus Austria, where a complaint had been raised that Article 8 ECHR 
(and Article 3) had been violated considering the force-feeding of a detainee, the 
374. ECtHR 22 November 2011, no. 35254/07, §83 (Makharadze and Sikharulidze v. Georgia). 
See also Recommendation No. R (98)7, III.D.60-63.
375. ECtHR 29 April 2008, no. 26057/04 (Ivanova-Sokolova v. Bulgaria).
376. Recommendation No. R (98)7, III.D.60-63.
377. See for example ECtHR 5 April 2005, no. 54825/00, §§68-69, 93-99 (Nevmerzhitsky v. 
Ukraine). See also Jacobs 2012, p. 216.
378. Jacobs 2012, pp. 180-200.
379. ECtHR 5 April 2005, no. 54825/00, §§100-106 (Nevmerzhitsky v. Ukraine), NJCM-Bulletin 
(30) 2005, no. 7, pp. 992-1000, with commentary from P. Vegter.
380. ECtHR 19 June 2007, no. 12066/02, §89 (Ciorap v. Moldova).
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ECtHR did make an assessment under Article 8 ECHR and concluded that the 
medical necessity of the measure and the detainee’s incompetence to take deci-
sions for himself were relevant to conclude that Article 8 ECHR had not been 
violated.381 Whether the detainee’s representative consented to the force-feeding 
has not been explicitly taken into account,382 which shows in my view a disregard 
of a basic health care principle, namely that if a patient is not capable to decide 
for himself, a representative should be involved in the decision-making process.383 
WMA Declaration of Malta and Declaration of Tokyo
The WMA stresses that physicians should respect the detainee’s individual auton-
omy and that hunger strikers should not be forcibly given treatment if they refuse 
while being informed of the potential consequences and the refusal is voluntary. 
Physicians must verify that the hunger striker does not have a mental impairment 
which seriously undermines his competence to decide for himself and that the de-
cision to start a hunger strike is made voluntarily. The detainee must understand 
the potential health consequences of fasting. If the detainee is not competent to 
decide for himself, he cannot be regarded as a hunger striker and needs, in view 
of the WMA, to be given treatment for his mental health problems. The WMA 
stresses with regard to dual loyalties that the physician’s primary obligation is to 
the individual patient. The physician should examine the detainee at the start 
of the hunger strike, acquire a detailed and accurate medical history of the de-
tainee, and the detainee’s wishes regarding medical treatment and management 
of future symptoms should be discussed, including the detainee’s wishes if he is 
no longer able to communicate meaningfully. It should be ascertained on a daily 
basis whether the detainee wishes to continue the strike. If no advance instruc-
tions exist and discussion with the detainee is not possible, the physician must 
act according to what he thinks is to be in the hunger striker’s best interest. This 
includes taking into account the detainee’s previously expressed wishes, his per-
sonal and cultural values and his physical health.384 The WMA also stresses that 
the decision on the detainee’s capacity to decide to refuse nourishment should be 
confirmed by one other independent physician.385 
381. ECtHR 24 September 1992, no. 10533/83, §§85-86, 83 (Herczegfalvy v. Austria).
382. Although the Government did state that the curator of the applicant agreed to the coercive 
measures including injection of sedatives and the use of handcuffs and a security bed. ECtHR 24 
September 1992, no. 10533/83, §81 (Herczegfalvy v. Austria).
383. See also Jacobs 2012, p. 319. 
384. WMA 2006.
385. WMA 2006b.
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4.5.3. Stop eating and drinking to hasten the end of life
A detainee may also stop eating and drinking to hasten the end of life, for exam-
ple if the detainee is in a terminal stage of an illness and no longer takes food or 
liquids to accelerate death. Non-intervention by the State authorities will mean 
that death may occur sooner than if food and liquids would be ingested. The con-
flict which arises is that the State authorities have the obligation to protect the 
health and life of detainees, though will act against the detainee’s wishes if he is 
force-fed or if other interventions are applied. Non-intervention will ultimately 
lead to the death of the detainee, which is however already imminent. This issue 
has to my knowledge not yet been raised before the ECtHR. Following the same 
line of reasoning as with a competent detainee’s refusal to be treated and a compe-
tent detainee in a hunger and/or thirst strike,386 the State authorities do not have 
an obligation to intervene if a competent detainee decides with full understanding 
of the consequences to stop ingesting food and liquids with the aim to accelerate 
death in the final stages of life.387 In case of an incompetent detainee, the repre-
sentative of the detainee should be involved in the decision-making process. The 
detainee’s best interests should be taken into account.388
What if a competent detainee is not in the terminal stage of an illness but 
nevertheless stops ingesting food and liquids with death as ultimate aim? The 
question has been raised whether this is a form of suicide or the ultimately ex-
ercise of the right to self-determination.389 In my view, it is essential to identify 
the conflict which arises under these circumstances. A competent detainee’s deci-
sion to stop ingesting food or liquids does not correspond with the obligation of 
the State in question to protect that detainee’s health and life. Non-intervention 
will mean that nature will take its course with death as ultimate and irreversible 
consequence, whereas intervention will breach the detainee’s wishes. Follow-
ing the aforementioned line of reasoning regarding hunger and/or thirst strikes 
would mean that the State is not obliged to intervene if the detainee is com-
petent to decide for himself, made a voluntarily decision and is fully informed 
about the possible consequences. The State authorities do have the obligation to 
offer appropriate healthcare.390 In case of an incompetent detainee, the detainee’s 
386. See Jacobs 2012, p. 315. Hagens 2011, p. 217. Van Kempen 2008, p. 43. Concurring opinion 
of judge Bonello ECtHR 21 January 1999, no. 26103/95 (Geyseghem v. Belgium). Mertens 2012, 
p. 226.
387. ECtHR 31 March 2009, no. 1639/03, §§28-30 (Horoz v. Turkey).
388. ECtHR 5 April 2005, no. 54825/00, §64 (Nevmerzhitsky v. Ukraine): reference to 
Recommendation No. R (98) 7, I.C.16.
389. Williams 2001.
390. ECtHR 31 March 2009, no. 1639/03, §§28-30 (Horoz v. Turkey).
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representative should be involved in the decision-making process and should ob-
serve the detainee’s best interests.391
4.5.4. Suicide
The conflict in suicide (prevention) among detainees is that State authorities take 
measures to prevent a detainee from terminating his own life. At least two ques-
tions arise in this conflict: 1) is there a right to take one’s own life, and 2) do 
Member States have the obligation to prevent suicides? In Haas versus Switzer-
land, the ECtHR stresses that Article 8 ECHR also covers the right to decide 
by what means and at what point one’s life will end, provided that the person 
concerned is capable to freely reach a decision on this question and acts accord-
ingly. However, Member States have the obligation to protect vulnerable people, 
including the obligation to prevent an individual from taking his own life if that 
decision has not taken freely and with full understanding of what is involved.392 
Hendriks has stressed that by acknowledging the right to determine one’s end of 
life, the ECtHR seems to be opposed to legislation prohibiting suicide.393 In my 
view, the Haas judgment acknowledges the right to take one’s own life considering 
the role of the right to self-determination in this regard.
The aforementioned principles hardly (explicitly) emerges in the ECtHR’s 
case law on suicides among detainees. In Keenan versus The United Kingdom, 
the government argued that special considerations arise with regard to suicides 
considering the principles of dignity and autonomy. These principles would put 
restraints on the preventive measures taken by the authorities. The ECtHR stresses 
in response that the authorities must meet their obligations in a manner compat-
ible with the individual’s rights and freedoms. There exist general measures and 
precautions to reduce the possibilities for self-harm which do not infringe the 
personal autonomy of the person concerned. It will depend on the circumstances 
of the case whether more stringent measures are required and whether it is rea-
sonable to enforce them.394 In my view, the ECtHR does not explicitly take into 
391. ECtHR 5 April 2005, no. 54825/00, §64 (Nevmerzhitsky v. Ukraine): reference to 
Recommendation No. R (98) 7, I.C.16.
392. ECtHR 20 January 2011, no. 31322/07, §§51, 54 (Haas v. Switzerland). See, for example, 
ECtHR 13 March 2012, no. 2694/08, §61 (Reynolds v. UK): suicide of voluntary in-patient in an 
intensive support unit.
393. GJ 2011/53.
394. ECtHR 3 April 2001, no. 27229/95, §92 (Keenan v. UK). ECtHR 17 February 2015, no. 
43696/14, §13 (Kałużna v. Poland). See also ECtHR 16 October 2008, no. 5608/05, §83 (Renolde 
v. France). ECtHR 5 July 2005, no. 49790/99, §70 (Trubnikov v. Russia). ECtHR 13 December 
Death in State Custody DRUK.indd   149 13-Sep-17   2:40:04 PM
150 Chapter 4 
account what has been stressed in Haas versus Switzerland, namely the right to 
decide by what means and at what point one’s life will end, provided that the per-
son concerned is capable of freely reaching a decision on this question and acts 
accordingly with full understanding of the consequences.395 This also applies to 
judgments on suicide among detainees after the Haas judgment. In these cases, 
the ECtHR explicitly examines whether the State authorities knew, or ought to 
have known, about a real and immediate suicide risk of a detainee and, if so, 
whether the authorities did all that could reasonably have been expected of them 
to prevent the suicide attempt or the lethal outcome.396 This means in my view 
that State authorities have an operational obligation to act if they have knowl-
edge or ought to know about a suicide risk regarding a detainee. The case law of 
the ECtHR therefore seems to suggest that detainees are by definition regarded 
as a group of vulnerable people who cannot freely take a decision on this matter 
and with full understanding of what is involved considering the circumstances. 
The question can be raised whether such categorical approach is desirable, also 
considering the ECtHR’s view that detainees cannot be regarded as a real and im-
mediate suicide risk just because they are deprived of their liberty?397 The ECtHR 
does leave room for an individual assessment by stating that whether any more 
stringent measures, apart from general measures and precautions, are necessary 
with regard to a detainee and whether it is reasonable to apply them will depend 
on the circumstances of the case.398 However, it is not clear what factors are rele-
vant to determine the reasonableness of measures to intervene. What is the role of 
the detainee’s right to self-determination in this regard? A complicating factor is 
the context of deprivation of liberty, and the high prevalence of mental illnesses 
2012, no. 62120/09, §85 (Volk v. Slovenia). ECtHR 22 January 2013, no. 31963/08, §47 (Mitić 
v. Serbia). ECtHR 9 October 2012, no. 1413/07, §55 (Çoşelav v. Turkey). ECtHR 19 July 2012, 
no. 38447/09, §73 (Ketreb v. France). ECtHR 1 June 2010, no. 28326/05, §61 (Jasińska v. 
Poland). ECtHR 6 December 2011, no. 8595/06, §70 (De Donder and De Clippel v. Belgium). 
General measures are for example confiscating sharp objects, belt or laces, keeping supervision 
and a physician’s visit to the detainee. See for example ECtHR 21 October 2008, no. 8327/03, 
§89 (Kilavuz v. Turkey). ECtHR 16 November 2000, no. 21422/93, §74 (Tanribilir v. Turkey). 
ECtHR 18 October 2005, no. 46747/99, §47 (Akdoğdu v. Turkey). ECtHR 30 November 2004, 
no. 38418/97, §44 (A.K. and V.K. v. Turkey).
395. ECtHR 20 January 2011, no. 31322/07, §§51, 54 (Haas v. Switzerland).
396. ECtHR 3 April 2001, no. 27229/95, §93 (Keenan v. UK). ECtHR 14 February 2012, no. 
9296/06, §§90, 92 (Shumkova v. Russia). ECtHR 4 February 2016, no. 58828/13, §38 (Isenc v. 
France).
397. ECtHR 7 January 2003, no. 57420/00 (Younger v. UK).
398. ECtHR 3 April 2001, no. 27229/95, §92 (Keenan v. UK).
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among detainees should not be left unmentioned.399 The ECtHR also states that 
the particular vulnerability of mentally ill detainees must be taken into account.400 
Considering the Member States’ obligation to protect vulnerable persons, and 
to prevent that hasty decisions are made which are not taken freely and with 
full understanding of what is involved,401 the approach of the ECtHR to require 
action if the State authorities know, or ought to know, of a real and immediate 
suicide risk regarding a detainee is in my view in principle justified. In my view, 
the obligation to act in response to indications for a suicide risk aims to prevent 
hasty decisions that are not taken freely and with full understanding of the con-
sequences. However, the approach of the ECtHR in relation to suicide among 
detainees (obligation to act in all cases where a real and immediate suicide risk 
is observed or ought to be observed) diverges from the approach in relation to 
end of life decisions in free society; the right to decide by what means and when 
one’s own life will end, provided that the person in question is capable of freely 
reaching a decision on this question and acts accordingly, is not explicitly taken 
into account regarding suicide among detainees. Considering the principle that 
detainees retain their human rights, the question whether a detainee is capable of 
freely reaching a decision on this matter and acts accordingly should in my view 
be raised if a detainee persists in his wish to commit suicide. This means, among 
others, that any influence of the deprivation of liberty on the detainee’s wish to 
commit suicide should be ruled out.
The ECtHR’s case law shows that Member States must pay special attention to 
suicide prevention among detainees. The ECtHR has developed several standards 
in this regard. It requires national authorities to take basic precautions aimed at 
preventing suicide among detainees. A positive operational obligation to take ad-
ditional measures exists if the authorities know, or ought to know, about a real 
and immediate suicide risk. If a positive obligation to act exists, the State au-
thorities must take all “measures within the scope of their powers which, judged 
reasonably, might have been expected to avoid that risk”.402 The mere fact that a 
399. A study of Bulten and Nijman showed that the prevalence of psychiatric disorders among 
detainees in the Netherlands is high. Bulten and Nijman 2009. The extra vulnerability considering 
the deprivation of liberty and mental illnesses has been stressed by the ECtHR: ECtHR 6 December 
2011, no. 8595/06, §75 (De Donder and De Clippel v. Belgium).
400. ECtHR 16 October 2008, no. 5608/05, §84 (Renolde v. France).
401. ECtHR 20 January 2011, no. 31322/07, §§54, 56 (Haas v. Switzerland).
402. ECtHR 5 July 2005, no. 49790/99, §69 (Trubnikov v. Russia). See also ECtHR 3 April 
2001, no. 27229/95, §93 (Keenan v. UK). ECtHR 30 November 2004, no. 38418/97, §43 (A.K. 
and V.K. v. Turkey). ECtHR 18 October 2005, no. 46747/99, §46 (Akdoğdu v. Turkey). ECtHR 4 
February 2016, no. 58828/13, §38 (Isenc v. France).
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person is deprived of his liberty does not mean that the State authorities should 
assume that there is a real and immediate suicide risk. If all detainees were to be 
regarded as a suicide risk, the State authorities would have a disproportionate bur-
den considering their positive obligation to prevent an individual detainee from 
committing suicide, whereas individual detainees would be confronted with un-
necessary and inappropriate restrictions.403 The ECtHR nevertheless stresses that 
deprivation of liberty, regardless on what grounds, may have a negative effect on 
the mental condition of the person concerned and may therefore bring along a 
suicide risk.404 It also emphasises that it could accept as general proposition that 
the suicide risk among detainees may be higher than in the general population.405 
Furthermore, the first phase of deprivation of liberty has been identified as a del-
icate period with regard to a suicide risk.406
Basic precautions to prevent suicide
State authorities must in any event take basic precautions aimed at preventing 
suicides of detainees. A distinction emerges in the ECtHR’s case law between 
precautions during deprivation of liberty by the police and in prison.407 A mini-
mum precautionary measure to prevent suicide in prison is a medical screening 
on admission, especially if the person in question is being admitted to prison for 
the first time. Such a screening could also relieve some of the anxiety experienced 
by newly-arrived prisoners.408 The medical and custodial staff in prison must con-
stantly assess the suicide risk among detainees.409 The ECtHR has referred in this 
regard to410 the recommendation that this assessment should be made by appro-
priate trained personnel, among others by using modern instruments, and should 
403. ECtHR 7 January 2003, no. 57420/00 (Younger v. UK). See also ECtHR 6 December 2011, 
no. 8595/06, §75 (De Donder and De Clippel v. Belgium).
404. ECtHR 16 November 2000, no. 21422/93, §74 (Tanribilir v. Turkey). ECtHR 30 November 
2004, no. 38418/97, §44 (A.K. and V.K. v. Turkey). ECtHR 18 October 2005, no. 46747/99, §47 
(Akdoğdu v. Turkey). ECtHR 6 December 2011, no. 8595/06, §75 (De Donder and De Clippel 
v. Belgium).
405. ECtHR 7 January 2003, no. 57420/00 (Younger v. UK).
406. ECtHR 4 February 2016, no. 58828/13, §39 (Isenc v. France).
407. Including remand centres.
408. ECtHR 4 February 2016, no. 58828/13, §§39, 45 (Isenc v. France). See also CPT/Inf/E 
(2002) 1 – Rev. 2015, CPT Standards, p. 44. EPR, 52.1. Recommendation CM/Rec(2012)12, 
II.31.7.
409. ECtHR 1 June 2010, no. 28326/05, §71 (Jasińska v. Poland). ECtHR 19 July 2012, no. 
38447/09, §89 (Ketreb v. France): reference to Recommendation R(98)7. 
410. ECtHR 27 November 2012, no. 17892/03, §62 (Savičs v. Latvia).
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be repeated regularly.411 Routine monitoring is expected in prison, though the EC-
tHR has not defined what is considered to be routine monitoring.412 The case law 
of the ECtHR does not show a univocal stance on whether certain objects should 
be taken from detainees who are held in prison and do not pose a suicide risk. 
In Kilavuz versus Turkey, the ECtHR emphasises that any deprivation of liberty 
can have negative effects on the detainee’s mental condition and may therefore 
bring along a suicide risk. The ECtHR emphasises the vulnerability of detain-
ees and stresses that general measures exist to reduce the risk, for example taking 
away sharp objects, belt and laces, supervision and medical care. It will depend on 
the circumstances whether any more stringent measures are necessary.413 In Uçar 
versus Turkey, where the ECtHR concludes not to be persuaded that the State 
authorities knew about the suicide risk, the ECtHR did not refer to the fact that 
the detainee used a belt to commit suicide.414 In Mitić versus Serbia, the ECtHR 
states that special protective measures in case of a suicide risk are (among others) 
not placing a detainee alone in a cell with easy access to means of killing himself, 
like belts and ties.415 The latter two jugdments hold the view that only after a su-
icide risk has been identified, or could have been identified, measures should be 
taken to avoid that the detainee has easy access to means of killing himself, like 
belts and ties.416
After admission to a police station, detainees must be subjected to a body 
search, and belt, shoelaces and sharp objects must be taken from them. A screen-
ing for a suicide risk is not required on admission in a police station. Detainees 
must be checked on regularly417 and custodial staff must be permanently present 
in the cell block.418 Interrogations should not be carried out while the police of-
ficer is armed, unless compelling reasons are present to perform the interrogation 
411. Recommendation Rec(2003)23, 12, 14, 15a, 15b, 16, 24. 15c recommends that instruments 
to assess the suicide risk should be evaluated for strengths and weaknesses.  
412. ECtHR 11 April 2006, no. 52392/99, §87 (Uçar v. Turkey).
413. ECtHR 21 October 2008, no. 8327/03, §89 (Kilavuz v. Turkey).
414. ECtHR 11 April 2006, no. 52392/99, §88 (Uçar v. Turkey).
415. ECtHR 22 January 2013, no. 31963/08, §49 (Mitić v. Serbia).
416. See also: ECtHR 24 January 2017, no. 21782/15, §28 (Jagiełło v. Poland).
417. ECtHR 16 November 2000, no. 21422/93, §§74-75 (Tanribilir v. Turkey): supervised every 
half an hour. ECtHR 30 November 2004, no. 38418/97, §§44-46 (A.K. and V.K. v. Turkey). See 
with regard to confiscating certain objects: ECtHR 27 July 2004, no. 30015/96, §§47-48 (A.A. 
and others v. Turkey). ECtHR 18 October 2005, no. 46747/99, §47 (Akdoğdu v. Turkey). The basic 
precautions to confiscate specific objects that are required under the ECHR during deprivation of 
liberty by the police are in my view more stringent than those required in prison.
418. ECtHR 16 November 2000, no. 21422/93, §78 (Tanribilir v. Turkey).
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while being armed.419 Such ‘compelling reasons’ are in my view hardly conceiva-
ble, making the exception highly theoretical.
CPT Standards and Recommendations Committee of Ministers
Suicide prevention is one of the tasks of the medical service in prison. The medical 
service should ensure sufficient awareness about suicide prevention in prison and 
should ensure that appropriate procedures are in place. The custodial staff should 
be trained in recognising signs/indications for a suicide risk. The CPT emphasises 
the increased suicide risk in the period before and after trial and the period before 
release.420 Appropriate assistance and counselling should be provided to detainees 
with a long-term prison sentence or to life imprisonment to reduce a suicide risk, 
especially after a decision is given by the judge.421 Persons detained in prison may 
carry their medication, provided that the medication is not dangerous if taken as 
an overdose. In the latter case, the medication should be provided on an individ-
ual dose-by-dose basis.422
Know, or ought to know, about suicide risk
If the State authorities know, or ought to know, of a real and immediate risk to the 
life of an identified person, there exists a positive obligation to act.423 This princi-
ple also applies to suicide risks among detainees.424 The immediacy of the risk does 
not have to be decisive in relation to suicides.425 The fact that the suicide risk may 
vary from time to time does not mean that the risk is not real. In these cases, mon-
itoring of the detainee is necessary in order to observe any relapses in time.426 The 
ECtHR stresses that knowing about the suicide risk relates to the situation where 
the authorities had actual knowledge about the suicide risk.427 An example is that 
the authorities formally acknowledged the risk because health care providers or 
custodial staff indicated prior to the suicide that it was probable that the person 
in question would commit a serious suicide attempt or would show self-harming 
419. ECtHR 14 December 2010, no. 74832/01, §89 (Mižigárová v. Slovakia).
420. CPT/Inf/E (2002) 1 – Rev. 2015, CPT Standards, p. 44.
421. Recommendation Rec(2003)23, 24.  
422. Recommendation No. R (98)7, III.B.48.
423. As formulated in: ECtHR 28 October 1998, no. 23452/94, §116, GC (Osman v. UK).
424. ECtHR 3 April 2001, no. 27229/95, §93 (Keenan v. UK).
425. ECtHR 6 December 2011, no. 8595/06, §76 (De Donder and De Clippel v. Belgium). 
426. ECtHR 19 July 2012, no. 38447/09, §83 (Ketreb v. France). See also: ECtHR 3 April 2001, 
no. 27229/95, §96 (Keenan v. UK). ECtHR 16 October 2008, no. 5608/05, §89 (Renolde v. 
France).
427. ECtHR 7 January 2003, no. 57420/00 (Younger v. UK).
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behaviour in the future.428 Also sufficient to conclude that the authorities knew 
about the risk, is that the authorities acknowledged that the psychiatric disorder 
the detainee suffered from was a risk factor for suicide,429 or that the authorities 
were made expressly aware of the risk as they were informed that the detainee 
expressed the intention to kill himself.430 Though such expressions must always 
alert the State authorities involved, it should in my view be kept in mind that in 
retrospect the outcome is known, which is not the case when assessing a suicide 
risk beforehand. Not rarely are suicidal expressions made, whereas the person in 
question does not commit suicide. Furthermore, ‘ought to have known’ means 
that factors pointing towards a suicide risk were present, though the risk has not 
been acknowledged by the State authorities involved, or there were omissions in 
the monitoring procedure and shortcomings in the assessment of the detainee’s 
condition and diagnosis,431 or in the transfer of information.432 The difference be-
tween knowing of the suicide risk and ‘ought to have known’ about that risk does 
not always clearly emerge in the ECtHR’s case law.433 Noteworthy is that the EC-
tHR often examines a combination of factors to establish whether the authorities 
should have known of the suicide risk.434 
An important factor to examine the foreseeability of a suicide is whether the de-
tainee states that he is going to commit suicide or makes other remarks suggesting 
that a suicide is imminent. The authorities must respond to such suicidal expres-
sions of detainees.435 If there are doubts about the sincerity of suicidal expressions, 
428. ECtHR 5 July 2005, no. 49790/99, §74 (Trubnikov v. Russia). See also Kilavuz versus 
Turkey: the detainee was transferred considering the risk he posed to himself and to others. ECtHR 
21 October 2008, no. 8327/03, §92.
429. ECtHR 14 February 2012, no. 9296/06, §94 (Shumkova v. Russia).
430. ECtHR 7 January 2003, no. 57420/00 (Younger v. UK). See also: ECtHR 22 January 2013, 
no. 31963/08, §49 (Mitić v. Serbia).
431. ECtHR 5 July 2005, no. 49790/99, §76 (Trubnikov v. Russia). ECtHR 13 December 2012, 
no. 62120/09, §86 (Volk v. Slovenia). ECtHR 17 February 2015, no. 49044/12, §26 (Konopacka 
v. Poland). ECtHR 17 February 2015, no. 43696/14 (Kałużna v. Poland).
432. Cf. ECtHR 14 March 2002, no. 46477/99, §§60-64 (Paul and Audrey Edwards v. UK).
433. See, for example, ECtHR 11 April 2006, no. 52392/99, §§83-89 (Uçar v. Turkey): the 
ECtHR only explicitly answers the question whether the authorities knew of the risk. See also 
ECtHR 22 January 2013, no. 31963/08, §49 (Mitić v. Serbia).
434. See, for example, ECtHR 19 July 2012, no. 38447/09, §§77-83 (Ketreb v. France). ECtHR 
3 April 2001, no. 27229/95, §§93-95 (Keenan v. UK). ECtHR 16 October 2008, no. 5608/05, 
§§85-89 (Renolde v. France).
435. ECtHR 7 January 2003, no. 57420/00 (Younger v. UK). ECtHR 4 February 2016, no. 
58828/13, §40 (Isenc v. France). See also ECtHR 13 December 2012, no. 62120/09, §§86-90 
(Volk v. Slovenia): authorities had responded to two threats of suicide. See with regard to (the 
absence of ) a prior announcement also: ECtHR 17 December 2009, no. 4762/05, §115 (Mikayil 
Mammadov v. Azerbaijan). ECtHR 3 May 2011, no. 20201/07 (Zemzami and Barraux v. France).
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one must take into account that the detainee may kill himself unintentionally in 
an attempt to manipulate the prison authorities.436 Another important factor is 
whether the detainee was known to have (chronic or acute) mental problems,437 
especially psychotic disorders.438 Persons diagnosed with schizophrenia suffer from 
a condition in which the suicide risk is well known and high.439 The ECtHR also 
stresses the high risk of suicide if a person has borderline syndrome, combined 
with multiple addiction.440 The seriousness of the condition is also relevant.441 A 
deterioration of the detainee’s mental condition should raise the question whether 
a suicide risk exists.442 In Trubnikov versus Russia, the ECtHR concludes for ex-
ample that it was difficult to predict the suicide, as the detainee’s mental and 
emotional condition had been stable during the three years prior to the suicide. 
Therefore, the authorities could not reasonably foresee the suicide.443 Indications 
for a suicide risk can also be found in the behaviour of detainees.444 The detainee’s 
behaviour before the suicide is especially of importance with regard to detainees 
held by law enforcement officials such as the police. In Tanribilir versus Tur-
key, the ECtHR notes for example that the detainee was calm when entering the 
station of the gendarmerie.445 In another case, the ECtHR emphasises that the de-
tainee showed normal behaviour. Considering the absence of suicidal tendencies, 
436. ECtHR 3 April 2001, no. 27229/95, §§95-96 (Keenan v. UK). 
437. ECtHR 13 December 2012, no. 62120/09, §86 (Volk v. Slovenia). ECtHR 5 July 2005, 
no. 49790/99, §§73-74 (Trubnikov v. Russia). ECtHR 22 January 2013, no. 31963/08, §§48-49 
(Mitić v. Serbia). ECtHR 11 December 2012, no. 14730/09, §53 (Karpisiewicz v. Poland). 
ECtHR 19 July 2012, no. 38447/09, §77 (Ketreb v. France). 
438. ECtHR 21 October 2008, no. 8327/03, §91 (Kilavuz v. Turkey). ECtHR 1 June 2010, no. 
28326/05, §§65-69 (Jasińska v. Poland). ECtHR 6 December 2011, no. 8595/06, §75 (De Donder 
and De Clippel v. Belgium). ECtHR 16 October 2008, no. 5608/05, §§85-89 (Renolde v. France).
439. ECtHR 3 April 2001, no. 27229/95, §94 (Keenan v. UK). ECtHR 6 December 2011, no. 
8595/06, §75 (De Donder and De Clippel). ECtHR 8 October 2015, no. 32432/13, §51 (Sellal 
v. France).
440. ECtHR 19 July 2012, no. 38447/09, §77 (Ketreb v. France).
441. ECtHR 6 December 2011, no. 8595/06, §75 (De Donder and De Clippel v. Belgium).
442. For example if the detainee informs the psychiatrist that he is having negative thoughts and 
total malaise and is suffering from depression and headaches. ECtHR 1 June 2010, no. 28326/05, 
§§66-69 (Jasińska v. Poland).
443. ECtHR 5 July 2005, no. 49790/99, §§75-77 (Trubnikov v. Russia). 
444. ECtHR 3 April 2001, no. 27229/95, §95 (Keenan v. UK): making a noose. ECtHR 7 
January 2003, no. 57420/00 (Younger v. UK): detainee acted in a normal fashion. See also: ECtHR 
22 January 2013, no. 31963/08, §49 (Mitić v. Serbia). In Kilavuz versus Turkey, the ECtHR refers 
to the fact that during transport the detainee had talked in a worrying manner about his fears of 
being killed. ECtHR 21 October 2008, no. 8327/03, §92. 
445. ECtHR 16 November 2000, no. 21422/93, §76 (Tanribilir v. Turkey). See also: ECtHR 3 
September 2013, no. 58497/11 (Robineau v. France).
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there was no reason to take special measures.446 Other important indications for a 
suicide risk are prior suicide attempts and self-harm,447 though the absence of (a) 
prior suicide attempt(s) does not mean that the authorities could not know about 
the existence of a suicide risk.448 Whether the detainee requested help is also rel-
evant,449 though in Younger versus The United Kingdom, the ECtHR considers 
that the fact the authorities knew that the detainee was a drug user and had re-
quested twice for a physician on the morning prior to the suicide (which requests 
were not fulfilled) was not sufficient to conclude that the authorities should have 
known about the suicide risk. The ECtHR takes into consideration the detain-
ee’s behaviour on the morning prior to the suicide,450 and the circumstances in 
which these requests were expressed.451 The applicant’s argument that the author-
ities could have known about the risk if they reacted promptly to the requests is 
not shared by the ECtHR and is in view of the ECtHR too speculative.452 Signs 
of mental distress,453 like severe paranoia and anxiety,454 are also relevant in the as-
sessment of the suicide risk. Violent behaviour may also suggest mental distress or 
may show a deterioration of the detainee’s health condition.455
The argument that non-medically trained personnel could not know of the 
suicide risk as the medical file in prison was not accessible to them was not con-
vincing in view of the ECtHR. The difficulties entailed in safeguarding medical 
confidentiality must be overcome by introducing an efficient system where in-
formation regarding risks for the health of a detainee are exchanged as soon as 
446. ECtHR 30 November 2004, no. 38418/97, §§43-47 (A.K. and V.K. v. Turkey). See also 
ECtHR 18 October 2005, no. 46747/99, §§49-50 (Akdoğdu v. Turkey).
447. ECtHR 9 October 2012, no. 1413/07, §§57, 62 (Çoşelav v. Turkey). See also: ECtHR 16 
October 2008, no. 5608/05, §§86-89 (Renolde v. France). ECtHR 1 June 2010, no. 28326/05, 
§§31, 66 (Jasińska v. Poland). ECtHR 19 July 2012, no. 38447/09, §§78, 83, 90 (Ketreb v. 
France). ECtHR 24 March 2015, no. 2959/11, §73 (Association for the defence of human rights in 
Romania – Helsinki committee on behalf of Ionel Garcea v. Romania).
448. ECtHR 6 December 2011, no. 8595/06, §77 (De Donder and de Clippel v. Belgium).
449. ECtHR 9 October 2012, no. 1413/07, §§57, 62 (Çoşelav v. Turkey).
450. The person concerned showed normal behaviour. There were no signs of physical or mental 
distress. 
451. The person concerned was not known with mental problems or suicidal behaviour. He 
furthermore indicated that he wanted to consult a physician before he was transferred to prison as 
he thought that a consult in prison would be more difficult to realise. Therefore, the professionals 
involved concluded that there was no hurry.
452. ECtHR 7 January 2003, no. 57420/00 (Younger v. UK).
453. ECtHR 22 January 2013, no. 31963/08, §49 (Mitić v. Serbia).
454. ECtHR 21 October 2008, no. 8327/03, §92 (Kilavuz v. Turkey).
455. ECtHR 19 July 2012, no. 38447/09, §80 (Ketreb v. France). See also: ECtHR 21 October 
2008, no. 8327/03, §92 (Kilavuz v. Turkey).
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possible between all the parties involved.456 A precondition for an adequate as-
sessment of the suicide risk and an adequate response is in my view that relevant 
information is actually recorded and exchanged with the (right) professionals in-
volved, such as health care providers. Information must also be exchanged with 
the custodial staff, who supervise the detainee during his daily routine and are in 
the position to intervene if necessary.
Reasonable measures
If a suicide risk has been identified, the State authorities have an obligation to do 
all that can reasonably be expected of them to avert that risk.457 What are such 
reasonable measures? Basic principle in this regard is that the authorities have to 
observe all rights and freedoms laid down in the Convention, including Article 
5 and Article 8 ECHR. The ECtHR emphasises that there exist general measures 
and precautions to reduce the possibilities of self-harm among detainees, with-
out infringing the detainee’s personal autonomy. The circumstances of the case 
are relevant in assessing whether any more stringent measures are necessary and 
whether it is reasonable to apply them.458 A relevant factor with respect to the 
reasonableness of the duration of an imposed measure is whether the decision to 
apply a measure is limited in time and therefore subjected to regular review of the 
measure.459
Detainees held in prison and identified as a suicide risk must not have easy 
access to means which can be used to commit suicide, like cell window bars, bro-
ken glass, belts or ties.460 Extra vigilance must also be observed as to other sharp 
objects, like razor blades.461 The presence of a suicide risk may also mean that 
the cell of the detainee should be searched on a regular basis for the presence of 
456. ECtHR 19 July 2012, no. 38447/09, §82 (Ketreb v. France). See also: CPT/Inf/E (2002) 1 – 
Rev. 2015, CPT Standards, p. 44. See however also Elger, Handtke and Wangmo 2015, who stress 
the importance of confidentiality if a mentally capacitated prisoner refuses disclosure of suicidal 
plans.
457. ECtHR 3 April 2001, no. 27229/95, §§90-93 (Keenan v. UK). ECtHR 18 October 2005, 
no. 46747/99, §46 (Akdoğdu v. Turkey).
458. ECtHR 3 April 2001, no. 27229/95, §92 (Keenan v. UK).
459. ECtHR 1 June 2004, no. 8704/03, pp. 18-20 (Van der Graaf v. The Netherlands).
460. ECtHR 22 January 2013, no. 31963/08, §49 (Mitić v. Serbia): reference to CPT/Inf/E 
(2002) 1 – Rev. 2015, CPT Standards, p. 44. See also: ECtHR 10 November 2009, no. 20496/02 
(Silickis and Silickienė v. Lithuania). ECtHR 19 July 2012, no. 38447/09, §95 (Ketreb v. France). 
ECtHR 21 October 2008, no. 8327/03, §§95-96 (Kilavuz v. Turkey).
461. ECtHR 14 February 2012, no. 9296/06, §95 (Shumkova v. Russia). Considering the incident 
a couple of days before the suicide where the detainee slashed his wrist, the authorities should have 
been more cautious with regard to a missing blade of a safety razor.
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such objects.462 If appropriate, suicide-proof clothing should be used, for exam-
ple if the detainee is placed under camera surveillance after a suicide attempt or 
other self-harming behaviour.463 If a suicide risk exists concerning a detainee held 
by the police, special measures must be taken, for example measures to prevent a 
fall from a great height by placing guards in front of windows,464 or taking away 
clothing465 or blankets.466 The foreseeability of the suicide method used is relevant 
when taking preventive measures.467
When a suicide risk has been established, the supervision of the detainee in 
question should be intensified.468 This supervision needs to be effective in that it 
can actually prevent a suicide attempt or a lethal outcome. The supervisory staff 
must have the possibility to access the cell of the detainee in case of an emergency 
and therefore needs to be in possession of the key. Supervision needs to be carried 
out on a regular basis and the custodial staff must have a complete overview of the 
detainee’s cell. That the monitoring of detainees is a secondary task of the custo-
dial staff may devalue the supervision’s effectiveness.469 The staff should respond 
to suicidal expressions of detainees, for example by immediately checking the de-
tainee in person,470 by temporarily placing a detainee under camera surveillance471 
or to place the detainee on a care unit where the detainee is monitored every 15 
minutes.472 The ECtHR also expects that if a detainee is known with a suicide risk 
and asks for a physician, this request needs to be forwarded without delay.473 
462. ECtHR 19 July 2012, no. 38447/09, §95 (Ketreb v. France).
463. ECtHR 22 January 2013, no. 31963/08, §49 (Mitić v. Serbia).
464. ECtHR 2 March 2006, no. 51480/99, §36 (Erikan Bulut v. Turkey).
465. ECtHR 16 November 2000, no. 21422/93, §77 (Tanribilir v. Turkey). ECtHR 30 November 
2004, no. 38418/97, §47 (A.K. and V.K. v. Turkey).
466. ECtHR 18 October 2005, no. 46747/99, §§48-50 (Akdoğdu v. Turkey).
467. ECtHR 16 November 2000, no. 21422/93, §76 (Tanribilir v. Turkey). ECtHR 30 November 
2004, no. 38418/97, §§43-47 (A.K. and V.K. v. Turkey). See also: ECtHR 18 October 2005, no. 
46747/99, §§46-50 (Akdoğdu v. Turkey).
468. ECtHR 16 November 2000, no. 21422/93, §§75-77 (Tanribilir v. Turkey). Constant guard 
can be realised by placing a guard in front of the detainee’s cell. See furthermore: ECtHR 3 April 
2001, no. 27229/95, §96 (Keenan v. UK). ECtHR 9 October 2012, no. 1413/07, §§62, 68 (Çoşelav 
v. Turkey). See also ECtHR 19 July 2012, no. 38447/09, §§83, 89 (Ketreb v. France): reference to 
Recommendation No. R(98), where close and constant observation has been recommended, and 
CPT/Inf/E (2002) 1 – Rev. 2015, CPT Standards, p. 44.
469. ECtHR 21 October 2008, no. 8327/03, §96 (Kilavuz v. Turkey).
470. ECtHR 7 January 2003, no. 57420/00 (Younger v. UK).
471. ECtHR 13 December 2012, no. 62120/09, §§88-89 (Volk v. Slovenia).
472. ECtHR 3 April 2001, no. 27229/95, §§98-99 (Keenan v. UK).
473. ECtHR 16 October 2008, no. 5608/05, §92 (Renolde v. France).
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Health care providers must be involved if a suicide risk has been identified.474 
Counselling of these detainees is important.475 A detainee must be provided 
with adequate medical or specialist help and assistance if he suffers from men-
tal problems.476 If appropriate, the authorities must provide adequate and regular 
psychiatric care and the staff must respond to a deterioration of the detainee’s 
condition. Adequate psychiatric care may imply constant medical supervision or 
admission to a care unit.477 In Renolde versus France, the ECtHR stresses that it 
was struck by the fact that it did not appear that the authorities had considered 
on their own motion whether the detainee should be admitted to a psychiatric 
facility or unit, though the detainee committed a suicide attempt and was diag-
nosed with a psychiatric disorder.478 The ECtHR also emphasises that a shortage 
of places on (psychiatric) care units cannot dispense the State’s obligations under 
Article 2 ECHR.479 If a detainee is not admitted to a psychiatric facility, the au-
thorities have nevertheless the obligation to ensure that the detainee receives the 
necessary healthcare, including a responsible medication supply, especially with 
regard to persons suffering from a psychotic disorder. In Renolde versus France, 
the ECtHR raises the question whether it is advisable to leave the administration 
of medication to a prisoner suffering from psychotic disorders, without any super-
vision. The experts had concluded that the suicide of the detainee was more the 
consequence of a psychotic disorder (might have taken place in a hallucinatory 
state) than of a depressive syndrome, especially if the detainee had not taken his 
medication as prescribed. The ECtHR was not persuaded by the arguments that 
the detainee never showed any signs of refusing to take his medication, his condi-
tion did not call for special attention and that it was impossible to supervise the 
administration of all medication prescribed to detainees. The ECtHR concludes 
that in the given circumstances the lack of supervision of the medication intake 
474. ECtHR 4 February 2016, no. 58828/13, §46 (Isenc v. France).
475. ECtHR 25 February 2014, no. 19696/10, §§54-55 (Gheorghe Predescu v. Romania).
476. ECtHR 9 October 2012, no. 1413/07, §§62-70 (Çoşelav v. Turkey). See also ECtHR 19 
July 2012, no. 38447/09, §§84-86, 89 (Ketreb v. France): ECtHR refers to Recommendation 
No. R(98)7: “(…) dialogue and reassurance, as appropriate, should be used in moments of crisis.” 
ECtHR 13 December 2013, no. 62120/09, §§86-89 (Volk v. Slovenia). See also Recommendation 
Rec(2003)23, 24, 27.
477. ECtHR 14 February 2012, no. 9296/06, §94 (Shumkova v. Russia). ECtHR 3 April 2001, 
no. 27229/95, §99 (Keenan v. UK).
478. ECtHR 16 October 2008, no. 5608/05, §97 (Renolde v. France). See also ECtHR 6 
December 2011, no. 8595/06, §§80-84 (De Donder and De Clippel v. Belgium), where a detainee 
was not placed in a psychiatric unit, although it was prescribed in legislation and was ordered by 
the appropriate authority.
479. ECtHR 6 December 2011, no. 8595/06, §84 (De Donder and De Clippel v. Belgium).
Death in State Custody DRUK.indd   160 13-Sep-17   2:40:05 PM
Obligations arising from the Convention to avert premature death of detainees  161
played a part in the death of the detainee.480 Member States must therefore ensure 
that medication is taken and monitored properly, especially when detainees suf-
fer from mental problems.481 In case of a suicide risk, the authorities must observe 
caution with regard to placement in a disciplinary cell.482 The medical service must 
be involved to examine the compatibility of the detainee’s health condition with 
placement in a disciplinary cell.483
A suicide attempt calls for action, for example calling in a psychiatric emer-
gency team and applying more stringent supervision.484 As for first aid after a 
detainee has committed a suicide attempt, the case Shumkova versus Russia, 
where a detainee refused first aid after a suicide attempt, is noteworthy. The EC-
tHR concludes in this case that the decision by the prison officers not to provide 
first aid could not be justified with the argument that the detainee verbally refused 
first aid, as the prison officers knew that the detainee suffered from psychiatric 
problems, it had not been alleged that the detainee physically tried to resist first 
aid and the seriousness of his injuries. Considering the seriousness of his injuries, 
the ECtHR did not think that the detainee would have been capable of putting 
up resistance. Furthermore, an instruction required the prison officers to provide 
necessary first aid in case of a suicide attempt.485 That the detainee would not have 
been able to resist, is in my view not relevant in the examination whether the State 
authorities should have interfered. The decisive factor to intervene in such cases is 
in my view the detainee’s psychiatric problems, which raises the question whether 
he is capable to decide for himself and can oversee the irreversible consequences 
of suicide. If there is doubt about the detainee’s competence in an emergency sit-
uation, the State authorities must intervene considering their duty to protect the 
health and life of detainees.
480. ECtHR 16 October 2008, no. 5608/05, §§97-105 (Renolde v. France).
481. ECtHR 1 June 2010, no. 28326/05, §§73-79 (Jasińska v. Poland). ECtHR 8 January 2013, 
no. 10799/06, §65 (Jashi v. Georgia). 
482. ECtHR 3 April 2001, no. 27229/95, §116 (Keenan v. UK).
483. ECtHR 19 July 2012, no. 38447/09, §88 (Ketreb v. France).
484. ECtHR 16 October 2008, no. 5608/05, §§90-93 (Renolde v. France). In Çoşelav versus 
Turkey, the ECtHR also stresses the importance of keeping supervision if a detainee is returned to 
his cell after having received treatment for self-harming behaviour. ECtHR 9 October 2012, no. 
1413/07, §68.
485. ECtHR 14 February 2012, no. 9296/06, §§96-103 (Shumkova v. Russia). The ECtHR bears 
in mind that in case of a suicide(attempt), the custodial personnel is confronted with an extreme 
urgent situation and have to decide rapidly in a short space of time. ECtHR 31 May 2016, no. 
46190/13, §64 (Castro and Lavenia v. Italy).
Death in State Custody DRUK.indd   161 13-Sep-17   2:40:05 PM
162 Chapter 4 
4.5.5. Euthanasia and assisted suicide
A totally different conflict arises if the detainee requests for euthanasia or as-
sisted suicide. Fulfilling the detainee’s request would mean that a detainee’s life is 
actively terminated or the detainee receives assistance in ending his life by provid-
ing the necessary means. Two questions can be raised in this regard: 1) does the 
ECHR allow euthanasia or assisted suicide to be performed on detainees, and if 
so, 2) are Member States obliged to facilitate euthanasia or assisted suicide among 
detainees? 
The ECtHR’s view on these end of life decisions has been changed during the 
last decade. In Pretty versus The United Kingdom, the ECtHR stated not to be 
persuaded that the right to life as laid down in Article 2 ECHR encompasses a 
negative right, namely a right to die, “nor can it create a right to self-determination 
in the sense of conferring on an individual the entitlement to choose death rather 
than life”.486 It continued that factors regarding the quality of life take on signif-
icance under Article 8 ECHR. The ECtHR did not exclude that preventing the 
applicant by law from exercising her choice to avoid an, in her view, undignified 
and distressing end of her life, constitutes an interference with her right to respect 
for private life as guaranteed in Article 8 §1 ECHR. This interference was however 
justified because it was necessary in a democratic society, namely to protect the 
right of others (the life and safety of others, especially the weak and vulnerable). 
The ECtHR emphasises the Member States’ margin of appreciation, which is in 
these circumstances broad. It is primarily up to Member States “(…) to assess the 
risk and the likely incidence of abuse” considering the seriousness of the harm for 
public health and safety.487 Another step has been taken by the ECtHR in Haas 
versus Switzerland, where it stresses that Article 8 ECHR does include the “(…) 
right to decide by what means and at what point his or her life will end, provided 
he or she is capable of freely reaching a decision on this question and acting in 
consequence,”488 which means that under these conditions Member States should 
in principle not interfere.489 The ECtHR also stresses that the Member States have 
not reached a consensus on the individual’s right to decide how and when his 
own life will end: “(…) a vast majority of Member States seem to attach more 
486. ECtHR 29 April 2002, no. 2346/02, §§39-40 (Pretty v. UK). The ECtHR refers to Article 
11 ECHR, which implies the right to join an association and the right not to be forced to join an 
association. ECtHR 13 August 1981, nos. 7601/76; 7806/77, §52 (Young, James and Webster v. 
UK). ECtHR 30 June 1993, no. 16130/90, §35 (Sigurdur A. Sigurjónsson v. Iceland).
487. ECtHR 29 April 2002, no. 2346/02, §§61, 65, 67, 68-78 (Pretty v. UK). 
488. ECtHR 20 January 2011, no. 31322/07, §51 (Haas v. Switzerland).
489. See also: EHRC 2011/53.
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weight to the protection of the individual’s life than to his or her right to ter-
minate it”. Member States have therefore a considerable margin of appreciation 
when it comes to the possibility to perform euthanasia and assisted suicide in free 
society, though the obligation to protect vulnerable people (against impulsive ac-
tions of themselves) must be observed.490 These principles imply in my view two 
things. Firstly, if euthanasia and assisted suicide are possible in a Member State, it 
is important to note that Article 2 ECHR obliges the Member State to develop “a 
procedure capable of ensuring that a decision to end one’s life does indeed corre-
spond to the free wish of the individual concerned”. Member States are obligated 
to protect everybody from hasty decisions and to prevent abuse. This obligation 
can be fulfilled by requiring a medical prescription, provided after a full psychiat-
ric assessment.491 Secondly, Article 8 §2 ECHR requires that infringements on the 
rights laid down in Article 8 §1 ECHR must be in accordance with the law and 
thus foreseeable. This means that if euthanasia or assisted suicide are not possible, 
this must be made clear to the public.
In Haas versus Switzerland, the question arose whether Article 8 ECHR 
obliges Member States to ensure that the applicant could obtain a lethal sub-
stance without a medical prescription (in deviation from domestic legislation) to 
commit suicide in a painless manner and without the risk of failing. The ECtHR 
does not ultimately answer the question whether a positive obligation exists for 
Member States to take measures to facilitate a dignified suicide.492 Buijsen rightly 
concludes that this judgment therefore shows that no such positive obligation ex-
ists in view of the ECtHR.493
The aforementioned case law relates to complaints of persons at liberty. Cases 
concerning requests for euthanasia or assisted suicide by detainees have to my 
knowledge and up till now not been brought before the ECtHR. Applying the 
aforementioned principles arising from the ECtHR’s case law would mean that 
the ECHR is not by definition opposed to fulfilling requests for euthanasia or 
assisted suicide by detainees, provided that the vulnerable position of detainees 
is carefully taken into account. If a Member State makes euthanasia or assisted 
490. ECtHR 20 January 2011, no. 31322/07, §§54-55, 58 (Haas v. Switzerland). 
491. ECtHR 20 January 2011, no. 31322/07, §§56-58 (Haas v. Switzerland). 
492. ECtHR 20 January 2011, no. 31322/07, §§52-61 (Haas v. Switzerland). The ECtHR 
concludes not to be convinced that it was impossible for the applicant to find a physician who 
wanted to help him and that the right to choose when, and how, his life would end was not 
merely theoretical or illusory. See furthermore: “(…) even assuming that the States have a positive 
obligation to adopt measures to facilitate the act of suicide with dignity (…). See also: ECtHR 19 
July 2012, no. 497/09, §§51-52 (Koch v. Germany).
493. Buijsen 2015, p. 12. See also: Hendriks 2015, p. 8.
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suicide for detainees possible, a special procedure must exist to prevent hasty deci-
sions and to ensure that an adequate assessment is made on the detainee’s capacity 
of freely reaching a decision on this matter, without being influenced by the spe-
cific context of deprivation of liberty. If Member States do not allow euthanasia or 
assisted suicide for detainees, the expected foreseeability under Article 8 §2 ECHR 
requires that Member States must be clear that euthanasia or assisted suicide is 
not possible. The ECtHR’s case law furthermore shows that Member States are 
at present not obligated to facilitate euthanasia or assisted suicide for detainees. 
4.6. Concluding remarks
The ECHR obliges Member States to protect the health and life of detainees. 
The detainee’s health condition must be compatible with his continued deten-
tion which means that he must be provided with the appropriate healthcare of 
the requisite quality.494 If not, the detainee may be subjected to treatment that 
is incompatible with Article 3 ECHR (if the minimum level of severity is ob-
tained)495 or even Article 2 ECHR (if the detainee dies due to a lack of healthcare). 
These basic principles show that the interest of punishment of detainees (retribu-
tion) does not overrule the access of detainees to healthcare.496 The obligation to 
protect the health and life of detainees includes legislative and operational obli-
gations to provide the necessary healthcare and to take protective measures aimed 
at preventing premature death of detainees. The ECtHR’s case law reveals several 
preconditions to fulfil the obligation to provide the necessary healthcare and to 
take protective measures. Though the ECtHR does not examine whether domes-
tic legislation in abstracto meets the requirements to protect the health and life of 
detainees, a legislative framework that addresses the obligations and preconditions 
is in my view a safeguard for an effective implementation of these requirements 
in practice and observes foreseeability. Another step is how the legislative frame-
work is observed in practice. An important factor in this regard is training of the 
involved State officials and medical personnel. 
The obligations of Member States to protect the health and life of detainees 
may however conflict, which leads to small, but also big dilemmas. These con-
flicting obligations arise from Article 8 ECHR (right to respect for private life 
and self-determination) on the one hand, and Article 2 and Article 3 ECHR, 
494. ECtHR 30 April 2013, no. 49872/11, §210 (Tymoshenko v. Ukraine).
495. ECtHR 24 January 2012, no. 57541/09, §§76-77 (Valeriy Samoylov v. Russia). 
496. See also: Duijst 2007, pp. 76-77.
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more specifically the obligation to protect the health and life of detainees, on 
the other. These conflicting obligations can be grouped in several themes. Main 
themes are: 1) the duty of medical confidentiality (to protect the detainee’s pri-
vate life and to ensure access to healthcare) versus the exchange of (medical) data 
with non-medically trained personnel to protect the health and life of detain-
ees, 2) the detainee’s right to self-determination versus the exchange of medical 
data to protect the health and life of detainees, and 3) the detainee’s right to 
self-determination and physical integrity, more specifically in relation to end life 
decisions of detainees, versus the duty to protect the health and life of detainees. 
With regard to the first group of conflicting obligations, strictly observing 
medical confidentiality to respect the detainee’s private life and to observe the in-
terest of access to healthcare may not always be in the best interest of the detainee 
in question (or of others). Noteworthy is that sharing necessary information be-
tween medically and non-medically trained staff about a suicide risk regarding an 
identified detainee is required under the ECHR.497 This also applies to informa-
tion about a detainee’s dangerousness for others.498 The ECtHR has not explicitly 
set this requirement for other risks (such as somatic problems). However, it fol-
lows in my view from the ECtHR’s case law, more specifically the obligation to 
protect the health and life of detainees,499 that medical staff should in principle 
share such necessary information (thus breaching the duty of medical confiden-
tiality as little as possible) with non-medically trained personnel, such as prison 
or police custody officers, to ensure that the detainee is properly cared for by the 
custodial staff and that alarming symptoms for health problems can be recognised 
in time. 
A complicating factor with regard to the detainee’s right to respect for his pri-
vate life and self-determination arises when a detainee objects to an exchange of 
(medical) data with medically or non-medically trained personnel (for example if 
he is transferred to another institution), whereas knowledge of this data is nec-
essary to protect others or to ensure that adequate healthcare can be provided to 
that detainee.500 As stressed before, the ECtHR’s case law shows that the duty to 
protect the health and life of detainees brings along the obligation for State au-
thorities to exchange necessary data concerning a detainee’s medical history and 
dangerousness if necessary to protect the health and life of other(s) (detainees).501 
This implies in my view that if health care providers working in free society were 
497. ECtHR 19 July 2012, no. 38447/09, §82 (Ketreb v. France).
498. ECtHR 14 March 2002, no. 46477/99, §61 (Paul and Audrey Edwards v. UK).
499. ECtHR 26 October 2000, no. 30210/96, §94, GC (Kudła v. Poland).
500. Or if the detainee requests to have his medical file (or parts of that file) destroyed.
501. ECtHR 14 March 2002, no. 46477/99, §61 (Paul and Audrey Edwards v. UK).
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involved prior to deprivation of liberty, the domestic legal framework should en-
able these professionals to exchange such data with the State authorities to avert a 
risk for others, regardless of whether the detainee objects. This interference with 
the detainee’s right to self-determination and private life is necessary to protect 
health (Article 8 §2 ECHR). Such an interference must however have a basis in 
domestic law. 
If only the detainee’s own interests are at stake, the duty to protect the health 
and life of detainees brings along that the medical file should be sent with a de-
tainee in case of a transfer from one facility to another for the entire length of the 
deprivation of liberty by the State, the detainee should be informed about this 
exchange and should have the possibility to object.502 The ECtHR’s case law does 
not provide an explicit answer how to handle a detainee’s objection to exchange 
of data if only his own interests are at stake. Member States have a margin of ap-
preciation in this regard.503 In these cases, it is in my view important to note the 
basic idea behind positive obligations towards detainees, namely to ensure that de-
tainees are able to exercise their human rights because of their vulnerable position. 
Not compatible with this purpose is the situation that the Member State’s positive 
obligations to protect the health and life of detainees is altered into an obligation 
to act against the detainee’s wishes to fulfil the obligation to protect his health 
and life.504 This line of reasoning can also be applied with regard to the exchange 
of medical data, which would imply that the detainee’s wishes are in principle re-
spected, provided that the detainee is fully informed about, and fully understands, 
the possible consequences. Any consequences of not exchanging data based on the 
objection of the detainee cannot be imputed to the State involved, provided that 
the detainee has been sufficiently informed and has full understanding of the pos-
sible consequences. However, the risk for the detainee’s own health when medical 
data is not exchanged with the physician connected to the institution to which the 
detainee will be transferred is in my view a relevant factor in the decision making 
process considering the obligation to protect arising from Article 3 and Article 2 
ECHR. Interference with the right to respect the self-determination and private 
life of the detainee (such as exchanging medical data against the detainee’s wishes) 
requires a basis in domestic law and must be necessary in a democratic society. 
Necessity implies that the interference corresponds with a pressing social need and 
502. ECtHR 10 February 2004, no. 42023/98, §94 (Naoumenko v. Ukraine).
503. Cf. EComHR 9 July 1991, no. 14461/88 (Chave née Jullien v. France).
504. See also: Jacobs 2012, p. 315. Hagens 2011, p. 217. Van Kempen 2008, p. 43. Concurring 
opinion of judge Bonello ECtHR 21 January 1999, no. 26103/95 (Geyseghem v. Belgium). Mertens 
2012, p. 226.
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is proportionate to the legitimate aims pursued (Article 8 §2 ECHR).505 An im-
portant factor in the decision making process regarding a detainee’s objection to 
exchange data is therefore the necessity to exchange medical data considering the 
risk for the detainee’s own health and life, and therefore to prevent that a detainee 
is subjected to inhuman and/or degrading treatment within the meaning of Arti-
cle 3 ECHR (or even a violation of Article 2 ECHR).506 The medical necessity to 
take note of the medical data and the physician’s responsibility for the healthcare 
for detainees can be regarded as a pressing social need that justifies interference 
with the right to self-determination and private life of the detainee. The vulnera-
ble position of detainees and any possible influence of the deprivation of liberty 
on the detainee’s objection to exchange medical data must be taken into account 
considering the Member State’s duty to protect. The vulnerability of detainees, 
any possible influence of the deprivation of liberty and the State’s obligation to 
protect them must bring along extra vigilance in handling an objection of a de-
tainee to exchange medical data. Another relevant factor is in my view whether 
the detainee’s objection is enduring; the detainee may change his mind after his 
transfer. At that moment, the exchange of medical data with the physician in the 
receiving institution may come too late. These factors (necessity for the physician 
who takes over the treatment to take note of medical data to provide adequate 
healthcare and the physician’s responsibility for the healthcare, vulnerable position 
due to deprivation of liberty and the question whether the objection is enduring) 
may under certain circumstances justify that medical data is exchanged with the 
involved physician against the detainee’s wishes, provided that safeguards against 
abuse exist (such as medical confidentiality and accessibility restricted to persons 
who need to know) to ensure that the interference is proportional. Such an in-
terference must also be in accordance with the law, which means that it has some 
basis in domestic law and is accessible to the person concerned. If the detainee is 
not capable to decide for himself, the aforementioned principles should be ob-
served towards the detainee’s representative, or if there is no time to involve the 
representative, the physician should act in the detainee’s best interests, which will 
often bring along the need to exchange necessary information with the physician 
in the receiving institution. It follows in my view from the ECtHR’s case law that 
if a suicide risk is involved, exchange of information is, regardless of the detain-
ee’s (or representative’s) objection, in all cases expected,507 which can be justified 
505. ECtHR 1 June 2004, no. 8704/03, pp. 19-20 (Van der Graaf v. The Netherlands).
506. The same line of reasoning applies with regard to the necessity to inform non-medically 
trained staff to ensure that the detainee is properly cared for and signs for health problems can be 
recognised in time. EComHR 9 July 1991, no. 14461/88 (Chave née Jullien v. France).
507. ECtHR 19 July 2012, no. 38447/09, §82 (Ketreb v. France).
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considering any possible influence of the deprivation of liberty on the suicide risk, 
and to prevent hasty decisions with irreversible consequences. 
With regard to end of life decisions concerning refusal of treatment, hunger 
and/or thirst strike, and other decisions to stop eating and drinking, it is impor-
tant to note that the obligation of the State to provide the necessary healthcare 
to detainees aims to ensure the detainee’s right to receive the necessary health-
care, not an obligation for the State to provide healthcare against the detainee’s 
wishes.508 However, the vulnerable position of detainees due to the deprivation 
of liberty must be kept in mind. The case law of the ECtHR shows in my view 
three factors that must be taken into account when the aforementioned end of 
life decisions of detainees are concerned, namely: 1) whether these decisions have 
been taken freely, 2) by a competent detainee who is fully informed about the 
possible consequences,509 and 3) whether the refusal poses a risk to others.510 If a 
detainee voluntarily refuses proposed medical treatment, examinations, food or 
liquids, or to be resuscitated if the need arises while being capable to decide and 
fully informed about the consequences, Member States do not have an obligation 
to intervene,511 unless the detained patient poses a risk for others, for example if 
he suffers from a contagious disease or considering his mental condition.512 If a 
detained patient is not capable to decide for himself (incompetent), a represent-
ative should be involved in the decision-making process to observe the detained 
patient’s interests. The aforementioned three factors can also be used to examine 
a request for euthanasia or assisted suicide of a detainee, although Member States 
do not have an obligation to facilitate euthanasia or assisted suicide.513
The ECtHR requires Member States to act if they know, or ought to know, of 
a suicide risk regarding an identified detainee.514 This approach does not fully cor-
respond with the approach applied to end of life decisions in free society, where 
the ECtHR stresses that Article 8 ECHR also covers the right to decide by what 
means, and at what point, one’s own life will end, provided that the person con-
cerned is capable to freely reach a decision on this question and acts accordingly. 
Though the ECtHR does not explicitly state that Article 8 ECHR covers the right 
to commit suicide, the right to decide by what means, and at what point, one’s 
508. See, for example, ECtHR 31 March 2009, no. 1639/03, §28 (Horoz v. Turkey).
509. ECtHR 22 November 2011, no. 35254/07, §83 (Makharadze and Sikharulidze v. Georgia).
510. ECtHR 5 April 2011, no. 2974/05, §79 (Vasyukov v. Russia).
511. Cf. ECtHR 26 March 2013, no. 73175/10, §51 (Rappaz v. Switzerland). ECtHR 31 March 
2009, no. 1639/03, §§28-30 (Horoz v. Turkey).
512. ECtHR 5 April 2011, no. 2974/05, §79 (Vasyukov v. Russia).
513. ECtHR 20 January 2011, no. 31322/07, §§52-61 (Haas v. Switzerland).
514. ECtHR 5 July 2005, no. 49790/99, §69 (Trubnikov v. Russia).
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own life will end cannot be otherwise interpreted as the right to decide to end 
one’s own life as ultimate form of self-determination. Member States have under 
Article 2 ECHR the obligation to protect vulnerable people, for example to pre-
vent an individual from taking his own life if that decision has not been taken 
freely and with full understanding of what is involved.515 The question whether 
a detainee was, or is, capable of freely reaching a decision on suicide with full 
understanding of what is involved does not explicitly arise in the ECtHR’s case 
law. It seems that detainees are therefore by definition considered as a vulnerable 
group that ought to be protected from suicide, without making an individual as-
sessment. Complicating factor with respect to suicide of detainees is any influence 
of the deprivation of liberty on the detainee’s wish to commit suicide. However, 
the possibility that a detainee is capable of reaching a decision on suicide, acts 
accordingly and the decision is taken freely, without influence of the deprivation 
of liberty, is in my view not excluded. This raises questions as to why the ECtHR 
applies a different approach in relation to suicide among detainees.516 
To conclude, the ECtHR’s case law shows that several factors are relevant in the 
balance between Article 8 (right to respect for privacy and self-determination) on 
the one hand and Article 3 and Article 2 ECHR (obligation to protect health and 
life of detainees) on the other, namely: 
1) the nature and seriousness of the interference with the rights laid down in Ar-
ticle 8 ECHR,
2) whether a risk to health and/or life exists, 
3) whether the detainee endangers his own health and/or life, 
4) whether a risk to the health and/or life of other(s) (such as fellow detainees or 
staff) exists. 
With regard to the proportionality of the interference, it is also relevant whether 
the interference is restricted to a minimum, for example through safeguards 
against abuse of information. This means with regard to exchanging or record-
ing of data that Member States have a margin of appreciation to decide about the 
necessity to exchange or record data against the detainee’s wishes in view of the 
interest of protecting health, unless a risk of suicide or a risk to the health and/or 
life of others exists. In the latter cases, the State authorities must act, whereas such 
an interference must have a basis in domestic law. With regard to the detainee’s 
515. ECtHR 20 January 2011, no. 31322/07, §§51, 54 (Haas v. Switzerland).
516. An explanation for this approach could be that the ECtHR is bound by the complaint raised 
by the applicant(s), i.e. the next of kin of a deceased detainee who complain about insufficient 
measures taken by State authorities to prevent the suicide attempt and/or the lethal outcome.
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right to self-determination regarding examinations or treatment, Member States 
have no other choice than to accept the detainee’s wishes if no danger to health 
and/or life exists. In these cases, Article 2 and Article 3 ECHR are not applicable. 
If the detainee endangers his own health and life, Member States have a margin 
of appreciation with regard to the manner in which the State will deal with the 
detainee’s wishes, unless the risk involves suicide. In the latter case, the ECHR 
obliges Member States to act. It follows from the ECtHR’s case law that if the 
detainee endangers the health and/or life of others, Member States do not have a 
margin of appreciation but have an obligation to act.
If State authorities intervene against the detainee’s wishes regarding end of life, 
it is important to note that Article 3, Article 5 and Article 8 ECHR must be ob-
served. This means that intervention must not lead to torture or inhuman and/
or degrading treatment and must be justified under Article 5 (if applicable) and 
Article 8 ECHR. An important factor that may lead to dilemmas is the length of 
time in which measures, such as camera surveillance and isolation, are applied. 
Prolonged isolation and camera surveillance will eventually lead to inhuman and 
degrading treatment but may be considered necessary, for example in view of a su-
icide risk. In such cases, a balance must be struck between the measures applied to 
prevent suicide and the conditions in which a detainee is held; the detainee must 
in any event be held in humane conditions. Article 8 §2 ECHR also requires that 
the interference must be in accordance with the law and is necessary in a demo-
cratic society in the interests of one or more of the aims enumerated in the second 
paragraph of Article 8, whereas necessity implies that the interference corresponds 
to a pressing social need and is proportionate to the legitimate aims pursued. Reg-
ular review of a measure imposed with the aim to protect a detainee from suicide 
is important to observe proportionality of that measure.517  
517. ECtHR 1 June 2004, no. 8704/03, p. 19 (Van der Graaf v. The Netherlands).
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CHAPTER 5. 
Implementation of obligations 
to avert premature death of 
detainees in the Netherlands
5.1. Introduction 
The obligations of Member States to avert premature death of detainees have been 
discussed in the previous chapter. The Netherlands is bound by the ECHR and 
the obligations expounded in chapter 4. This chapter will discuss whether, and if 
so, how, the aforementioned obligations arising from the ECHR are safeguarded 
in the Dutch legal framework,1 while distinguishing the same categories as in 
chapter 4. This chapter will close with concluding remarks regarding the question 
whether, and if so, how, the main dilemmas, as elaborated in chapter 4, section 
4.6, are addressed in the Dutch legal framework and whether this corresponds 
with the principles arising from the ECHR.
To ensure readability, this chapter will focus on deprivation of liberty in penal 
institutions and by the Dutch police. Throughout this chapter, legislation not 
specifically developed for the context of deprivation of liberty though neverthe-
less applicable in that context will firstly be discussed. Subsequently, the legal 
framework regarding deprivation of liberty in penal institutions and with regard 
to deprivation of liberty by the police will be considered.2 As for hospital orders 
combined with compulsory treatment, the Hospital Orders (Framework) Act or 
the Psychiatric Hospitals (Compulsory Admissions) Act is applicable.3 To en-
1. I.e. Dutch legislation (including its history), case law, national policy, and standards of the 
supervisory bodies, the Council for the Administration of Criminal Justice and Protection of 
Juveniles and representative bodies of professionals involved.
2. The Royal Netherlands Marechaussee is bound by the same legislation (art. 9 §1 Police Act 
2012) on the care for detainees as the Dutch Police. 
3. See chapter 3, section 3.2. See with respect to the hospital order with compulsory treatment 
also: Bleichrodt and Vegter 2016, §5.3.4. Kelk (edited by Boone) 2015, §§7.5-7.8.
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sure readability, the principles laid down in these Acts will only be enumerated 
in footnotes. Data from earlier performed studies (including studies of Thoonen 
and Duijst) is also discussed in this chapter to illustrate how risks (may) emerge 
in practice. 
5.2. Protective measures to prevent death because of the State
A first legislative safeguard to prevent lethal force (by State officials) is the Dutch 
criminal law that penalises, among others, deliberately taking another person’s 
life4 and ill-treatment.5 Furthermore, the use of force by State officials is, as 
required under the ECHR,6 regulated in several Dutch laws and regulations, in-
cluding the Custodial Institutions (Framework) Act and the Rules governing the 
use of force in penal institutions, the Police Act and the Official Instructions for 
the Police.7 The use of force by State officials must also meet the principles of 
proportionality and subsidiarity.8 Both custodial staff of penal institutions and 
police (custody) officers have to follow a basic training when they start working. 
They have to preserve the acquired skills by sufficient training,9 though there are 
indications that the frequency of the training needs to be increased.10 
With regard to the expected care if a person with severe mental problems 
shows aggressive behaviour and is approached by the police,11 it is noteworthy 
that the Dutch police is on a regular basis confronted with persons who show 
disturbing behaviour12 (and are violating criminal law). Several local initiatives 
are taken to deal with these persons, such as the Centre for disturbed persons in 
4. Art. 287 Criminal Code.
5. Art. 300 Criminal Code.
6. ECtHR 20 December 2004, no. 50385/99, §§57-58, GC (Makaratzis v. Greece).
7. See also: Rules governing the use of force in institutions for hospital orders with compulsory 
treatment.
8. Staatscourant (Stcrt.) Government Gazette 1998, no. 247. Art. 7 §1 Police Act.
9. Art. 2 §1, section c Rules governing the use of force in penal institutions. Police Use of Force 
(Review) Regulations. Art. 2, art. 3 §1, section c Rules governing the use of force in institutions for 
hospital orders with compulsory treatment
10. Inspectorate Security and Justice 2016, pp. 17-18.
11. The presence of medically and/or psychiatrically trained personnel is important in these cases. 
ECtHR 16 January 2014, no. 5269/08,  §§229-241 (Shchiborshch and Kuzmina v. Russia). See 
also: ECtHR 16 December 2008, no. 58478/00, §118 (Rupa v. Romania).
12. In a recent study, it was stated that police officers are, on average, confronted with disturbed 
persons from half a day to one day a week. Abraham and Nauta 2014. See also Kamerstukken 
(Parliamentary papers) II 2000-01, 26 983, no. 13.
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‘s-Gravenhage13 and the Emergency Psychiatry.14 The Dutch legislator has not 
regulated how mentally disturbed persons should be approached, but the Dutch 
police and Mental Health Care have developed a covenant on how to deal with 
mentally disturbed suspects to ensure involvement of a mental health care provid-
er.15 An employee of the crisis team should arrive to assist the police within two 
hours at most after the first contact (by telephone). The police has the responsibil-
ity to supervise the person concerned before the health care provider arrives. Both 
parties have a joint responsibility to solve such crisis situations.16 Evaluation of 
this covenant showed however that it may take some time before a mental health 
care provider arrives.17 The Inspectorate Security and Justice, the Health Care 
Inspectorate and the Inspectorate for Youth Care observed in 2016 that mentally 
disturbed persons are often locked in a police cell longer than necessary because 
mental health care providers are not able to examine or admit the person in ques-
tion immediately. It was also observed that too little psychiatrists were available to 
examine persons in crisis situations in need of psychiatric care and that during the 
training of police custody officers little to no attention is paid to extra vulnerable 
detainees, like mentally disturbed, suicidal or addicted detainees.18 Such observa-
tions may pose a risk to the detainee’s health.
Dutch law and regulations contain measures that aim to ensure a safe en-
vironment for detainees. Noteworthy are the powers of the prison governor to 
perform a body search of detainees and examine their clothes,19 to perform an 
internal examination of the detainee’s body,20 to inspect the cell of detainees for 
contraband,21 to examine the urine of detainees for the presence of narcotics,22 
13. See, for example: https://www.palier.nl/hoe-wij-helpen/poliklinieken/
opvang-verwarde-personen. Last accessed: 22 April 2017.
14. See, for example: https://www.spoedeisendepsychiatrieamsterdam.nl/. Last accessed: 17 
February 2017.
15. Covenant Dutch Police – Dutch Association of Mental Health and Addiction Care. See 
furthermore art. 66 Psychiatric Hospitals (Compulsory Admissions) Act that prescribes that police 
officers assigned to enforce judicial decisions to deprive a person with mental problems of his 
liberty according to this Act, must be accompanied by professionals trained in dealing with persons 
suffering from mental problems.
16. Covenant Police-Dutch Association of Mental Health and Addiction Care 2012. See also 
Bisseling and Braam 2009. Police Utrecht 2005.
17. Van der Zalm 2015, pp. 8-9.
18. Inspectorate Security and Justice, Health Care Inspectorate, Inspectorate for Youth Care 
2015, pp. 11, 15-16. 
19. Art. 29 Custodial Institutions (Framework) Act. See chapter V Hospital Orders (Framework) 
Act and chapter III Psychiatric Hospitals (Compulsory Admissions) Act.
20. Art. 31 Custodial Institutions (Framework) Act. 
21. Art. 34 Custodial Institutions (Framework) Act.
22. Art. 30 Custodial Institutions (Framework) Act.
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to inspect the post of detainees for contraband,23 and to examine the clothes of 
visitors.24 As for detainees held by the police, the measure to examine the de-
tainee’s clothes (and the authority to take away objects that may pose a danger 
during deprivation of liberty) is noteworthy in view of the obligation to ensure 
a safe environment.25 The obligation of the prison governor to provide detainees 
with nourishment includes the obligation to observe the quality of the provided 
nourishment.26 Dutch law does not specifically assign the medical service of penal 
institutions with the supervision on the quantity, quality, preparation and distri-
bution of food and conditions of hygiene. The job description of judicial nurses 
does however note that nurses should signalise factors that threaten the health of 
detainees and relate to the detainees’ living or work conditions, and make propos-
als for improvement.27 The CPT stated in 2017 that the health care staff in Dutch 
prisons should have a central role in the organisation of healthcare and interact 
regularly with the prison governors, which required a fundamental review of the 
medical services.28
5.3. Protective measures to prevent lethal violence by other 
detainees
Dutch law contains legislative safeguards to protect the right to life, including 
criminal law provisions and the authority to perform searches to find any dan-
gerous objects during deprivation of liberty (see section 5.2). As discussed in 
chapter 4, the ECHR requires a screening process of newly arrived detainees.29 
Dutch law prescribes that State officials assigned to select the penal institution 
where a detainee will be placed must develop a risk profile for the detainee con-
cerned.30 These officials must take into account the instructions given by the 
23. Art. 36 Custodial Institutions (Framework) Act. Art. 40 Psychiatric Hospitals (Compulsory 
Admissions) Act.
24. Art. 38 §5 Custodial Institutions (Framework) Act. See also: Bleichrodt and Vegter 2016, pp. 
218-223. Kelk (edited by Boone) 2015, §6.1.
25. Art. 28 Official Instructions for the Police.
26. BrC 24/10/2013 – 13/2103/GA. See also art. 44 Custodial Institutions (Framework) Act.
27. Custodial Institutions Agency 2011c, pp. 2-3.
28. CPT/Inf (2017) 1 – Netherlands, p. 27.
29. ECtHR 14 March 2002, no. 46477/99, §62 (Paul and Audrey Edwards v. UK), 
NJCM-Bulletin (28) 2003, no. 5, pp. 641-652 (with commentary from M. Boone).
30. Art. 22 Rules on selection, placement and transfer of detainees. Art. 11 §2 Hospital Orders 
(Framework) Act determines that the safety of society and of others and the treatment of the 
detainee should be taken into account when placing a detainee who is subjected to a hospital order 
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Public Prosecution Service and the authority who imposed the penalty or measure 
concerned,31 including information regarding physical or mental problems and 
the use of medication.32 The governor of the penal institution has the responsi-
bility to assign detainees to a cell.33 Detainees who are selected for a general34 or 
restricted regime35 may be placed in a shared cell, unless the detainee is unfit to be 
placed in such a cell due to mental problems, addiction(s), health condition, be-
havioural problems, the background of the committed crime (for example a sexual 
offence) or considering the restrictions imposed on the detainee.36 These criteria 
are however not absolute; they are just factors to be weighed in each individual 
case. Other relevant factors are the ethnic and cultural background and language 
barriers.37 Both the Inspectorate on the Enforcement of Sanctions and the Coun-
cil for the Administration of Criminal Justice and Protection of Juveniles have 
emphasised the importance that a thorough screening is performed before a de-
tainee is placed in a shared cell,38 whereas the latter also recommends to observe 
the detainee for two weeks before taking a decision on where to place a detainee.39 
with compulsory treatment in a particular facility. Basic principle is that the person will be detained 
in a facility closest to his residence, unless contraindications exist to place a detainee in that facility, 
such as a victim who is placed in the same facility or incidents that occurred during an earlier 
admission to that facility. Custodial Institutions Agency 2016f, pp. 5, 12. A detainee subjected to a 
hospital order with compulsory treatment may also be temporarily placed (maximum seven weeks) 
in another facility for observation. Art. 13 §1 Hospital Orders (Framework) Act.
31. Art. 15 §4 Custodial Institutions (Framework) Act. 
32. Instructions execution-indicator and risk profile form. 
33. Art. 16 §2 Custodial Institutions (Framework) Act. See also Boone 2003. The Minister of 
Security and Justice is responsible for placement of detainees subjected to a hospital order with 
compulsory treatment. Art. 11 §1 Hospital Orders (Framework) Act.
34. Detainees placed in a general regime stay in joint living or work areas and are locked in 
their (shared) cell during nights, National holidays and during remaining, as stipulated in the 
House rules, hours during weekends. These detainees may be locked in their (shared) cell during 
meals, during visiting times if they do not have visitors, or during activities in which they do not 
participate. Art. 20 Custodial Institutions (Framework) Act. See also Tak 2012, pp. 545-546. This 
regime is not or hardly applied these days. Bleichrodt and Vegter 2016, p. 212. 
35. Detainees placed in a restricted regime are provided the opportunity to participate in 
communal activities. They are locked in their (shared) cell for the remaining time. Art. 21 Custodial 
Institutions (Framework) Act. Tak 2012, pp. 545-546.
36. Art. 11a §§1-2 Rules on selection, placement and transfer of detainees. Detainees subjected 
to a hospital order with compulsory treatment are not placed in shared cells. Art. 16 §1 Hospital 
Orders (Framework) Act. See furthermore the evaluations of the Lelystad Detention Concept pilot 
project, where six-person cells are used: Post, Stoltz and Miedema 2007. Jongebreur, Abraham 
and Nauta 2008. The Custodial Institutions Agency also aims to expand the use of shared cells. 
Custodial Institutions Agency 2013b, pp. 16-17. 
37. Kamerstukken II 2003/04, 28 979, no. 5, p. 12.
38. Inspectorate on the Enforcement of Sanctions 2011b, pp. 40-41.
39. Council for the Administration of Criminal Justice and Protection of Juveniles 2008, pp. 6-7.
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The Inspectorate on the Enforcement of Sanctions noticed in 2011 that the proce-
dure on screening for placement in a shared cell was, in general, laid down in local 
policy. In general, the medical service assesses during the screening on admission 
whether contraindications for placement in a shared cell are (possibly) present. If 
necessary, advice of a psychologist will be obtained. Contraindications relating to 
the detainee’s behaviour, like aggression or the committed offence, are assessed by 
the prison officer or other personnel of the penal institution. In most penal insti-
tutions, it has been prescribed in policy that the decision to place a detainee in a 
shared cell should be taken in the multi-disciplinary meeting, though in practice 
this is often not possible considering the necessity to make a quick decision. The 
Inspectorate observed that most of the visited penal institutions had a ward for 
newly arrived detainees where detainees were firstly placed in a single cell. If the 
penal institution does not have a ward for newly arrived detainees, newly arrived 
detainees are nevertheless placed in a single cell during the first period of their 
stay. This basic principle is sometimes undermined by high numbers of newly ar-
rived detainees (with contraindications for placement in a shared cell), leading to 
the situation that some detainees are placed in a shared cell immediately after ad-
mission.40 Such a practice poses a risk, especially if not all available information 
is transferred to the receiving institution.
The Custodial Institutions (Framework) Act does contain a procedure for 
imposing disciplinary sanctions to detainees (as recommended by the CPT).41 
Special events (such as violent incidents) must be reported to the Minister and 
recorded.42 Although detainees are entitled to report criminal offences,43 a clear 
obligation to investigate all violent incidents between detainees does not exist. 
This is problematic;44 not investigating violent incidents between detainees does 
not correspond with the procedural obligations arising from Article 3 ECHR.45 
The Appeal Commission of the Council for the Administration of Criminal Jus-
tice and Protection of Juveniles has given a noteworthy judgment regarding a 
violent incident between two detainees at the exercise yard of the Maximum Se-
curity Prison in Vught. During the incident, the personnel immediately raised the 
40. Inspectorate on the Enforcement of Sanctions 2011b, pp. 36-39.
41. Art. 50-55. Chapter X Hospital Orders (Framework) Act.
42. Art. 5a §1 Custodial Institutions (Framework) Act and art. 4 §1 and art. 37 §1, section f 
Prison Rules. Art. 7a §1 Hospital Orders (Framework) Act. Art. 5 §2, section d Hospital Orders 
(Care) Regulations.
43. Art. 161 Code of Criminal Procedure.
4 4 .  S e e  f o r  e x a m p l e :  h t t p s : / / w w w. n r c . n l / n i e u w s / 2 0 1 7 / 0 1 / 1 8 /
sinds-die-zuuraanval-in-de-gevangenisis-hij-blind-6273656-a1541854. Last accessed: 6 May 
2017. 
45. ECtHR 10 February 2011, no. 44973/04, §§74, 92 (Premininy v. Russia).
Death in State Custody DRUK.indd   176 13-Sep-17   2:40:06 PM
Implementation of obligations to avert premature death of detainees in the Netherlands  177
alarm, the detainee was loudly instructed to stop, but no prison officers entered 
the yard (which corresponded with an instruction that aimed to prevent being 
taken hostage). To de-escalate the incident, the decision was made to let a fellow 
detainee enter the yard, who put his arms around the detainee which stopped the 
incident. The Appeal Commission ruled that these two detainees should not have 
been allocated to the same unit, nor should they have been brought to the yard 
simultaneously. The commission also ruled that the State authorities’ reaction to 
the incident was sufficiently adequate.46 The question has been raised whether 
mediation by another detainee during a violent incident corresponds with the ob-
ligations pursuant to the ECHR to do whatever is reasonably possible to protect 
the health and life of detainees.47 As already put forward by Sackers,48 I doubt 
whether this will suffice considering the possible risks for the detainee who medi-
ates in the conflict.
5.4. Healthcare and protective measures to avert premature 
death due to health issues
The starting point to examine legal safeguards regarding healthcare in Dutch law 
is the Dutch Constitution. The Dutch constitution does not contain a right to 
life.49 Article 2 ECHR has however, according to Article 93 Dutch Constitution, 
immediate binding force in the Dutch legal order, which means that the legislator 
should observe the principles arising from Article 2 ECHR when drafting a bill 
and Dutch courts can examine a case in line with the principles emerging from 
the ECHR. As for healthcare, the Dutch Constitution prescribes that the Govern-
ment must take measures to promote public health.50 The Dutch Constitution 
also contains the right to respect for privacy (Article 10) and the right to respect 
the physical integrity of persons (Article 11).
The rights of patients and the obligations of health care providers are furthermore 
explicitly laid down in Dutch law. An important act in this regard is the Medical 
Treatment Contracts Act. The Medical Treatment Contracts Act is applicable on 
46. BrC 21/02/2012 – 11/2979/GA.
47. Van de Bunt et al 2013, pp. 165-166, 18-19.
48. Sancties 2012/16, with commentary from Sackers.
49. A study has however been performed to explore the value of including the right to life in the 
Dutch Constitution. Peters et al 2009.  
50. Art. 22 §1 Dutch Constitution.
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actions in the field of medicine directly related to a specific patient,51 and which 
are performed in the exercise of one’s profession or business.52 These actions are 
defined as: a) actions – including examination and advice – directly related to a 
person and aimed at curing a disease, preventing a disease from developing, as-
sessing that person’s condition or assisting at a delivery, b) acts that do not fall 
within the ambit of section a, but directly affects a person and are performed by 
a physician in that capacity.53 Acts in the field of medicine also include nursing 
and caring for the patient.54 Physicians (including psychiatrists) are bound by 
the Medical Treatment Contracts Act, just like nurses and pharmacists. Psycholo-
gists are bound by this Act if they perform acts on the field of medicine, i.e. give 
treatment to a patient, for example treatment by a health care psychologist (i.e. a 
profession with a protected title pursuant to the Individual Health Care Profes-
sions Act).55 The Medical Treatment Contracts Act is laid down in Book 7 of the 
Dutch Civil Code. A medical treatment contract is a special contract between the 
health care provider on the one hand and the patient or third party on the other. 
If a third party closes the contract, the medical treatment contract is closed in the 
benefit of the patient, though the third party is liable for the obligations arising 
from the medical contract. 
The Dutch legislator holds the view that healthcare provided to a detainee 
is not based on an agreement (contract) between the detainee and the health 
care provider, but on Article 464 Medical Treatment Contracts Act (a mutatis 
mutandis provision).56 According to this provision, the health care regulations 
enshrined in the Medical Treatment Contracts Act are also applicable if medi-
cine is practised without an agreement between the patient and the health care 
provider and as far as the legal relationship permits. The legislator stressed that 
the Medical Treatment Contracts Act applies to medicine practised in judicial 
institutions pursuant to Article 464. It stressed that the detained patient’s volun-
tariness to submit oneself to the medical conduct is completely or partly absent 
because there exists a legal obligation to submit oneself to acts on the field of 
medicine. Several provisions laid down in the Medical Treatment Contracts Act, 
51. Art. 446 §1 Medical Treatment Contracts Act.
52. Kamerstukken II 1990/91, 21 561, no. 6, p. 55.
53. Art. 446 §2 Medical Treatment Contracts Act.
54. Art. 446 §3 Medical Treatment Contracts Act.
55. See also: Leenen et al 2014, p. 100. The Individual Health Care Professions Act is discussed 
in more detail in section 5.4.3.
56. Stb. (Bulletin of Acts and Decrees) 2000, 121, p. 3. See for the same view: Kelk (edited by 
Boone) 2015, §6.8.2. Duijst 2011, p. 225. Leenen et al 2014, p. 562. See with regard to deprivation 
of liberty by the police: Stb. 1994, 275, p. 26.
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for example informed consent, could in view of the legislator cause problems in a 
context of deprivation of liberty if they would apply unabridged.57 The case law 
of the Appeal Commission also shows some noteworthy constructions in relation 
to the applicability of the Medical Treatment Contracts Act when healthcare is 
provided during deprivation of liberty. In 2003, the Appeal Commission stressed 
that the Medical Treatment Contracts Act applied to the relationship between a 
detainee and the institution’s physician pursuant to Article 464.58 In 2013, the 
Appeal Commission concluded that the medical conduct in a Penal Psychiatric 
Centre should be based on Article 42 Custodial Institutions (Framework) Act 
and not on a treatment agreement as meant in Article 446 §1 Medical Treatment 
Contracts Act. It also stated that pursuant to Article 464 §1 Medical Treatment 
Contracts Act, the duty of medical confidentiality does not fully apply, though 
Article 457 §1, third sentence Medical Treatment Contracts Act was in view of 
the Appeal Commission the legal basis to supply the Commission with the infor-
mation necessary to assess the decision to apply forced medical treatment.59 This 
approach reveals in my view some propensity to ‘cherry-picking’. The individual 
rights laid down in the Medical Treatment Contracts Act are in my view fully 
applicable (and not partly) or not at all. Others have furthermore stressed that a 
deviation from the patients’ rights laid down in the Medical Treatment Contracts 
Act should have a legal basis,60 which is supported by the legislative history that 
states that the regulations on medical conduct laid down in the Custodial Insti-
tutions (Framework) Act must be regarded as a lex specialis with regard to the 
Medical Treatment Contracts Act as lex generalis.61 Considering the vagueness of 
the criterion laid down in Article 464, such a legal basis ensures in my view also 
the foreseeability of a deviation.   
In my opinion, a detainee may request for a consult with the physician of his 
own volition and in practice, healthcare during deprivation of liberty is mainly 
57. Stb. 2000, 121, pp. 3-4, 6.
58. BrC 15/07/2003 – 02/1447/GM.
59. BrC 03/12/2013 – 13/2493/GA; 13/2585/GA. See also: BrC 22/01/2014 – 13/2583/GA. 
BrC 23/01/2014 – 13/2649/GA. BrC 23/01/2014 – 13/2707/GA. BrC 14/02/2014 – 13/2497/
GA. BrC 02/04/2014 – 13/3550/GA (tussenbeslissing). BrC 06/08/2014 – 14/1222/GA. This is 
in my view an incorrect stretch of the term legal obligation. Apparently, the legislator has omitted 
to provide a legal basis for transferring necessary medical data to the Appeal Commission in order 
to assess the decision to apply forced medical treatment. See also BrC 18/12/2015 – 15/1486/
GA (eindbeslissing): governor stressed that there was no legal basis to submit the treatment plan. 
See furthermore BrC 06/10/2014 – 14/2418/GB: the psychologist’s claim to the protection of 
professional confidentiality was in view of the BrC unjust. See also: BrC 17/02/2014 – 13/2728/
TA.
60. Hendriks 2007, pp. 65-71. Leenen et al 2014, pp. 99-100.
61. Stb. 2000, 121, pp. 7, 10.
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provided after a request of the detainee and based on consent of the detained 
patient. Under these conditions, it cannot be said that the detainee is obliged 
to submit himself to this consult. This raises the question whether such acts on 
the fields of medicine are performed pursuant to a medical treatment contract 
between the detained patient and the physician, which is relevant for the applica-
bility of the rights and obligations laid down in the Medical Treatment Contracts 
Act. On the other hand, a basic principle in contracts law is the freedom to choose 
any contracting party.62 This freedom is for a large part impaired when it con-
cerns healthcare provided within judicial institutions. The detainee only has a 
right to consult a physician of his own choice, at his own expense, and not to be 
treated by this physician.63 The medical service of a penal institution, includ-
ing the physician, is furthermore directly involved in the detainee’s treatment 
from the moment the detainee enters the institution (as the medical service’s tasks 
commence from that moment)64 or from the moment inquiries into his medical 
history are made prior to his admission. Although free choice of physician may 
in free society also be limited (for example because a limited number of physi-
cians are practising within a municipality, or the health care insurance only gives 
a refund if healthcare is provided by specifically contracted health care providers), 
these limitations are not as far-reaching as during deprivation of liberty. Neverthe-
less, the fact remains that if a detainee voluntarily turns to a health care provider 
with a request for care and the health care provider responds by performing exam-
inations and proposing treatment, it is clear that both parties agree. Under these 
conditions, the Medical Treatment Contracts Act is in my view applicable pursu-
ant to a medical treatment contract between the detained patient and the health 
care provider. This means that the ground for the applicability of this Act must 
be determined on each separate request for care or on each occasion healthcare is 
provided to the detainee. This also means that the grounds for the applicability of 
this Act may in my view diverge. If healthcare is provided on the detainee’s request 
and with his consent, the Act is applicable pursuant to an agreement between the 
detainee and the health care provider. The rights and obligations laid down in the 
Medical Treatment Contracts Act are in these cases fully applicable; deviations 
from these rights and obligations must be explicitly laid down in law (for example 
the Custodial Institutions (Framework) Act). If healthcare is provided to a de-
tainee under duress, the Medical Treatment Contracts Act is applicable pursuant 
62. Hartkamp 2006, p. 33.
63. Art. 42 §2 Custodial Institutions (Framework) Act. Art. 41 §2 Hospital Orders (Framework) 
Act. See section 5.4.4. The right to receive care from a physician is not explicitly laid down in the 
Psychiatric Hospitals (Compulsory Admissions) Act.
64. Commentary to Recommendation Rec(2006)2, pp. 18-19.
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to Article 464, which means that the Custodial Institutions (Framework) Act has 
priority as far as it deviates from the rights and obligations laid down in the Med-
ical Treatment Contracts Act. Deviations from the Medical Treatment Contracts 
Act therefore require in both cases an explicit basis in law to prevent arbitrariness 
and ‘cherry-picking’.   
5.4.1. Appropriate environment 
The Dutch legal framework contains several guarantees to ensure that a detainee 
is held in an appropriate environment. If during the criminal proceedings it is put 
forward in the suspect’s defence that a suspect’s health condition is not compati-
ble with deprivation of liberty, Dutch courts must investigate whether the Prison 
System Division is capable of providing the care that is necessary in view of the 
suspect’s health condition.65 Dutch law provides the possibility to interrupt the 
deprivation of liberty on urgent physical or mental grounds, provided that these 
grounds are incompatible with continuation of deprivation of liberty.66 There also 
exists the possibility to ask for a pardon, for example if a detainee is terminally 
ill.67 The safety of other persons may however hamper the decision to grant a par-
don and/or the moment a detainee can be pardoned. The assessment whether a 
detainee’s health condition is compatible with (continued) deprivation of liberty 
is made by the medical advisors of the Custodial Institutions Agency.68 
65. Supreme Court 7 November 1995, ECLI:NL:PHR:1995:AC0054, NJ 1996, 166. See 
however also: Supreme Court 7 November 1995, ECLI:NL:PHR:1995:AC0052, NJ 1996, 165. 
See furthermore: Supreme Court 24 May 2016, ECLI:NL:HR:2016:953, with commentary from 
B.F. Keulen, NJ 2016/389.
66. Art. 570b Code of Criminal Procedure. Art. 37 Rules on temporary leave. See, for example: 
District Court ‘s-Gravenhage 3 November 2016, ECLI:NL:RBDHA:2016:13618: claim to suspend 
execution of prison sentence rejected. The Hospital Orders (Framework) Act and the attached 
regulations do not contain the possibility to interrupt the deprivation of liberty on urgent physical 
or mental grounds. The Leave Regulation for Hospital Orders does contain the possibility to grant 
leave for personal reasons (art. 13).
67. Art. 122 Dutch Constitution and art. 2 Pardons Act. Art. 558 Code of Criminal Procedure. 
See also art. 559a §2 Code of Criminal Procedure: possibility to suspend execution of sentence 
before decision regarding pardon is reached, for example if a person has a life-threatening disease. 
Policy rule regarding three specific elements of the instrument to grant pardon (Beleidsregels 
betreffende drie specifieke onderdelen van het gratie-instrument). Bleichrodt and Vegter 2016, pp. 
410-415.
68. Westra, Muilwijk and Roeleveld-Kuijper 2014.
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Screening
Medical screening on admission in a penal institution is not an obligatory step 
according to Dutch law,69 though it has been set as a norm by the Custodial 
Institutions Agency70 and it is practice in the Netherlands to perform a med-
ical screening (including screening for tuberculosis)71 on admission in a penal 
institution. The Inspectorate Security and Justice also expects that each detainee 
is screened on admission to identify any health risks (including the risk of 
self-harm).72 Monitoring that the screening will actually take place is expect-
ed.73 The Public Health Act, applicable during deprivation of liberty, contains 
legal provisions regarding the procedure (such as the obligation to report and the 
possibility to isolate the person in question) that needs to be followed if specific 
enumerated contagious diseases (listed under Groep A (for example the Ebola vi-
rus), B1, B2 and C) are suspected or established. Although a medical screening is 
not regulated in Dutch law, a detainee who refuses to cooperate with this screen-
ing may nevertheless be isolated on medical grounds.74 Duijst furthermore stated 
that screening for tuberculosis can be enforced pursuant to Article 32 Custodial 
Institutions (Framework) Act (considering the State’s responsibility to protect 
the health of other detainees),75 though this possibility has not been stressed by 
the legislator. Considering the ECtHR’s case law on this matter76 and Article 8 
ECHR, the medical screening should in my view preferably have a basis in Dutch 
law, including a provision on how to deal with detainees who refuse to submit to 
the screening. Such a provision can be regarded as a stronger safeguard to fulfil 
the obligations deriving from the ECHR (namely to protect the health of other 
69. See also: Hendriks and Van Dijk 2008, footnote 27.
70. Custodial Institutions Agency 2016c. This does not apply to non-judicial institutions where 
hospital orders with compulsory treatment can be executed.
71. Van Dam and Erkens 2014. Several categories of detainees are distinguished: detainees 
admitted to a judicial institution pursuant to a hospital order with compulsory treatment are for 
example not screened for tuberculosis on admission because this has already been done elsewhere. 
A thorax photo on admission in a penal institution will only be made if the detainee falls within 
a high-risk group. Custodial Institutions Agency 2010, p. 16. See with regard to the screening on 
admission in the maximum security prison: Van de Bunt et al 2013, pp. 97-98.
72. Inspectorate Security and Justice 2015, p. 19. 
73. Inspectorate Security and Justice 2015b, p. 9. Council for the Administration of Criminal 
Justice and Protection of Juveniles 2015, p. 11.
74. Custodial Institutions Agency 2010, p. 18. BrC 13/05/2005 – 05/0289/GA and 05/0454/
GA. The BrC stated that it is the physician’s responsibility to intervene after two, at most three 
weeks if no symptoms manifest itself during isolation. BrC 25/07/2000 – 00/0446/GM and 
00/0518/GM.
75. Duijst 2011, p. 229.
76. ECtHR 4 February 2016, no. 58828/13, §§39, 45 (Isenc v. France).
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detainees), meets the requirement that any interference with the detainee’s right 
to self-determination and physical integrity must be in accordance with the law, 
ensures foreseeability and prevents arbitrariness. 
The manner in which the screening on admission in a penal institution should 
be performed and by whom is also not regulated in Dutch law. The Custodial In-
stitutions Agency has set standards regarding the medical screening on admission. 
A nurse will perform an interview on admission and the newly arrived detainee 
must be scheduled for the next office hours of the physician. The physician must 
see the detainee or examine the admission form that is used by the nurse to in-
terview the detainee on admission.77 The Health Care Inspectorate accepts that 
the medical screening on admission is performed by a nurse, provided that this 
screening is regulated by protocols that precisely prescribe the nurse’s tasks. A 
screening performed by a nurse can never replace an examination by the physi-
cian.78 The Inspectorate observed in 2009 that the physician did not authorise 
every screening on admission performed by a nurse,79 which is a risk in view of 
the Inspectorate.80 This view corresponds with the CPT-standards as referred 
to by the ECtHR,81 holding that the nurse who performs the screening should 
report to a physician. The Eindhoven Regional Disciplinary Committee for the 
Health Care Sector furthermore emphasises that the physician should examine 
a detainee promptly if the screening by the nurse shows indications for medical 
problems such as addiction, heart complaints, possible pregnancy, the use of mul-
tiple medications, a great loss of weight in a short period, high blood pressure, or 
a high score on the suicide screening.82 The Health Care Inspectorate further-
more expects that penal institutions have a policy on recognising, diagnosing and 
monitoring psychiatric illnesses and addictions.83 The institution should have 
(sufficient) policy on the referral of detainees to psychological or psychiatric care 
after the screening and this policy must be clear to the staff.84 
The Custodial Institutions Agency also prescribes that the medical screening 
should be finished within 24 hours after admission, and the physician should have 
seen the detainee and/or authorised the admission form used for the interview on 
77. Custodial Institutions Agency 2016c.
78. Health Care Inspectorate 1999, p. 69.
79. Health Care Inspectorate 2009, p. 26.
80. Health Care Inspectorate 2011 (Haarlem), p. 7.
81. ECtHR 18 December 2012, no. 1871/08, §31 (Jeladze v. Georgia).
82. RTG Eindhoven 23 October 2014, ECLI:NL:TGZREIN:2014:86.
83. Health Care Inspectorate 2009, p. 52. See with regard to addictions: Custodial Institutions 
Agency 2008. Westra et al 2009.
84. Health Care Inspectorate 2011 (Achterhoek, Zutphen), p. 8.
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admission during the next office hours.85 The standards developed by supervisory 
bodies do not provide an uniform view on the maximum admissible time frame to 
perform the medical screening on admission. The Health Care Inspectorate seems 
to expect that a detainee is seen by the physician within two working days after 
admission.86 Other bodies expect a medical screening to be performed within 
24 hours after admission.87 Not performing a medical screening within 24 hours 
after admission, for example in the weekend after the detainee is admitted on a 
Friday, may pose a risk for the detainee’s own health and that of other detainees. 
The National ombudsman observed in 2012 that the medical screening on admis-
sion was not always performed within 24 hours.88 This was also observed by the 
CPT in 2016.89 Noteworthy is that the CPT Standards, as referred to by the EC-
tHR, recommend a screening on the day of admission, which is more stringent 
than the Custodial Institutions Agency’s norm of maximum 24 hours,90 which 
may include one (risky) night. Lastly, it is noteworthy that whether a detainee 
smokes is another relevant factor to take into account when deciding about place-
ment in a shared cell.91
As discussed in chapter 4, screening of persons deprived of their liberty by the 
police is not required by the ECtHR, nor is it laid down in soft law. Dutch legisla-
tion does not prescribe that persons deprived of their liberty by the police must be 
examined by a physician on admission,92 and at present, it is not standard proce-
dure to perform a medical examination of a detainee after entering a police station 
or police custody suite. Practice shows that the police custody officer performs a 
brief screening before a person is locked in a police cell, by asking the detainee 
whether he is ill, is using medication or is addicted. If there are indications that 
the detainee is in need of healthcare or the detainee actually carries medication, 
85. Custodial Institutions Agency 2016c.
86. Health Care Inspectorate 2011 (Haarlem), appendix I, p. 24.
87. Inspectorate Security and Justice 2015, p. 19; 2015b, p. 9. Council for the Administration 
of Criminal Justice and Protection of Juveniles 2015, p. 13.
88. National Ombudsman, no. 2012/037, pp. 38-40. See also Inspectorate on the Enforcement 
of Sanctions 2010, p. 30.
89. CPT/Inf (2017) 1 – Netherlands, p. 28.
90. ECtHR 18 December 2012, no. 1871/08, §31 (Jeladze v. Georgia).
91. Kamerstukken II 2003/04, 28 979, no. 5, p. 12. See also BrC 12/07/2010 – 10/0537/GA: 
prison governor failed in his duty to care for the detainee in question by placing a non-smoking 
detainee in a shared cell with a smoking detainee. See also BrC 22/12/2016 – 16/3548/GA: 
obligation of means of prison governor to take measures to prevent passive smoking.
92. The Dutch State Secretary has stated that the case Rudyak versus Ukraine (ECtHR 4 
September 2014, no. 40514/06) does not imply an obligation for the State to screen every detainee 
entering police custody. Aanhangsel Handelingen II 2014/15, 83.
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the police is instructed to consult the (forensic) physician.93 The latter has to 
give a medical advice or an advice on how to care for the detainee. The (forensic) 
physician must also assess whether it is, from a medical perspective, advisable to 
detain the person concerned.94 The Inspection Security and Justice expects that 
police custody officers should actively inquire whether vulnerable detainees, like 
detainees with addictions or mental health problems, have specific needs.95 
Care facilities
The legislator has stressed that the detainee’s right to medical treatment, as laid 
down in Article 42 Custodial Institutions (Framework) Act, does not imply treat-
ment (psychiatric/psychological) comparable to treatment provided in forensic 
psychiatric centres or other mental health institutions. Aim of the prison sentence 
is serving the sentence and rehabilitation.96 The Custodial Institutions (Frame-
work) Act does however contain provisions aimed at detainees with a special need 
for care. Penal institutions can be specifically assigned for detainees in need of 
special care, for example due to their physical and mental health condition.97 
At present, several penal institutions have a special unit for detainees with men-
tal problems, the Penal Psychiatric Centres (PPCs). These centres are meant for 
detainees in need of forensic care due to a psychiatric illness, personality dis-
order, psychosocial problems, addiction or due to a mental disablement, or if 
further observation is necessary to assess whether the detainee is in need of fo-
rensic care.98 The custodial staff working in PPCs are specifically trained to deal 
with these detainees.99 The basic principle regarding the provided care in PPCs 
is equivalence of care, though with due regard to the restrictions resulting from 
deprivation of liberty. The aim of the provided treatment in PPCs is to stabilise 
the detainee’s condition and to continue treatment that aims to improve the men-
tal condition of the detainee and his general functioning to contribute to a safer 
93. Art. 32 §1 Official Instructions for the Police.
94. Instructions for execution, Stcrt. 2010, no. 20473, appendix 4.
95. Inspectorate Security and Justice and Health Care Inspectorate 2014, p. 13.
96. Kamerstukken II 2009/10, 32 337, no. 3, pp. 18-19. See about the care for detainees with 
psychological problems also: Roorda and Buysse (DSP-groep) 2016.
97. Art. 14 Custodial Institutions (Framework) Act. The governor may assign parts or units 
within the penal institution for detainees in need of special care. Art. 16 §3 Custodial Institutions 
(Framework) Act.
98. Art. 20c Rules selection, placement and transfer of detainees. The Hospital Orders 
(Framework) Act provides the opportunity to place a detainee on a unit for intensive care (art. 32). 
See also: CPT/Inf (2017) 1 – Netherlands, pp. 36-49.
99. See, for example, Custodial Institutions Agency 2012, p. 9.
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society.100 Retarded detainees or detainees who are suffering from a mental illness 
can also be transferred to a psychiatric hospital to receive care.101 Furthermore, 
the Prison System Division has at its disposal Extra Care Facilities.102 Also note-
worthy is that if a person is convicted to both a prison sentence and a hospital 
order with compulsory treatment, the detainee needs to serve the prison sentence 
before the detainee is placed in the forensic psychiatric centre. Deviation from 
this basic principle is possible if there are urgent medical reasons necessitating 
an earlier placement.103 The Health Care Inspectorate requires that detainees are 
transferred to a suitable psychiatric institution or another suitable institution if 
necessary considering their mental condition.104 This standard corresponds with 
the standards developed in the ECtHR’s case law.105 The health condition of the 
detainee in question must also be kept in mind when deciding whether or not a 
detainee needs to be handcuffed during transport.106 The Inspectorate also con-
siders it to be a risk if prison officers are not trained in recognising psychiatric 
behaviour as this may have the consequence that the medical service is not, or too 
late, informed.107 Lastly, the Custodial Institutions Agency has a care facility for 
detainees who are in a terminal phase of their illness: the Judicial Centre for So-
matic Care can provide terminal and palliative care.108 
Disciplinary punishment
The ECtHR has stressed that any mental problem(s) of the detainee in ques-
tion must be taken into account when enforcing a disciplinary punishment. The 
importance of involving medical personnel in these circumstances has also been 
stressed.109 The governor of a penal institution is authorised to enforce discipli-
100. Kamerstukken II 2009/10, 32 337, no. 3, p. 4. See with regard to mental health treatment 
in prison also: DJI 2003 and 2003b. See furthermore: Council for the Administration of Criminal 
Justice and Protection of Juveniles 2012b.
101. Art. 15 §5 Custodial Institutions (Framework) Act. These hospitals are psychiatric hospitals 
as mentioned in the Psychiatric Hospitals (Compulsory Admissions) Act. 
102. See also: https://www.dji.nl/justitiabelen/volwassenen-in-detentie/zorg-en-begeleiding/
index.aspx. Last accessed: 17 February 2017. The CPT stated in 2017 that these Extra Care 
Provisions could serve as a model for other countries. CPT/Inf (2017) 1 – Netherlands, p. 24.
103. Art. 42 §§1, 2 section a Prison Rules.
104. Health Care Inspectorate 1999, p. 69.
105. ECtHR 20 January 2009, no. 28300/06, §§94-98 (Sławomir Musiał v. Poland).
106. BrC 16/02/1996 – SG-A 95/690, Sancties 1996/45.
107. Health Care Inspectorate 2011 (Achterhoek, Zutphen), pp. 10-11. 
108. Judicial Centre for Somatic Care 2013.
109. ECtHR 19 July 2012, no. 38447/09, §§87-99 (Ketreb v. France).
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nary punishments, for example placing a detainee in a punishment cell.110 If such 
a disciplinary punishment is being enforced in a punishment cell and exceeds 24 
hours, the governor must inform the institution’s physician (or his substitute).111 
This provision is incompatible with the Rules on punishment and isolation cell 
penal institutions, which determines that the governor must inform the physician 
immediately about the placement in a punishment cell and that the physician or 
the nurse (the latter under authority of the physician) must visit the detainee as 
soon as possible. The physician or nurse must regularly visit the detainee if place-
ment in a punishment cell exceeds 24 hours.112 Despite this inconsistency, Dutch 
law does contain provisions to ensure notification of, and monitoring by, medical 
personnel during disciplinary punishment. This is expected under the ECHR if a 
detainee with mental problems, showing an alarming deterioration in his state of 
health, is placed in a disciplinary cell.113
During a detainee’s stay in a punishment cell the governor must ensure due 
contact between the staff and the detainee. The detainee’s individual situation 
must be taken into account when establishing nature and frequency of this con-
tact.114 The Inspectorate Security and Justice has however observed in practice 
that more attention could be given to the detainee’s situation.115 The governor is 
obliged to ensure that he will be informed about the condition of a detainee who 
is placed in a punishment cell, at least on a daily basis,116 though the Inspectorate 
Security and Justice observed that the governor did not in a standard fashion en-
sure that he is kept informed of the detainee’s condition during the weekends.117 
If the detainee repeatedly misuses the means of communication in the punish-
ment cell, the governor may decide to shut this means of communication down, 
provided that necessary measures will be taken to ensure sufficient means of com-
munication between the detainee and custodial personnel.118 The Inspectorate 
110. Art. 51 §1, section a Custodial Institutions (Framework) Act. The Hospital Orders 
(Framework) Act authorises the head of the institution to place a detainee in its own room as 
a disciplinary measure (Article 49 §1, section a). The governor of a penal institution may also 
segregate a detainee to maintain order within the institution. Art. 24 in connection with art. 23 §1, 
section a Custodial Institutions (Framework) Act. Art. 34 in connection with art. 32 §1, section b 
Hospital Orders (Framework) Act.
111. Art. 55 §2 Custodial Institutions (Framework) Act.
112. Art. 4 Rules punishment and isolation cell penal institutions.
113. ECtHR 19 July 2012, no. 38447/09, §§87-99 (Ketreb v. France).
114. Art. 8 Rules punishment and isolation cell penal institutions.
115. Inspectorate Security and Justice 2012b, p. 60.
116. Art. 5 Rules on punishment and isolation cell penal institutions. This also applies during the 
weekends. Stcrt. 1999, no. 132.
117. Inspectorate Security and Justice 2012b, p. 66.
118. Art. 6 Rules on punishment and isolation cell penal institutions. 
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observed the risk that the custodial staff switches off the sound of the intercom 
of their own volition, so that only a light is visible if the detainee uses the means 
of communication.119 Whenever the detainee shows self-destructive behaviour or 
if there are indications that the detainee will show such behaviour, the custodial 
staff must inform themselves of the condition of the detainee at least once every 
hour.120 The Council for the Administration of Criminal Justice and Protection 
of Juveniles expects that detainees with a risk of self-destructive behaviour are 
supervised continuously or at least very frequently.121 ‘Very frequently’ has how-
ever not been defined. The governor must ensure that the individual situation 
of the detainee is taken into account when determining the manner (nature and 
frequency) in which one must report about the detainee’s stay in a punishment 
cell.122 Camera surveillance may be applied if the mental or physical condition 
of the detainee requires constant surveillance.123 Before applying camera surveil-
lance, the governor must consult a behavioural expert or the physician, unless this 
advice cannot be awaited. In the latter case, the advice needs to be obtained as 
soon as possible.124 The camera in a punishment cell must have an overview of 
the entire cell.125
Acute problems
Dutch legislation on deprivation of liberty by the police contains safeguards 
to ensure attention for extra vulnerability of detainees. Police custody officers 
are instructed to alert a physician if a detainee has, or appears to have, mental 
problems.126 Whether a physician is notified will thus depend on the individual 
assessment of police custody officers (who are not trained in this regard), which 
may pose a risk. A detainee can furthermore be observed with a camera for 24 
hours a day when necessary to observe the detainee continuously to avert a risk for 
the life or safety of the detainee in question.127 The maximum length of camera 
surveillance during deprivation of liberty by the police is not regulated in Dutch 
law, nor do legislation or any other regulations prescribe the involvement of a 
physician when using camera surveillance. The Inspectorate Security and Justice 
119. Inspectorate Security and Justice 2012b, pp. 59-60.
120. Art. 9 Rules on punishment and isolation cell penal institutions.
121. Council for the Administration of Criminal Justice and Protection of Juveniles 2015, p. 14.
122. Art. 10 Rules punishment and isolation cell penal institutions.
123. Art. 51a §1 Custodial Institutions (Framework) Act. See also art. 33 Rules punishment and 
isolation cell penal institutions.
124. Art. 51a §2 Custodial Institutions (Framework) Act.
125. Art. 20 §2 Rules punishment and isolation cell penal institutions.
126. Art. 25 §3 Official Instructions for the Police.
127. Art. 31 §§1-2 Official Instructions for the Police.
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does however expect that camera surveillance is used with reserve and as short as 
possible. If the use of camera surveillance exceeds 24 hours, a physician should in 
view of the Inspectorate determine whether it is necessary to continue this meas-
ure. The Inspectorate Security and Justice and Health Care Inspectorate require 
that persons with abnormal behaviour are detained as short as possible.128 
The basic assumption that can be derived from Article 25 Official Instructions 
for the Police is that every police (custody) officer is able to determine whether 
a person is only intoxicated by alcohol and/or other substances. The police of-
ficer is after all only required to call a physician if the person concerned has, or 
seems to have, mental problems. The assessment whether a person is intoxicated 
is however not easy, even for medically trained professionals. As stressed by the 
CPT, several medical conditions (e.g. internal bleeding, diabetes) can be mistaken 
for, or masked by, a state of intoxication.129 This does not only apply to the con-
sumption of alcohol, but also to the consumption of stimulants like cocaine. The 
Central Disciplinary Committee for the Health Care Sector has in this regard 
emphasised that if an ambulance nurse is informed that a patient has consumed 
an excessive amount of alcohol and has sustained a head injury, a full examination 
must be performed, including standard procedures such as taking the person’s 
blood pressure and pulse and checking the person’s consciousness and cognitive 
functions.130 Thoonen and Duijst have previously raised the difficulties entailed in 
assessing whether a person is (only) intoxicated or not and recommended that a 
physician should always be called if an (apparently) intoxicated person is deprived 
of his liberty by the police.131 The Guideline of the Forensic Medical Society on 
the assessment of intoxicated detainees shows that this is not standard procedure 
in every police district in the Netherlands. In some districts, the physician may, 
under certain conditions and on the basis of local protocols, give his advice by 
telephone.132 A member of the Lower House raised the question whether the State 
Secretary is of the opinion that a physician should always be called when an (ap-
parently) intoxicated person was held by the police. The State Secretary has not 
answered this question.133 This is striking as several studies show that a state of 
intoxication can be regarded as a risk for premature death during deprivation of 
128. Inspectorate Security and Justice and Health Care Inspectorate 2014, pp. 9-10, 20.
129. CPT/Inf (93) 8, Finland, p. 22.
130. CTG 21 July 2009, TvGr 2009/38.
131. Thoonen and Duijst 2014b. Thoonen and Duijst 2014. 
132. Forensic Medical Society and Dutch Association of Community Health Services 2013.
133. Aanhangsel Handelingen II 2013/14, 2694.
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liberty by the Dutch police.134 In former days, a guideline prescribed that every 
intoxicated person deprived of his liberty by the police should be medically ex-
amined as soon as possible.135 This principle has not been adopted in the guideline 
that entered into force in 1987. The current Official Instructions for the Police do 
not prescribe that a physician should always be alerted if an apparently intoxicated 
person is deprived of his liberty by the police. However, the national regulations 
developed by the Dutch police, as established in 2016, do contain the instruction 
to provide intoxicated detainees with healthcare as soon as possible.136 The Health 
Care Inspectorate also requires that an intoxicated person receives extra attention 
during deprivation of liberty by the police and is supervised more often. The In-
spectorate Security and Justice expects that intoxicated persons held by the police 
have the right to receive medical treatment as soon as possible.137
5.4.2. Access to healthcare
Access to health care providers and the role of custodial staff
Persons held in penal institutions have a statutory right to receive care from the 
physician or the locum physician connected to the institution, which includes 
medical (somatic), psychiatric and dental care.138 This statutory right is one of 
the legal safeguards to ensure the detainee’s access to a physician and to meet the 
requirements set by the ECtHR.139 Detainees also have the right to receive so-
cial care and assistance from rehabilitation officers, behavioural experts and social 
134. Blaauw, Kerkhof, Vermunt, De Vries and van Veen 1995, pp. 70-71. A study of the 
Rijksrecherche shows that intoxication (in particular cocaine) was the most frequent cause of death 
in police custody in 2000-2004. Rijksrecherche 2006, pp. 5 and 12. Between 2005 and 2010 
(included), 78 persons died in police custody (police shooting and apprehension included), of 
which approximately 25% due to intoxication. In almost 70% of the included cases, there were, 
prior to the detainee’s death, indications that the detainee was intoxicated. Thoonen and Duijst 
2014. 
135. Guidelines to observe when drafting official instructions for the police regarding the treatment 
of intoxicated persons (Richtlijnen in acht te nemen bij het opstellen van dienstvoorschriften voor 
de politie inzake de behandeling van geïntoxiceerden), Ministry of the Interior (Ministerie van 
Binnenlandse Zaken), EA79/U1159, 23 April 1979.
136. National police 2016, p. 16.
137. Inspectorate Security and Justice and Health Care Inspectorate 2014, pp. 9, 20. 
138. Art. 42 §1 Custodial Institutions (Framework) Act. Art. 41 §1 Hospital Orders (Framework) 
Act. See with regard to medical care in prison also: Kelk 2007. Kelk 1998. See with regard to 
psychiatric care in prison also: Zwemstra 2009, pp. 38 et seq.
139. ECtHR 24 July 2014, no. 46956/09, §116 (Lyapin v. Russia).
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workers,140 which includes psychological treatment/counselling.141 The Appeal 
Commission accepts that the detainee’s access to a psychiatrist is decided in the 
psycho-medical consultation. Therefore, the detainee does not have direct access 
to a psychiatrist, which corresponds with health care principles in free society.142 
The psychiatrist should however have the opportunity to examine the necessity 
of a psychiatric examination and treatment.143 Whether a detainee should be re-
ferred to a psychologist is also discussed in the psycho-medical consultation.144 
Temporary absence of a psychologist does not relieve the authorities to provide 
this assistance if a detainee is in need of it. The authorities must provide a suita-
ble solution within the foreseeable future. In view of the Appeal Commission, it 
is not sufficient to offer the detainee the alternative of weekly talks with a general 
practitioner.145 The governor of the institution must inform the detainee about 
the rights laid down in the Custodial Institutions (Framework) Act (including 
the right of access to a physician) in writing and in a language he understands.146 
Every penal institution must also develop House Rules,147 that should, in view 
of several bodies, contain information about the detainee’s possibilities to con-
sult the physician, dentist or psychiatrist, including during evening, nights and 
weekends.148 These domestic obligations to inform detainees about their rights 
correspond with the CPT Standards as referred to by the ECtHR.149
Dutch law does not prescribe how access to a physician must be organised 
in penal institutions, though other legal safeguards exist to organise this access. 
At present, every penal institution has a medical service that provides primary 
140. Art. 43 §§1-2 Custodial Institutions (Framework) Act. Art. 43 §1 Hospital Orders 
(Framework) Act.
141. Kamerstukken II 1994/95, 24 263, no. 3, p. 63. Several reports show that access to 
psychological care was not always ensured. Health Care Inspectorate 2011 (Achterhoek, Zutphen), 
pp. 8-9. Health Care Inspectorate 2011 (Flevoland, Lelystad), p. 9.
142. BrC 20/12/2013 – 13/3244/GM.
143. BrC 14/12/2001 – 01/1697/GM.
144. BrC 05/02/2015 – 14/3866/GM.
145. BrC 29/09/2014 – 14/2351/GM. In non urgent cases, it is not unreasonable if it takes four 
weeks before a detainee’s request for a consult with a psychologist is fulfilled. BrC 24/03/2014 
– 14/0180/GM.
146. Art. 56 §1 Custodial Institutions (Framework) Act. Art. 52 §1 Hospital Orders (Framework) 
Act. 
147. Art. 5 §1 Custodial Institutions (Framework) Act. Art. 7 §1 Hospital Orders (Framework) 
Act. Art. 37 §§1, 4 Psychiatric Hospitals (Compulsory Admissions) Act: the patient must be 
informed about the applicable house rules and the rights of patients laid down in this Act. See also 
art. 3 Decree legal position Psychiatric Hospitals (Compulsory Admissions). 
148. Inspectorate Security and Justice 2015, p. 16; 2015b, p. 7. Council for the Administration of 
Criminal Justice and Protection of Juveniles 2015, p. 11.
149. ECtHR 11 December 2008, no. 4268/04, §45 (Panovits v. Cyprus).
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healthcare and consists of a head medical service, (a) physician(s), nurses, a (health 
care) psychologist and administrative medical staff. Access to the physician is, in 
general, arranged as follows. In non-urgent cases, the detainee can request for a 
consult with a physician. A nurse will subsequently see the detainee and deter-
mine whether it is necessary to refer the detainee to the physician (whether with 
or without consulting the physician). This procedure is called ‘referral to the phy-
sician’. The nurse must assess, on the basis of the complaints and symptoms, the 
seriousness of the detainee’s problems and the degree of urgency.150 The Appeal 
Commission considers the referral procedure by a nurse as adequate medical pol-
icy.151 It also expects that if a detainee requests for medical assistance, he should 
be visited by a nurse.152 Contact with the detainee in person is important to assess 
the urgency.153 If necessary, it is expected that a nurse insists that the physician 
will visit and examine the detainee.154 The Health Care Inspectorate has stressed 
that referral by a nurse aims to delegate the physician’s task to the nurse so that 
the physician (whose presence is limited) has room for more complex care. The 
Inspectorate has emphasised that nurses should not put up a barrier in the access 
to healthcare; if the request for care cannot be sufficiently answered by the nurse, 
the detainee should be referred to the physician. Nurses must use protocols for 
the referral procedure and detainees should be fully informed about the system of 
referral by a nurse.155 Protocols on referral must contain standards on the examina-
tion the nurse has to perform and in which cases the physician should be notified. 
If a detainee maintains the wish to consult the physician, this wish should always 
be fulfilled.156 Every consult performed by a nurse should be discussed with the 
physician.157 The Health Care Inspectorate has emphasised with regard to medical 
services in Detention and Removal Centres that both physicians and nurses need 
to be trained in applying the system of referral to the physician.158 Though not ex-
plicitly stated by the Inspectorate, it is in my view reasonable to assume that these 
150. Roeleveld-Kuijper and Lohmann 2014. See for example BrC 13/05/2013 – 13/0454/GM: 
no emergency requiring immediate response.
151. BrC 16/11/2007 – 07/1315/GM.
152. BrC 22/11/1999 – A 99/323/GA, A 99/353/GA, A 99/354/GA and A 99/355/GA.
153. BrC 10/10/2002 – 02/1218/GM.
154. BrC 01/07/2004 – 04/0098/GM.
155. Oral information is not enough. The detainee must also be informed in writing. Health 
Care Inspectorate 2009, pp. 19, 23, 32, 34. See with regard to the access of detainees to the 
physician: Inspectorate Security and Justice 2013 (Utrecht, Nieuwersluis), p. 30.
156. Health Care Inspectorate 1999, p. 69.
157. Custodial Institutions Agency 2016e. Health Care Inspectorate 2009, pp. 16, 49. See also 
BrC 23/04/2002 – 01/1604/GM.
158. Health Care Inspectorate 2009b, p. 13.
Death in State Custody DRUK.indd   192 13-Sep-17   2:40:08 PM
Implementation of obligations to avert premature death of detainees in the Netherlands  193
standards also apply to the medical service of other judicial institutions like penal 
institutions.
An important aspect of the referral procedure is that nurses guard the bound-
aries of their field of expertise. If these boundaries are not observed, this may not 
correspond with the obligations arising from the ECHR, more specifically the 
detainee’s access to a physician and the requirement that healthcare must be pro-
vided by qualified personnel. The Central Disciplinary Committee for the Health 
Care Sector has in this regard stressed that a nurse must refer a detainee to a 
physician if the steps that ought to be taken fall within the physician’s field of 
expertise.159 The suicide of Alexander Dolmatov in a Detention and Removal 
Centre illustrates that the system of referral by a nurse may pose a risk for the de-
tainee’s life if nurses do not guard the boundaries of their professional expertise 
and do not consult a physician (or other care providers, such as a psychologist or 
psychiatrist), for example to assess the suicide risk. Alexander Dolmatov had been 
detained in view of his mental condition and was subsequently detained in view 
of his deportation. He committed a suicide attempt during deprivation of liberty 
by the police. No physician had been called after this suicide attempt. Alexander 
Dolmatov was transferred to a Detention and Removal Centre the following day, 
where he was examined by two nurses who had summary knowledge about the 
suicide attempt in the police custody suite. The nurses gave the advice to place 
Alexander Dolmatov in the Extra Care Facility instead of an observation cell. Al-
though prescribed in protocols, no physician had been notified. The following 
morning, Alexander Dolmatov was found lifeless in his cell.160 
Non-medically trained prison officers are in practice the link between detain-
ees and (nurses or)161 physicians,162 though in some institutions direct contact 
between the detainee and the physician is possible by telephone outside office 
hours.163 Both the case law of the Appeal Commission and the Dutch criminal 
case law contain examples where a detainee’s access to the physician was ham-
pered by the decision of non-medically trained personnel not to notify health 
159. In this case excluding the presence of thrombosis. CTG 22 July 2010, 
ECLI:NL:TGZCTG:2010:YG0472. See also BrC 13/03/2012 – 11/4266/GM. BrC 15/11/2007 – 
07/1676/GM. BrC 14/05/2013 – 13/0288/TA.
160. Inspectorate Security and Justice 2013 (Dolmatov), pp. 11, 16. See also Thoonen and Duijst 
2014b, pp. 1240-1248.
161. Health Care Inspectorate 2010 (Torentijd, Middelburg), p. 7.
162. Health Care Inspectorate 2011 (Achterhoek, Zutphen), p. 6. See also Health Care 
Inspectorate 2009c, p. 29: access to physician via nurse and sociotherapist (daily guidance of 
persons held under a hospital order in Forensic Psychiatric Centres). 
163. Health Care Inspectorate 2011 (Arnhem, Zuid and De Berg), p. 7. Inspectorate Security 
and Justice 2012 (Almelo, De Karelskamp), p. 33.
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care personnel. In 2009, a governor of a penal institution was brought to trial for 
culpable homicide (and for deliberately leaving a detainee in a helpless state). The 
detainee involved was known as a compelling, demanding man, who was difficult 
to get on with. The day before the detainee was found dead, he requested several 
times for medical assistance because he was vomiting and he stated that he had 
abdominal pain. Despite this request, the custodial staff decided to wait and see 
for a while. After threatening to slash his wrists if no medical assistance would be 
called, the detainee was placed in an isolation cell, where he was visited by the 
governor. The governor told the detainee that the vomiting was not a sufficient 
reason to call in medical assistance and that he could visit the medical service 
the next day (apparently the medical service was not staffed that day as it was a 
public holiday). The governor did not ask why the detainee had asked for a phy-
sician earlier that day, neither did the detainee request the governor for a consult 
with a physician. The detainee was subsequently placed in an isolation cell under 
camera surveillance, though due to the failure to inform the responsible persons, 
these video pictures were not monitored. The detainee was found dead the next 
day. He died owing to the effects of a rotation of the small intestine. The District 
Court Zwolle had emphasised in that case that a governor should arrange that if 
the physician is not present, a doctor’s surgery is accessible if necessary in view of a 
detainee’s health condition. Within certain limits and with the necessary restraint, 
the necessity to notify health care personnel may be examined by the governor or, 
under his responsibility, by an employee of the penal institution. One must how-
ever bear in mind that neither the governor nor employees such as prison officers 
are medically trained. If there is any doubt about the necessity to call for a physi-
cian, the detainee must be given the opportunity to consult the doctor’s surgery, 
for example by telephone. If so, it is the responsibility of the physician or other 
medical personnel to determine whether it is necessary to visit the detainee or 
take other actions. The District Court ruled that the governor had not provided 
the detainee with sufficient access to healthcare. The governor knew that the de-
tainee had several times asked for a physician, nevertheless he did not ask for the 
reason of these requests nor did he ask whether the detainee still wished to see a 
physician. The fact that the detainee was placed in an isolation cell gave further-
more cause for calling a physician or enabling the detainee to consult the doctor’s 
surgery by telephone. This could have been different if the governor had in fact 
asked for the reason to request for a physician and it subsequently turned out that 
it was no longer necessary to call a physician. Though the governor of the penal 
institution had not provided the detainee with sufficient access to healthcare, this 
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factor was not sufficient to conclude that he was criminally liable for culpable 
homicide.164 
The Appeal Commission concluded in another case that the custodial staff’s 
decision not to notify a physician on the detainee’s request was not reasonable 
and fair, considering the medical service’s remark that if the detainee’s condition 
would not improve, a physician should be notified.165 In view of the Appeal Com-
mission, access to the institution’s physician should not be completely dependent 
on the opinion of non-medically trained staff.166 As has the ECtHR by refer-
ring to the relevant CPT Standards,167 the Appeal Commission has stressed that 
non-medically trained staff should not seek to filter requests for healthcare.168 Both 
the District Court Zwolle and the Appeal Commission leave nevertheless some 
margin of appreciation to the governor and his non-medically trained employees 
in assessing the detainee’s request for a consult with a physician. The Appeal Com-
mission stressed that such requests must be granted unless it is obvious that the 
detainee commits obstruction.169 Considering the subjective nature of this exami-
nation, this principle may pose a risk and does not fully meet the CPT Standards 
that are cited by the ECtHR. The Appeal Commission has rightly emphasised 
that by consulting a nurse or physician, the physician is provided the opportunity 
to take responsibility for the health condition of a detained patient.170 The afore-
mentioned risk may furthermore be reduced by enabling the detainee to contact 
the physician or other health care providers himself outside office hours. The In-
spectorate Security and Justice and Council for the Administration of Criminal 
Justice and Protection of Juveniles expect, for example, that detainees have the 
possibility to contact the physician directly (for example by telephone) during 
164. District Court Zwolle 12 March 2009, ECLI:NL:RBZLY:2009:BH5678, NJCM-bulletin 
(34) 2009, no. 7, pp. 747-757 (with commentary from G. de Jonge). The Health Care Inspectorate 
has also stressed the aforementioned risk that non-medically trained prison officers have the 
responsibility to assess whether medical care is necessary during the evening, night and weekend, 
when the medical service is not staffed. Health Care Inspectorate 2009, p. 15.
165. BrC 23/01/2006 – 05/2583/GA. See also Health Care Inspectorate 2011 (Haarlem), pp. 
6-7.
166. BrC 18/01/2000 – A 99/564/GM. 
167. ECtHR 2 June 2009, no. 36936/05, §34 (Szuluk v. UK).
168. BrC 09/02/1996 – A 95/559, 95/641, 95/642 and 95/775. See also BrC 26/06/2002 – 
01/1892/GM: custodial staff called physician who made the appraisal that it was not necessary to 
visit the detainee.
169. BrC 14/04/2011 – 10/2989/GA. See also De Jonge and Cremers 2008, p. 177. De Jonge 
and Cremers have stressed that every request for healthcare should be transferred to the medical 
service. The custodial staff, such as prison officers, do not have any freedom in assessing these 
requests. They refer to: BrC 22/11/1999 – A 99/323/GA.
170. BrC 27/09/2004 – 04/0696/GM.
Death in State Custody DRUK.indd   195 13-Sep-17   2:40:08 PM
196 Chapter 5 
evenings, nights and weekends.171 It is furthermore expected that custodial staff 
respond to the call of a detainee from his cell within 10 minutes,172 which meets 
the expectations of the ECtHR.173 
Dutch law contains guarantees to ensure the detainee’s access to a physician dur-
ing deprivation of liberty by the police, though it is, contrary to the Custodial 
Institutions (Framework) Act, not explicitly formulated as a right. The Chief of 
Police is obliged to make an arrangement with physicians to ensure that the nec-
essary healthcare is provided to persons deprived of their liberty by the police.174 If 
necessary in crisis situations, a psychiatrist or social-psychiatric nurse can be noti-
fied to perform an examination.175 One of the statutory obligations of the Dutch 
police force is to assist persons who are in need of help.176 Police officers must 
make sure that persons with severe injuries and unconscious persons are brought 
to a hospital by ambulance. The same applies to persons who cannot be woken or 
who are not approachable.177 Dutch legislation also prescribes that the detainee 
must be informed about the applicable procedures in the police custody suite,178 
which should include the detainee’s access to a physician. In correspondence with 
the CPT Standards, police custody officers are instructed to inform detainees 
about their rights in writing.179 The Inspectorates observed that detainees held by 
the police are mainly verbally informed about their rights; they therefore recom-
mended to inform detainees about their rights both verbally and in writing.180
As with prison officers, police custody officers are the first link between the 
detainee and the physician, though some police custody suites (for example Am-
sterdam) are visited on a daily basis by nurses who assess the medical condition 
171. Inspectorate Security and Justice 2015, p. 16; 2015b, p. 7. Council for the Administration 
of Criminal Justice and Protection of Juveniles 2015, p. 11.
172. Council for the Administration of Criminal Justice and Protection of Juveniles 2015, p. 14. 
See also: BrC 02/02/2017 – 16/3117/TA.
173. ECtHR 21 December 2010, no. 45744/08, §§62-67 (Jasinskis v. Latvia).
174. Art. 26 §1, section d in connection with §3 Official Instructions for the Police. Noteworthy is 
that the health insurance of persons deprived of their liberty by the police is not put on hold during 
deprivation of liberty by the police. Custodial Institutions Agency 2014. At present, healthcare to 
persons deprived of their liberty by the police is provided by diverging parties: forensic physicians 
of the Community Health Services and general practitioners connected to private organisations. 
Aanhangsel Handelingen II 2015/16, 699.
175. Covenant Police-Dutch Association of Mental Health and Addiction Care 2012.
176. Art. 3 Police Act 2012.
177. Art. 24 §1 Official Instructions for the Police.
178. Art. 26 §1, section e Official Instructions for the Police.
179. National Police 2016, p. 9.
180. Inspectorate Security and Justice, Health Care Inspectorate, Inspectorate for Youth Care 
2015, p. 10.
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of the detainee and, if necessary, refer a detainee to the physician.181 The Official 
Instructions for the Police explicitly prescribes under what circumstances police 
custody officers must consult the physician,182 namely if the detainee carries med-
ication, asks for medical assistance or medication or if there are indications that a 
detainee is in need of medical care.183 If so, health care providers are expected to 
be alerted in time and to arrive promptly.184 The National regulations on the care 
for police custody detainees also contains a checklist for police custody officers to 
help them in making a decision on whether or not to consult a physician.185 Note-
worthy is that the Inspectorate Security and Justice expects police custody officers 
to make an assessment of the medical condition of detainees and inform the phy-
sician if necessary.186 The Health Care Inspectorate is more cautious by expecting 
that a physician or psychiatrist is always notified whenever reasonable doubt exists 
about a detainee’s physical or mental condition.187 Important in this regard is that 
police custody officers are not medically trained and may not recognise a need 
for medical assistance, which may pose a risk for the detainee’s health and life. A 
recent report shows that at present no national requirements on the training of 
police custody officers are set and that during the training little attention is given 
to healthcare.188 A study of Thoonen and Duijst on deaths during deprivation of 
liberty by the police (2005-2010) shows that problems in the care process were 
mainly seen in the conduct of non-medically trained personnel such as police 
(custody) officers, including recognising medical problem(s) and warning medical 
personnel (in time).189 Noteworthy is that Dutch police regulations do not reg-
ulate the time limit in which police custody officers should consult a physician. 
Another finding of the study of Thoonen and Duijst was that in 10 of the 78 in-
cluded deaths, an indication to start cardiorespiratory resuscitation (CPR) was 
found, though CPR was not applied by the police custody officers. The decision 
181. Dorn et al 2009.
182. The Chief of Police must also make an instruction for personnel charged with the supervision 
of detainees who are not bound by the Official Instruction because they are not police officers. 
Art. 23 §2 Police Organisation Decree and explanatory memorandum, Stb. (Bulletin of Acts and 
Decrees) 2015, 223.
183. Art. 32 §1 Official Instructions for the Police. 
184. Court of Appeal Amsterdam 30 May 2008, ECLI:NL:GHAMS:2008:BD4406.
185. National Police 2016, p. 21.
186. Inspectorate Security and Justice and Health Care Inspectorate 2014, p. 10.
187. Inspectorate Security and Justice and Health Care Inspectorate 2014, p. 20.
188. Inspectorate Security and Justice, Health Care Inspectorate, Inspectorate for Youth Care 
2015, p. 16.
189. Thoonen and Duijst 2014. See also Blaauw, Vermunt and Kerkhof 1997: this study showed 
that several detainees who died during police custody should have received medical attention prior 
to their death, but did not receive it. 
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not to start CPR was, for example, motivated by the argument that signs of life 
(pulse, breathing) were absent. The absence of signs of life should precisely give 
rise to start CPR. Thoonen and Duijst also observed several problems in actually 
performed CPRs, such as a delay in starting the CPR as the need to start resuscita-
tion was recognised too late or stopping a CPR before medical staff had arrived.190 
Thoonen and Duijst recommend to involve physicians in determining under what 
circumstances a physician should be consulted by police custody officers. This is 
at present not the case because this is unilaterally laid down in the Official In-
structions for the Police by the legislator.191 The National regulations on the care 
for police custody detainees do prescribe that police custody officers should not 
determine whether a detainee has died.192
Another observed risk for the detainee’s access to health care personnel is that 
medical guidelines and instructions were not sufficiently accessible for police cus-
tody officers, nor sufficiently consistent and up to date.193 These guidelines and 
instructions are important as they can provide guidance to non-medically trained 
personnel to determine what steps need to be taken.
Facilities
Dutch law contains several safeguards to ensure that the necessary circumstances 
are created (facilities) to perform prescribed examinations and provide pre-
scribed treatment. Firstly, the detainee does not have to pay for the received care; 
the health care expenses for persons detained in penal institutions are a public 
charge.194 There are however several circumstances where the health insurance of 
the person in question will not be postponed (and provided healthcare will not be 
a public charge), for example during participation in a penal program.195 Health-
care during a penal program is provided by health care providers who work in free 
society, for example the detainee’s own family physician. The penal program must 
190. Thoonen and Duijst 2014. Dutch criminal case law shows that a police officer does not have 
to be criminally liable if CPR is not started immediately, for example if simulation, considering 
the conduct of the person in question (in the past), cannot be ruled out. Whenever police officers 
realise that the person concerned is in immediate danger, CPR should be started immediately. 
Court of Appeal Amsterdam 12 December 2006, ECLI:NL:GHAMS:2006:AZ4607. Court of 
Appeal Amsterdam 30 May 2008, ECLI:NL:GHAMS:2008:BD4406.
191. Thoonen and Duijst 2015, p. 109.
192. National Police 2016, p. 22.
193. Inspectorate Security and Justice, Health Care Inspectorate, Inspectorate for Youth Care 
2015, p. 12.
194. Art. 47 Prison Rules. Art. 79 Hospital Orders (Care) Regulations. The rights and obligations 
arising from health insurance will be put on hold during deprivation of liberty. Art. 24 §1 Health 
Insurance Act. 
195. Custodial Institutions Agency 2014.
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therefore provide room to visit these physicians. Noteworthy in this regard is that 
the special conditions of a penal program should arrange that the detainee must 
report that he is ill or has to visit a physician,196 which implies that the detainee 
has the opportunity to visit these health care providers. 
The Healthcare Quality, Complaints and Disputes Act obliges a care pro-
vider197 to organise the care in such a way that it must reasonably lead to adequate 
care, which includes sufficient staffing, material and architectural means and (if 
applicable) assigning responsibilities and competences.198 The governor of a penal 
institution also has a statutory obligation to arrange that the physician connected 
to the institution or his locum is regularly available for consultation and that a 
physician is available outside office hours if necessary in view of a detainee’s health 
condition.199 The Custodial Institutions (Framework) Act does not contain fur-
ther regulations on emergency treatment for detainees.200 Current practice shows 
that the staffing of the medical service differs between institutions. In some in-
stitutions a nurse is present 24 hours a day. Penal Psychiatric Centres, specifically 
assigned for detainees with psychiatric problems, are legally obliged to have suffi-
cient psychiatric trained nurses present for 24 hours a day, seven days a week, and 
a psychiatrist must be on call 24 hours a day, seven days a week.201 The Health 
Care Inspectorate stated in 1999 that a physician should be present in penal in-
stitutions every weekday.202 It also expected that a physician was always accessible 
by telephone and could arrive at the institution within 15 minutes.203 These norms 
have been liberalised; a physician should always be accessible and must be able to 
arrive at the penal institution within 30 minutes in case of an emergency that does 
not necessitate the arrival of an ambulance.204 Several reports show that the time 
196. Circular 18 May 2000, no. 5029466/00/DJI. Appendix 5.
197. Including care providers who provide healthcare to detainees.
198. Art. 3 Healthcare Quality, Complaints and Disputes Act. See RTG Zwolle 4 November 2016, 
ECLI:NL:TGZRZWO:2016:112: use of alternative means to diagnose understandable considering 
that the dentist had, to no avail, repeatedly requested prison management for adequate equipment 
to make x-rays. See also: RTG Zwolle 5 January 2011, ECLI:NL:TGZRZWO:2012:YG1666.
199. Art. 42 §3, section a-b Custodial Institutions (Framework) Act. See also BrC 27/09/2004 
– 04/0696/GM. Art. 41 §3, section a-b Hospital Orders (Framework) Act. This is not arranged in 
the Psychiatric Hospitals (Compulsory Admissions) Act.
200. This also applies to the Hospital Orders (Framework) Act. See however Guideline on deaths 
in judicial institutions. 
201. Art. 14 §4 Custodial Institutions (Framework) Act in connection with art. 21a §2 Prison 
Rules. These requirements are also set for judicial institutions where hospital orders can be imposed. 
Art. 33a §2 Hospital Orders (Care) Regulations.
202. Health Care Inspectorate 1999, p. 70.
203. Health Care Inspectorate 1999, p. 69.
204. Health Care Inspectorate 2011 (Utrecht, Nieuwegein), pp. 5-6.
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in which a physician can arrive in the institution diverges between institutions 
and does not always satisfy the general practitioner’s standards.205 The governor 
must furthermore arrange that the physician has sufficient time at his disposal 
to ensure the detainee’s access to healthcare. This does not mean that every re-
quest of a detainee to consult a physician should immediately be complied with. 
If there are more applications of patients than available time, it is justified to 
make a selection. The physician is responsible for how this selection is made. The 
governor’s responsibility in this regard is limited to the assessment whether the 
process and practice of selection corresponds with the detainee’s right to consult 
the physician. Non-medically trained personnel should not, except for in very 
exceptional circumstances, thwart the selection made by the health care staff.206 
The Inspectorate also requires that psychiatric care must be easily accessible out-
side office hours, though it observed in 2009 that this was not always the case in 
penal institutions.207
The Health Care Inspectorate monitors the level of health care staff working 
in penal institutions and follows in this regard the standard set by the Custo-
dial Institutions Agency, which standard is however not provided.208 The Appeal 
Commission has stressed that a detainee should have the possibility to consult the 
physician within a reasonable period,209 i.e. a couple of days.210 Seven to fourteen 
days was not considered to be such a reasonable term.211 Further indications for 
what is considered reasonable are not provided by the Appeal Commission. Such 
205. Health Care Inspectorate 2011 (Flevoland, Lelystad), pp. 6-7; 2011 (Utrecht, Nieuwegein), 
pp. 6-7; 2011 (Haarlem), p. 6.
206. BrC 10/04/1991 – SG-A 346/90, Sancties 1991/56. 
207. Health Care Inspectorate 2009, pp. 15, 23. 
208. Health Care Inspectorate 2009; 2011 (Haarlem), pp. 7-9, 19; 2010 (Torentijd, Middelburg), 
pp. 7-9, 18; 2011 (Utrecht, Nieuwegein), pp. 7-9, 19. Contrary to the recommendation of the 
CPT, the Dutch Government did not find it necessary to increase the medical staffing at the 
penal institution in Veenhuizen as the establishment believed that it provided detainees with the 
care equivalent to the care provided to citizens in free society. The physician was 44 hours a week 
available as a general practitioner and was outside office hours and/or in emergencies available 
within the set time limit. CPT/Inf (2013) 22, Response of the Government of the Netherlands. See 
furthermore Health Care Inspectorate 2009c, pp. 15, 27, 29. See with regard to a study on the 
workload of health care staff in penal institutions: Te Brake et al 2005. See furthermore CPT/Inf 
(2017) 1 – Netherlands, pp. 27, 40-42: insufficient staffing level of the health care personnel in the 
visited establishments.
209. BrC 18/01/2000 – A 99/564/GM.
210. BrC 22/09/2005 – 05/1305/GM. BrC 22/07/2005 – 05/1086/GM. A term of seven days 
was not unreasonable considering that the complaint related to skin problems: BrC 08/01/2004 
– 03/1722/GM. See also: BrC 22/06/2015 – 15/0916/GM and BrC 03/11/2015 – 15/1886/GM: 
insufficiently prompt response to pain complaints.
211. BrC 05/09/2008 – 08/1427/GA. 
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indications have been provided by other bodies, though these standards diverge. 
The Health Care Inspectorate expects that a detainee can consult the medical 
service within 48 hours after a request.212 The maximum period in which the In-
spectorate expects a request for a non-urgent consult with a physician to be met 
is not clear, both 72 hours and 48 hours are mentioned.213 To prevent obscurity, 
this standard should in my view be clearly defined in policy. The Council for the 
Administration of Criminal Justice and Protection of Juveniles expects that de-
tainees have the opportunity to consult a nurse on a daily basis, except during the 
weekends.214 A noteworthy development is that high numbers of persons are mo-
mentarily at the same time admitted in penal institutions for default detention, 
which is relevant when discussing the requirement of sufficient staffing. If the 
level of health care staff is not increased correspondingly, this will inevitably have 
implications for the medical screening of these detainees on admission, which 
may pose a risk to their health and life.
A statutory obligation of the penal institution’s governor is to arrange that a 
detainee is transferred to a suitable location if necessary to receive social care or 
assistance, provided that this transfer does not disturb execution of the depriva-
tion of liberty.215 The governor is also obliged to arrange that medication, other 
treatment or diets prescribed by a physician are provided to the detainee and to 
transfer a detainee to hospital or another facility if the prescribed treatment has 
to be provided there.216 A detainee can be transferred to a general public and/or 
academic hospital or the Judicial Centre for Somatic Care in Scheveningen, for-
merly known as penal hospital. According to the Health Care Inspectorate, the 
penal hospital was not sufficiently equipped to provide emergency care. It stressed 
212. Health Care Inspectorate 2009, pp. 12, 24.
213. Health Care Inspectorate 2011 (Haarlem), p. 6 and Appendix I, p. 24.
214. Council for the Administration of Criminal Justice and Protection of Juveniles 2015, p. 11. 
See also Inspectorate Security and Justice 2015b, p. 7.
215. Art. 43 §3 Custodial Institutions (Framework) Act. This does not apply to the Hospital 
Orders (Framework) Act and the Psychiatric Hospitals (Compulsory Admissions) Act. See also 
RTG Zwolle 1 September 2014, ECLI:NL:TGZRZWO:2014:109: a physician is not responsible 
for arranging transfer of detainees to hospital.
216. Art. 42 §4 Custodial Institutions (Framework) Act. Art. 41 §4 Hospital Orders (Framework) 
Act. The Court of Appeal Arnhem has stressed that the necessary medical care for detainees was 
guaranteed as it was primarily provided by the medical service of the penal institution and, if 
necessary, supplemented by medical care provided outside the institution. Court of Appeal Arnhem 
2 June 2008, ECLI:NL:GHARN:2008:BD2944. See also: BrC 14/08/2015 – 15/2552/GV. See 
furthermore BrC 21/02/2012 – 11/2430/GA: medication must be handed over according to the 
prescription. A deviation of this prescription of maximum one hour later is allowed. 
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that a hospital must possess at least eight basis specialisms.217 The penal hospital 
did not meet this requirement and was therefore ordered to present oneself as a 
care centre and not as a hospital.218 The penal hospital was subsequently called Ju-
dicial Medical Centre and after that the Judicial Centre for Somatic Care.219 The 
following categories of detainees can be placed in the Judicial Medical Centre:220 
1) detainees in need of medical treatment requiring admission in hospital, 2) de-
tainees suspected of hiding objects in their body and which objects may constitute 
a danger for the detainee’s health, or 3) detainees who require extra medical care 
and therefore cannot, or with extreme difficulty, stay in a regular institution.221 
A detainee should be admitted in a general hospital if necessary from a medical 
point of view and admission to the Judicial Medical Centre is neither possible 
nor advisable.222 The primary consideration is therefore whether a detainee can be 
admitted to the Judicial Centre for Somatic Care. If not, admission to a general 
hospital can be considered.223 
In 2014, the Health Care Inspectorate observed that the Judicial Medical 
Centre was sometimes faced with detained patients in need of healthcare that 
could not be provided in this centre. It occurred that a patient was refused by 
the Centre’s physician on medical grounds, but was nevertheless placed on penal 
grounds under the authority of the penal institution’s management. In response 
to these situations, the physicians of the Judicial Medical Centre have formulated 
an exhaustive list of inclusion and exclusion criteria for admission. The Centre is 
meant for: detainees in need of nursing care, post-operative/post specialist care 
and care for ‘specials’, like detainees on hunger- and thirst strike, detainees with 
217. Namely trauma care (traumazorg), neurological emergency care (spoedeisende neurologische 
zorg), cardiological emergency care (spoedeisende cardiologische zorg), vascular emergency surgery 
care (spoedeisende vaatchirurgische zorg), emergency birth care (spoedeisende geboortezorg), other 
emergency care (overige spoedeisende zorg), pediatric emergency care (spoedeisende pediatrische 
zorg), psychiatric emergency care (spoedeisende psychiatrische zorg).
218. Handelingen II 2009/10, 444, p. 945 et seq. See also Handelingen II 2008/09, 1404, p. 
2955 et seq. The Health Care Inspectorate’s report about the death of the teenager in question and 
the penal hospital is not published. See for a study on the second line healthcare for detainees and 
in particular the penal hospital also: Van den Wijngaart and Post 2007.  
219. Handelingen II 2013/14, 1407, p. 1 et seq. The Judicial Centre for Somatic Care has made 
arrangements for cooperation with a general hospital. Health Care Inspectorate 2014 (Judicial 
Medical Centre Scheveningen), p. 13.
220. At present Judicial Centre for Somatic Care. The name of the centre has not been changed 
in legislation.
221. Art. 19 Rules on selection, placement and transfer of detainees.
222. Art. 33 Rules on selection, placement and transfer of detainees. See also RTG ‘s-Gravenhage 
23 November 2010, ECLI:NL:TGZRSGR:2010:YG0706.
223. See also: Stcrt. 12 September 2000, no. 176 / p. 9.
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an infectious disease,224 detainees addicted to Gamma HydroxyButyrate (GHB), 
pre- and postnatal care, and detainees with comorbidity in somatic and psychi-
atric illnesses. The management has explicitly granted authority to the Judicial 
Medical Centre’s physicians for observing the inclusion and exclusion criteria. A 
physician should at any time decide, from a medical point of view, about the ad-
visability to admit a detainee into the Judicial Medical Centre. The Health Care 
Inspectorate has observed that the agreed inclusion and exclusion criteria were 
met in specific cases,225 though this finding has not been further substantiated. 
The preceding shows in my view a conflict between the statutory obligation of 
the governor to transfer a detainee to a particular hospital/centre and the assess-
ment whether, from a medical perspective, it is advisable to admit a detainee to a 
particular hospital/centre, such as the Judicial Centre for Somatic Care. The latter 
assessment has to be made by a physician. This tension evokes the question who 
has the authority to make the final decision to which centre/hospital a detainee 
needs to be transferred? In my view, this decision lies within the physician’s field 
of expertise. It should therefore be the physician who has the authority to as-
sess the suitability of a centre/hospital in view of the detainee’s health condition. 
The admission criteria for the Judicial Centre for Somatic Care must be strictly 
guarded by the medical staff to prevent that patients are admitted who are in need 
of care that cannot be provided in this Centre. Not acting in correspondence with 
this principle which has adverse effects for the detainee in question or leads to 
the detainee’s death will not correspond with the requirements arising from Arti-
cle 3 or Article 2 ECHR respectively. The governor has the obligation to facilitate 
the transfer. The case law of the Amsterdam Regional Disciplinary Committee 
for the Health Care Sector furthermore shows that it is the physician’s (and not 
the nurse’s) responsibility to assess whether a detainee with an extra need for care 
needs to be transferred. It also stated that the physician has final responsibility to 
actually realise a transfer if he thinks that a transfer is necessary.226 
224. It has not been stressed whether this relates to non-acute infectious diseases.
225. Health Care Inspectorate 2014 (Judicial Medical Centre Scheveningen), pp. 11-13. See 
about the problems regarding admission also: Penal institution Haaglanden 2013, p. 13. See also 
Thoonen and Duijst 2014b. They raised the question whether the situation had actually been 
changed.
226. RTG Amsterdam 1 February 2005, no. 03254vp. See also no. 03255vp. See furthermore 
Committee van Dinter 1995, p. 22 and Health Care Inspectorate 1999, p. 29: a tension between 
security and healthcare for detainees was observed. Health Care Inspectorate 2009c, p. 12. RTG 
‘s-Gravenhage 4 March 2014, ECLI:NL:TGZRSGR:2014:27, ECLI:NL:TGZRSGR:2014:28: the 
limited possibilities to diagnose within a centre must urge the physician to consult a specialist if 
necessary.
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A legal guarantee to ensure the detainee’s access to healthcare during depriva-
tion of liberty by the police is that physicians should be given complete freedom 
to examine and treat detainees.227 The Health Care Inspectorate requires that if a 
physician considers it necessary to transfer a detainee to hospital for examination 
or admission, the police will act upon this advice.228 
Relationship of trust
The principle that medical confidentiality serves access to healthcare is also gen-
erally accepted in the Netherlands.229 The duty of medical confidentiality is laid 
down in Article 457 §1 Medical Treatment Contracts Act. Health care providers 
must keep medical data confidential, unless the patient has given permission to 
provide this data to a third party.230 Other exceptions on the duty of medical 
confidentiality are: 1) a legal obligation to share medical data,231 2) a conflict of du-
ties,232 or 3) a weighty interest.233 The duty of medical confidentiality also brings 
along that a public prosecutor is not allowed to confiscate medical data in view 
of a criminal investigation, unless the health care provider gives permission,234 or 
in case of very exceptional circumstances where the interest of finding the truth 
must prevail over the duty of confidentiality,235 for example if the person who is 
bound by the duty of confidentiality is suspected of having committed a severe 
227. Art. 33 Official Instructions for the Police.
228. Inspectorate Security and Justice and Health Care Inspectorate 2014, p. 20.
229. Leenen et al 2014, p. 141. 
230. Art. 457 §1 Medical Treatment Contracts Act. 
231. Art. 457 §1, third sentence Medical Treatment Contracts Act. An example is the obligation 
to report specific contagious diseases pursuant to the Public Health Act. See also BrC 30/01/2013 
– 12/3283/GA: the medical service has the responsibility to determine whether medical data can 
be provided to a third party.
232. Art. 6:74 Civil Code. Art. 40 Criminal Code (circumstances beyond one’s control). A conflict 
of duties arises if the health care provider’s duty of medical confidentiality brings along that the 
health care provider has to keep specific information secret, though sharing this information may 
prevent severe harm to (an)other person(s) or the patient himself. The following criteria are set 
to assess the conflict of duties: 1) everything reasonably possible has been done to obtain consent 
of the patient, 2) the physician has a moral dilemma by observing the duty of confidentiality, 3) 
there is no other way to solve the problem, 4) not breaching the duty of medical confidentiality 
results in a severe harm to the patient or (an)other(s) person(s), 5) breaching the duty of medical 
confidentiality will almost certainly prevent or limit this damage. Royal Dutch Medical Association 
2012b, pp. 12-13. See also: CTG 30 August 2012, ECLI:NL:TGZCTG:2012:YG2310.
233. For example a conflict with regard to a will. Supreme Court 20 April 2001, 
ECLI:NL:HR:2001:AB1201. See also: Duijst 2007, pp. 61-70. Leenen et al 2014, pp. 148-152.
234. Art. 98 Code of Criminal Procedure.
235. Supreme Court 1 March 1985, NJ 1986, 173. Supreme Court 14 October 1986, NJ 1987, 
490.
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criminal offence.236 The duty of medical confidentiality is also laid down in Arti-
cle 88 Individual Health Care Professions Act, to which, among others, physicians 
and nurses are bound. Furthermore, the Personal Data Protection Act regulates 
the processing of (medical) data.237 In addition to the Personal Data Protection 
Act, the Medical Treatment Contracts Act aims to give more detailed regulations 
for health care files,238 though the applicable regulations laid down in the Medical 
Treatment Contracts Act are not a lex specialis of Article 21 Personal Data Pro-
tection Act.239 It is not allowed to process medical data if prohibited by the duty 
of medical confidentiality.240 The duty of medical confidentiality does not apply 
to professionals directly involved in fulfilling the medical treatment agreement or 
to locums. This means that the health care provider is allowed to provide these 
directly involved professionals with the data necessary to perform their duties.241 
Only medical data necessary to treat the patient or to prevent health problems 
may be shared, pursuant to the ‘need to know’ principle. Permission of the patient 
to share this information is in these cases assumed,242 which means that the pa-
tient does not need to give his explicit consent,243 although the patient may object 
to the exchange of information.244 Another legal safeguard in view of the relation-
ship of trust is that medical examinations and treatment must be performed out 
of sight and hearing of third persons, unless the patient consents that other per-
sons observe these activities or when these persons are directly and professionally 
involved in the examination or treatment.245 As stressed before, these provisions 
are in principle also applicable during deprivation of liberty.
Other guarantees for medical confidentiality (and thus the relationship of trust) 
during deprivation of liberty can be found in the standards of the Health Care In-
spectorate and the disciplinary case law for health care providers. The Health Care 
Inspectorate expects that written requests for a consult with a physician or the 
medical service in a penal institution are posted in a mail box specifically intended 
for that purpose. To guarantee the privacy of detainees, these requests should not 
236. Supreme Court 30 November 1999, ECLI:NL:HR:1999:AA3805.
237. See in particular art. 21 and art. 23. See also: Duijst 2016.
238. Kamerstukken II 1991/92, 21 561, no. 6, p. 9. Kamerstukken II 1991/92, 21 561, no. 11, 
p. 6.
239. Kamerstukken II 1997/98, 25 892, no. 3, p. 108.
240. Art. 9 §4 Personal Data Protection Act.
241. Art. 457 §2 Medical Treatment Contracts Act.
242. Kamerstukken II 1989/90, 21 561, no. 3, pp. 14-15.
243. See also: RTG Groningen 25 February 2014, ECLI:NL:TGZRGRO:2014:7.
244. Ministry of Health, Welfare and Sport 2015. 
245. Art. 459 §§1-2 Medical Treatment Contracts Act. See also: BrC 13/03/2012 – 11/3464/
GM.
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be collected by prison officers but by nurses.246 The The Hague Regional Discipli-
nary Committee for the Health Care Sector requires that confidentiality of data 
regarding a detainee’s health status is ensured when forwarding this data, thus 
using a closed envelope to prevent non-addressees from making a copy.247 As dis-
cussed in chapter 4, the CPT emphasises the importance of medical confidentiality 
during medical examinations, which principle is cited by the ECtHR. The CPT 
stated that, although special security measures may be required in a particular 
case, it cannot be justified that police or prison officers are systematically present 
during medical examinations. It observed that this was nevertheless the case in 
some Netherlands establishments, such as police establishments, the maximum 
security prison and the terrorist unit.248 With regard to police establishments, the 
Dutch government is of the opinion that medical examinations should in princi-
ple be performed out of the hearing and, if possible, out of sight of police custody 
officers, if allowed by the security situation.249 The Dutch government further-
more states that safety requires the presence of prison officers in the maximum 
security prison and that a deviation of Article 459 §1 Medical Treatment Contracts 
Act was allowed pursuant to Article 464.250 The Appeal Commission concluded 
on this matter that Article 8 §2 ECHR allows the authorities to breach the pri-
vacy of a detainee if necessary to prevent crime or to protect the health or safety of 
others and stated that this infringement has a legal basis. The CPT’s recommen-
dation that all examinations should be conducted out of the hearing and – unless 
the physician requests otherwise in a particular case – out of sight of prison of-
ficers did not give cause to determine otherwise since the recommendations of 
the CPT have no binding force.251 In another case (not involving the maximum 
security prison), the Appeal Commission determined that consults with a nurse 
or physician in a penal institution should take place with due regard to medical 
confidentiality (out of the hearing of prison officers), unless safety requires other-
wise.252 Preferably, nurses should actively point out to a detainee that confidential 
246. Health Care Inspectorate 2009, pp. 14, 19; 2011 (Haarlem), p. 7.
247. RTG ‘s-Gravenhage 25 May 2010, ECLI:NL:TGZRSGR:2010:YG0315.
248. CPT/Inf (2008) 2, Kingdom in Europe, Aruba, and the Netherlands Antilles, p. 19. 
CPT/Inf (2002) 30, Kingdom in Europe and the Netherlands Antilles, p. 28. CPT/Inf (2008) 2, 
Kingdom in Europe, Aruba, and the Netherlands Antilles, p. 30. See also: ECtHR 17 March 2009, 
no. 15828/03, §80 (Salmanoğlu and Polattaş v. Turkey).
249. CPT/Inf (2009) 7, Response of the Authorities of the Kingdom of the Netherlands, pp. 7, 16. 
The Government also stated that the manner in which medical examinations were conducted in 
the Terrorist Unit were to be evaluated.
250. CPT/Inf (2003) 39, Response of the Authorities of the Kingdom of the Netherlands. p. 15.
251. BrC 29/01/2004 – 03/2214/GA.
252. BrC 03/06/2014 – 14/0807/GA. 
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information can be overheard by a prison officer, even if the detainee should be 
aware of this fact as the officer is present in the room.253 The Appeal Commission 
also stresses that distribution of medication by non-medically trained personnel 
such as prison officers breaches medical confidentiality.254 The discussion about 
medical confidentiality also arises when a detainee must be brought to hospital 
for examination and/or treatment.255 Escorting officers are not allowed to open 
medical records that have been sent with the detainee.256 Dutch legislation fur-
thermore determines that a medical examination and treatment will in these cases 
be performed in presence of an escorting officer, unless the health care provider 
explicitly expresses the desire that he leaves the room and the official who leads or 
orders the transport considers it safe.257 Duijst stresses that health care providers 
must in such cases examine whether security measures are compatible with the de-
tainee’s health condition and with the medical treatment.258 In my view, the main 
issue is that the aforementioned examples show that infringements on medical 
confidentiality are made systematically, without making an individual assessment 
of the situation at hand. Security may require that custodial staff is present during 
medical examinations or treatment, though the necessity should be examined in 
each individual case where the health care provider expresses the desire that cus-
tody officers leave the room.259
253. BrC 07/11/2013 – 13/2925/GM.
254. BrC 12/09/2011 – 11/0536/GA and 11/0927/GA. This has also been stressed by the 
CPT. CPT/Inf (2012) 21, The Netherlands, p. 25: baxter-system was used. Name and doses of 
medication were therefore clearly visible for prison officers.
255. For example: BrC 18/07/2001 – 01/0602/GA. The Health Care Inspectorate stated that 
security measures that are taken in case of a visit to health care providers outside the penal 
institution may be a barrier for the detainee to visit these care providers. Health Care Inspectorate 
2009, p. 16. 
256. Art. 7 §2 Instruction on transport of detainees by the Service Transport & Support. Art. 13 
§1 Rules on transport of detainees.
257. If present during a medical examination or treatment, the escorting officer must show 
discretion. Art. 19 Rules on transport of detainees. Art. 23 of the Instruction on transport of 
detainees by the Service Transport & Support. This instruction is not applicable when detainees 
are transported by the police. When the detainee is transported to receive social assistance (art. 
43 Custodial Institutions (Framework) Act), the escorting officer should supervise the detainee 
continuously. Art. 22 §1 Rules on transport of detainees. Art. 24 §1 Instruction on transport of 
detainees by the Service Transport & Support. See furthermore: CPT/Inf (2017) 1 – Netherlands, 
p. 30.
258. Duijst 2011, p. 226.
259. See also BrC 26/08/2013 – 13/1368/GA: prison governor should make this appraisal. BrC 
28/04/2016 – 16/529/GB: regarding the decision to keep a detainee in the maximum security 
prison. See furthermore: RTG Zwolle 13 February 2017, ECLI:NL:TGZRZWO:2017:37. BrC 
16/11/2007 – 07/1570/GM.
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The detainee’s access to healthcare may be compromised considering another 
risk relating to the duty of medical confidentiality. In the Netherlands, it is possible 
to place a suspect who is detained on remand in an observation centre or psychi-
atric hospital if an examination of that person’s mental condition is necessary, for 
example to answer the question whether the suspect can be held criminally liable 
(if convicted).260 To impose a hospital order,261 the court needs the advice of two 
behavioural experts, including a psychiatrist, who have assessed the suspect.262 
One of the centres for clinical observation is the Pieter Baan Centrum (PBC). 
The observation in the PBC takes seven weeks at the most.263 During this stay 
the detainee is observed to assess the detainee’s personality, to determine whether 
the detainee has a mental illness and, if so, whether this illness can be related to 
the charged offence.264 During observation, the detainee must receive the neces-
sary medical and psychiatric care. Exchange of medical data is therefore necessary 
to provide adequate healthcare and to guarantee continuity of care. In my view, 
current legislation prohibits that medical data obtained to provide healthcare is 
used for the advice that will be sent to the court if the detainee does not give his 
consent.265 Apparently, the legislator had a different view by stating that if a judge 
gives an order to observe and report about a detainee, the duty of medical confi-
dentiality (as laid down in Article 457 Medical Treatment Contracts Act) will no 
longer be applicable. It stressed that data collected during the assessment can be 
used for the report that will be sent to the court, just like data collected by the 
medical service of a remand centre where the detainee had been held earlier as far 
as necessary considering the situation.266 Two district courts have concluded that 
if a public prosecutor claims that medical data must be submitted to the PBC in 
view of the observation that has to be made by the PBC to examine the suspect’s 
criminal liability, this does not entail very exceptional circumstances that overrule 
the duty of medical confidentiality.267 In my view, the duty of medical confiden-
tiality will be breached if medical data which has been collected by the medical 
260. Art. 196, art. 317, art. 509g Code of Criminal Procedure.
261. See chapter 3, section 3.3.2.
262. If the suspect refuses to cooperate with the examination, this report is not required. In 
that case, other reports to which the suspect has cooperated in the past can be used to determine 
whether an illness is present. Art. 37 §§2-3 Penal Code.
263. Art. 198 §1 Code of Criminal Procedure.
264. NIFP 2014.
265. See also: Council for the Administration of Criminal Justice and Protection of Juveniles 
2012. Beukers 2011, p. 284. 
266. Stb. 2000, 121, pp. 10-12.
267. District Court Noord-Nederland 26 April 2013, ECLI:NL:RBNNE:2013:BZ9199. District 
Court Overijssel 24 April 2013, ECLI:NL:RBOVE:2013:BZ9109.
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service of a penal institution to provide healthcare is (mis)used for the observa-
tion report without the consent of the detainee. This data has not been collected 
to report to a court but to provide adequate healthcare. Such an infringement re-
quires in my view a legal basis to ensure foreseeability. At present, such a bill has 
been introduced. This bill provides, under certain conditions, the possibility to 
obtain medical data without the suspect’s consent in order to assess whether the 
suspect is mentally disturbed.268 Several organisations have responded negatively 
to this bill and referred to the possible side effect that persons may be restrained 
in seeking medical and psychiatric care, informing the health care provider in full, 
or will more often request to destroy the medical file, which may obstruct access 
and continuity of care.269
As for the physician’s position, the Committee van Dinter has recommended that 
the physician should, in addition to his work in the penal institution, preferably 
be active as a general practitioner outside the institution, which may guarantee 
that free society is, and remains, the physician’s state of reference.270 Further-
more, that the physician is responsible for his own medical conduct implies that 
the physician must exercise his medical authority and expertise towards the gov-
ernor if necessary in the detainee’s interest.271 Noteworthy is that the physician 
who works in a penal institution has a double role; on the one hand, he provides 
detainees with healthcare and on the other, he advises the governor.272 The gover-
nor must arrange that the physician examines the detainee’s eligibility for work, 
exercise or other activities.273 The physician must also monitor a detainee during 
segregation (as disciplinary punishment or otherwise),274 and he has an advisory 
268. Forensic Care Act. Kamerstukken I 2012/13, 32 398, D.
269. Appendixes of Kamerstukken II 2012/13, 32 398, no. 24, containing, among others, the 
reactions of the Dutch Association of Mental Health and Addiction Care, Royal Dutch Medical 
Association, Council for the Administration of Criminal Justice and Protection of Juveniles, and 
Dutch Association for Psychiatry. See furthermore De Jong 2012, who stated that no evidence is 
provided for the proposition that unobstructed access to healthcare may be endangered by this bill.
270. Committee van Dinter 1995, pp. 14, 29.
271. BrC 11/12/2014 – 14/2820/GM. See also BrC 25/07/2000 – 00/0446/GM and 00/0518/
GM: a physician has the responsibility to intervene if observing protocols leads, from a medical 
perspective, to an unnecessary restriction of the detainee’s freedoms.
272. Kamerstukken II 1994/95, 24 263, no. 3, p. 62. See also: Groenouwe 2013.
273. Art. 42 §3, section c Custodial Institutions (Framework) Act. Art. 41 §3, section c Hospital 
Orders (Framework) Act. See for example: BrC 13/05/2013 – 13/0761/GM.
274. Art. 24 §6, art. 55 §2 Custodial Institutions (Framework) Act. Art. 4 Rules punishment and 
isolation cell penal institutions. This is not explicitly regulated in the Hospital Orders (Framework) 
Act. Art. 34 §5 Hospital Orders (Framework) Act.
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role when camera surveillance is used during segregation.275 The physician may 
also be involved in forced treatment,276 an internal examination of the detainee’s 
body277 and may be asked to assess the detainee’s fitness to be interrogated.278 The 
legislator has emphasised that, in view of the relationship between physician and 
patient, the governor should involve forensic physicians instead of the institu-
tion’s physician to perform forced measures.279 Though the institution’s physician 
cannot be forced to apply forced medical treatment on a detainee,280 in practice 
forced medical treatment is performed by the health care staff connected to the 
institution.281 The legislator furthermore stated that the double role of the institu-
tion’s physician has actually led to a demand for a consult with a physician of the 
detainee’s own choice,282 which illustrates the risk that detainees may be restrained 
in turning to the institution’s physician/medical service. The Central Disciplinary 
Committee for the Health Care Sector has stressed that physicians must be aware 
of the different roles they fulfil.283 Another complicating factor in relation to the 
double role of the physician is the duty of medical confidentiality when giving 
advice, for example to the governor. Which information can be provided when 
giving advice?284 The Royal Dutch Medical Association stresses that if the physi-
cian is involved as attending physician, the duty of medical confidentiality applies 
in full. If the physician is involved as a medical advisor, only medical information 
strictly necessary to answer the questions of the governor of the judicial institu-
tion (or of the police/public prosecutor) may be provided by the physician to the 
governor. The physician must inform the detainee about the purpose of the exam-
ination and to whom he will report.285 The Appeal Commission has stated that 
the double role of the institution’s physician, i.e. medical attendant and medical 
officer who examines the eligibility to work, is inherent to his position.286 The 
275. Art. 24a §2, art. 51a §2 Custodial Institutions (Framework) Act. Art. 34a §2 Hospital 
Orders (Framework) Act.
276. Art. 21-23 Prison Rules. Art. 33-35 Hospital Orders (Care) Regulations.
277. Art. 31 §1 Custodial Institutions (Framework) Act. Art. 25 Hospital Orders (Framework) 
Act. 
278. See for example: BrC 18/02/2002 – 01/1138/GM. 
279. Kamerstukken II 1994/95, 24 263, no. 3, p. 62.
280. See also: Jacobs 2012, pp. 227-228.
281. Roeleveld-Kuijper and Lohmann 2014.
282. Kamerstukken II 1994/95, 24 263, no. 3, pp. 62-63. See also BrC 11/11/2016 – 16/2168/
GM: relationship patient-physician severely disturbed. In such cases, reference to a colleague is 
expected.
283. CTG 23 February 2012, ECLI:NL:TGZCTG:2012:YG1809, §§4.3-4.4.
284. See for example: BrC 18/02/2002 – 01/1138/GM.
285. Royal Dutch Medical Association 2012b, pp. 51, 49.
286. BrC 23/10/2000 – 00/0957/GM. 
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double role of the institution’s physician when the enforcement of disciplinary 
punishment or other forced measures are concerned has been criticised in Dutch 
literature. Kelk has recommended that, from a medical-ethical perspective, the 
legislator should re-examine its view about the double role of the institution’s 
physician.287 The basic principle in free society is that the function of attending 
physician and medical examiner are separated,288 though there are also deviations 
from this principle, for example in the army289 or in relation to forced treatment 
in mental health care. Though the double role of the institution’s physician is not 
recommendable in my view, separating these functions will probably come with a 
price and is not an explicit obligation arising from the ECHR.
Forensic physicians also have a double role in the Netherlands. A forensic 
physician may be involved to advise the police and judicial authorities in view 
of criminal proceedings and to report on their behalf and may be involved as 
a detainee’s attending physician.290 The police custody officer must be aware of 
this distinction when calling the forensic physician, especially considering the 
restrictions imposed on the physician in relation to data sharing.291 The forensic 
physician must also be alert as to the role in which he is involved when visiting 
and examining a detainee.292 The guideline issued by the Royal Dutch Medical 
Association stresses that the forensic physician’s duty of medical confidentiality 
applies in full when the physician visits a police custody detainee as an attending 
physician. If the forensic physician is involved as a medical advisor on the request 
of the police or public prosecutor, the forensic physician should only answer the 
questions raised by the police/public prosecutor and only provide medical infor-
mation strictly necessary to answer these questions. The forensic physician must 
inform the person in question about the purpose of such an examination and to 
whom the physician will report.293 Noteworthy is a judgment of the Zwolle Re-
gional Disciplinary Committee for the Health Care Sector, that concluded that 
a forensic physician had breached the disciplinary rules by informing the police 
287. Kelk 2006, p. 228.
288. MT Amsterdam 24 June 1984, TvGR 1987/17. See also Leenen, Dute and Kastelein 2008, 
p. 335.
289. Hendriks 2007.
290. Explanatory memorandum on Official Instructions for the Police, Stb. 1994, 275, art. 
32-36. The advisory role of the forensic physician is regulated in several laws, such as art. 56 §2 
and art. 195 §2 Code of Criminal Procedure (examination in a suspect’s body by a physician) and 
art. 163 §6 Road Traffic Act 1994 (blood test). See about the role of the forensic physician also: 
Cohen et al 2004. Duijst and Das 2011.
291. Stb. 1994, 275, art. 32-36. 
292. RTG Zwolle 24 June 2016, ECLI:NL:TGZRZWO:2016:63, §5.4.
293. Royal Dutch Medical Association 2012b, p. 49. 
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that the detainee’s sugar level was not alarmingly increased and about his advice 
to the detainee, whereas the detainee himself had informed the police that he was 
diabetic and the police asked the forensic physician for the detainee’s diabetic 
status.294 The Committee has in my view lost sight of the fact that sharing infor-
mation between forensic physicians and police custody officers can be necessary to 
ensure that the detainee is properly cared for by police custody officers, regardless 
of the role in which the physician is involved. Though it was in this case not nec-
essary to share the forensic physician’s advice on the steps to be taken after release, 
this is not evident in relation to the glucose level. Such information is relevant to 
ensure proper care for the detainee during deprivation of liberty.
Informed consent of a patient is the basic principle in the Dutch healthcare leg-
islation and is guaranteed in Article 448 in connection with Article 450 Medical 
Treatment Contracts Act. Article 448 Medical Treatment Contracts Act includes 
the obligation to inform the patient about possible consequences if a proposed 
treatment or examination is not performed. If the patient cannot give his consent 
because he is not capable to decide for himself (incompetent),295 consent must be 
given by a representative, such as a curator,296 mentor,297 or a person who is as-
signed by the patient to represent him.298 If the representative has given consent 
for an intrusive examination or treatment but the patient resists, the proposed 
examination or treatment is only possible if necessary to avert severe harm to the 
patient.299 If immediate action is necessary to prevent severe harm to the patient, 
consent of the representative is not required if there is no time to obtain such con-
sent.300 Informed consent is pursuant to Article 448 and 450 Medical Treatment 
Contracts Act also the starting point when healthcare is provided during deprivation 
294. RTG Zwolle 24 June 2016, ECLI:NL:TGZRZWO:2016:63, §5.4.
295. To consider a person to be competent to decide for himself, the following criterion must 
be fulfilled: 1) the patient is provided with the necessary information to take the decision, 2) 
the provided information is adapted to the patient’s comprehension, 3) as far as necessary 
considering the nature and scope of the decision that needs to be taken, 4) the patient shows that 
he understands the information. The basic principle in the Netherlands is that a patient is assumed 
to be competent. Kamerstukken II 1999/00, 26 885, no. 1, pp. 3, 8.
296. Art. 1:378 Civil Code.
297. Art. 1:450 Civil Code.
298. In all other cases, the patient may be represented by his husband/wife, other life partner, 
or his parent, child, brother or sister, unless this would go against the patient’s wishes. The 
representative must act as a ‘good representative’ and must involve the patient as much as possible 
in the decision making process. Art. 465 §§2-5 Medical Treatment Contracts Act.
299. Art. 465 §6 Medical Treatment Contracts Act.
300. Art. 466 §1 Medical Treatment Contracts Act.
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of liberty,301 which corresponds with the principles under the ECHR.302 The duty 
to inform the patient about the intended examination, treatment and (devel-
opments regarding the) condition of the patient is applicable when the patient 
is detained in a penal institution.303 It is incompatible with the standard laid 
down in Article 28 Prison Rules304 if insufficient information is provided to a de-
tained patient.305 The detainee must give his consent before administering medical 
treatment (and/or before examination) and the detainee may refuse medical ex-
amination and/or treatment.306 As for treatment for mental health problems of 
detainees placed in a special care unit, it is explicitly regulated that the detainee 
must be consulted about the treatment plan, must agree with the plan and must 
not resist to the treatment. If the detainee has a curator or mentor, this represent-
ative must be consulted about the proposed treatment plan, must consent to the 
treatment plan and must not resist to the treatment.307 Noteworthy is that other 
representatives are not mentioned,308 which would mean (as the Custodial Insti-
tutions (Framework) Act is a lex specialis of the Medical Treatment Contracts Act) 
301. Kamerstukken II 1994/95, 24 263, no. 3, p. 52. Informed consent is not required if the 
detainee is admitted for observation under the authority of a judge or another judicial authority in 
view of a criminal procedure. Stb. 2000, 121, pp. 10-11. The Health Care Inspectorate requires that 
if a physician visits a person detained by the police, he must inform the detainee in advance about 
purpose and function of the physician’s visit and the detainee must give his consent. Inspectorate 
Security and Justice and Health Care Inspectorate 2014, p. 23. 
302. ECtHR 2 June 2016, no. 59620/14, §100 (Yunusova and Yunusov v. Azerbaijan).
303. BrC 30/07/2001 – 01/0266/GM and BrC 12/12/2002 – 02/1923/GM.
304. Art. 28 Prison Rules prescribes that detainees may complain about the healthcare provided 
by the physician, nurses and other care providers involved. Healthcare is defined as: a) any conduct 
or neglect in breach of the care that is to be expected of the physician, nurse or other care providers 
in their professional capacity towards detainees (enig handelen in het kader van of nalaten in strijd 
met de zorg die de in het eerste lid bedoelde personen in die hoedanigheid behoren te betrachten ten 
opzichte van de gedetineerde, met betrekking tot wiens gezondheidstoestand zij bijstand verlenen of 
hun bijstand is ingeroepen), b) any other conduct or neglect than mentioned under a that breaches 
good healthcare practice (enig ander dan onder a bedoeld handelen of nalaten in die hoedanigheid 
in strijd met het belang van een goede uitoefening van de individuele gezondheidszorg).
305. BrC 10/08/2012 – 12/1591/GM. See also: BrC 08/01/2013 – 12/2916/GM. Though art. 
448 was, in view of the Appeal Commission, not applicable in relation to the manner in which 
medication is handed over, namely without the packing. BrC 07/12/2015 – 15/2716/TA and 
15/2804/TA.
306. BrC 13/12/1999 – A 99/680/GA.
307. Art. 46b and art. 46c Custodial Institutions (Framework) Act. Art. 16 and art. 16a Hospital 
Orders (Framework) Act. Art. 38a §§3-4 Psychiatric Hospitals (Compulsory Admissions) Act. See 
however the findings of the CPT regarding drawing up a treatment plan. CPT/Inf (2017) 1 – 
Netherlands, p. 40.
308. These representatives are for example mentioned in art. 38a §4 Psychiatric Hospitals 
(Compulsory Admissions) Act. Though the legislator stressed that it would follow this provision 
(Kamerstukken I 2011/12, 32 337, C, p. 18), these representatives are not mentioned.
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that if an incompetent detainee does not have a curator or mentor, other repre-
sentatives do not have to be involved, which is in my view troublesome. When 
it comes to examinations or treatment for somatic health problems of incompe-
tent detainees, the general health care legislation on representation of patients 
applies in my view, which means that a representative must be involved.309 If not, 
this may compromise the relationship of trust as the health care provider would 
act on his own discretion. As will be discussed below, the Custodial Institutions 
(Framework) Act does contain several provisions that authorises health care pro-
viders to act without the detainee’s informed consent (including the consent of 
the detainee’s representative) if necessary to avert a danger, namely Article 32 and 
Article 46d.310
5.4.3. Quality of healthcare
Necessity and equivalence of healthcare
In correspondence with the ECtHR’s case law,311 the vademecum of the Custodial 
Institutions Agency determines that only necessary healthcare that is qualitatively 
comparable to that provided in free society will be provided to persons detained 
in judicial institutions (thus including penal institutions). Healthcare will not be 
provided if the treatment can be postponed until release without causing harm to 
the detainee’s health and if it is safe from a medical perspective.312 It is up to the 
institution’s physician to assess the medical necessity of a particular treatment. The 
term ‘medical necessity’ is however subjective and may therefore lead to arbitrari-
ness. A specific treatment may be provided to a detainee in one penal institution 
and may not be continued in the next, as previously seen with regard to meth-
adone.313 Though this is not so much a risk for the life of the detainee, it may 
nevertheless lead to discussions about the minimum level of healthcare that ought 
to be provided within these institutions. The 2013 annual report of the Custodial 
309. Art. 465 §§3-6 Medical Treatment Contracts Act. See also Kamerstukken I 2011/12, 32 337, 
C, p. 18: general healthcare legislation applies in judicial institutions. Kamerstukken II 2009/10, 
32 337, no. 3, p. 6: treatment plan can only be applied with consent of the detainee or, in case of 
an incompetent detainee, his representative.
310. Art. 26 and art. 16b Hospital Orders (Framework) Act. Art. 38c Psychiatric Hospitals 
(Compulsory Admissions) Act. These exceptions will be discussed in more detail in section 5.5.1.
311. ECtHR 26 October 2000, no. 30210/96, §94, GC (Kudła v. Poland). ECtHR 2 February 
2016, no. 65158/09, §83 (Drăgan v. Romania).
312. Custodial Institutions Agency 2016. See also Kamerstukken II 1995/96, 24 263, no. 6, p. 
32. See with regard to the principle of equivalence of care concerning addictions: BrC 10/02/2011 
– 10/3551/GM. BrC 30/07/2010 – 10/0528/GM.
313. District Court ‘s-Gravenhage 16 August 1996, KG 1996, 291.
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Institutions Agency shows for example that healthcare was one of the themes of 
the management agreements. The purpose of this health care agenda was to ensure 
certainty about the final responsibility for health care themes, which should serve 
coherence in healthcare.314 
The Chief of Police must arrange that the necessary healthcare is available 
during deprivation of liberty by the police.315 The principle of equivalence of care 
does however not emerge in relation to healthcare during deprivation of liberty by 
the police, which was also observed in the ECtHR’s case law.
Adequate healthcare according to professional standard
Dutch law contains several safeguards to ensure adequate healthcare. Health care 
professionals who provide healthcare to detainees are bound by the same quality 
standards as health care providers who (only) work in free society. The medical 
service of a penal institution can be regarded as a care provider as defined in the 
Healthcare Quality, Complaints and Disputes Act, namely an institute, and more 
specific, persons providing care on a professional basis and in an organisational 
context.316 Physicians connected to Community Health Services or private or-
ganisations who provide care to detainees held by the police also fall within the 
definition of care provider pursuant to the Healthcare Quality, Complaints and 
Disputes Act. Pursuant to this Act, a care provider must provide adequate health-
care.317 Adequate healthcare is defined as care of good quality and of an adequate 
level, which means that care is safe, timely, effective, suitable and patient-oriented. 
The provided care must correspond with the actual needs of the client (patient). 
Care providers must act in accordance with their responsibility, arising from 
their professional standard, and in line with the applicable quality standard in-
cluded in the public register referred to in Article 66b Health Insurance Act.318 
The professional standard includes guidelines, modules, (healthcare) standards, 
314. Custodial Institutions Agency 2014f, p. 14. Wijngaart and Post also concluded that a central 
policy on referral of detainees to second-line health care providers was absent. Van den Wijngaart 
and Post 2007, p. 58.
315. Art. 26 §1, section d Official Instructions for the Police.
316. Art. 1 §1 Healthcare Quality, Complaints and Disputes Act.
317. Art. 2 §1 Healthcare Quality, Complaints and Disputes Act. The term ‘good health care’ 
is identical to the term ‘safe health care’, as used in the former Care Institutions (Quality) Act. 
Kamerstukken I 2013/14, 32 402, I, p. 18. The last-mentioned Act has been replaced by the 
Healthcare Quality, Complaints and Disputes Act.
318. Art. 2 §§1-2 Healthcare Quality, Complaints and Disputes Act. The medical service must 
react promptly to pain complaints. Four days later was considered to be negligent. BrC 26/04/2012 
– 12/0379/GM. See also BrC 19/03/2015 – 14/4236/GM: delay in planning surgery in breach of 
norm laid down in art. 28 Prison Rules. BrC 07/11/2008 – 08/1564/GM.
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or organisation’s descriptions on the care process that prescribe what is necessary 
to provide adequate healthcare from the patient’s perspective.319 The National 
Health Care Institute keeps a record of professional standards and measurement 
instruments. These standards and instruments can be submitted by organisations 
in the field of healthcare.320 ‘Good health care’ furthermore requires that if multi-
ple health care providers are involved, the care must be coordinated.321
To ensure the quality of healthcare, the Health Care Inspectorate requires that 
the medical service of penal institutions works with guidelines, protocols and pro-
cess descriptions.322 Physicians and nurses should have meetings to discuss policy 
and protocols on a regular and systematic basis, though practice showed that the 
availability of physicians outside surgery hours was often not arranged.323 Physi-
cians should contribute to the development of protocols and to the training and 
structure of the medical service.324 Medical protocols in force, such as protocols 
to reduce the use of medication, should be followed.325 Deviating from national 
circulars on medical conduct is only allowed with a special medical reason. For-
mulating own (local) policy cannot be regarded as such special medical reason.326 
The Health Care Inspectorate requires the medical staff of a penal institution 
to actively monitor the condition of detainees suffering from chronic diseases, in 
accordance with the standards of the Dutch Association of General Practition-
ers (for example the standard for diabetes mellitus).327 Active monitoring is also 
319. Art. 1 §1 Healthcare Quality, Complaints and Disputes Act. See also art. 453 Medical 
Treatment Contracts Act: this provision obliges health care providers to observe in their work 
the care of a good health care provider. The health care provider needs to act according to the 
applicable professional standard.
320. Art. 66b §1 Health Insurance Act.
321. Kamerstukken I 2013/14, 32 402, I, p. 18.
322. Health Care Inspectorate 1999, p. 72. See with regard to healthcare for persons detained 
by the police: Inspectorate Security and Justice and Health Care Inspectorate 2014, p. 23. The 
Inspectorate refers to the guidelines of the Forensic Medical Society, in particular the guidelines on 
intoxications, addiction to opiates and drug users.
323. Health Care Inspectorate 2009, pp. 26, 35.
324. Health Care Inspectorate 2010 (Torentijd, Middelburg), pp. 5-7.
325. BrC 11/12/2014 – 14/3600/GM. See also BrC 14/02/2006 – 05/2667/GM: if a detainee 
does not assent to reducing medication in accordance with such protocols, the physician should 
visit the detainee.
326. BrC 27/08/2007 – 07/0556/GM. BrC 19/07/2004 – 04/0906/GM. BrC 23/10/2003 – 
02/2459/GM. In BrC 28/10/2009 – 09/1382/GM, the BrC concluded that the physician had 
breached the norm laid down in art. 28 Prison Rules because the methadone was cut back more 
rapidly than prescribed in protocol.  
327. These standards are published on the website of the Dutch College of General Practitioners. 
www.nhg.org. Last accessed: 24 April 2017. See also BrC 27/09/2016 – 16/2373/GM: detainee 
not referred to medical specialist, because of his status (detained on remand), which was not in 
accordance with the standards of the Dutch College of General Practitioners.
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required with regard to addiction and psychiatric illnesses. Whether a detainee 
is checked periodically should not depend on the detainee’s initiative.328 These 
principles observe the obligation arising from the ECHR’s case law to monitor 
the condition of detainees if necessary considering the detainee’s health condi-
tion.329 In 2010, the Health Care Inspectorate observed however that monitoring 
of chronically sick patients was not guaranteed in every penal institution.330 The 
Inspectorate furthermore emphasises the importance of integrating somatic and 
psychiatric care for detainees with comorbidity in somatic and psychiatric illness-
es.331 The physician must adequately respond to health complaints of detainees to 
establish a diagnosis.332 A detailed treatment plan must be developed for detainees 
with complex illnesses such as a HIV-infection,333 hepatitis C,334 or addictions.335 
An instrument to monitor the condition of detainees is the psycho-medical con-
sultation, which is expected to be organised in every penal institution. Detainees 
who are in need of special psycho-medical care need to be discussed during these 
meetings.336 A psycho-medical consultation is chaired by a psychologist. Dur-
ing this multidisciplinary meeting (in principle attended by nurses, physicians, 
psychiatrists and psychologists), the most desirable approach for each individ-
ual patient is discussed.337 This multidisciplinary meeting did not have a basis in 
Dutch legislation. Since 2013, the Prison Rules prescribe that a multidisciplinary 
meeting between a psychiatrist, physician, psychologist and a nurse should take 
place at least every two weeks.338 This consultation must guarantee that the con-
dition of the detainee is followed continuously. The suitability and necessity of the 
provided (involuntary) treatment should be evaluated during this meeting and it 
should be assessed whether alternatives exist.339
328. Health Care Inspectorate 2009, pp. 28, 37.
329. ECtHR 12 January 2016, no. 2763/13, §69 (Khayletdinov v. Russia).
330. Health Care Inspectorate 2010 (Torentijd, Middelburg), pp. 6, 18.
331. Health Care Inspectorate 2014 (Judicial Medical Centre Scheveningen), p. 14; 2009c, pp. 
18, 29-30.
332. BrC 12/05/2011 – 11/0485/GM.
333. BrC 10/08/2012 – 12/1329/GM.
334. BrC 08/02/2007 – 06/2188/GM.
335. BrC 19/07/2004 – 04/0906/GM. BrC 23/10/2003 – 02/2459/GM. 
336. Inspectorate Security and Justice 2015, p. 16. See about the psycho-medical consultation 
also: Roorda and Buysse (DSP-groep) 2016, chapter 4 (Psycho-Medical Team). De Jonge and Knol 
2001.
337. Roeleveld-Kuijper and Lohmann 2014. De Jonge and Cremers 2008, p. 178. https://www.
dji.nl/justitiabelen/volwassenen-in-detentie/zorg-en-begeleiding/index.aspx. Last accessed: 17 
February 2017.
338. Art. 21a §4 Prison Rules.
339. Stb. 2013, 99, p. 24.
Death in State Custody DRUK.indd   217 13-Sep-17   2:40:10 PM
218 Chapter 5 
With regard to the monitoring of detainees during the day, it is noteworthy that 
(as opposed to the Official Instructions for the Police) the applicable legislation 
and rules do not contain requirements on the supervision performed by prison 
officers, except for detainees who are placed in a punishment or isolation cell and 
are showing self-destructive behaviour or if indications for such behaviour ex-
ist. Under these circumstances, the detainee should be observed at least once an 
hour.340
Main focus of healthcare during deprivation of liberty by the police are 
life-threatening situations and conditions.341 Police custody officers have an im-
portant role in supervising the condition of detainees, though on a different level 
than health care staff. The Official Instructions for the Police prescribe that a 
detainee should in principle be checked every two hours. The detainee must be 
observed in his cell every 15 minutes if a physician has been notified. When the 
physician has provided healthcare, the detainee must be observed as often as ad-
vised by the physician. In both situations the officer should observe the detainee 
in his cell and on his body. During these checks the officer must in particular pay 
attention to the degree in which the detainee can be woken and the degree in 
which he is approachable. A detainee who cannot be woken or is not approacha-
ble must immediately be brought to hospital by ambulance.342 The police custody 
officer must follow the instructions given to him by the physician about the care 
for the detainee’s health.343 Striking is that the Inspectorate Security and Justice 
stated that it is not necessary to wake a detainee with medical complaints.344 This 
is in my opinion inconsistent with the regulations laid down in Article 34 Offi-
cial Instructions for the Police and should in my view depend on the nature of 
the medical complaints and the physician’s advice. Noteworthy is that studies on 
deaths occurring during deprivation of liberty by the Dutch police reveal several 
problems regarding the manner in which detainees were supervised, for exam-
ple not observing the (forensic) physician’s advice to wake the detainee at every 
check.345 
340. Art. 9 Rules on punishment and isolation cell penal institutions. These instructions are not 
laid down in the Hospital Orders (framework) Act.
341. See also: Das 2011, p. 266.
342. Art. 34 §1, section a-c and §2 Official Instructions for the Police.
343. Art. 33 Official Instructions for the Police. See also: Court of Appeal Amsterdam 5 June 
2007, ECLI:NL:GHAMS:2007:BA6609.
344. Inspectorate Security and Justice and Health Care Inspectorate 2014, p. 14, footnote 123. 
345. Thoonen and Duijst 2014. Shortcomings in the monitoring of detainees were also seen in 
the study on police custody deaths in the period 1983-1993. Blaauw, Vermunt and Kerkhof 1997. 
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Thoonen and Duijst also detected several problems in the conduct of forensic 
physicians relating to the care for detainees who died during deprivation of liberty 
by the Dutch police, namely the (overdue) arrival of the forensic physician, the 
medical examination (not/briefly performed), the conclusion of the physician and 
the prescribed treatment.346 Noteworthy is that the applicable legislation and reg-
ulations do not provide a maximum time limit in which the physician is expected 
to arrive after he is notified by the police, though the physician is bound by the 
Healthcare Quality, Complaints and Disputes Act and has therefore the obliga-
tion to provide assistance in a timely fashion.347 This will require an assessment by 
the physician in each individual case.
Qualified and competent
Dutch law contains several safeguards to ensure that healthcare is provided by 
qualified and competent health care providers. The Individual Health Care Pro-
fessions Act protects several professional titles, such as physicians, health care 
psychologists and nurses.348 Only professionals who are listed in a special register 
for health care professionals (BIG-register) are authorised to use the title in ques-
tion.349 There is also a register for medical specialists.350 A condition to be listed in 
the register is a qualification for the profession concerned.351 The area of expertise 
of the protected titles are defined in Articles 18-33 Individual Health Care Profes-
sions Act. The physician’s expertise is defined as acts on the field of medicine.352 
The expertise of a nurse is defined as acts on the field of observation, guidance, 
nursing and care and acts performed under the authority of an individual health 
care professional after his diagnosis and treatment.353 Professionals registered in 
the BIG-register are bound by disciplinary rules,354 which aim to protect the 
quality of healthcare.355 The registered professional must be legally qualified and 
346. Thoonen and Duijst 2014.
347. Art. 2 §2 Healthcare Quality, Complaints and Disputes Act. 
348. Art. 3 §1 Individual Health Care Professions Act.
349. Art. 4 Individual Health Care Professions Act.
350. Art. 14-17 Individual Health Care Professions Act.
351. Art. 6 Individual Health Care Professions Act.
352. Art. 19 §1 Individual Health Care Professions Act.
353. Art. 33 Individual Health Care Professions Act.
354. Art. 47 §§1-2 Individual Health Care Professions Act. Detained complainants 
should have the opportunity to find out the full name of the health care provider to fulfil the 
admissibility criteria: CTG 7 April 2016, ECLI:NL:TGZCTG:2016:152. CTG 20 August 2015, 
ECLI:NL:TGZCTG:2015:261.
355. The Prison Rules furthermore contain a special procedure to complain about the medical 
conduct of health care providers like the physician and the nurse. Contrary to the disciplinary 
procedure, the emphasis of the procedure laid down in the Prison Rules is the individual legal 
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competent to act. If a registered professional is legally qualified, though not com-
petent to perform the act in question, he will breach the disciplinary rules if he 
nevertheless performs the act in question.356 The Individual Health Care Pro-
fessions Act also contains regulations on reserved procedures, such as surgical 
treatment or administering injections. If no emergency exists, these procedures 
may only be independently and professionally performed by specifically assigned 
professions.357 
The health problems of detainees are often different than the health problems 
of the patient population of a general practitioner. Addiction, psychiatric prob-
lems and behavioural disturbances are more common in penal institutions than 
in the general population.358 As emphasised by the CPT, this requires specific 
training.359 In the past, there have been discussions about the job requirements of 
physicians who work in Dutch penal institutions.360 The Health Care Inspector-
ate has stressed that the expertise of physicians practising in judicial institutions 
will only be secured if all physicians have successfully followed the training for 
judicial physicians. Physicians practising in these institutions should have suffi-
cient curative competence and expertise and should have expertise on addictions, 
psychiatry and infectious diseases. Sufficient legal knowledge is also expected.361 
The Board for general practitioners with special competences has acknowledged 
judicial medicine as special competence within the general practice. The training 
for judicial physicians exists since 2008. General practitioners who successfully 
finish this training can be listed in the register ‘Judicial general practice’.362 Sev-
eral reports show however that not all general practitioners practising within penal 
protection of detainees. Stb. 1998, 111, p. 42. Chapter 7 Prison Rules. Others have rightly stressed 
that procedures to complain about medical conduct also aim to improve the quality of healthcare. 
Hendriks, Van der Meer and Van Meersbergen 2016. The Hospital Orders (Framework) Act and 
the Psychiatric Hospitals (Compulsory Admissions) Act do not contain a special procedure to 
complain about the medical conduct of health care providers.
356. Kamerstukken II 1985/86, 19 522, no. 3, pp. 42, 75. See also: MT ‘s-Gravenhage 7 December 
1977, TvGR 1978, no. 53. RTG Groningen 15 March 2016, ECLI:NL:TGZRGRO:2016:8: extra 
caution is required if a health care provider is unfamiliar with a particular remedy and this remedy 
is administered for the first time.
357. Art. 35-37 Individual Health Care Professions Act.
358. Bulten and Nijman 2009. Lutke Schipholt 2010.
359. CPT/Inf/E (2002) 1 – Rev. 2015, CPT Standards, p. 47.
360. RTG Eindhoven 13 February 2003, Stcrt. 4 April 2003, no. 67/ p. 18. See also Crommentuyn 
2003. CTG 12 January 2006, no. 2004/152. ‘Centraal Tuchtcollege doet waarschuwing 
gevangenisarts teniet’, Medisch Contact 2006, no. 3, p. 99.
361. Health Care Inspectorate 2009, pp. 16, 26-27, 35-36, Appendix 3; 2011 (Flevoland, 
Lelystad), p. 7. See also Inspectorate Security and Justice 2015, p. 16; 2015b, p. 7. Council for the 
Administration of Criminal Justice and Protection of Juveniles 2015, p. 10.
362. Duijst 2011, p. 223. See also Custodial Institutions Agency 2011b.
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institutions have finished the training to become judicial physicians.363 A special 
training for nurses working in judicial institutions has also been developed.364 The 
Health Care Inspectorate requires every nurse working in a penal institution to be 
trained as a judicial nurse, though reports show that not every nurse successfully 
finished the training.365 The Health Care Inspectorate expects a policy on training 
and adequate refresher courses, and health care providers (including physicians) 
should be subjected to performance interviews on a systematic basis.366 
Health care providers working in penal institutions should not lose sight of the 
boundaries of their professional qualifications and competence. Neither a nurse 
or a psychologist is for example qualified to decide that medication is no longer 
provided to a detainee, even if this would correspond with the detainee’s own 
request.367 Assessment of a detainee’s state of mind also does not fall within the 
nurse’s field of expertise. The ‘s-Gravenhage Regional Disciplinary Committee for 
the Health Care Sector expects that nurses object to being assigned with tasks for 
which they are neither qualified nor competent.368
In general, healthcare to persons deprived of their liberty by the police is pro-
vided by forensic physicians. There exists a special training (‘forensic medicine’) 
for forensic physicians, including a module on healthcare for persons detained 
by the police. At present, there are two different registers for forensic physicians 
(connected to two different courses).369 The Forensic Medical Society has, in 
addition to the general requirements for physicians, formulated a professional 
profile for forensic physicians.370 The Health Care Inspectorate requires that 
a forensic physician is registered as a forensic physician Royal Dutch Medical 
Association (KNMG), is a general practitioner, or has a general practitioner as 
backup.371 The Netherlands Health Council concluded in 2013 that the training 
363. Health Care Inspectorate 2011 (Torentijd, Middelburg), p. 6; 2011 (Haarlem), p. 7.
364. National Professional Association Judicial Nurses 2004. See also Custodial Institutions 
Agency 2011c.
365. Health Care Inspectorate 2011 (Flevoland, Lelystad), p. 7; 2011 (Torentijd, Middelburg), 
p. 7.
366. Health Care Inspectorate 1999, p. 66. Inspectorate Security and Justice and Health Care 
Inspectorate 2014, p. 23.
367. RTG Eindhoven 4 May 2012, ECLI:NL:TGZREIN:2012:YG1991. See also: BrC 
09/02/2009 – 08/2702/GM.
368. RTG ‘s-Gravenhage 26 August 2014, ECLI:NL:TGZRSGR:2014:96 and 
ECLI:NL:TGZRSGR:2014:97. See also: Health Care Inspectorate 1999, p. 67.
369. Namely a register of the Social Medicine Registration Committee and a register of the 
Forensic Medical Society. There also exists a training for forensic nurses, including a module on 
care for persons detained by the police. Duijst 2014, pp. 28-29.
370. Forensic Medical Society 2011.
371. Inspectorate Security and Justice and Health Care Inspectorate 2014, p. 23.
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for forensic physicians was of limited length and academic status, with hardly any 
possibility to gain practical experience. The Council stresses that the population 
in police cells requires specific knowledge, for example on the legal context and 
on addictions, and that general practitioners do not always possess this expertise. 
Forensic physicians possess this knowledge but do not always possess sufficient 
clinical experience (as do general practitioners). The Council also observed that 
the responsibility for the quality of the forensic-medical discipline as a whole is 
not assigned to a specific body. The National Health Council recommends that 
practical training and internships should be added to the training for forensic 
physicians and that this course should receive the same weight as the training for 
other medical disciplines. The discipline should also be given a stronger scien-
tific basis (by introducing a chair for forensic medicine) and peer assessment and 
visitations should be compulsory. A registration system should be introduced in 
order to assess forensic-medical conduct. This should lead to the development of 
quality indicators. Furthermore, funding of the training should be simplified and 
comparable to that of other medical disciplines.372 In February 2017, the Forensic 
Medical Society presented a plan for the training of forensic physicians.373
Assigning responsibilities
Several disciplines are represented in a medical service of penal institutions, in-
cluding physicians and nurses. The position of head medical service has also been 
introduced and the governor of the penal institution has a responsibility in re-
lation to the detainee’s access to healthcare. Though not explicitly stressed by 
the ECtHR, involvement of all these professions requires that responsibilities are 
clearly assigned.374 
The referral procedure by a nurse has prompted the Appeal Commission to 
assign the responsibility for arranging access to a physician. The governor of the 
penal institution is responsible for the detainee’s access to a physician, though not 
for the manner in which the medical service performs its duties.375 The physician 
is responsible for his medical conduct and the medical services operates under 
372. National Health Council 2013, pp. 12-14, 51, 54, 71, 74, 76, 79.
373. Forensic Medical Society 2017.
374. See, for example, Health Care Inspectorate 2014 (Judicial Medical Centre Scheveningen), 
pp. 5, 11-12.
375. BrC 17/03/2009 – 08/3236/GA. See also: BrC 06/07/2007 – 06/0566/GM. BrC 
18/02/2000 – A 99/431/GA, A 99/1345/GA, A 99/670/GA and A 99/671/GA. See about the 
responsibility of the institution’s governor for the detainee’s access to the medical service: BrC 
30/11/2006 – 06/2082/GA.
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that responsibility.376 This means that the governor must arrange that a detainee 
has sufficient access to the medical service (i.e. in principle the nurse),377 for ex-
ample by ensuring that requests for a consult with a physician will actually reach 
the medical service.378 A system to contact the medical service, for example us-
ing notes for the request to consult a physician, must be in force.379 Whether the 
detainee will be referred to a physician by a nurse is not the responsibility of the 
governor considering the medical nature of this conduct.380 The governor does 
not have the authority to interfere in the decision whether the detainee should be 
provided with any healthcare, nor in informing the detainee about his health con-
dition.381 Nevertheless, the Appeal Commission seems to expect that the governor 
demands an explanation for the fact that a detainee is not referred to a physician, 
despite several requests to that end.382 The legislator has emphasised that the gov-
ernor of the penal institution has no authority over health care providers (such 
as the physician, nurse, psychologist etcetera) as far as their professional conduct 
concerns. The governor may however give directions with regard to his statutory 
obligations and with regard to the general course of events in the institution.383 
The Health Care Inspectorate stresses that medical advice needs to be followed 
by non-medically trained personnel, including the governor. If not, this is con-
sidered to be a high risk.384 Kelk has rightly emphasised in this regard that when 
the rights of detainees come into play, the governor of the institution has final 
responsibility, even if this concerns the manner in which the medical service func-
tions. If things (threaten to) go wrong, the governor must take action.385 In 2009, 
the Health Care Inspectorate concluded that the manner in which the position 
376. BrC 18/03/1986 – SG-A 241/85, PI 1986/57. See also: Kelk (edited by Boone) 2015, 
§5.2.1.2.
377. BrC 21/12/2010 – 10/2314/GA.
378. BrC 15/12/2006 – 06/2196/GA. BrC 19/12/2013 – 13/3063/GM.
379. BrC 27/09/2004 – 04/0696/GM.
380. BrC 21/12/2010 – 10/2314/GA. See about assigning responsibilities between the governor 
and the physician also: BrC 19/05/1988 – no. SG-A 160/87, PI 1988/70. BrC 14/10/2010 – 
10/1510/GA. Medical conduct of the institution’s physician or other health care providers involved 
in the care for detainees is governed by the medical complaints procedure. Art. 28 §1 Prison Rules. 
The Hospital Orders (Framework) Act and the Psychiatric Hospitals (Compulsory Admissions) Act 
do not contain a special complaints procedure for medical conduct.
381. BrC 19 May 1988 – no. SG-A 160/87, PI 1988/70, pp. 143-146.
382. BrC 26/06/2009 – 08/3263/GA.
383. Kamerstukken II 1994/95, 24 263, no. 3, p. 21. See about the professional responsibility of 
individual care providers also: Kamerstukken II 1995/96, 24 263, no. 6, p. 16. Kamerstukken II 
1995/96, 24 263, no. 5, p. 15. See also: BrC 21/05/1980 – SG-A 109/79, PI 1980/74. Bleichrodt 
and Vegter 2016, pp. 239-240.
384. Health Care Inspectorate 2011 (Achterhoek, Zutphen), p. 10. 
385. Kelk (edited by Boone) 2015, §5.2.1.2.
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of head medical service was filled in diverged from a working foreman to a posi-
tion where responsibility for the complete healthcare was implicated. In view of 
the Inspectorate, the head medical service should be responsible for the quality of 
healthcare pursuant to the Care Institutions (Quality) Act.386 The head medical 
service should be responsible for the manner in which the physician functions, 
though the physician retains his professional responsibility. This means that the 
head medical service is in the position to address the physician on his function-
ing.387 Physicians should be sufficiently involved in the organisational aspects of 
healthcare in the penal institution, such as discussing and setting up policy and 
protocols with regard to the manner in which nurses implement referral to a phy-
sician. Necessary in this regard is structural consultation between physicians and 
nurses. If multiple physicians work in the medical service of a penal institution, 
one physician should be assigned to develop policy on medical quality.388 
The responsibilities of the diverging health care providers should also be clearly 
assigned and defined with regard to the actual content of healthcare.389 The phy-
sician has final responsibility for the medical policy.390 The Appeal Commission 
furthermore stresses that the professional conduct of nurses falls under the respon-
sibility of the physician,391 which is in my opinion a too far-reaching view. A nurse 
has his own professional responsibility, though may have to follow the instructions 
given by the physician. The physician should supervise whether these instructions 
are actually followed. Furthermore, the physician of the penal institution can 
often be regarded as head practitioner, which means that he coordinates all pro-
vided treatment (next to the treatment he himself provides) and he is the patient’s 
contact person.392 If the physician can be regarded as head practitioner, he has 
final responsibility for the treatment of the detainee.393 The psychiatrist is how-
386. At present: Healthcare Quality, Complaints and Disputes Act.
387. Health Care Inspectorate 2009, pp. 27, 36. See with regard to the physician’s own 
responsibility for example CTG 31 March 2015, ECLI:NL:TGZCTG:2015:116: physician 
acted correctly by adjusting medication according to guidelines without further inquiries as the 
prescribed dose was too high. 
388. Health Care Inspectorate 2009, pp. 26, 35. See about the physician’s co-responsibility for the 
organisation of the medical service and the manner in which access to the physician is guaranteed 
also: BrC 18/01/2000 – A 99/0564/GM A. BrC 27/09/1999 – 99/0626/GM A. 
389. Health Care Inspectorate 1999, p. 67. See with regard to healthcare provided to persons 
detained by the police: Inspectorate Security and Justice and Health Care Inspectorate 2014, p. 23.
390. Health Care Inspectorate 1999, p. 66.
391. BrC 08/02/2007 – 06/2495/GM. De Jonge and Cremers 2008, p. 182.
392. CTG 1 April 2008, no. 2007/037. Leenen, Dute and Kastelein 2008, pp. 74-75. The 
position of the psychologist as first or second line care provider was not always clear. Health Care 
Inspectorate 2011 (Breda), p. 9. 
393. BrC 23/09/2013 – 13/1969/GM. 
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ever responsible for the medication he prescribes to a detainee.394 Furthermore, 
medication prescribed by a medical specialist always prevails over the medication 
prescribed by the general practitioner.395 Whether a physician can be regarded 
as head practitioner will depend on the circumstances of the case. If psychiatric 
problems are the main health problem, the psychiatrist can be regarded as head 
practitioner instead of the physician. Noteworthy is that treatment co-ordinators 
are active in Penal Psychiatric Centres,396 for example a health psychologist. The 
Royal Dutch Medical Association has also drawn up rules of thumb on assigning 
responsibilities in case of cooperating health care providers.397 In view of the Cen-
tral Disciplinary Committee for the Health Care Sector, a locum has a different 
position (and therefore responsibilities) than the physician of the institution, for 
example in relation to the monitoring of the effects of prescribed medication and 
inquiring about the findings of a medical specialist who examined the patient in 
question.398
5.4.4. Continuity of healthcare
In correspondence with the principles arising from the ECtHR’s case law,399 the 
Health Care Inspectorate requires that continuity of healthcare is guaranteed be-
fore, during and after deprivation of liberty.400 That healthcare during deprivation 
of liberty must be guaranteed without interruptions is also emphasised in Dutch 
disciplinary case law. The disciplinary tribunal stresses that if a detainee needs to 
be transferred to a health care facility because of his need for nursing care, the phy-
sician must make sure that the detainee is actually transferred if no nursing staff 
are present during the night and only supervision and support by non-medically 
trained personnel is possible. The disciplinary rules will otherwise be breached.401 
394. BrC 06/09/2012 – 12/1817/GM.
395. Handelingen II 1996/95, 68, 4891. 
396. Custodial Institutions Agency 2012. 
397. Royal Dutch Medical Association et al 2010.
398. CTG 11 May 2006, no. 2005.0113, §4.2.
399. ECtHR 12 January 2016, no. 2763/13, §73 (Khayletdinov v. Russia).
400. Health Care Inspectorate 2009, pp. 25-26. See also: RTG Amsterdam 5 August 2014, 
ECLI:NL:TGZRAMS:2014:77; ECLI:NL:TGZRAMS:2014:78; ECLI:NL:TGZRAMS:2014:79; 
ECLI:NL:TGZRAMS:2014:80. BrC 16/10/2012 – 12/2470/GM: medication prescribed by 
psychiatrist in former institution was, in view of continuity of care, continued in the receiving 
institution after the detainee’s transfer.
401. CTG 11 May 2006, no. 2005.0113. See also section 5.4.3. for the responsibilities of the 
physician and the penal institution’s governor on this matter. See furthermore RTG Amsterdam 1 
February 2005, no. 03254vp; no. 03255vp, for the judgments concerning the nurses in question. 
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The Appeal Commission also requires that the physician takes sufficient action to 
ensure that a necessary operation can be performed.402
Second-line healthcare must be sufficiently available and accessible during 
deprivation of liberty. In 2009, the Inspectorate observed that this requirement 
was fulfilled in penal institutions.403 It is also expected that a referral to a medical 
specialist must take place promptly.404 If a detainee is admitted to a general hospi-
tal, the penal institution of origin should follow the course of treatment provided 
in that hospital. The medical service is the contact point for any special circum-
stances or incidents.405 If a detainee is treated by a medical specialist, the medical 
service of the penal institution should keep itself informed and should see to it 
that the necessary checks/appointments will actually take place.406 
Several legal safeguards are developed to ensure continuity of care during trans-
port of detainees. In case of a medical emergency, the transporting officer must 
drive to a physician or hospital. The vehicle is not to be opened before sufficient 
assistance is present, unless medical assistance is urgently necessary.407 If necessary 
from a medical point of view, a nurse or other employee of the institution may 
accompany the detainee when he is transported to receive medical treatment or 
examination elsewhere.408 The person who transports the detainee needs to take 
special measures if necessary in view of the physical or mental condition of the 
detainee.409 The governor of the penal institution must arrange that the required 
and prescribed medication is sent with the detainee and that the transporting 
officer is given instructions on how the medication should be handed out. The 
transporting officer is in charge of the medication and must provide the detainee 
the medication according to the given instruction.410 A report on the transport 
See also De Jonge and Knol 2001: continuity of mental healthcare is often hampered due to penal 
decisions, such as sanctions, transfers and unexpected releases from detention.
402. BrC 05/07/2010 – 10/1216/GM.
403. Health Care Inspectorate 2009, pp. 15, 25, 34.
404. RTG Groningen 18 August 2009, no. 2008/42. BrC 11/08/2015 – 15/1645/GM: 
insufficiently prompt reaction is in breach of norm laid down in art. 28 Prison Rules.
405. Art. 33 §4 Regulation on selection, placement and transfer of detainees.
406. RTG Eindhoven 26 February 2009, no. 2008/60. 
407. Art. 8 §§1-2 Rules on transport of detainees. This provision applies to detainees held in penal 
institutions and on persons deprived of their liberty pursuant to a hospital order with compulsory 
treatment. Art. 1, section a Rules on transport of detainees. See also art. 20 §4 Instruction on the 
transport of detainees by the Service Transport & Support.
408. Art. 20 Rules on the transport of detainees.
409. Art. 21 Rules on the transport of detainees.
410. Art. 15 §§1-2 Rules on transport of detainees. Art. 15 §2 Instruction on the transport of 
detainees by the Service Transport & Support assigns the officer who leads the transport (instead 
of the transporting officer) as the person who should receive the medication and who should be 
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of detainees (2006) showed that transporting officers were often not informed of 
the medical condition of a detainee. Medical information, including the use of 
medication, was not or hardly provided by the penal institution with reference to 
the detainee’s privacy.411
A detainee held in a penal institution has the right to consult a physician of his 
own choice at his own expense,412 including medical specialists.413 The right to 
consult a physician of one’s own choice does not include the right to receive treat-
ment by that physician,414 unless an appointment with a medical specialist for 
further treatment is already made prior to the start of the deprivation of liberty.415 
The physician of the penal institution may however decide to interrupt this if this 
consult is in his view no longer immediately necessary.416 The legislator was of the 
opinion that it would be incompatible with the right course of events in the insti-
tution if a physician unconnected to the institution would thwart the treatment 
plan of the institution’s physician.417 The relevance of this provision lies in prac-
tice mainly in the field of primary healthcare, provided by the physician of the 
institution, and the secondary healthcare provided by the psychiatrist. The reason 
to restrict the free choice of physician, namely to prevent that treatment provided 
by the physician of the institution would be thwarted by a third physician, does 
after all not apply to treatment provided by medical specialists as this treatment 
informed about the manner in which the medication should be handed over to the detainee. See 
furthermore: art. 35 Official Instructions for the Police.
411. Inspectorate on the Enforcement of Sanctions 2006, p. 22.
412. Art. 42 §2 Custodial Institutions (Framework) Act. The right to consult the own physician 
by telephone should not be restricted to the regular moments the detainees are allowed to make 
a phone call. The moment of the consult should be arranged by mutual agreement between the 
governor and the physician in question. BrC 21/12/2010 –  10/1913/GA. Art. 41 §2 Hospital 
Orders (Framework) Act.
413. Kamerstukken II 1994/95, 24 263, no. 3, p. 62. BrC 25/05/2004 – 04/0156/GM.
414. BrC 23/09/2013 – 13/1969/GM. CTG 7 June 2012, ECLI:NL:TGZCTG:2012:YG2102. 
See also: BrC 15/07/2003 – 02/1447/GM. BrC 25/05/2004 – 04/0156/GM. See also: Sluiter 
1993. See with regard to the case law under the Principles Act Prison System: BrC 25/07/1983 – 
SG-A 62/83, PI 1984/6. Detainees should however, as in free society, be offered the opportunity 
to receive an influenza vaccination at their own expense. BrC 25/05/2000 – 00/0445/GM. See 
also BrC 17/03/2015 – 14/4765/GM: the detainee should have been given the opportunity to 
receive the preferred orthodontic treatment at his own expense. BrC 25/07/2002  – 02/0290/GM. 
BrC 11/06/2013 – 13/1058/GM. See also BrC 07/10/2003 – 03/1420/GM: possibility to obtain 
homoeopathic substances. 
415. BrC 11/12/2001 – 01/1685/GM. 
416. BrC 11/06/2002 – 01/1776/GM. The physician has the freedom to make his own assessment 
on whether it is necessary to refer a detainee. BrC 13/05/2011 – 11/0397/GM.
417. Kamerstukken II 1994-1995, 24 263, no. 3, p. 62-63. Kamerstukken II 1995/96, 24 263, 
no. 6, p. 32. See also: De Jonge and Cremers, pp. 176-177.
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will normally not be provided by the institution’s physician. The legislator has 
stated that medical specialists are only accessible by a referral of the institution’s 
physician or by a referral of a physician of the detainee’s own choice.418 In view 
of the Appeal Commission, a detainee has in principle the freedom to choose a 
medical specialist, though this freedom may be restricted due to the deprivation 
of liberty. If it is not necessary to refer the detainee to the specialist of the detain-
ee’s own choice, the detainee may be referred to another specialist.419 The Appeal 
Commission did not clearly state who decides about the necessity to consult the 
specialist of the detainee’s own choice. Medical necessity should in my view always 
be determined by a physician as this falls within the physician’s field of expertise. 
Practice furthermore shows that penal institutions often work together with a lo-
cal hospital,420 which may restrict the detainee’s choice of medical specialist. The 
detainee’s wish to consult a specialist practising in a hospital situated far away 
from the penal institution may be refused considering the expenses involved. The 
current legislation leaves therefore room for the governor to overrule the physi-
cian’s/detainee’s choice of specialist.421 The Custodial Institutions (Framework) 
Act does not regulate whether the detainee has the freedom to choose a psycholo-
gist. In the explanatory memorandum it is stated that the right to receive social 
care and guidance includes the activities of a psychologist who is, in most cases, 
connected to the penal institution. The psychologist is not part of the medical 
staff; he provides social care and assistance.422 Article 42 §2 Custodial Institutions 
(Framework) Act is therefore not applicable which means in view of the Appeal 
Commission that a detainee does not have the right to consult a psychologist of 
his own choice.423 Though the ECtHR’s case law does not provide any principles 
on this matter, the soft law does contain standards regarding this subject. The 
foregoing shows that Dutch law does not contain the right to be treated by a phy-
sician of a detainee’s own choice, a standard which has been formulated by the 
Committee of Ministers for remand prisoners (provided that it is necessary and 
at their own expense).424 Dutch law also does not make the distinction between 
418. Handelingen II 1996/95, 68, 4891.
419. BrC 16/11/2007 – 07/1570/GM. See also: BrC 08/03/2007 – 06/3131/GM.
420. Roeleveld-Kuijper and Lohmann 2014.
421. See for example: BrC 14/07/2008 – 08/0561/TA.
422. Art. 43 Custodial Institutions (Framework) Act. Kamerstukken II 1994/95, 24 263, no. 3, 
p. 63. See also art. 43 §1 Hospital Orders (Framework) Act, though this provision explicitly refers 
to the treatment provided to the detainee in view of the hospital order.
423. BrC 18/07/2002 – 02/0186/GA.
424. Recommendation Rec (2006)13, 37.2.
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remand or sentenced prisoners, as has been made in soft law. This distinction has 
not been made by the ECtHR.
Police custody officers are obliged to call the detainee’s own physician if re-
quested by that detainee.425 The detainee has the right to be visited, examined 
and treated by this physician,426 which corresponds with the CPT Standards.427 
However, the CPT observed in 2011 and 2016 that police officers in several of the 
visited Dutch police establishments seemed to be unaware of this right.428 The fact 
that the detainee’s own physician has its practice elsewhere or is otherwise una-
ble to visit the detainee may pose practical obstacles to meet the right to consult 
one’s own physician. In these cases, the physician in attendance, i.e. the forensic 
physician, needs to be notified. According to the explanatory memorandum, this 
physician will act as advisory physician.429 This physician is in my view directly 
involved in the medical treatment of the patient and should not be regarded as 
advisory physician. The relevance of this distinction lies mainly in the duty of 
medical confidentiality, which fully applies if the physician is involved as attend-
ing physician.430 
5.4.5. (Medical) record and transfer of information
Content (medical) record
Health care providers who attend detainees are bound by the Medical Treat-
ment Contracts Act, which obliges health care providers to keep a medical record 
with regard to the treatment of the patient. This obligation corresponds with the 
requirement arising from the ECtHR’s case law.431 The Medical Treatment Con-
tracts Act requires that the health care provider keeps record of the health of the 
patient and the performed actions. Documents containing such data must be 
included in the medical record if necessary to provide adequate healthcare. The 
data retention requirement is 15 years or longer if reasonably necessary in view of 
the requirement to provide adequate healthcare.432 The disciplinary tribunals em-
425. Art. 32 §2 Official Instructions for the Police.
426. Explanatory memorandum, Stb. 1994, 275. 
427. CPT/Inf/E (2002) 1 – Rev. 2015, CPT Standards, p. 11.
428. CPT/Inf (2012)21, Netherlands, p. 18. CPT/Inf (2017) 1 – Netherlands, p. 17.
429. Explanatory memorandum, Stb. 1994, 275. 
430. See also section 5.4.2.
431. ECtHR 14 December 2006, no. 4353/03, §§76, 67 (Tarariyeva v. Russia).
432. Art. 454 Medical Treatment Contracts Act. Art. 455 Medical Treatment Contracts Act 
determines that the health care provider must destroy medical data within three months after a 
request to that end is made by the patient, unless there exists a substantial interest for another 
person to keep the data or there exists a legal provision that prohibits destruction of the data. See 
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phasise the importance of a sufficient complete medical file;433 it should contain 
notes regarding intended steps,434 must be held up to date on a systematic basis 
and must be detailed, such as a motivation for the decisions taken, differential 
diagnosis, notes on the information exchanged during a change of shift, notes 
regarding the communication with the patient/next of kin on intended steps/de-
cisions and changed or advanced perspectives. The health care provider’s thoughts 
should be clear by reading the medical file. This serves continuity and quality of 
care. Furthermore, it has also been stressed that deficient medical files hinder peer 
assessment of medical conduct. A comprehensive and adequate medical file also 
serves reflection on the care provider’s own medical conduct. Adequate recording 
is especially of importance when treatment options are limited and palliative care 
comes into play.435
The Custodial Institutions Agency explicitly refers to436 the guideline of the 
Dutch Society for family doctors on adequate record keeping in an electronic 
patient file.437 The Agency has also developed a guideline for the head medical 
service on how to ensure adequate registration of somatic care in patient files of 
detainees. It provides guidelines relating to four areas: completeness and accuracy 
of the detainee’s medical history, a structured method of recording, completeness 
and accuracy of medication, and how to guard contraindications regarding med-
ication.438 Several safeguards to fulfil the requirements arising from the ECtHR’s 
case law regarding the content of a medical file can furthermore be found in the 
standards of the Health Care Inspectorate and the disciplinary tribunals. The ob-
ligation to keep a medical file for every detainee cannot be eased by an agreement 
between a health care provider and the Custodial Institutions Agency. This means 
that the care provider is nevertheless obliged to meet the minimum norm, i.e. to 
record which treatment is provided and why.439 It has even been emphasised that, 
also: BrC 03/03/2004 – 03/2794/GM. Art. 456 Medical Treatment Contracts Act contains the 
right to consult the medical file and to receive a copy. See also: BrC 26/10/2004 – 04/1667/GA 
and 04/1856/GA.
433. RTG Eindhoven 23 October 2014, ECLI:NL:TGZREIN:2014:86. See also: RTG 
‘s-Gravenhage 28 October 2014, ECLI:NL:TGZRSGR:2014:100, §5.7. CTG 5 March 2015, 
ECLI:NL:TGZCTG:2015:79, §4.9 and ECLI:NL:TGZCTG:2015:80, §4.9. RTG Eindhoven 28 
December 2009, no. 09/165. RTG Groningen 28 January 2014, ECLI:NL:TGZRGRO:2014:2, 
§5.5. RTG Eindhoven 21 October 2013, ECLI:NL:TGZREIN:2013:30. See also BrC 14/11/2005 
– 05/1476/GM: inaccurate record keeping.
434. RTG Eindhoven 23 October 2014, ECLI:NL:TGZREIN:2014:86.
435. RTG ‘s-Gravenhage 28 October 2014, ECLI:NL:TGZRSGR:2014:100, §§5.8-5.11.
436. Custodial Institutions Agency 2016e.
437. Dutch College of General Practitioners 2013.
438. Custodial Institutions Agency 2015c.
439. CTG 12 August 2014, ECLI:NL:TGZCTG:2014:300, §§4.3.-4.5.
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considering the context, more stringent requirements may be set regarding the 
medical file of a detainee.440 The Health Care Inspectorate emphasises that the 
population in penal institutions differs substantially from the population in free 
society. Differences in language and culture may exist and the frequency of addic-
tions and psychiatric problems is relatively high amongst detainees. Furthermore, 
the population changes frequently and the care is provided by multiple health care 
providers. Therefore, high demands must be set with regard to the medical file 
and the transfer of information. Locums and psychiatrists must have access to the 
medical file, including the problem list and current medication. Registration of 
prescribed medication in the medical file is of importance to observe contraindi-
cations. Problem list441 and current medication must be registered in the medical 
file and must be kept up to date.442 The Appeal Commission found it also ad-
visable to register whether medication is actually handed over to the detainee.443 
Details on who decided to discontinue the supply of medication and why must be 
recorded in the medical file,444 just as the guidance of, and the medical examina-
tions performed during a hunger/thirst strike,445 the fact that the detainee had no 
complaints,446 or peculiarities after an examination. By doing so, other involved 
health care providers can gain insight into the performed examinations.447 Every 
contact between the medical service of the penal institution and a detainee must 
be recorded to enable an assessment of the medical conduct later on and (if nec-
essary) to authorise it.448 This includes in my view the screening on admission, 
which corresponds with the Standards set by the CPT.449 Notes must be dated, 
and it must be clear which professional made the note.450 Making a ‘mental note’ 
regarding steps that need to be taken is insufficient,451 though a health care 
provider does not need to put personal notes regarding a patient in the med-
ical file.452 Personal notes are reminders which serve the health care provider’s 
440. MT Amsterdam 23 September 1991, TvGR 1992/25. 
441. A problem list is a summary of the core health problems of the patient in question. See also 
Duijst et al 2012, p. 77.
442. Health Care Inspectorate 2009, pp. 11, 15-16, 26, 35. 
443. BrC 03/06/2002 – 02/0106/GM.
444. BrC 26/04/2012 – 12/0379/GM.
445. BrC 20/12/2013 – 13/2924/GM.
446. Health Care Inspectorate 1999, pp. 40, 68.
447. RTG Amsterdam 15 June 2010, ECLI:NL:TGZRAMS:2010:YG0507, §5.4.
448. BrC 09/10/2002 – 01/2152/GM.
449. CPT/Inf (96)27, Aruba, pp. 37-38.
450. Health Care Inspectorate 1999, pp. 39-40, 68. BrC 07/03/2005 – 04/2831/GM.
451. RTG Eindhoven 23 October 2014, ECLI:NL:TGZREIN:2014:86.
452. BrC 26/10/2004 – 04/1667/GA and 04/1856/GA.
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thoughts, including suspicions and questions.453 The health care provider must 
refrain from making subjective notes in the medical file; information must be re-
corded objectively (facts).454 
The Committee van Dinter concluded in 1995 that several systems were used 
to document medical, psychiatric and psychological information about persons 
detained in penal institutions.455 Duijst et al observed with regard to case files 
of detainees who committed suicide in the period 2005-2010 that psychological 
information was recorded in diverging systems, including separate word-office 
computer files. They stressed that the latter are not by definition accessible for 
other involved care providers.456 The disciplinary tribunals also made a criti-
cal comment on the manner in which the medical files of detainees in penal 
institutions were kept. Diverging disciplines, such as the physician, nurse and 
psychologist, made notes in one and the same medical file and had access to all 
the information included in that file. The Central Disciplinary Committee for 
the Health Care Sector considered this approach undesirable and incorrect; only 
directly involved care providers, such as the physician’s assistants and locums need 
to have access to this information. Others should only have access to the physi-
cian’s medical file with the patient’s consent.457 This is a different approach than 
the approach of the CPT, who recommended the introduction of a comprehen-
sive medical file instead of the diverging files kept by the psychiatrist, nurses and 
physician.458 At present, the medical service of penal institutions record medical 
data in Microhis, a digital system.459 Duwar is the archive function of the medical 
file in the diverging penal institutions; it contains the letters of medical specialists, 
lab results etcetera. If a detainee is transferred from one institution to another, 
Microhis is closed in the sending institution and Duwar is accessible for the med-
ical service of the receiving institution, though the receiving institution can open 
Duwar only after 24 hours. Therefore, a medical transfer or a print of Micro-
his is necessary to ensure continuity of care. Furthermore, psychologists have an 
own electronic file, the Information System Psychologists (ISP). Psychiatrists have 
453. Stolker 2015, p. 621.
454. Subjective notes are for example: “en nu natuurlijk weer keelpijn (..)” (“and now, of course 
again, a sore throat”). RTG Groningen 18 August 2009, no. 2008/42, §4.9.
455. Committee van Dinter 1995, p. 16.
456. Duijst et al 2012, pp. 77-78.
457. RTG Zwolle 7 August 2008, no. 017/2007. CTG 12 November 2009, no. 2008/253 and 
2008/254.
458. CPT/Inf (2008) 2, Kingdom in Europe, Aruba, and the Netherlands Antilles, p. 43.
459. Custodial Institutions Agency 2016d. Health Care Inspectorate 2009. 
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access to Microhis (when authorised). This does not apply to psychologists.460 
The Judicial Centre for Somatic Care does not use a digital medical file, but uses 
handwritten and multiple files (nursing and medical file). There is a digital psy-
chological file and the psychiatrist also records the information digitally.461
Several reports showed that the registration in medical records within penal 
institutions required attention. In 1995, the Committee van Dinter observed that 
it was not always recorded why a particular kind of medication was prescribed.462 
The Health Care Inspectorate noted in 2009 that the electronic medical file was 
not sufficiently used. Problem list and current medication were not always regis-
tered and the medical file was not always accessible for locums and psychiatrists 
during the evening, night and weekend. Risks regarding contraindications were 
seen as prescribed medication was not always recorded in the electronic file.463 
Duijst et al concluded over the period 2005-2010 that notes in the medical file 
were not accompanied by name and profession of the person who made the 
note,464 which was also observed by the Committee van Dinter in 1995465 and by 
the Health Care Inspectorate in 1999.466 Duijst et al also observed that, although 
a structured method467 was used to record medical data in the medical file, the 
evaluation of the subjective and objective findings was often missing. The problem 
list was missing in over 80% of the cases.468 In 2013, the Health Care Inspectorate 
concluded that medical files in the Judicial Medical Centre (at present the Judicial 
Centre for Somatic Care) were kept fragmented, incomplete and slovenly, though 
in 2014 improvements were observed in this regard.469 The CPT observed in 2016 
that the medical files in the visited establishments were generally well-kept.470
460. National ombudsman 2012, p. 37. Duwar also does not contain all available data. The 
Health Care Inspectorate observed in Forensic Psychiatric Centres that psychiatrists did not have 
access to Microhis. Health Care Inspectorate 2009c, p. 30.
461. Penal institution Haaglanden 2013, pp. 6, 15-16.
462. Committee van Dinter 1995, p. 17.
463. Health Care Inspectorate 2009, pp. 16, 26, 32.
464. Duijst et al 2012, p. 77.
465. Committee van Dinter 1995, pp. 16-17.
466. Health Care Inspectorate 1999, pp. 39-40. 
467. SOEP-method: Subjective (Subjectief), Objective (Objectief), Evaluation (Evaluatie) and 
Plan (Plan). See also Dutch College of General Practitioners 2013, pp. 20-21.
468. Duijst et al 2012, p. 77. Thoonen and Duijst 2014c, p. 141. See also Health Care 
Inspectorate 2010 (Torentijd, Middelburg), pp. 13-14; 2010 (Achterhoek, Zutphen), pp. 12-13.
469. Health Care Inspectorate 2014 (Judicial Medical Centre Scheveningen), pp. 12-14. See with 
regard to penal institution Vught: Inspectorate Security and Justice and Health Care Inspectorate 
2013 (Vught), pp. 18-20, 23.
470. CPT/Inf (2017) 1 – Netherlands, p. 29.
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With regard to the content of the medical file regarding a person deprived of his 
liberty by the police, the Health Care Inspectorate has stressed that cooperating 
health care providers preferably use an integrated record, which can be consulted 
and supplemented by all health care providers involved. If no such integrated 
record is used, health care providers must arrange that relevant data can be ob-
tained from the record.471 The Forensic Medical Association has also formulated 
guidelines on the manner in which physicians should keep medical records. The 
medical record must be filled in, kept and stored according to local agreements. 
The forensic physician must give a written explanation and instructions to the po-
lice custody officers about the care for the detainee. The manner in which these 
instructions should be given is arranged locally and may therefore diverge.472 The 
Health Care Inspectorate also expects the physician to provide a written explana-
tion and instruction regarding the treatment of the detainee and the medication 
directions. The physician must clearly specify how often the detainee must be 
supervised and/or what his advice to the police custody officers contains.473 The 
Inspectorate Security and Justice observed a risk regarding handwritten instruc-
tions (which need to be taken over by police custody officers), for example when 
mistakes are made when copying these instructions into a digital system.474
Dutch penal law also contains provisions on documenting,475 including regarding 
the medical file. The results of, and agreements made, during multidisciplinary 
meetings between the psychiatrist, physician, psychologist and nurse must be re-
corded in the medical file.476 There are also special provisions on recording for 
situations where detainees are treated under duress.477 The physician, or under his 
authority the nurse, must visit the detainee as often as necessary during the period 
that forced medical treatment is administered and the observations of these visits 
need to be recorded in the medical file.478 The physician of the penal institution 
should furthermore document in the medical record his findings regarding his 
monitoring duties, for instance when a detainee is segregated, provided that no 
471. Inspectorate Security and Justice and Health Care Inspectorate 2014, p. 21.
472. Forensic Medical Society and Dutch Association of Community Health Services 2013; 
2011b; 2012.
473. Inspectorate Security and Justice and Health Care Inspectorate 2014, p. 22.
474. Inspectorate Security and Justice, Health Care Inspectorate and Inspectorate for Youth Care 
2015, pp. 15-16. 
475. Art. 59 Custodial Institutions (Framework) Act. Art. 19 Hospital Orders (Framework) Act.
476. Art. 21a §4 Prison Rules. This requirement is not laid down in the Hospital Orders 
(Framework) Act, nor in the Psychiatric Hospitals (Compulsory Admissions) Act.
477. See furthermore section 5.5.1.
478. Art. 22d Prison Rules. Art. 34c Hospital Orders (Framework) Act determines that the 
observations must be recorded in the Hospital Orders Patient File.
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specific penal rules are applicable.479 The governor must ensure that the specific 
situation is taken into account when recording about the detainee’s stay in an iso-
lation or punishment cell.480 The penal institution must also start a penal record 
for every detainee (including those attending a penal program).481 Every penal 
institution must also start and keep a record regarding the stay in each individual 
institution.482 Reports on special events and internal reports need to be included 
in the penal file, just as summaries of meetings in which the individual detainee is 
discussed and the penal institution’s correspondence about the detainee.483 
Provisions on documenting are also developed for deprivation of liberty by the 
police. Police custody officers must record all observations during police custo-
dy,484 regarding applied camera surveillance,485 and the instructions that are given 
by the (forensic) physician about the care for the detainee’s health.486 It must be 
registered that a detainee uses medication, just like the moments that medica-
tion is given to the detainee and the detainee is checked during the night.487 The 
National regulations on the care for police custody detainees, issued in 2016, pre-
scribe that the detainee’s request for a consult with a physician, the consultation 
with the physician and the physician’s visit should be recorded.488 In addition, the 
Inspectorate Security and Justice expects details regarding the physical and mental 
condition of detainees to be recorded, just as details regarding the approachability 
of the detainee.489
Information about persons deprived of their liberty by the police is registered 
in a digital system (Basis Voorziening Handhaving, BVH) specifically designed to 
record about the care for detainees. The Inspectorates have observed that the reg-
istration by police custody officers is limited; they mainly record practical events, 
479. Decree of 13 March 2000, Stb. 2000, 121, p. 8. 
480. Art. 10 Rules punishment and isolation cell penal institutions. No such requirements are 
laid down in the Hospital Orders (Framework) Act.
481. Art. 35 Prison Rules. A separate patient file must also be kept pursuant to art. 19 Hospital 
Orders (Framework) Act in connection with arts. 29-32 Hospital Orders (Care) Regulations. Art. 
51 §3 in connection with art. 56 and art. 37a Psychiatric Hospitals (Compulsory Admissions) 
Act. Decree patient files Psychiatric Hospitals (Compulsory Admissions). See also: Kelk (edited by 
Boone) 2015, §§6.14.1-6.14.2.
482. Art. 37 §2 Prison Rules.
483. Art. 37 §1, section f, h, j Prison Rules.
484. Art. 34 §3 Official Instructions for the Police.
485. Art. 31 §3 Official Instructions for the Police.
486. Art. 33 Official Instructions for the Police.
487. Art. 12 §1, section h and j Rules police custody suite.
488. National Police 2016, p. 12. See also Inspectorate Security and Justice and Health Care 
Inspectorate 2014, p. 22.
489. Inspectorate Security and Justice and Health Care Inspectorate 2014, p. 12.
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for example whether food and liquids have been offered. Information concerning 
the detainee’s behaviour is often not recorded. Whether the detainee has asked 
for a physician or has been visited by a physician is not always recorded.490 Not 
recording peculiarities that are observed regarding a detainee can be regarded as 
a risk for the detainee’s health and life if these observations are not otherwise 
exchanged, both within the same facility (during a change of shift) and to the re-
ceiving facility in case of a transfer. 
Transfer of information
The Medical Treatment Contracts Act determines that medical data must be kept 
confidential. This duty of medical confidentiality does not apply towards health 
care providers directly involved in the medical treatment (agreement) or to lo-
cums. The health care provider may share information with these directly involved 
health care providers if necessary to perform their tasks.491 Consent of the patient 
is in these cases assumed,492 though the patient may object to this exchange of 
information.493 Directly involved health care providers are for instance doctor’s 
assistants,494 dieticians,495 or medical specialists to whom a patient is referred by 
the general practitioner.496 Article 455 of the Medical Treatment Contracts Act 
contains the right of the patient to ask for destruction of his medical record. Such 
a request may only be refused in view of another person’s interests or if a legal 
provision opposes to the destruction of the medical record. The Custodial Institu-
tions (Framework) Act does not contain a provision that excludes the applicability 
of these rights during deprivation of liberty in a penal institution, which means 
490. Inspectorate Security and Justice, Health Care Inspectorate and Inspectorate for Youth Care 
2015, p. 13.
491. Art. 457 §§1-2 Medical Treatment Contracts Act. See also: Inspectorate Security and Justice 
and Health Care Inspectorate 2014, p. 22. Royal Dutch Medical Association 2010b. Nature and 
extent of the data required depends on the tasks these persons have to perform. Noteworthy is 
that art. 5 Decree patient files Psychiatric Hospitals (Compulsory Admissions) determines that 
information laid down pursuant to art. 2 of this Decree can be transferred to the next health care 
provider involved in the treatment without the patient’s consent.
492. Kamerstukken II 1990/91, 21 561, no. 6, p. 39.
493. Appendix I, Letter Minister of Health, Welfare and Sport, 15 June 2016, 
964183-150018-MEVA. Royal Dutch Medical Association 2010b. The Dutch Safety Board stated 
that the possibilities to share data in case of a transfer from a police cell to a Detention and Removal 
Centre were not clear. Dutch Safety Board 2014, pp. 54-56, 115. See for the State Secretary’s 
response: Kamerstukken II 2014/15, 19 637, no. 1947, p. 2.
494. Kamerstukken II 1989/90, 21 561, no. 3, p. 39.
495. Kamerstukken II 1990/91, 21 561, no. 6, p. 39.
496. Leenen et al 2014, pp. 142-143.
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that these rights remain in force when the patient is deprived of his liberty.497 
Nevertheless, Article 464 Medical Treatment Contracts Act, which is according 
to the legislator the basis for the applicability of this Act during State custody, 
determines that this Act is applicable as far as the legal relationship permits. This 
construction may lead to discussions regarding the applicability of this Act, in-
cluding the right laid down in Article 455, which diminishes legal certainty. In 
my view, deviations from the Medical Treatment Contracts Act should be clearly 
laid down in law as the provision of Article 464 may bring along the risk of 
arbitrariness. 
The medical file of a person held in a penal institution should contain all 
relevant information regarding the detainee and should in principle include in-
formation of a detainee’s stay in other institutions. The medical service is however 
not obliged to include all medical information from other institutions; it may 
weigh the pros and cons of including information.498 Relevant data regarding 
the medical history of a detainee needs to be collected as much as possible be-
fore a treatment is started.499 The Health Care Inspectorate requires the detainee’s 
medical history to be retrieved in a sound manner if a detainee enters the penal 
institution and this effort should preferably be laid down in policy. Information 
about a detainee’s medical history should be transferred to the next health care 
provider if the detainee is released or transferred.500 Not having a policy to request 
written confirmation of earlier prescribed medication or not observing this policy, 
is a risk factor in view of the Health Care Inspectorate.501 The Custodial Institu-
tions Agency prescribes that nurses must actively inquire from the sending party 
(for example the police) or other health care providers for information about a 
newly arrived detainee.502 The Appeal Commission finds it permissible if a nurse, 
497. As for the file regarding compulsory treatment of persons pursuant to a hospital order, 
art. 19 §3 Hospital Orders (Framework) Act determines that art. 455 of the Medical Treatment 
Contracts Act is not applicable. 
498. BrC 16/07/2009 – 09/1064/GM.
499. BrC 28/11/2008 – 08/2095/GM. Or, the decision to reduce medication is made: BrC 
27/09/2004 – 04/0959/GM. BrC 08/03/2007 – 06/3018/GM: the physician who prescribed the 
medication should be consulted.
500. It stressed that by developing a policy on retrieving information about a detainee’s medical 
history, this practice will be less dependent on the individual professional involved. Health Care 
Inspectorate 2009, p. 35; 1999, p. 67; 2011 (Achterhoek, Zutphen), p. 13; 2011 (Arnhem, Zuid 
and De Berg), p. 18. See also: RTG Eindhoven 23 October 2014, ECLI:NL:TGZREIN:2014:86. 
BrC 24/02/2012 – 11/4153/GM: physician had to request the detainee’s family physician once 
again for the detainee’s medical data.
501. Health Care Inspectorate 2011 (Haarlem), p. 14. See also: RTG Eindhoven 23 October 
2014, ECLI:NL:TGZREIN:2014:86.
502. Custodial Institutions Agency 2016c.
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under the physician’s authority and responsibility, retrieves data on medication al-
ready prescribed to the person in question.503 In 2009, the Inspectorate observed 
that medical services had difficulties in obtaining sufficient information about a 
detainee’s medical history prior to deprivation of liberty.504 Health care provid-
ers are expected to make efforts to receive data on a detainee’s medical history.505 
This may imply that pressure needs to be exerted to ensure that medical data is 
actually and in time obtained to provide the necessary medical treatment, such as 
pain management.506 Exceptional events regarding the detainee that occur dur-
ing transport must also be reported to the penal institution by the transporting 
officer,507 just like the detainee’s behaviour or other circumstances affecting the 
risks during transport.508 Furthermore, a rapid communication between medical 
specialist and general practitioner after the patient is discharged is also expected in 
view of continuity of care. The medical specialist has the responsibility to ensure 
that this is performed in time509 and that sufficient information is provided.510 
Continuity of care also requires that information is exchanged at the end and be-
ginning of shifts if healthcare is provided by multiple professionals.511 The penal 
institution’s physician must actively inquire about the contacts between the med-
ical service and a detained patient during the physician’s absence.512 The Appeal 
Commission has concluded that the norm laid down in Article 28 Prison Rules 
will be breached if the medical service provides incorrect information about 
503. BrC 06/09/1999 – 99/0751/GM A.
504. Health Care Inspectorate 2009, pp. 15-16, 25, 35.
505. BrC 08/12/2014 – 14/2951/GM. See also BrC 16/11/2007 – 07/1315/GM.
506. BrC 20/05/2005 – 05/0502/GM. Noteworthy is that art. 38a §5 Psychiatric Hospitals 
(Compulsory Admissions) Act prescribes that the health care provider who is involved in the 
detainee’s treatment during deprivation of liberty in the psychiatric hospital must consult the 
health care providers (psychiatrist and/or general practitioner) earlier involved in the detainee’s 
treatment before deciding about the treatment plan.
507. Art. 23 Rules on transport of detainees.
508. Art. 24 §2, section c Rules on transport of detainees.
509. RTG ‘s-Gravenhage 28 October 2014, ECLI:NL:TGZRSGR:2014:100, §§5.7, 5.10. See 
also BrC 24/10/2016 – 16/2388/GM: medical service responsible for transfer of information to 
hospital.
510. BrC 17/12/2002 – 02/1584/GM. 
511. RTG ‘s-Gravenhage 28 October 2014, ECLI:NL:TGZRSGR:2014:100, §§5.8-5.11. RTG 
‘s-Gravenhage 17 January 2017, ECLI:NL:TGZRSGR:2017:11: physician had to visit the detainee 
because not all necessary information was available. See with regard to the exchange of medical 
information during deprivation of liberty by the police: Inspectorate Security and Justice and 
Health Care Inspectorate 2014, pp. 21-22. Royal Dutch Medical Association et al 2010, pp. 7-8.
512. RTG Amsterdam 10 August 2010, ECLI:NL:TGZRAMS:2010:YG0507. 
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prescribed medication to a detainee in case of a transfer from one penal institu-
tion to another.513
The Committee van Dinter observed in 1995 that relevant medical informa-
tion was not always transferred to everyone involved in the care for the detainee 
and stressed that this may lead to problems.514 Several bodies expect that risks 
for a detainee’s medical condition (for example an assessment of the suicide risk) 
that are identified during the medical screening on admission are exchanged be-
tween the officials involved.515 The Minister of Justice and the Minister of Health, 
Welfare and Sport emphasise that the physician of the penal institution does not 
have a duty of confidentiality towards employees of the medical service as they 
are involved in the care process. The legislator and the Appeal Commission stated 
that prison officers can be regarded as directly involved in the treatment of de-
tainees, especially during the weekends when the medical service is not staffed. 
Medical information may therefore be provided to prison officers if this informa-
tion is strictly necessary to effectively monitor the detainee during the hours that 
the medical service is not staffed.516 The Royal Dutch Medical Association has 
stressed that the possibility to exchange necessary information with professionals 
directly involved in the care process is sometimes too broadly interpreted by in-
cluding efforts of all parties that are in any way involved with the patient. Only 
persons directly involved in the healthcare for the patient must be included in 
their view.517 In my opinion, non-medically trained personnel working in penal 
institutions (like prison officers) should not be regarded as directly involved in 
the medical treatment agreement as meant in Article 457 Medical Treatment Con-
tracts Act. This does not mean that necessary information cannot be exchanged 
with these professionals. This is after all expected under the ECHR.518 Firstly, ex-
change of information is possible with the detainee’s consent. Another basis for the 
exchange of information may in my view be found in the principle of conflicting 
513. BrC 07/07/2016 – 16/1015/GM.
514. Committee van Dinter 1995, p. 17.
515. Inspectorate Security and Justice 2015b, p. 9. Council for the Administration of Criminal 
Justice and Protection of Juveniles 2015, p. 13.
516. Stb. 2000, 121, p. 8. BrC 10/08/2012 – 12/1591/GM. See also: BrC 24/03/2014 – 13/4285/
GM. BrC 07/07/2014 – 14/1118/GM. CPT/Inf (2013) 22, Response of the Government of the 
Netherlands, 25. See with regard to sociotherapists in case of a detainee held pursuant to a hospital 
order combined with compulsory treatment: BrC 24/09/2004 – 04/1241/TA. BrC 02/02/2016 – 
15/3333/TA. See with regard to the duty of confidentiality also: art. 58 Prison Rules and art. 80 
Hospital Orders (Care) Regulations.
517. Royal Dutch Medical Association et al 2014, p. 5.
518. ECtHR 19 July 2012, no. 38447/09, §82 (Ketreb v. France).
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duties,519 and the principle of reasonableness and fairness (redelijkheid en billi-
jkheid)520 in connection with the principle that a health care provider must act 
as a good health care provider.521 The Health Care Inspectorate also requires that 
the medical service of a penal institution, though bound by the duty of medical 
confidentiality, provide prison officers with the information necessary to provide 
adequate care. This can be limited to instructions with regard to the care, with-
out providing a diagnosis.522 In view of the required foreseeability under Article 8 
ECHR and the ECtHR’s case law,523 it should be explicitly laid down in law that 
the detainee must be informed about the exchange of necessary data (in case of a 
transfer) and be offered the possibility of making an objection.
Article 33 Official Instructions for the Police explicitly prescribes that police cus-
tody officers must follow the instructions given to them by the physician. As 
stressed before, the physician can, and should, in principle share necessary in-
formation to ensure effective monitoring of the detainee with police custody 
officers pursuant to the principle of reasonableness and fairness.524 The Official 
Instructions for the Police also contain regulations on the transfer of (medical) 
data. Police custody officers must see to it that registrations that may be relevant 
and the report of the physician, intended for the physician who will take over 
the treatment, will be sent with the detainee in case of a transfer.525 The Health 
Care Inspectorate requires that a physician discusses the exchange of medical data 
both in- and outside their own organisation with the person held by the police,526 
which corresponds with the standards laid down in soft law.527 The State Secretary 
has stated that in case of a transfer, it is procedure to send the medical information 
with the detainee in a sealed envelope and to hand it over to the medical service of 
the institution. Initiatives are taken to improve the transfer of information, among 
519. Art. 6:74 Civil Code. Art. 40 Criminal Code (circumstances beyond one’s control). See 
section 5.4.2.
520. Art. 6:2 §2 Civil Code. See also Hartkamp 2006, pp. 307-310.
521. Art. 453 Medical Treatment Contracts Act. See for example: CTG 4 October 2016, 
ECLI:NL:TGZCTG:2016:308.
522. Health Care Inspectorate 1999, p. 68. The Inspectorate also states that prison officers can be 
informed with the detainee’s consent.
523. ECtHR 10 February 2004, no. 42023/98, §94 (Naoumenko v. Ukraine).
524. Art. 6:2 §2 Civil Code.
525. Art. 35 Official Instructions for the Police. This task is assigned to the person who has the 
responsibility to manage the operational processes (operationeel coördinator). National Police 2016, 
pp. 19, 4. Art. 35 Official Instructions is therefore an exception to the duty of confidentiality of 
police officers. Art. 7 Police Data Act. 
526. Inspectorate Security and Justice and Health Care Inspectorate 2014, p. 22. 
527. Recommendation No. R (98) 7, I.C.18.
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others by rolling out an application form and by introducing an Electronic Pa-
tient Record/Electronic Medical Record.528 The Health Care Inspectorate requires 
that the receiving institution is provided with a complete and current overview of 
medication.529 In addition to the aforementioned legislation and regulations, the 
Inspectorate Security and Justice expects that the receiving police station or ju-
dicial institution will be provided with a report from the ‘sending’ police station. 
This report must at least contain details on the presence of addiction(s), psychi-
atric problems, the risk of suicide or absconding and other details regarding the 
stay of the detainee. The service responsible for the detainee’s transport must also 
be actively informed.530 The Court of Appeal has stressed that a correct transfer 
of information is the responsibility of the sending and receiving party. The pro-
fessionals involved in the care for a person held by the police must be informed 
about incidents that have occurred earlier and in which circumstances the per-
son has been found.531 It is important that police officers pass information about 
the used force during arrest to the attending physician.532 Noteworthy is that the 
Inspectorates observed in 2015 that in most police districts, there was no time 
scheduled for exchanging information at the end of a shift, which was a risk fac-
tor because important information may get lost. The Inspectorates recommend to 
schedule time for exchanging information after, and at the beginning, of shifts of 
police custody officers.533 This is a safeguard which facilitates that information is 
actually exchanged in practice. 
In 1995, the Committee van Dinter concluded that the transfer of medical 
data from police custody suites to the medical service of a penal institution was 
not always without errors.534 The diverging (more recent) observations of several 
Inspectorates on the transfer of medical information from police custody suites 
to the medical service of a penal institution are striking. In 2008, the Inspector-
ate on the Enforcement of Sanctions concluded that diagnostic information of 
the physician and prescribed medication is structurally transferred from police 
establishments to penal institutions. It stated that in almost all cases in which a 
physician was notified for a person detained by the police, the information was 
528. Aanhangsel Handelingen II 2013/14, 2694.
529. Inspectorate Security and Justice and Health Care Inspectorate 2014, p. 22. See also: ActiZ 
et al 2008; 2012.
530. Inspectorate Security and Justice and Health Care Inspectorate 2014, p. 16.
531. Court of Appeal Amsterdam 16 February 2007, ECLI:NL:GHAMS:2007:AZ8826.
532. Court of Appeal Amsterdam 10 November 2014, ECLI:NL:GHAMS:2014:4642.
533. Inspectorate Security and Justice, Health Care Inspectorate and Inspectorate for Youth Care 
2015, p. 12.
534. Committee van Dinter 1995, p. 16.
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sent in writing when the detainee was transferred. Official agreements about this 
practice were however absent.535 The Inspectorate stated that no univocal proce-
dure existed on whether medication should be sent with a police custody detainee 
who is transferred to a penal institution. According to the Inspectorate oral agree-
ments existed on the information that should be transferred from the police to the 
penal institution.536 Article 35 Official Instructions for the Police is not mentioned 
in this report, though this provision (in force since 1994) clearly determines that 
medication, relevant registrations and the report of the physician, intended for the 
physician who will take over the treatment, must be sent with the police custody 
detainee in case of a transfer. Furthermore, in 2012 the National Ombudsman 
concluded that the transfer of information in case of a newly arrived detainee in 
a penal institution could be improved. The Ombudsman observed that informa-
tion regarding a detainee’s stay in a police cell was not systematically registered 
and passed on to the institution.537 Problems in the transfer of information from 
police stations to penal institutions were also observed by the Health Care Inspec-
torate in 2009, who emphasised that health care providers previously involved in 
the detainee’s treatment were not always easily traceable and accessible.538 A com-
plicating factor is that the physician who attends a person held by the police often 
does not know if, and if so, to which institution the detainee will be transferred. 
Thoonen and Duijst therefore propose that the physician who attends persons 
detained by the police and the physicians of penal institutions make notes in the 
same medical file.539 Problems regarding the exchange of (medical) data between 
the police and judicial institutions were still observed by the Inspectorates in 2016. 
Another observed complicating factor is that police custody officers often do not 
known which information they are allowed to exchange. The Inspectorates rec-
ommend to use a digital system to register (medical) information and to clearly 
instruct police custody officers which information may be exchanged.540 
535. The following locations were included: Penal Institution Amsterdam, Demersluis; Limburg 
Zuid, De Geerhorst; Overijssel, Zwolle Zuid; Utrecht, Nieuwegein; Veenhuizen, Esserheem. 
Inspectorate on the Enforcement of Sanctions 2008, pp. 13, 15-18.    
536. Inspectorate on the Enforcement of Sanctions 2008, pp. 17-18.
537. National ombudsman 2012/037, p. 40. See also Duijst, Thoonen, Van der Gaauw and 
Korthals 2012, p. 65. In the latter study, it has been stressed that it was not clear whether 
information was available but not transferred, or that no information was available at all.
538. Health Care Inspectorate 2009, pp. 25, 35.
539. Thoonen and Duijst 2014b.
540. Inspectorate Security and Justice, Health Care Inspectorate, Inspectorate for Youth Care 
2015, pp. 13-14. See about problems in recording and transferring of information also: Inspectorate 
Security and Justice 2013 (Dolmatov), pp. 87 et seq.
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Studies also showed that the transfer of information between penal institutions 
was not always complete, which may pose a risk. A complicating factor is that the 
electronic file must be closed by the ‘sending institution’ and cannot immediately 
be opened in the ‘receiving institution’. Therefore, the first mentioned institution 
must transfer the information (orally or in writing) to the receiving institution 
through other means. The transfer of information within penal institutions also 
showed deficiencies. The National ombudsman observed for example that in-
formation was available on the detainee’s mental condition and about suicidal 
expressions made by the detainee, nevertheless the psychologist had no knowledge 
of that information, or medical information was received but not recorded in the 
medical file.541
In case of a release, the detainee must be provided with a copy of the prob-
lem and medication list, containing the relevant medical history of the person in 
question. The Health Care Inspectorate observed in 2009 that future health care 
providers were hardly informed after the patient in question was released from a 
penal institution. Practical obstacles were unexpected or unknown releases and 
the absence of a system to rapidly provide the detainee with the necessary data. 
The Inspectorate recommends to lay down in policy the procedure to inform 
health care providers who will become involved after deprivation of liberty.542 In 
2011, improvements on continuity of care after release were in some institutions 
observed by the Health Care Inspectorate.543
5.4.6. Medication safety 
Legislation on the quality, availability and safety of medication can be found in 
several Dutch Acts, including the Medicines Act and the Individual Health Care 
Professions Act. These Acts also apply when healthcare is provided during dep-
rivation of liberty. The Medicines Act distinguishes four categories of medicines 
(medication): 1) medicines only available on prescription of a medical profession 
541. National Ombudsman no. 2012/037, pp. 36, 40-43. See also Duijst et al 2012, pp. 77-78. 
Health Care Inspectorate 2011 (Overijssel, De Karelskamp, Almelo), p. 9: word-documents were 
used to register the agreements made during the psycho-medical consultation.
542. Health Care Inspectorate 2009, pp. 19, 25, 35; 2011 (Haarlem), pp. 14-15. See also Health 
Care Inspectorate 2011 (Middelburg), pp. 13-14; (Utrecht), pp. 15-16.
543. Health Care Inspectorate 2011 (Achterhoek, Zutphen), pp. 13-14; (Arnhem, Zuid and De 
Berg), pp. 18-19; (Breda), pp. 14-15; (Flevoland, Lelystad), pp. 14-15; (Overijssel, Karelskamp), 
pp. 13-14.
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authorised to prescribe it,544 2) medicines only available in a pharmacy,545 3) med-
icines only available in a pharmacy and a chemist,546 and 4) medicines for free 
sale.547 Only pharmacists, licensed general practitioners and other, by Ministerial 
regulation assigned persons or bodies, may put medicines of the first category for 
sale or hand these medicines over.548 The preparation of medicines falls within the 
exclusive field of expertise of pharmacists,549 which corresponds with the stand-
ards laid down in soft law as frequently referred to by the ECtHR.550 Medicines of 
the first category may only be handed over after submitting a prescription from a 
medical profession authorised to prescribe that medicine. In emergency cases, the 
pharmacist may hand over medicines of the first category without a prescription 
if there is sufficient certainty that there is no danger for abuse.551 Article 36 §14 
Individual Health Care Professions Act assigns the individual medical professions 
authorised to prescribe medicines that are only available on prescription, namely: 
physicians, dentists, midwives as far as it falls within their field of expertise, and 
a category of nurses552 that are specifically assigned by Ministerial regulation to 
prescribe medicines.553 Noteworthy is that the Health Care Inspectorate has in-
tensified its supervision on prescribing medicines as from February 1st 2016.554 
Prescribing medication for another indication than registered by the Medicines 
Evaluation Board is only allowed when this is laid down in protocols or standards 
developed by the profession involved.555
The medicine stock in the physician’s bag is regulated by Article 61 §8 Med-
icines Act, which states that physicians (and other specifically mentioned health 
care providers) may only be handed over medicines after a written and signed 
544. UR-geneesmiddelen (Uitsluitend Recept).
545. UA-geneesmiddelen (Uitsluitend Apotheek).
546. UAD-geneesmiddelen (Uitsluitend Apotheek en Drogist).
547. AV-geneesmiddelen (Algemene verkoop). Art. 56 in connection with art. 1 §1, section s, s.1., 
t, u Medicines Act.
548. Art. 61 §1 Medicines Act.
549. Art. 23 Individual Health Care Professions Act.
550. ECtHR 14 December 2006, no. 4353/03, §67 (Tarariyeva v. Russia).
551. Art. 61 §9 Medicines Act.
552. Additional conditions are set for nurses, namely provided that: 1) a physician, dentist or 
midwife has made a diagnosis with regard to the patient in question, 2) medical protocols and 
standards regarding the prescription of medicines are followed, 3) it falls within the competence 
provided to this category of nurses by the Ministerial regulation, and 4) a note is made about this 
competence in the BIG-register.
553. Regulation on the competence of nurses to prescribe medicines. For example, nurses trained 
in the field of diabetes mellitus.
554. Health Care Inspectorate 2015.
555. Art. 68 Medicines Act. Additional criteria are developed by the Royal Dutch Medical 
Assocation in case such standards do not (yet) exist. See also: BrC 30/03/2016 – 15/4218/GM.
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request, containing the name, address and the capacity of the medical profes-
sion who requests for the medicines, as well as the name and quantity of the 
medicine. These medicines are meant for direct use by the physician to a patient 
and are handed over without a prescription for a particular patient.556 The max-
imum quantity of the medicine stock in the physician’s bag is not regulated in 
legislation.557
The Custodial Institutions Agency expects that a physician authorises pre-
scribed medication on a daily basis. Chronic use of medication by detainees who 
are staying in the institution for longer than four months should be verified. 
There should be a policy on the use of medication from the emergency stock and 
its implementation should be verified.558 The Agency adheres to559 the guideline 
developed by the Task Force medication safety care560 and also issued a guideline 
on the medication’s emergency stock. The guideline assigns the physicians and 
pharmacists’ responsibilities for the medication’s emergency stock. Because it has 
been fixed by contract that necessary medication should be delivered in the ju-
dicial institution within two hours after the order has been made (24/7), there is 
no need to have a large emergency stock. The guideline prescribes that one physi-
cian should be assigned as contact person for the pharmacist on matters relating 
to medication and the emergency stock. This physician must at least ensure that 
sufficient medication is available in the emergency stock, must develop and moni-
tor a registration system for the use of the emergency stock (who used medication 
from the stock, when, and for which patient), monitor periodically whether med-
ication in the emergency stock is stored under the right conditions and to observe 
the expiration date of this medication (though the pharmacist may also be asked 
to monitor these points). The pharmacist should be given the opportunity to 
advise on the compilation of the emergency stock. This compilation should be 
evaluated annually by the physician and the pharmacist, whereas the board of the 
judicial institution should endorse this compilation. The physician should arrange 
in writing whether, and if so what, medication may be administered by a nurse if 
the physician is not present. Such use of medication should be registered in the 
patient’s file, and should be reported to the physician and the pharmacist.561 
556. Kamerstukken II 2003/04, 29 359, no. 3, pp. 28-29, 60, 12.
557. Although several associations have given advice on the composition of the physician’s bag.
558. Custodial Institutions Agency 2016d.
559. Custodial Institutions Agency 2016d.
560. ActiZ et al 2012.
561. Custodial Institutions Agency 2014c. The guideline recognises that some institutions have a 
medication committee, to whom certain tasks may be assigned. See with regard to the requirement 
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Standards on medication safety within penal institutions have also been set 
by the Health Care Inspectorate. The pharmaceutical supply must be ensured 
24 hours a day, seven days a week.562 Medication should be distributed in daily, 
individual doses. The pharmaceutical procedure must be safe and laid down in 
protocol.563 A medicines formulary and an electronic prescription system should 
be used to observe contraindications, ensure monitoring of interaction and to 
prevent mistakes (for example when copying a prescription in writing) and un-
certainties (illegible handwriting) concerning the prescription of medication.564 
Prescriptions must be linked to a complete, up-to-date problem list, including the 
use of codes.565 The responsibility for the medication supply should be clearly as-
signed. Every prescription must be signed and therefore authorised by a physician. 
This also applies when a prescription is repeated; it should be assessed whether the 
medication is still necessary. The Health Care Inspectorate observed in 2009 that 
medication that is only available on prescription was taken from the emergency 
supply by nurses, often without intervention of a physician. This means that med-
ication is prepared and handed over by one and the same person, which poses 
a risk in the view of the Inspectorate.566 The Eindhoven Regional Disciplinary 
Committee for the Health Care Sector has emphasised that prescriptions must 
be checked and signed by a physician before they are sent to the pharmacy. As 
already stressed above, it is not in accordance with the law if a nurse writes a pre-
scription that is afterwards checked by the physician.567 Furthermore, the stock of 
non-prescribed medication should not exceed the emergency supply and it should 
be kept under lock and key.568 To ensure supervision on the use of the emergency 
stock, a prescription should be made afterwards which is sent to the pharmacy.569 
The Health Care Inspectorate also observed other risks with regard to medication 
safety in the diverging penal institutions. Problem lists, that must state which 
medication is currently used, were not always complete, medicines formulary were 
that the use of medication from the emergency supply should be registered also: Health Care 
Inspectorate 2011 (Achterhoek, Zutphen), pp. 12-13.
562. Health Care Inspectorate 2011 (Achterhoek, Zutphen), p. 12. As for Forensic Psychiatric 
Centres, the Inspectorate requires periodic meetings between the pharmacist, psychiatrist and 
physician to reduce or remove risks regarding the use of medication. Health Care Inspectorate 
2009c, p. 30. See also BrC 19/07/2004 – 04/0907/GM: unacceptable delay in supplying detainee 
with prescribed medication.
563. Health Care Inspectorate 2011 (Achterhoek, Zutphen), p. 12. 
564. Health Care Inspectorate 2009, pp. 17, 29, 37.
565. Health Care Inspectorate 2011 (Achterhoek, Zutphen), pp. 12-13.
566. Health Care Inspectorate 2009, pp. 17, 29, 37.
567. RTG Eindhoven 23 October 2014, ECLI:NL:TGZREIN:2014:86.
568. Health Care Inspectorate 2011 (Achterhoek, Zutphen), p. 13.
569. Health Care Inspectorate 2009, p. 34.
Death in State Custody DRUK.indd   246 13-Sep-17   2:40:12 PM
Implementation of obligations to avert premature death of detainees in the Netherlands  247
not always used and codes were not always correctly used.570 Medication was not 
always prescribed electronically, the ordered medication was not always author-
ised by the physician within 24 hours, the emergency supply was sometimes larger 
than allowed and the use of medication from the emergency supply was not al-
ways registered,571 which hampers supervision on the use of this supply. 
The Dutch legislator has not regulated the manner in which medication should 
be distributed to persons held in penal institutions. The Custodial Institutions 
Agency has set the norm that the executive personnel (i.e. prison officer) must su-
pervise the ingestion of medication and it must be recorded whether medication 
is ingested. The head of the ward must check periodically whether this has been 
recorded.572 In most penal institutions medication is handed over to the detainees 
by prison officers.573 Incidents with incorrect distribution of medication by prison 
officers were seen in the past.574 The Custodial Institutions Agency has developed 
a guideline on the conditions to deviate from the principle that medication is dis-
tributed per moment of ingestion. The physician must give advice when deviation 
from the prescribed medication is not allowed, for example with regard to persons 
who are suicidal, psychotic and/or depressed or are mentally impaired, persons 
who collect or deal in medication, persons who indicate not to want any medi-
cation in their cell, specific medication (for example medication for tuberculosis 
that has to be ingested under supervision, medication listed in the Opium Act, 
benzodiazepines, or medication for Attention Deficit Hyperactivity Disorder). If 
deviation per moment of ingestion is allowed, the physician should monitor on 
a regular basis whether the detainee takes his medication properly.575 The Ap-
peal Commission stressed that handing over medication by non-medically trained 
staff may pose a risk, though does not require that medication is per se handed 
over by medical staff. The personnel that distribute medication must act with 
the necessary carefulness, like sufficient supervision on whether the detainee has 
570. Health Care Inspectorate 2011 (Achterhoek, Zutphen), pp. 12-13; (Breda), pp. 12-13; 
(Haarlem), pp. 12-13. The Inspectorate observed in Forensic Psychiatric Centres risks concerning 
medication safety because multiple separate files were used (psychiatric files and Microhis). 
Inspectorate 2009c, p. 15. 
571. Health Care Inspectorate 2010 (Torentijd, Middelburg), p. 12; 2011 (Utrecht, Nieuwegein), 
p. 14. See also: Health Care Inspectorate 2015b, p. 22.
572. Custodial Institutions Agency 2016d. See also Custodial Institutions Agency 2010, p. 63: 
supervising the ingestion of medication for tuberculosis. Health Care Inspectorate 2011 (Overijssel, 
De Karelskamp), pp. 12-13.
573. For example: Health Care Inspectorate 2011 (Arnhem, Zuid and De Berg), p. 18; (Breda), p. 
13; (Overijssel, De Karelskamp), p. 13; (Utrecht, Nieuwegein), p. 14.
574. Health Care Inspectorate 2011 (Haarlem), p. 16.
575. Custodial Institutions Agency 2010b. See also: BrC 27/08/2013 – 13/1248/GA. BrC 
04/07/2007 – 07/0929/GA.
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swallowed the medicine(s).576 If prison officers have the duty to distribute med-
ication, the physician should give instructions on what to do when the medical 
service is not staffed and questions regarding the dose of medication arise.577 The 
Health Care Inspectorate observed in 2011 that it was not always checked whether 
medication was actually ingested578 nor was the distribution of medicines always 
recorded.579 Furthermore, handing over medication to detainees by prison officers 
not trained for this task poses a risk in view of the Health Care Inspectorate,580 
which corresponds with the ECtHR’s case law.581 The Inspectorate did not connect 
any consequences to this and this aspect no longer emerges in more recent reports 
of the Health Care Inspectorate. The Custodial Institutions Agency expects that 
the personnel who hand over medication will be trained periodically for this task, 
though no concrete standards have been developed for this training.582 
At present, medication that is only available on prescription are ordered by 
the medical service of the penal institution at a pharmacy. The pharmacist has 
to check the prescription and must supervise that the medication is prepared in 
accordance with the prescription.583 The medication is subsequently delivered in 
the penal institutions (in client unit packagings). If the medication is not deliv-
ered in client unit packagings, the nurse must set out the medication according 
to the prescription. Prison officers are given the task to distribute the medicines 
to the detainees concerned.584 Several disciplines are therefore involved before 
medication is actually ingested by a detainee. Several errors may emerge during 
this process, which raises the question where the responsibility of the diverging 
involved disciplines begins and ends. The case law of the Appeal Commission 
shows in my view inconsistencies in relation to the diverging responsibilities for 
the supply of medication. It concluded for example that the fact that a detainee 
did not receive his medication was a breach of the governor’s obligation to supply 
the prescribed medication.585 The case law also shows that the medical service of 
576. BrC 16/11/2011 – 11/2421/GA.
577. BrC 26/03/2003 – 02/2136/GM.
578. Health Care Inspectorate 2011 (Haarlem), p. 13.
579. Health Care Inspectorate 2011 (Overijssel, De Karelskamp), pp. 12-13; (Haarlem), pp. 
12-13.
580. Health Care Inspectorate 2009, p. 37. 
581. ECtHR 9 November 2010, no. 37138/06, §§131-132 (Farhad Aliyev v. Azerbaijan).
582. Custodial Institutions Agency 2016d.
583. Royal Dutch Pharmacists Association’s guideline on handing over medication, p. 10. See also 
CPT/Inf (2013) 22, Response of the Government of the Netherlands, §25.
584. Custodial Institutions Agency 2016d.
585. BrC 09/09/2011 – 11/1606/GA. See also: BrC 10/03/2003 – 02/2324/GA. BrC 05/11/2013 
– 13/2689/GM. BrC 25/08/2014 – 14/2027/TA. BrC 19/11/2014 – 14/2757/GA. BrC 05/02/2015 
– 14/3866/GM. BrC 08/03/2007 – 06/3131/GM.
Death in State Custody DRUK.indd   248 13-Sep-17   2:40:13 PM
Implementation of obligations to avert premature death of detainees in the Netherlands  249
the penal institution should ensure that prescribed medication is in stock. The fact 
that the prescribed medication was not in stock was in breach with the standard 
laid down in Article 28 Prison Rules.586 The medical service must also ensure that 
the right medication is handed over to a detainee. This means that the medical 
service must check whether changes in medication are actually carried through.587 
It has also been stressed that, because the medical service orders the medication 
at a pharmacy, the medical service is responsible for the supply of medication in 
the penal institution which means that the medical service must check whether 
the right medication is delivered by the pharmacy.588 It has also been stressed that 
the physician has the final responsibility for the right supply of medicines.589 Fur-
thermore, the medical service cannot be held accountable for the fact that ordered 
medication is delivered days later.590 The medical service does however have an 
obligation to inform detainees about the length of time needed to deliver particu-
lar substances.591 In my view, the medical service (under final responsibility of the 
physician of the institution) has the responsibility to ensure that the right medi-
cation, in the right dose, is prescribed and ordered, though the pharmacist has the 
responsibility to supply the ordered medication and ensure that client unit pack-
agings contain the right medication in the right doses. The medical service should 
check whether changes in medication are actually followed through. If prison of-
ficers are given the task to hand out medication to detainees, the responsibility of 
the governor is engaged for that step in the process. The governor must in any case 
facilitate that prescribed medication is provided to detainees.
During deprivation of liberty by the police, medication is in general handed over 
to the detainee by police custody officers. Police custody officers are only allowed 
to give medication to detainees if this medication is prescribed by a physician 
(including a psychiatrist), even if the detainee carries the medication with him 
when apprehended. Prescribed medication may only be changed or stopped if au-
thorised by a physician. Medication should be stored in a package for individual 
patients, preferably in the required dose, and needs to be handed over to the de-
tainee according to a complete and current administration list. One must record 
the moments that medication is distributed. Changes in prescribed medication 
must also be recorded on the administration list. A complete overview of the 
586. BrC 09/10/2002 – 02/1109/GM. See also: BrC 21/11/2006 – 06/1796/GM.
587. Custodial Institutions Agency 2016d. See also: BrC 05/02/2015 – 14/3652/GM.
588. BrC 11/12/2009 – 09/2432/GM.
589. BrC 26/03/2003 – 02/2136/GM.
590. BrC 10/10/02 – 02/1175/GM.
591. BrC 27/09/1999 – 99/0403/GM A.
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current use of medication should be available as soon as possible (within 24 hours 
at most) after admission. This overview should include possible contraindications, 
allergies for medication and the used medication in the preceding three months. 
After the release of a detainee, the remaining medication should be destroyed, if 
necessary by the medium of a pharmacist. In the meantime, the medication must 
be stored in such a way that they are inaccessible for unauthorised persons. Only 
a restricted and accurately determined emergency supply is allowed.592 The In-
spectorates observed risks with regard to the medication safety during deprivation 
of liberty by the police, including handwritten directions (which must be copied 
in a digital system) and because medication is set out (klaarzetten) and handed 
out by police custody officers, whereas healthcare is summarily discussed during 
the training of police custody officers.593 In view of the ECtHR’s case law, the fact 
that medication is set out and handed out by police custody officers who are not 
trained for this task can be regarded as a shortcoming in the medical assistance for 
detainees.594 Furthermore, police custody officers are not bound by the Health-
care Quality, Complaints and Disputes Act. Questions therefore also arise as to 
whether, and if so, to whom, medication errors are reported and whether they are 
evaluated and if so, by whom.595 Considering the ECtHR’s case law,596 distribution 
of medication by prison or police officers does in principle not lead to a violation 
of the ECHR, though this is in my view no longer tenable if mistakes are made 
that adversely affect the detainee’s health or even leads to the detainee’s death. 
5.4.7. Evaluation of healthcare 
According to Dutch law, health care providers have the responsibility to systemat-
ically monitor and improve the quality of healthcare. This includes systematically 
collecting, recording and examining data regarding the quality of healthcare to 
determine whether the manner in which healthcare is organised leads to adequate 
592. Inspectorate Security and Justice and Health Care Inspectorate 2014, p. 21. See with regard 
to supplying detainees with medication also: National Police 2016, pp. 12-13. See also CTG 29 
May 2012, ECLI:NL:TGZCTG:2012:YG2086: forensic physician should have seen detainee before 
prescribing medication considering the condition of the detainee and the amount and nature of the 
medication he was carrying to determine whether it was necessary to adjust the medication and to 
determine whether the medication was complete.
593. Inspectorate Security and Justice, Health Care Inspectorate and Inspectorate for Youth Care 
2015, pp. 15-16. See with regard to the risks involved in distributing medication by police custody 
officers also: Struijk 2012, pp. 192-194. See furthermore: CPT/Inf (2017) 1 – Netherlands, p. 16.
594. ECtHR 9 November 2010, no. 37138/06, §§131-132 (Farhad Aliyev v. Azerbaijan).
595. See section 5.4.7.
596. ECtHR 9 November 2010, no. 37138/06, §§131-132 (Farhad Aliyev v. Azerbaijan).
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care and, if necessary, implement alterations.597 In practice, health care provid-
ers often have an internal committee that evaluates incidents with regard to the 
provided healthcare.598 As from July 1st 2016, health care providers are obliged to 
develop an internal procedure to report and deal with possible incidents,599 which 
procedure is further regulated in Article 6.1 Decree Healthcare Quality, Com-
plaints and Disputes. The internal procedure must contain rules on the manner in 
which incidents should be reported for the purpose of analysis and how incidents 
will be examined.600 In addition to the aforementioned quality system, a health 
care provider is obliged to report calamities that have occurred during the care 
provision to the Health Care Inspectorate.601 A calamity is a non-intended or un-
expected event with regard to the quality of care that led to the death of a client 
or had a severe harmful effect for a client of the institution.602 The basic principle 
is that the involved health care provider performs its own inquiry into the calam-
ity, though the Health Care Inspectorate may deviate from this principle.603 An 
important basic principle that can be derived from disciplinary case law is that 
cooperating health care providers must address one another when indications for 
inadequate healthcare are observed.604
The medical services of penal institutions provide healthcare within an organ-
isational context and are therefore bound by the aforementioned regulations laid 
down in the Healthcare Quality, Complaints and Disputes Act.605 The Health 
Care Inspectorate observed in 2009 that none of the visited penal institutions had 
a committee to report incidents to.606 The Custodial Institutions Agency issued 
in 2009 a guideline on committees to report incidents regarding the care for 
597. Art. 7 §§1-2 Healthcare Quality, Complaints and Disputes Act. See also: RTG ‘s-Gravenhage 
28 October 2014, ECLI:NL:TGZRSGR:2014:100, §5.7. CTG 27 August 2003, no. 2002/109.
598. Legemaate, Christiaans-Dingelhoff, Doppegieter and de Roode 2006. The RTG and the 
CTG have emphasised the importance of reporting incidents in view of evaluation: CTG 27 
August 2003, no. 2002/109.
599. Art. 9 §2 Healthcare Quality, Complaints and Disputes Act. Stb. 2015, no. 525.
600. Art. 6.1. Decree Healthcare Quality, Complaints and Disputes came into force as from July 
1st 2016. Stb. 2015, no. 525.
601. Art. 11 §1, subsection a Healthcare Quality, Complaints and Disputes Act. Though there are 
signs that not all calamities are reported to the Inspectorate. Legemaate 2015.
602. Art. 1 §1 Healthcare Quality, Complaints and Disputes Act.
603. Art. 8.7 §2 Decree Healthcare Quality, Complaints and Disputes. The procedure to examine 
calamities will be further discussed in chapter 7. 
604. RTG ‘s-Gravenhage 28 October 2014, ECLI:NL:TGZRSGR:2014:100, §§5.7, 5.12.
605. See the definition of care provider (zorgaanbieder) in art. 1 Healthcare Quality, Complaints 
and Disputes Act.
606. The institutions were awaiting the Custodial Institutions Agency to introduce such a 
committee. Apparently, this construction was also used as standard by the Inspectorate. Health 
Care Inspectorate 2009, pp. 55, 31.
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patients to (i.e. a non-intended event that occurred during the care process and 
that has led, or could have led, to harm for the patient). The committees (consist-
ing of three members, actually working in the institution) should, on the basis of 
the reported incidents, advise the board of the institution on the measures to be 
taken to prevent similar incidents in the future and to monitor whether measures 
are actually taken in practice. The advices to the governor should be anonymised. 
The committee should also analyse the reports to determine whether there are any 
trends.607 Follow-up visits of the Health Care Inspectorate showed that several in-
stitutions introduced internal committees to report incidents to and to evaluate 
incidents, though not all committees had a system to learn from incidents, were 
not yet operative or not known to all staff members.608 The Inspectorate further-
more requires medication errors to be recorded and analysed to take preventive 
measures for the future,609 though it has not been made clear where, or by who, 
these errors need to be recorded. 
Physicians (and nurses) who provide healthcare to persons deprived of their 
liberty by the police are also bound by the Healthcare Quality, Complaints and 
Disputes Act.610 Noteworthy is that the standards of the Health Care Inspector-
ate regarding the care for persons deprived of their liberty by the police do not 
contain any norms about evaluating incidents with regard to the healthcare, nor 
does there exist national policy on this matter. The question arises as to what is 
considered to be a calamity (or incident) in the provided healthcare to detainees 
held by the police. Important factors in this regard are the detainee’s access to a 
physician and the fact that police custody officers are in most districts assigned to 
set out and hand out medication to detainees, which is considered to be a risk if 
these officers are not sufficiently trained for this task.611 Medication errors made 
in this regard should in my view be evaluated. This is at present not guaranteed 
in Dutch law, whereas the ECtHR stresses the importance of evaluation of pos-
sible errors.612
607. Custodial Institutions Agency 2009b.
608. Health Care Inspectorate 2011 (Breda), p. 16; (Flevoland, Lelystad), p. 16; (Haarlem), p. 
16; (Middelburg, Torentijd), p. 15; (Overijssel, Karelskamp), p. 15; (Utrecht, Nieuwegein), p. 17. 
See with regard to the Forensic Psychiatric Centres: Health Care Inspectorate 2009b, pp. 13, 21. 
This report showed that staff who reported incidents were often not informed about the findings.
609. Health Care Inspectorate 1999, p. 70; 2011 (Haarlem), pp. 15-16.
610. See the definition of care provider (zorgaanbieder) in art. 1 Healthcare Quality, Complaints 
and Disputes Act.
611. See the view of the Health Care Inspectorate with regard to prison officers: Health Care 
Inspectorate 2009, p. 37.
612. ECtHR 27 June 2006, no. 11562/05, §117 (Byrzykowski v. Poland).
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5.5. Obligations of Member States versus end of life decisions 
of detainees 
Several end of life decisions of detainees that lead to dilemmas for the State 
involved have been discussed in chapter 4. In the following, I will discuss the 
manner in which these dilemmas are dealt with in the Netherlands and whether 
this corresponds with the approach of the ECtHR.
5.5.1. Refusal of treatment 
The Dutch Constitution contains the right to respect for private life (Article 10) 
and the right to physical integrity (Article 11). Restrictions on the right to private 
life and physical integrity are only allowed if these restrictions are laid down in 
law. The rights laid down in Article 10 and Article 11 of the Dutch Constitution 
are further elaborated in (among others) health care legislation. An example is the 
basic principle that a patient must give informed consent to medical treatment 
or examinations;613 patients have the right to refuse medical treatment. Informed 
consent is also the basic principle in the relationship between a physician and a 
detained patient.614 
Dutch legislation determines that a person who is capable to decide for him-
self (competent) has the right to decide that cardiorespiratory resuscitation (CPR) 
or any proposed medical treatment or examinations will not be applied (if the 
need arises). An advance directive (such as an order not to apply resuscitation, a 
DNR) drawn up by a competent patient must be followed.615 The health care pro-
vider is authorised to deviate from this directive if he is of the opinion that valid 
reasons exist to do so, for example if he doubts the validity of the directive. The 
only statutory requirement is that the directive must be in writing.616 Additional 
requirements are developed in Dutch case law. The health care provider who is 
confronted with an advance directive while the patient is no longer capable to 
decide (for example an unconscious patient) must examine whether the patient 
was, at the moment the directive was written, capable to determine his will and 
613. Art. 450 in connection with art. 448 Medical Treatment Contracts Act.
614. Or in the relationship between a detained patient and nurse/other health care providers 
who are bound by the Medical Treatment Contracts Act. Art. 450 Medical Treatment 
Contracts Act. Cooperation of the patient is also a relevant factor when determining whether 
health care providers fulfilled the duty to care for the patient. CTG 14 December 2010, 
ECLI:NL:TGZCTG:2010:YG0765 and ECLI:NL:TGZCTG:2010:YG0766.
615. Even if the patient is no longer capable to decide.
616. Art. 450 §3 Medical Treatment Contracts Act.
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whether the directive is sufficient explicit and well-considered. The health care 
provider must be convinced that the directive is written by the involved patient 
(for example because it is signed with a name and signature) and the directive 
must be up-to-date. If the health care provider has doubts about these factors, 
he cannot be blamed for not following the directive. The patient must make sure 
that he provides clear information that enables the health care provider to make 
a sound decision.617 
The legislation and regulations on deprivation of liberty by the police do not 
contain any additional rules on advance directives of detainees. This also applies 
to the Custodial Institutions (Framework) Act and other regulations applicable in 
penal institutions, although the Custodial Institutions Agency has developed pilot 
instructions on how to deal with an existing directive not to resuscitate (DNR) if 
the need arises, or with requests to draw up a DNR. The basic principle laid down 
in these instructions is that a DNR that fulfils the requirements of authenticity 
and formalities will be respected if an examination by a psychiatrist has shown 
that the detainee is considered to be capable to decide for himself and a physi-
cian has informed the detainee about the consequences (conditions/execution), 
unless the detainee apparently attempted to commit suicide.618 These instructions 
correspond with the basic principle in ECtHR’s case law and in soft law that the 
patient’s wishes must be respected if the patient is capable to decide for himself, is 
informed about the possible consequences and the illness does not pose a danger 
to others. The case law of the ECtHR shows that there is no obligation to inter-
vene under such circumstances,619 whereas such an obligation does exist in case 
of a suicide attempt.620 There are no guidelines how to deal with a detainee who 
is not capable to decide for himself and who requests for a DNR, like involvement 
of the representative. If the detainee has not drawn up an advance directive, nurses 
are in principle obliged to start CPR on a detainee if necessary. If there are indi-
cations that the detainee had been dead for some time (no pulse, no breathing, a 
face covered with dried up vomit, no reaction of the pupil and an (ash)grey face), 
it is in view of the disciplinary tribunal not unreasonable if the nurse does not 
617. District Court Zwolle 13 December 1989, TvGr 1990/63. Court of Appeal Arnhem 23 
July 1991, TvGr 1993/66. At present, the Dutch Association for voluntary end of life (Nederlandse 
Vereniging voor een Vrijwillig Levenseinde, hereinafter: NVVE) issues tokens holding an obligatory 
instruction not to perform resuscitation if the need arises.
618. Instruction existing DNR 2016. Instruction request for DNR by detainee 2016. 
619. ECtHR 31 March 2009, no. 1639/03, §§28-30 (Horoz v. Turkey).
620. ECtHR 14 February 2012, no. 9296/06, §§92-105 (Shumkova v. Russia).
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start CPR.621 According to the ECtHR, the medical necessity to start CPR should 
be assessed by health care providers (physician, nurse),622 which means that cus-
todial staff should start CPR unless it cannot be denied that a detainee is already 
dead. The study of Thoonen and Duijst on deaths during deprivation of liberty by 
the police showed that the necessity to start or continue CPR was not in all cases 
assessed by health care providers, for example because CPR was stopped before 
health care providers arrived.623
The Custodial Institutions (Framework) Act contains several provisions allowing 
an infringement on the detainee’s right to physical integrity624 and the right to 
refuse medical treatment or examinations. This Act contains three forms of invol-
untary medical treatment, namely forced medical treatment laid down in Article 
32,625 forced treatment type A626 and forced treatment type B.627 
Article 32 Custodial Institutions (Framework) Act authorises the governor of 
the penal institution to decide that a detainee will be treated against his will if the 
treatment is absolutely necessary to avert a danger for the health or safety of the 
detainee or others. The physician has the responsibility to determine if, and if so, 
which treatment is necessary. Forced medical treatment can consist of, inter alia, 
administrating medicines,628 taking an X-ray to determine whether a detainee has 
swallowed objects or pushed objects into his body, force-feeding of an incom-
petent detainee,629 or an examination of the detainee’s body.630 Before taking a 
621. RTG Amsterdam 1 February 2005, no. 03254vp and no. 03255vp. Although one may state 
that these are symptoms for a cardiac arrest, therefore implying an obligation to act.
622. ECtHR 5 April 2005, no. 54825/00, §§93-96 (Nevmerzhitsky v. Ukraine).
623. Thoonen and Duijst 2014.
624. Art. 27 Custodial Institutions (Framework) Act. Art. 21 Hospital Orders (Framework) Act. 
625. Art. 32 Custodial Institutions (Framework) Act. Art. 26 Hospital Orders (Framework) Act.
626. Art. 46d, section a Custodial Institutions (Framework) Act. Art. 16b, section a Hospital 
Orders (Framework) Act.
627. Art. 46d, section b Custodial Institutions (Framework) Act. Art. 16b, section b Hospital 
Orders (Framework) Act. See also: Gooren 2013. Bleichrodt and Vegter 2016, pp. 223-226.
628. See for example BrC 05/12/2012 – 12/2370/GA.
629. Kamerstukken II 1994/95, 24 263, no. 3, p. 53 in connection with Kamerstukken II 
1993/94, 23 445, no. 5, pp. 12-13 and Kamerstukken II 1995/96, 24 263, no. 6, p. 28. In the 
latter document, it has been stressed, with reference to the declaration of Tokyo, that the wishes of 
a competent detainee who refuses food or liquids will in principle be respected.
630. BrC 09/07/2012 – 12/0241/GA. The decision not to continue a particular treatment 
during deprivation of liberty without the detainee’s consent cannot be regarded as forced medical 
treatment, even if it had been prescribed prior to the deprivation of liberty. To ensure the carefulness 
of this decision, the penal institution’s physician should consult the physician who prescribed the 
treatment. District Court ‘s-Gravenhage 18 March 2003, ECLI:NL:RBSGR:2003:AF5929. BrC 
15/07/2003 –  02/1447/GM. BrC 05/08/2003 – 03/0895/GM. See for a different view: District 
Court ‘s-Gravenhage 15 November 1996, ECLI:NL:RBSGR:1996:AH5759, KG 1996, 384. 
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decision, the governor must consult the physician and the head of the ward where 
the detainee is admitted and, if forced treatment is considered due to the detain-
ee’s mental condition, the psychiatrist responsible for the detainee’s treatment. 
When forced medical treatment is considered, one must assess whether there are 
alternatives, for example forced medication versus the effects of long-term isola-
tion.631 Forced medical treatment may only be performed by a physician or, under 
his authority, by a nurse.632 The legislator stated that the responsibility of the Min-
ister and the governor for the health of the detainee may justify forced medical 
treatment. Article 32 Custodial Institutions (Framework) Act has been introduced 
considering the increasing number of detainees with severe mental disorders dis-
turbing the order in penal institutions.633 This provision is formulated in quite 
general terms, without making a distinction between competent or incompetent 
detainees. It also leaves room for discussion and interpretation.634 The provision 
is, considering the legislative history, meant for forced medical treatment due to 
the (indirect) danger a detainee poses for the health or safety of others, for exam-
ple if force-feeding is considered necessary in case an incompetent detainee starts 
and persists in a hunger and/or thirst strike. Amendment of this Article is in my 
view required if this provision is to be used in other situations than defined in the 
legislative history to ensure the foreseeability required under Article 8 §2 ECHR, 
especially considering the far-reaching consequences.
In addition to the situations covered by Article 32, Article 46d Custodial In-
stitutions (Framework) Act authorises to apply medical treatment for a detainee’s 
mental health condition as ultimate means, without the consent of the patient 
(or his representative),635 and without agreement on the treatment plan. Forced 
treatment type A can be applied if the danger caused by the detainee’s mental 
illness can probably not be averted within a reasonable term without the medical 
District Court Amsterdam 13 February 1997, TvGR 1997/46. District Court ‘s-Gravenhage 16 
August 1996, KG 1996, 291 and DD 1997, 27, 6, p. 585.
631. Art. 22a §§1-3 Prison Rules. Art. 34 Hospital Orders (Care) Regulations.
632. Art. 32 §1 Custodial Institutions (Framework) Act. Art. 26 §1 Hospital Orders (Framework) 
Act.
633. Kamerstukken II 1994/95, 24 263, no. 3, p. 53.
634. See among others: Jacobs 2012, pp. 228-229.
635. This does therefore not necessarily mean that physical restraint is used to administer 
medication; a detainee is also treated under duress if the detainee does not have an actual choice 
but is forced against his will to take medication as the detainee is made clear that if he does not 
ingest the medication orally, it will be administered by injection. BrC 31/10/2016 – 16/2220/
TA. See with regard to the difference between forced treatment and acceptable persuasion: BrC 
02/12/2010 – 10/2277/TA and 10/1564/TA.
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treatment. The medical treatment must be included in the treatment plan.636 Dan-
ger relates to danger for the detainee,637 danger for one or more other people,638 
and danger for the general safety of persons or objects.639 Forced treatment type 
A is not only possible if the danger exists within the institution, but also if the 
danger would arise outside the institution.640 Within the Prison System, forced 
treatment type A can only be administered in a special care unit (PPC).641 Forced 
treatment type A can be applied when it is plausible that, without the treatment, 
the danger cannot be removed within a reasonable term, which means that the 
detainee has to stay within the special care unit (i.e. PPC) for an unnecessarily 
long period, which would be damaging for a psychiatric patient. The aim is to 
provide the detainee with the necessary care to recover and to return to a regular 
unit within a penal institution as soon as possible.642 The governor can only decide 
about forced treatment type A if he has a statement of the attending psychiatrist 
and of a psychiatrist who examined the detainee but was not involved in the treat-
ment of the detainee, holding that the detainee suffers from a mental condition, 
and that without the proposed treatment the danger the illness causes cannot be 
averted within a reasonable term.643
636. Art. 46d, section a in connection with art. 46c, section a Custodial Institutions (Framework) 
Act. Art. 16b, section a in connection with art. 16a, section a Hospital Orders (Framework) Act. 
Art. 38c §1, section a in connection with art. 38b Psychiatric Hospitals (Compulsory Admissions) 
Act.
637. Including the risk of suicide or the risk that the detainee will severely and physically harm 
himself, the danger that the detainee will go down socially, the danger of severe self-neglect, or the 
danger that the detainee provokes aggression by others due to his disturbing behaviour. Art. 46a, 
section 1 Custodial Institutions (Framework) Act. The risk that the person will go and wander 
and may commit theft does not fulfil the criterion of danger laid down in the aforementioned 
provision. BrC 20/06/2016 – 16/1331/GA. See furthermore: Art. 1, section t.1 Hospital Orders 
(Framework) Act. Art. 1, section f.1 Psychiatric Hospitals (Compulsory Admissions) Act.
638. Including the danger that the detainee will take a person’s life or will cause severe physical 
harm to another person, danger for the mental health of another person, or the danger that the 
detainee will neglect a person who is left in the detainee’s care. Art. 46a §2 Custodial Institutions 
(Framework) Act. Art. 1, section t.2 Hospital Orders (Framework) Act. Art. 1, section f.2 
Psychiatric Hospitals (Compulsory Admissions) Act.
639. Art. 46a §3 Custodial Institutions (Framework) Act. Art. 1, section t.3 Hospital Orders 
(Framework) Act. Art. 1, section f.3 Psychiatric Hospitals (Compulsory Admissions) Act.
640. Kamerstukken I 2011/12, 32 337, C, p. 6.
641. Kamerstukken II 2009/10, 32 337, no. 3, pp. 13, 25-26. Stb. 2013, 99, p. 22. See art. 
14 §2 Custodial Institutions (Framework) Act and the position of chapter VIII, §1a Custodial 
Institutions (Framework) Act. This is not laid down in the Hospital Orders (Framework) Act.
642. Kamerstukken II 2009/10, 32 337, no. 3, pp. 13-14. 
643. Art. 46e §§1-2 Custodial Institutions (Framework) Act. Art. 16c §§1-2 Hospital Orders 
(Framework) Act. See furthermore BrC 03/12/2013 – 13/2542/GA and 13/2699/GA: the 
BrC recommended that, to ensure the independence of the assessment, the psychiatrist who is 
not involved in the detainee’s treatment should not be employed in the PPC involved, nor be 
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Forced treatment type B is possible as ultimate means if the physician is of the 
opinion that it is absolutely necessary to avert a danger caused by the detainee’s 
mental condition. The governor is authorised to decide.644 The treatment must be 
included in the treatment plan.645 As with the forced medical treatment pursu-
ant to Article 32 Custodial Institutions (Framework) Act, forced treatment type 
B is intended for acute (emergency) situations within the institution.646 Forced 
treatment type B can, as opposed to forced medical treatment, only be applied in 
a PPC.647 Another difference with forced medical treatment is that both forced 
treatment type A and forced treatment type B require a causal connection be-
tween the mental illness and the danger, which is not required for forced medical 
treatment pursuant to Article 32.648 Forced medical treatment is only allowed as 
last resort and the principles of proportionality, subsidiarity and efficiency must 
be observed, which means that the least intrusive measure must be applied and as 
short as possible and this measure must be effective considering the circumstanc-
es.649 The aforementioned provisions to enforce treatment on a detainee fulfil the 
requirements under the ECHR, namely that there must be a medical necessity 
to intervene that is assessed by a physician (including psychiatrists) and there 
must be procedural safeguards to take the decision to enforce a measure upon a 
detainee.650
If a detainee held by the police refuses healthcare although there are indications 
that he is in need of such care, the police custody officer must consult a physician.651 
responsible for the care for the detainees in the PPC. At least one year should have gone by between 
the request to advise about forced treatment and the last treatment by the psychiatrist before 
that psychiatrist can be regarded as no longer be involved in the treatment of the patient. See 
however BrC 29/05/2015 – 15/0484/TA: psychiatrist who is not involved in the treatment may 
nevertheless be employed in the same institution as the attending psychiatrist. See also: Supreme 
Court 8 November 2013, ECLI:NL:HR:2013:1138. See also BrC 11/10/2016 – 16/2458/GA: 
second psychiatric assessment should be made by psychiatrist not employed in the PPC involved. 
644. Art. 46d, section b Custodial Institutions (Framework) Act. Art. 16b, section b Hospital 
Orders (Framework) Act.
645. Art. 46d in connection with art. 46c, section a Custodial Institutions (Framework) Act. Art. 
16b, section b in connection with art. 16a, section a Hospital Orders (Framework) Act.
646. Kamerstukken I 2011/12, 32 337, C, p. 6.
647. Kamerstukken II 2009/10, 32 337, no. 3, p. 13. Stb. 2013, 99, p. 22.
648. Kamerstukken I 2011/12, 32 337, C, p. 6.
649. Kamerstukken II 2009/10, 32 337, no. 3, pp. 6, 8. Art. 39 Psychiatric Hospitals (Compulsory 
Admissions) Act furthermore authorises the use of compulsory measures in temporary emergency 
cases caused by the patient due to his mental illness, including isolation, restraining, administering 
medication and force-feeding. Art. 2 Decree compulsory measures Psychiatric Hospitals 
(Compulsory Admissions). 
650. ECtHR 5 April 2005, no. 54825/00, §§93-96 (Nevmerzhitsky v. Ukraine).
651. Art. 32 §3 Official Instructions for the Police.
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It is the physician’s responsibility to determine what should happen subsequent-
ly.652 No further instructions are developed on how to deal with detainees who are 
held by the police and who refuse treatment, which means that the general prin-
ciples laid down in the Medical Treatment Contracts Act apply; healthcare may 
only be provided with the patient’s informed consent,653 or if the patient is not 
capable to decide for himself (incompetent), the informed consent of the repre-
sentative,654 unless immediate action is necessary to prevent severe harm to the 
patient and there is no time to obtain the consent of the representative.655
5.5.2. Hunger and/or thirst strike656
Pursuant to the Medical Treatment Contracts Act, no medical intervention is al-
lowed without the consent of the person concerned if the person in question is 
on a hunger and/or thirst strike, provided that he is capable to decide for himself 
(competent).657 If a patient is not competent to decide, his representative must 
consent to any medical intervention.658 During the parliamentary history of the 
Custodial Institutions (Framework) Act, it has been stated that if a person detained 
in a penal institution is capable to decide, his decision to start a hunger and/or 
thirst strike must be respected. The detainee’s competence to decide must be con-
firmed by one other independent physician and the detainee must be informed 
about the possible consequences of refusing food and/or liquids. If the detainee 
is incompetent, force-feeding can be applied pursuant to Article 32 Custodial In-
stitutions (Framework) Act.659 The principle of representation as laid down in the 
Medical Treatment Contracts Act is under these circumstances not applicable, as 
Article 32 Custodial Institutions (Framework) Act can be regarded as a lex spe-
cialis with regard to the aforecited Act. If a competent detainee goes on hunger 
and/or thirst strike and is subsequently no longer capable to decide, an advance 
directive drawn up while the detainee was still competent should be respected.660 
As rightly stressed by Jacobs, Article 32 Custodial Institutions (Framework) Act 
652. Explanatory memorandum on the Official Instructions for the Police, Royal Military 
Constabulary and Special Investigating Officers, Stb. 1994, 275, p. 26. 
653. Art. 448 in connection with 450 Medical Treatment Contracts Act. Art. 466 §1 Medical 
Treatment Contracts Act.
654. Art. 465 §§2-4 Medical Treatment Contracts Act.
655. Art. 466 §1 Medical Treatment Contracts Act. 
656. See also: Jacobs 2012. Kelk 2014 (discussion of book Jacobs).
657. Art. 450 §1 Medical Treatment Contracts Act.
658. Art. 465 §3 Medical Treatment Contracts Act.
659. Kamerstukken II 1995/96, 24 263, no. 6, p. 28.
660. Art. 450 §3 Medical Treatment Contracts Act. See also: Jacobs 2012, p. 231.
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cannot be the legal basis to enforce force-feeding if a competent detainee goes on 
hunger and/or thirst strike,661 which is confirmed by the 1985 circular of the State 
Secretary. This circular also stresses that the authorities must offer healthcare to 
prevent the harmful effects of the strike (such as bedsores) as much as possible.662 
Throughout the years, several organisations have emphasised that no medical in-
tervention should be applied if a competent detainee starts a hunger and/or thirst 
strike.663 The Minister of Justice took a different stand after the killing of Pim 
Fortuyn, when the force-feeding of the suspect of this crime became a hot issue. 
The Minister stated that force-feeding of a detainee on hunger and/or thirst strike 
was possible pursuant to Article 32 Custodial Institutions (Framework) Act; the 
will of the detainee should be balanced against the public interest, such as pro-
tecting legal order by uninterrupted court proceedings. The legislator announced 
to draft a new circular, holding the new, more broader view on force-feeding.664 
Up till now, no new circular has been drafted. The 1985 Circular is therefore 
still in effect.665 Noteworthy is that in 2013 the Council of State concluded that 
force-feeding of detainees in immigrant detention was possible pursuant to Article 
32 Custodial Institutions (Framework) Act.666 Jacobs rightly responded that this 
conclusion was based on an incomplete and at certain points incorrect account 
of the legal reality on force-feeding of detainees on a hunger strike.667 Article 32 
Custodial Institutions (Framework) Act is not written to provide a ground for ap-
plying force-feeding on detainees who are capable to decide for themselves. The 
Custodial Institutions Agency furthermore adheres to the guidelines issued by the 
Johannes Wier Stichting,668 that hold the principle that a competent detainee’s 
decision to start and persist in a hunger and/or thirst strike should be respected 
if that decision is taken freely and with full understanding of the consequences. 
The Johannes Wier Stichting also issued a guideline on the medical guidance dur-
ing a hunger and/or thirst strike and on the role and responsibilities of a trusted 
661. Jacobs 2012, pp. 228-229.
662. Circular State Secretary of Justice,  4 December 1985, no. 799/385.
663. Johannes Wier Stichting, file hunger and/thirst strike. Available at: https://www.
johannes-wier.nl/bijzondere-dossiers/honger-en-dorststaking/. Last accessed: 25 April 2017. 
Royal Dutch Medical Association 2002.
664. Aanhangsel Handelingen II 2002/03, 473. Aanhangsel Handelingen II 2002/03, 474. Earlier, 
the Minister of Justice was more restraint on this subject. Aanhangsel Handelingen II 2001/02, 
1547 Herdruk.
665. Jacobs 2012. She refers to a judgment of the Appeal Commission, who has concluded that 
circulars without a limited period of validity remain in force until they have been withdrawn. BrC 
23/12/1996 – A 96/515, Sancties 1997/37.
666. Council of State 2013.
667. Jacobs 2013.
668. Custodial Institutions Agency 2016e.
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physician.669 The guideline of the Custodial Institutions Agency on detainees who 
refuse food and liquids stresses that the physician, psychologist and psychiatrist 
must be informed of the strike, the guidance of a trusted physician should be of-
fered to the detainee and accurate recording should be ensured. If the detainee 
persists in the strike after the first day, it should be determined whether the strike 
stems from psychiatric problems. If so, he should be presented to a Penal Psychi-
atric Centre after two days of refusing liquids, or after six days of refusing food. If 
the strike does not seem to stem from psychiatric problems, the detainee should 
be presented to the Judicial Centre for Somatic Care or a civilian hospital after 
two days of refusing liquids, or after six days of refusing food. The guideline does 
not provide instructions how to deal with a strike after this period (in the Penal 
Psychiatric Centre or Judicial Centre for Somatic Care).670
The National regulations on the care for police custody detainees prescribe that if 
a detainee persists in refusing food for more than 48 hours, a physician should be 
consulted.671 The legislation and regulations applicable on deprivation of liberty 
by the police do not provide any further provisions on detainees on hunger and/
or thirst strike. Therefore, the basic principles laid down in the Medical Treatment 
Contracts Act apply (informed consent, involvement of representative if patient 
is not capable to decide).
5.5.3. Stop eating and drinking to hasten the end of life
The Royal Dutch Medical Association and the Dutch Association of Nurses have 
developed a guideline on how to care for competent persons who consciously 
decide to stop eating and drinking to hasten the end of their life. Though the 
guideline does not address the issue whether no longer taking food and liquids 
is the appropriate pathway, it has stressed that this decision is a choice each and 
every one can and may make for themselves. The guideline does however advise 
persons under the age of 60 years old who do not suffer from a life-threatening 
illness not to choose for stopping with eating and drinking to hasten one’s end 
of life. The decision to stop eating and drinking is furthermore compared with 
the refusal to receive a proposed treatment which will result in death and is not 
regarded as suicide, but as a patient who exercises his right to self-determination, 
669. Johannes Wier Stichting, file hunger and/thirst strike. Available at: https://www.
johannes-wier.nl/bijzondere-dossiers/honger-en-dorststaking/. Last accessed: 25 April 2017.
670. Custodial Institutions Agency 2014e. See about the procedure in the latter centre: BrC 
31/05/2012 – 12/0298/GA and 12/0334/GA.
671. National Police 2016, p. 10.
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more specifically the right to refuse care. The health care provider must inform the 
patient about possible consequences and should care for the person in question, or 
assign the patient to a colleague if the health care provider has objections. The role 
of the health care provider is to adequately and proportionately relieve the suffer-
ing of the patient and cannot be regarded as assisted suicide. A person who stops 
eating and drinking dies from a natural cause. The guideline does not include sit-
uations where a person stops eating and drinking as a symptom of psychological 
or psychiatric problems or who is compulsory treated pursuant to the Psychiatric 
Hospitals (Compulsory Admissions) Act.672
The situation that a competent detainee stops eating and drinking to hasten 
the end of life during deprivation of liberty has up till now not been raised before 
the ECtHR. Following the line developed for hunger and/or thirst strikes implies 
that there is no obligation to intervene in case of a competent detainee, provided 
that the authorities carefully assess the situation and act with care.673 This issue 
has also not been addressed for deprivation of liberty by the State in the Nether-
lands; no specific guidelines have been developed to deal with the situation where 
a (competent) detainee stops eating and drinking to hasten his end of life. Ob-
serving the principle of equivalence of care would mean that the aforementioned 
guideline of the Royal Dutch Medical Association and the Dutch Association of 
Nurses applies. Following this guideline means that the decision of a competent 
detainee to stop eating and drinking would be respected. This approach would, in 
my view, not lead to a violation of the ECHR.
5.5.4. Suicide
Suicide is not prohibited under Dutch criminal law. The basic principle emerg-
ing in Dutch (case) law is that a valid advance directive containing a refusal to 
be treated, written by a person who is capable to decide for himself (competent) 
should in principle be respected, even if the person in question committed a su-
icide attempt.674 This means that a person who is capable to decide for himself 
(competent) should not be deprived of the freedom to take his own life, which 
corresponds with the ECtHR’s point of view that Article 8 §1 ECHR encompasses 
672. Royal Dutch Medical Association and Dutch Association of Nurses 2014, pp. 19 et seq, 27.
673. ECtHR 26 March 2013, no. 73175/10, §51 (Rappaz v. Switzerland). ECtHR 31 March 
2009, no. 1639/03, §§28-30 (Horoz v. Turkey).
674. District Court Zwolle 13 December 1989, TvGr 1990/63. Court of Appeal Arnhem 23 July 
1991, TvGr 1993/66. Art. 450 §3 Medical Treatment Contracts Act. Kamerstukken II 1999/00, 
26 885, no. 1, p. 9. CTG 19 April 2007, TvGR 2007/20. See also: Moratti and Vezzoni 2011, pp. 
292-298. 
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the right to decide by what means, and at what point, his life will end, provided 
that the person in question is capable of freely reaching a decision on this mat-
ter and is acting in consequence. State authorities must prevent a suicide if this 
decision “(…) has not been taken freely and with full understanding of what is 
involved”.675 
The applicable principles during deprivation of liberty are however different. 
Dutch law contains several possibilities to interfere if necessary to protect the de-
tainee against himself. These possibilities will be discussed in the following. The 
aim in the Netherlands is to prevent suicides among detainees as much as possible, 
which corresponds with the obligation under the ECHR to try to avert a real and 
immediate suicide risk in relation to an individual detainee.676 Noteworthy is that 
the right to self-determination does not emerge in the Dutch legal framework on 
suicide prevention during deprivation of liberty. This is clearly illustrated by the 
instruction on how to deal with a DNR of a detainee; the instruction expects in-
tervention if it appears that a detainee has committed suicide though is wearing 
a DNR necklace. That the right to self-determination does not explicitly emerge 
in cases involving suicide among detainees was also observed in the ECtHR’s case 
law.677
Basic precautions to prevent suicide
A medical screening on admission in prison is in view of the ECtHR a minimum 
precautionary measure to prevent suicide.678 As discussed in section 5.4.1., it is 
practice in Dutch penal institutions to perform a medical screening on admis-
sion, though it is not laid down in legislation. The content of the screening is also 
not regulated in law. Safeguards as to the discipline qualified to assess the detain-
ee’s state of mind can be found in the Dutch disciplinary law. A nurse does not 
have the expertise to assess the state of mind (and therefore the suicide risk) of a 
detainee and must be reserved in making such assessments. Comprehensive infor-
mation on the detainee’s background is furthermore regarded to be important for 
assessing the detainee’s state of mind.679 
Routine monitoring must be performed in prison, though it has not been 
defined in the ECtHR’s case law what is considered to be routine monitoring.680 
675. ECtHR 20 January 2011, no. 31322/07, §§51, 54 (Haas v. Switzerland).
676. ECtHR 3 April 2001, no. 27229/95, §93 (Keenan v. UK).
677. For example: ECtHR 5 July 2005, no. 49790/99, §69 (Trubnikov v. Russia).
678. ECtHR 4 February 2016, no. 58828/13, §§39, 45 (Isenc v. France).
679. RTG ‘s-Gravenhage 26 August 2014, ECLI:NL:TGZRSGR:2014:97; 
ECLI:NL:TGZRSGR:2014:96.
680. ECtHR 11 April 2006, no. 52392/99, §87 (Uçar v. Turkey).
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The Dutch legislator has not regulated the manner in which detainees in penal in-
stitutions should be monitored. The Council for the Administration of Criminal 
Justice and Protection of Juveniles did formulate the criterion that staff members 
must respond to the call of a detainee from his cell within 10 minutes.681 
The Custodial Institutions (Framework) Act does contain provisions regarding 
the objects detainees are allowed to have in their possession. Firstly, the gover-
nor has to develop house rules for the penal institution or the unit. The Minister 
has developed a model for these house rules.682 The house rules must contain 
provisions on the objects the detainees are allowed to possess within the institu-
tion.683 The possession of specific objects may be prohibited if necessary to ensure 
the order or safety within the institution.684 The Custodial Institutions Agency 
has developed a list of objects detainees are allowed to have in their cell. Basic 
principle is that the detainee is allowed to wear his own clothes (except for the 
Judicial Centre for Somatic Care).685 The governor is authorised to search the cell 
of the detainee for forbidden objects.686 The governor is also authorised to search 
a detainee on his body or clothing at his entrance or when leaving the penal in-
stitution, before or after a visit, or if otherwise necessary to maintain the order or 
safety within the institution. The governor is authorised to confiscate forbidden 
objects found during these searches.687 Another competence of the governor is to 
decide that a detainee is subjected to an internal examination of his body if nec-
essary to avert a danger affecting the order or safety in the institution or to avert 
a danger for the detainee’s health. The governor is authorised to confiscate forbid-
den objects that are found during the examination and that can be removed out 
of the detainee’s body.688 
681. Council for the Administration of Criminal Justice and Protection of Juveniles 2015, p. 14.
682. Art. 5 §1 Custodial Institutions (Framework) Act. Art. 7 §1 Hospital Orders (Framework) 
Act. See also: Bleichrodt and Vegter 2016, pp. 244-246.
683. Model Regulations Penal Institutions, appendix, p. 17. Model Regulations judicial 
institutions for hospital orders with compulsory treatment. The maximum security prison has its 
own house rules. EBI Model Regulations. The house rules may also contain rules on the import 
of objects like shoes or clothes, and on the right to obtain goods, like food and products that are 
available at a chemist without a prescription. The governor may restrict the volume in which such 
goods can be obtained if a large amount of goods would obstruct the possibility to inspect. BrC 
24/07/2009 – 09/1014/GA.
684. Art. 45 §1 Custodial Institutions (Framework) Act. Art. 44 §2 Hospital Orders (Framework) 
Act. Art. 36 §3 Psychiatric Hospitals (Compulsory Admissions) Act.
685. Custodial Institutions Agency 2014. Custodial Institutions Agency 2016b.
686. Art. 34 Custodial Institutions (Framework) Act. Art. 29 Hospital Orders (Framework) Act.
687. Art. 29 §§1, 4 Custodial Institutions (Framework) Act. Art. 23 §§1, 4 Hospital Orders 
(Framework) Act.
688. Art. 31 §§1, 3 Custodial Institutions (Framework) Act. Art. 25 §§1, 3 Hospital Orders 
(Framework) Act.
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In 1999, the Health Care Inspectorate stated that every penal institution must 
have a protocol on suicide prevention and prison officers must receive training on 
how to deal with suicide risks and to prevent suicidal behaviour.689 This subject has 
not been discussed in more recent reports of the Inspectorate on medical services of 
penal institutions,690 which raises the question whether the Inspectorate’s view has 
been changed on this matter. Pursuant to the principle of equivalence of care, health 
care providers working in penal institutions are expected to observe the general 
guidelines on suicide prevention developed by the Dutch Association of Psychiatry, 
Dutch Association of Psychologists and Dutch Association of Nurses.691
Persons held by the police are not medically screened on admission at a police sta-
tion. Practice shows that police custody officers perform a brief screening when 
the detainee enters the police station, by asking whether the detainee is ill, uses 
medication, has mental problems and/or an addiction. The jurisprudence of the 
ECtHR shows that certain basic precautions are required to prevent suicide dur-
ing deprivation of liberty by the police, i.e. to search the detainee before he is 
locked in, to store sharp objects, belts and shoe laces, to supervise the detainees 
regularly,692 and not to question a detainee while being armed, unless compelling 
reasons are provided to act otherwise.693 These measures are laid down in Dutch 
regulations. The Chief of Police must ensure that police custody suites are de-
signed in such a way that detainees are not provided the opportunity to commit 
suicide.694 Furthermore, the police custody officer must search the detainee before 
he is locked in and assess whether he carries objects that might pose a danger to 
the detainee or others during deprivation of liberty. Such objects must be taken 
in storage by the police custody officer.695 Knives, other sharp objects, shoe laces, 
ties, scarves, bra’s and belts are regarded as objects that might pose a danger dur-
ing deprivation of liberty.696 Another precaution is that the police custody officer 
689. Health Care Inspectorate 1999, pp. 72, 56. The Health Care Inspectorate observed that 75% 
of the prison officers reported that they never received any training in dealing with and preventing 
suicidal behaviour of detainees.
690. See for example: Health Care Inspectorate 2009; 2011 (Arnhem, Zuid and De Berg).
691. Dutch Association of Psychiatry, Dutch Association of Psychologists and Dutch Association 
of Nurses 2012.
692. ECtHR 16 November 2000, no. 21422/93, §§74-75 (Tanribilir v. Turkey).
693. ECtHR 14 December 2010, no. 74832/01, §89 (Mižigárová v. Slovakia).
694. Art. 2 §1 Rules police custody suite.
695. Art. 28 §§1-2 Official Instructions for the Police. See also Kamerstukken I, 2012/13, 33 
112, A, article III: bill to introduce more possibilities to search a suspect before transport and 
competence to search a police custody detainee in his body. This bill has been passed, though it has 
not yet taken effect. See also: Kamerstukken I 2014/15, 34 013, no. A.
696. Explanatory memorandum on Official Instructions for the Police, Stb. 1994, 275.
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may require a detainee to undress (though provided with alternative clothing) if 
the clothing of the detainee may pose a risk to the safety of the detainee or others 
and the assistant prosecutor has given permission to enforce this measure or if the 
physician is of the opinion that the clothing may pose such a risk.697 Police cus-
tody officers are instructed to respond to a call from a police cell immediately. It is 
furthermore not allowed to wear firearms and pepper spray at places where detain-
ees are held.698 This precaution aims (among others) to protect detainees against 
themselves, for example to prevent a detainee from snatching away a firearm and 
to use it for committing suicide.
Know, or ought to know, about suicide risk
A precondition to adequately assess a suicide risk and to adequately intervene is 
that relevant information about a suicide risk is recorded and exchanged between 
the involved disciplines. Several files are kept within penal institutions, including 
a penal file,699 medical file,700 and psychological file.701 Special events regarding a 
detainee must be recorded in the penal file,702 which should in my view include 
alarming signs of a suicide risk observed by the custodial staff such as suicidal 
expressions,703 disturbed behaviour, self-harm and suicide attempts. Such signs 
should give cause to notify health care providers like the physician, nurse, psy-
chologist or psychiatrist and should also be recorded in the file that has to be kept 
by these professionals (like the medical or psychological file).704 
697. Art. 29 §§1-2 Official Instructions for the Police. 
698. National Police 2016, p. 5. See also Inspectorate Security and Justice and Health Care 
Inspectorate 2014, p. 15.
699. Art. 35 Prison Rules. Pursuant to the Hospital Orders (Framework) Act, a Hospital Orders 
Patient File must be kept. Art. 1, section w in connection with art. 29-32 Hospital Orders (Care) 
Regulations.
700. Art. 454 §1 Medical Treatment Contracts Act.
701. Pursuant to art. 454 §1 Medical Treatment Contracts Act. See for example: RTG 
‘s-Gravenhage 5 August 2014, ECLI:NL:TGZRSGR:2014:83. RTG Groningen 25 February 2014, 
ECLI:NL:TGZRGRO:2014:7.
702. Art. 37 §1, section f Prison Rules. Art. 30, section g Hospital Orders (Care) Regulations 
prescribes that other data regarding the detainee’s health and the performed actions should be 
recorded if necessary to provide adequate care in view of the hospital order. This may include 
information regarding somatic complaints. BrC 02/02/2016 – 15/3333/TA.
703. See also: RTG Groningen 25 June 2007, no. 2006/06.
704. That a suicide attempt does not always lead to a notification of health care providers was 
observed after the suicide attempt of Alexander Dolmatov. Inspectorate Security and Justice 2013 
(Dolmatov), p. 11.
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The diverging monitoring bodies expect the exchange of information between 
the involved disciplines.705 A multidisciplinary meeting between a psychiatrist, 
physician, psychologist and nurse should take place every two weeks or more of-
ten if required by the detainee’s interests.706 The results of these meetings must be 
registered in the medical file. As discussed before, every penal institution is ex-
pected to have a psycho-medical consultation.707 In my view it is not clear whether 
the multidisciplinary meeting as mentioned in Article 21a §4 Prison Rules and the 
psycho-medical consultation are separate meetings or one and the same. Practice 
in penal institutions shows that multidisciplinary meetings are also held between 
prison officers (head of the unit), nurses, social workers etcetera. During these 
meetings, the detainee’s detention and reintegration plan are, for example, dis-
cussed.708 These meetings also provide the opportunity to exchange information 
on the detainee’s condition, for example regarding a suicide risk. When profes-
sionals bound by the duty of medical confidentiality attend these meetings, they 
must, in view of the ECtHR’s case law,709 weigh which information needs to be 
shared with other disciplines to provide the necessary care. This means that if the 
medical service has detected that a detainee is at risk of suicide, they may share 
necessary information with other disciplines, such as prison officers, to ensure that 
the detainee is effectively monitored. Dutch law does not contain further provi-
sions that obliges the involved staff to notify health care providers about alarming 
signs.
Police custody officers must notify a physician if the detainee has, or seems to 
have, mental problems.710 This is in my view a safeguard to adequately assess the 
detainee’s condition and any possible suicide risk. Police custody officers must 
furthermore record their observations,711 though the Inspectorates observed that 
information about the behaviour of detainees is often not recorded in practice.712 
Relevant observations during deprivation of liberty by the police must be sent 
with the detainee in case of a transfer, just like the report of the physician intended 
705. Council for the Administration of Criminal Justice and Protection of Juveniles 2015, p. 14. 
Inspectorate Security and Justice 2015, p. 21.
706. Art. 21a §4 Prison Rules. Art. 33a §4 Hospital Orders (Care) Regulations.
707. Inspectorate Security and Justice 2015, p. 16.
708. Stcrt. 2014, no. 4617, p. 11.
709. ECtHR 19 July 2012, no. 38447/09, §82 (Ketreb v. France).
710. Art. 25 §3 Official Instructions for the Police.
711. Art. 34 §3 in connection with §1 Official Instructions for the Police.
712. Inspectorate Security and Justice, Health Care Inspectorate and Inspectorate for Youth Care 
2015, p. 13.
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for the physician who takes over the treatment of the detainee.713 The Inspectorate 
Security and Justice expects that the report that is sent with the detainee in case 
of a transfer, contains information regarding a suicide risk.714 
Reasonable measures
Dutch law does not contain much legal safeguards aimed at suicide prevention 
in penal institutions. The main provisions in this regard are the possibility to iso-
late a detainee, and to use camera surveillance and mechanical means. Isolation 
to protect the detainee may be enforced for two weeks at most.715 The decision to 
isolate a detainee for his own protection may however be prolonged repeatedly if 
necessary.716 Isolation can be enforced in an isolation cell or in another room.717 
The detainee should in principle be isolated in the detainee’s own cell, unless this 
is not possible due to the behaviour of the detainee or his physical or mental 
condition.718 An isolation cell is considerably less furnished than a regular cell. 
It does not have a toilet, bed or cupboards.719 A detainee placed in an isolation 
cell is provided with a seating unit or with a mattress and sufficient blankets.720 
The detainee is furthermore not allowed to have objects in his possession during 
his stay in an isolation cell, unless the governor determines otherwise.721 During 
the detainee’s stay in an isolation cell, the detainee is provided with clothing by the 
government (suicide-proof clothing), though the governor may decide otherwise 
713. Art. 35 Official Instructions for the Police.
714. Inspectorate Security and Justice and Health Care Inspectorate 2014, p. 16.
715. Art. 24 §1 in connection with art. 23 §1, section b Custodial Institutions (Framework) Act. 
Art. 34 §1 in connection with art. 32 §1 Hospital Orders (Framework) Act. Art. 34 §2 Hospital 
Orders (Framework) Act determines that a detainee may be isolated for four weeks. Art. 39 §§1-2 
Psychiatric Hospitals (Compulsory Admissions) Act in connection with art. 2, sub a-b Decree 
compulsory measures Psychiatric Hospitals (Compulsory Admissions). Art. 3 of the last-mentioned 
decree determines that these measures can be applied for 7 days at most. See with regard to isolation 
furthermore: Daniëls 2014.
716. Art. 24 §3 Custodial Institutions (Framework) Act. Pursuant to art. 34 §4 Hospital Orders 
(Framework) Act, the isolation may again and again be extended for four weeks with authorisation 
of the Minister.
717. Art. 24 §2 Custodial Institutions (Framework) Act. The Hospital Orders (Framework) Act 
distinguishes isolation in the detainee’s own room or in a room specifically designated for isolation. 
Art. 1, section aa and bb Hospital Orders (Framework) Act.
718. Art. 3, section b-c Rules on punishment and isolation cell penal institutions. The Rules 
on rights during isolation (based on the Hospital Orders (Framework) Act) do not contain such 
provisions.
719. Art. 11 Rules punishment and isolation cell penal institutions.
720. Art. 19 Rules punishment and isolation cell penal institutions.
721. Art. 23 Rules punishment and isolation cell penal institutions.
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in special circumstances.722 Special tableware is provided with each meal and taken 
from the detainee directly after each meal.723 The detainee must be searched on 
his body and clothes before he is placed in an isolation cell.724 Health care per-
sonnel must furthermore be involved when a detainee is placed in an isolation 
cell and the placement exceeds 24 hours.725 The Health Care Inspectorate requires 
that an isolated detainee726 is medically examined on a daily basis by a physician 
or a nurse, including during the weekends. The detainee needs to be examined by 
a physician or psychiatrist if the nurse considers this necessary.727 If a psychiatric 
patient is isolated, a nurse or physician must, in view of the Health Care Inspec-
torate, visit the detainee within six hours.728 This standard of the Health Care 
Inspectorate corresponds with the principles under the ECHR to ensure timely 
involvement of health care staff if persons with psychiatric problems are isolat-
ed.729 The Health Care Inspectorate observed that detainees placed in an isolation 
cell were not always visited by a nurse or physician within 24 hours,730 which is a 
high risk in view of the Health Care Inspectorate. The Inspectorate Security and 
Justice also observed that isolated detainees were often not visited by medical per-
sonnel during the weekends.731 The Health Care Inspectorate furthermore requires 
that penal institutions have a protocol on isolation. All involved staff members 
should be informed about this protocol.732 
An isolated detainee may be supervised with a camera for 24 hours a day if 
necessary to protect the detainee’s mental or physical condition.733 The governor 
is authorised to decide whether camera surveillance will be applied. Before taking 
722. Art. 28 Rules punishment and isolation cell penal institutions.
723. Art. 30 Rules punishment and isolation cell penal institutions.
724. Art. 31 Rules punishment and isolation cell penal institutions.
725. Art. 24 §6 Custodial Institutions (Framework) Act. Art. 34 §5 Hospital Orders (Framework) 
Act. See however art. 4 Rules punishment and isolation cell penal institutions that prescribes that 
the physician must immediately be informed. See also section 5.4.1.
726. Though the reports refer to detained foreign nationals, I understand this word to mean 
persons detained in penal institutions.
727. Health Care Inspectorate 2011 (Achterhoek, Zutphen), p. 10.
728. Health Care Inspectorate 2011 (Achterhoek, Zutphen), pp. 10-11.
729. ECtHR 19 July 2012, no. 38447/09, §§87-99 (Ketreb v. France).
730. Health Care Inspectorate 2011 (Arnhem, Zuid and De Berg), p. 15.
731. Inspectorate Security and Justice 2012b, p. 64.
732. Health Care Inspectorate 2011 (Achterhoek, Zutphen), p. 10. Health Care Inspectorate 
2009c, p. 14. 
733. Art. 24a §1 Custodial Institutions (Framework) Act. The Inspectorate considers it to be a 
risk if no camera surveillance can be imposed during isolation. Health Care Inspectorate 2011 
(Achterhoek, Zutphen), pp. 10-11. Art. 34a §1 Hospital Orders (Framework) Act. See on the 
grounds to impose camera surveillance also: Thoonen and Duijst 2012. Bleichrodt and Vegter 
2016, pp. 229-230.
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this decision, the governor must obtain advice of a behavioural expert or the insti-
tution’s physician, unless this advice cannot be awaited. In the latter situation, the 
governor needs to obtain the advice as soon as possible.734 The camera in an iso-
lation cell must have an overview of the entire cell.735 The Inspectorate observed 
that constant supervision of the camera pictures was not always ensured, pictures 
were not always of a good quality or did not have an overview of the entire cell.736 
A person who is detained in an individual regime737 or in the maximum security 
prison may also be supervised by a camera for 24 hours a day if necessary to pro-
tect the mental or physical condition of the detainee.738 Camera surveillance in 
an individual regime or in the maximum security prison may be applied for two 
weeks at most, though the decision may again and again be prolonged with two 
weeks if necessary. Consultation of the physician or a behavioural expert is each 
time required. The physician must be informed if the camera surveillance exceeds 
24 hours.739 If camera surveillance is applied 24 hours a day, the physician or a 
behavioural expert must visit the detainee at least once a week to inform himself 
of the detainee’s condition.740 
During isolation a detainee may be restricted in his freedom of movement by 
using mechanical means if necessary to avert a danger for the detainee’s health 
that is caused by the detainee himself. This measure may be applied for 24 hours 
at most, though the governor may extend this measure again and again for 24 
hours. The physician must immediately be informed about the use of this meas-
ure. Before extending the measure, the governor must consult the physician.741 
The Rules on use mechanical means in penal institutions contain more detailed 
734. Art. 24a §2 Custodial Institutions (Framework) Act. See also art. 20 and art. 33 Rules on 
punishment and isolation cell penal institutions. Art. 34a §2 Hospital Orders (Framework) Act: 
psychiatrist or physician must advise.
735. Art. 20 §2 Rules on punishment and isolation cell penal institutions. The Rules on rights 
during isolation (based on the Hospital Orders (Framework) Act) do not contain such provision.
736. Inspectorate Security and Justice 2012b, pp. 68, 71.
737. Art. 22 §1 Custodial Institutions (Framework) Act: in an individual regime, the detainee is 
allowed to participate in activities and is locked in his cell for the remaining period.
738. Art. 34a §1, section c Custodial Institutions (Framework) Act. See about the requirement to 
obtain an advice: art. 34a §2 Custodial Institutions (Framework) Act.
739. Art. 34a §§3-4 Custodial Institutions (Framework) Act. See however art. 4 Rules on 
punishment and isolation cell penal institutions. That the decision to apply camera surveillance 
applies for two weeks at most, is a legal guarantee to ensure review of the measure. See however BrC 
16/02/2017 – 16/2838/GA: insufficient reasons to take decisions for prolonged camera surveillance.
740. Art. 10c Rules on requirements accommodation penal institutions. The Rules on requirements 
accommodation judicial institutions for the enforcement of hospital orders with compulsory 
treatment do not contain such provision.
741. Art. 33 §§1-3 Custodial Institutions (Framework) Act. Art. 27 §§1-3 Hospital Orders 
(Framework) Act. See also: Bleichrodt and Vegter 2016, pp. 226-227.
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rules, including an exhaustive account of the allowed mechanical means742 (such 
as (crash) helmet, padded gloves, wristlets attached to a belt, handcuffs and the 
safety bed).743 Multiple mechanical means can be applied concurrently if the con-
dition of the detainee requires such intervention.744 The use of mechanical means 
must satisfy the criterion of proportionality (it should only restrict the detainee’s 
freedom of movement as far as necessary to avert the danger for his health or safe-
ty)745 and subsidiarity (there is no less intrusive alternative).746 The governor must 
develop a protocol on the use of mechanical means, which should contain in 
any case provisions on how to record about the detainee’s condition, the manner 
in which the staff will be trained periodically about the use of these means and 
which staff member will be assigned to take care for, and monitor, the detainee’s 
condition.747 If mechanical means are used, the last-mentioned staff member must 
inform himself about the condition of the detainee at least every hour and he 
must record his observations. The physician must inform himself of the condition 
of the detainee at least once a day. If the report of the staff member or the findings 
of the physician give reasons to do so, though in any case twice every 24 hours, 
the governor must assess whether mechanical means with less far-reaching conse-
quences for the freedom of movement can be applied or the use of these means 
can be terminated. The governor must consult the physician on these occasions.748 
If a suicidal detainee is transported, one must pay extra attention to objects 
like a belt and shoelaces etcetera when performing a body search. One must pay 
attention to objects that can be regarded as dangerous.749 The Custodial Insti-
tutions Agency prescribes that medication should be distributed per moment of 
ingestion if the detainee is considered to be suicidal.750 The foregoing shows that 
safeguards are laid down in law, in policy of the Custodial Institutions Agency 
and in the standards of the Health Care Inspectorate to respond to a suicide risk, 
though these provisions are mainly aimed at preventing access to physical means 
which can be used to commit suicide. 
742. Art. 2 §1 Rules on use mechanical means in penal institutions/on patients.
743. Appendix Rules on use mechanical means in penal institutions/on patients.
744. Art. 2 §2 Rules on use mechanical means in penal institutions/on patients.
745. Art. 3 §1 Rules on use mechanical means in penal institutions/on patients.
746. BrC 12/02/2015 – 14/3309/GA.
747. Art. 5 §§1-2 Rules on use mechanical means in penal institutions/on patients.
748. Art. 6 §§1-3 Rules on use mechanical means in penal institutions/on patients.
749. Art. 16 §4, section a-b Instruction on the transport of detainees by the Service Transport & 
Support.
750. Custodial Institutions Agency 2010b.
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The Official Instructions for the Police also contain provisions aimed at averting 
suicides. As stressed above, a physician should be notified if a detainee has, or 
seems to have, mental problems or if there are indications that he is in need of 
medical care.751 Furthermore, if it is reasonable to assume that a detainee might 
try to commit suicide, the physician or psychiatrist must be consulted.752 If the 
physician is called but has not yet arrived, the detainee needs to be observed every 
15 minutes753 and if medical care is provided, the detainee must be observed as of-
ten as the physician has advised.754 The detainee should immediately be placed in 
a cell with camera surveillance (after permission of the assistant prosecutor) if a 
suicide attempt is expected.755
The foregoing shows that the Dutch legal framework contains safeguards to pre-
vent suicide among detainees, although a system to ensure exchange of necessary 
information regarding a suicide risk within judicial institutions and between di-
verging establishments (such as police custody suites, courts, penal institutions) 
should be further developed and implemented in practice.
5.5.5. Euthanasia and assisted suicide
As discussed in chapter 4, Member States have a wide margin of appreciation 
to weigh the different interests at stake when euthanasia and assisted suicide are 
considered. The basic principle in Dutch law is that both euthanasia and assisted 
suicide are criminal offences. Euthanasia is the act of deliberately ending a person’s 
life on that person’s request.756 Article 293 §1 of the Dutch Penal Code prohibits 
ending a person’s life intentionally on that person’s explicit request. Assisted su-
icide, i.e. deliberately assisting a person to end his life at that person’s request,757 
is prohibited in Article 294 §2 Dutch Penal Code. Both euthanasia and assisted 
suicide are not criminally punishable if: 1) performed by a physician, and 2) the 
requirements listed in Article 2 Termination of Life on Request and Assisted 
751. Art. 25 §3 and art. 32 §1 Official Instructions for the Police.
752. National Police 2016, pp. 18, 12. Inspectorate Security and Justice and Health Care 
Inspectorate 2014, p. 20. 
753. Art. 34 §1, section a Official Instructions for the Police.
754. Art. 34 §1, section b Official Instructions for the Police.
755. National Police 2016, p. 18. Inspectorate Security and Justice and Health Care Inspectorate 
2014, p. 20. Camera surveillance may be applied if the detainee needs to be monitored continuously 
considering a danger for his life or safety. The police custody officer must record that this measure 
is applied. Art. 31 §§1-2 Official Instructions for the Police.
756. Leenen et al 2014, p. 394. See with regard to euthanasia in the Netherlands also: Pans 2006.
757. Leenen et al 2014, p. 394.
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Suicide (Review Procedure) Act are satisfied.758 The following requirements have 
to be fulfilled: 
The physician:
I. must be convinced that the patient has made a voluntary and well-considered 
decision;
II. must be convinced that there is no hope of improvement and that the pa-
tient suffers unbearably;
III. informs the patient about his condition and his prospects;
IV. and the patient are convinced that there is no other acceptable option in 
view of the patient’s condition;
V. must consult at least one other independent physician, who must personally 
visit the patient and must give his written judgment on the patient’s eligibil-
ity for euthanasia according to the aforementioned criteria;
VI. performs the termination of life or the assisted suicide in a medically sound 
manner.759
These requirements are also examined by a review committee after euthanasia 
or assisted suicide has been performed.760 A code of practice has been devel-
oped for this examination.761 Noteworthy is the judgment of the Court of Appeal 
Arnhem-Leeuwarden involving a man who assisted his 99 year old mother, who 
had a persistent death wish and had been saving medication herself, in commit-
ting suicide. The Court of Appeal concluded that this suspect was not punishable. 
Although the suspect was not a physician, the Court of Appeal nevertheless ap-
plied the criteria for euthanasia and assisted suicide.762 By applying this approach, 
examination/review of these cases is not ensured as only physicians are obliged to 
report euthanasia and assisted suicide. The approach of the Court of Appeal does 
in my view not fulfil the requirements arising from the ECHR that everyone’s 
right to life shall be protected by law, nor does it fulfil the State’s obligation to 
provide protection to vulnerable persons.763
758. See also ZonMw 2007 and ZonMw 2012.
759. If euthanasia or assisted suicide is performed, a number of steps have to be taken. These steps 
will be discussed in chapter 7.
760. Art. 8 §1 Termination of Life on Request and Assisted Suicide (Review Procedure) Act. See 
furthermore Mevis et al 2014: study on advance directives of patients who are no longer competent 
to decide about euthanasia.
761. Regional Euthanasia Review Committees 2015b. See also Nys 2015.
762. Court of Appeal Arnhem-Leeuwarden 13 May 2015, ECLI:NL:GHARL:2015:3444. See 
also GJ 2015/86, with commentary from Schalken. Mevis and Postma 2016. An appeal with the 
Supreme Court has been lodged in this case.
763. ECtHR 20 January 2011, no. 31322/07, §54 (Haas v. Switzerland).
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The aim of the Termination of Life on Request and Assisted Suicide (Review 
Procedures) Act is to provide legal certainty to physicians and patients.764 Pa-
tients do not have a right to euthanasia or assisted suicide; a patient merely has 
the possibility to ask for euthanasia or assisted suicide.765 The physician is never 
obliged to cooperate with a request for euthanasia or assisted suicide,766 though 
as a good health care provider he must not abandon his patient. This may imply 
that the physician refers the patient to a physician who may be willing to perform 
euthanasia or assisted suicide.767 Preferably, the physician who performs the eu-
thanasia or assisted suicide has treated the patient, though this is not an obligatory 
requirement.768 
Hendriks has examined the Dutch legislation on euthanasia in view of the 
ECHR. He concludes that all criteria laid down in the Termination of Life on Re-
quest and Assisted Suicide (Review Procedures) Act correspond with the ECHR. In 
his view, the following criteria correspond with the principle of self-determination 
arising from Article 8 ECHR: I) ‘voluntary and well-considered decision’, III) 
‘informs the patient about his condition and his prospects’, and IV) ‘no other ac-
ceptable option in view of the patient’s condition’. The criteria that aim to prevent 
violation of Article 2 ECHR are: II) ‘unbearable suffering’, IV) ‘no other accept-
able option in view of the patient’s condition’ and V) ‘consultation of at least one 
other independent physician’. The criterion that the termination of life or assisted 
suicide is performed in a medically sound manner aims to prevent an inhuman 
treatment (Article 3 ECHR) or other forms of unprofessional conduct (Article 8 
ECHR). Hendriks nevertheless observes several problematic aspects in the Dutch 
legislation on euthanasia. He stresses, among others, that more stringent require-
ments should be set when persons with mental problems or dementia request for 
euthanasia or assisted suicide.769
764. Kamerstukken II 1998/99, 26 691, no. 3, p. 1, 7. See also Hendriks 2014.
765. Shaw and Elger stress in this regard: “The principle of equivalence dictates that prisoners 
with terminal illnesses should be able to obtain assistance in suicide in a way equivalent to patients 
suffering from the same health conditions outside prison, and compassionate release should make 
this possible for most prisoners.” Shaw and Elger 2016. 
766. See also Griffiths, Bood, Weyers 1998, pp. 98-108.
767. Kamerstukken II 2000/01, 26 691, no. 9, p. 22.
768. Annual report Regional Euthanasia Review Committees 2005, p. 28.
769. Hendriks 2014, pp. 151-181. 
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Requirements examined more closely in relation to euthanasia and as-
sisted suicide during deprivation of liberty
Dutch law does not contain additional regulations for the situation that a de-
tainee requests for euthanasia or assisted suicide. There also does not exist a clear 
policy on this matter.770 An important principle is that a right to euthanasia or 
assisted suicide does not exist in the Netherlands (on the contrary, it is in princi-
ple a criminal offence). Therefore, detainees do not have a right to euthanasia or 
assisted suicide either. The question that arises in this context is whether euthana-
sia or assisted suicide is possible during deprivation of liberty. Article 2 Criminal 
Code determines that the Dutch Criminal Code is applicable to anyone who 
commits a criminal offence in the Netherlands. This includes the prohibition on 
euthanasia and assisted suicide, and the clause which determines that physicians 
who perform euthanasia or assisted suicide in accordance with the requirements 
are not punishable. Examination of the requirements for euthanasia and assisted 
suicide in case of a request of a detained person reveals however several compli-
cating factors. 
Firstly, meeting a request for euthanasia or assisted suicide of a detainee means 
that a (severe) criminal offence is committed in a judicial institution, which cre-
ates – to put it mildly – a peculiar situation considering the context and the State’s 
involvement. Although fulfilling the requirements laid down in the Termination 
of Life on Request and Assisted Suicide makes euthanasia or assisted suicide per-
formed by a physician not punishable, the context of deprivation of liberty and 
the extra vulnerability of detainees require extra care when dealing with these 
requests.
Secondly, the requirement of a voluntary and well-considered request. A vol-
untary request means that the patient has made the decision without pressure or 
influence by (a) third person(s). Euthanasia is only allowed on the patient’s own 
request and the request must be enduring. The patient must have been fully ca-
pable of making decisions (competence). If there are valid reasons to doubt the 
patient’s capacity to fully understand the meaning of the request or his physical 
770. The case law of the Appeal Commission contains an example of a detainee who requested 
for assisted suicide considering his severe mental suffering. The Appeal Commission concluded 
that the penal institution’s physician had breached Article 28 Prison Rules as he was not willing to 
at least refer the detainee to a psychiatrist, who could examine the nature and seriousness of the 
detainee’s mental suffering. BrC 08/08/2002 –  02/0840/GM. See furthermore BrC 02/09/2008 – 
08/1318/GM: request for euthanasia regarded as indication that mental healthcare was necessary. 
See also: ‘Verlangen naar de dood achter Nederlandse tralies’, Nederlands Dagblad 10 January 
2015. This article reports that a spokesman of the Ministry of Security and Justice stated that 
detainees have the same rights regarding euthanasia as people in free society. 
Death in State Custody DRUK.indd   275 13-Sep-17   2:40:15 PM
276 Chapter 5 
condition, for example due to a mental illness, a further examination must be 
performed to determine whether the decision is actually made voluntarily and 
with full understanding.771 A question that must be raised in relation to the vol-
untariness and how well-considered the request for euthanasia or assisted suicide 
is by a detainee is whether or not deprivation of liberty influences the end of life 
wish. The Dutch Association of Psychiatry (NVvP) has stressed, with regard to a 
request for euthanasia or assisted suicide of a person compulsory admitted pur-
suant to the Psychiatric Hospitals (Compulsory Admissions) Act, that it should 
be considered whether the person in question could live independently for some 
time to take away any effect of being compulsory admitted to a secure institution. 
As for persons compulsory admitted pursuant to a hospital order with compul-
sory treatment, the Dutch Association of Psychiatry has stressed that it should be 
considered whether it is advisable or necessary to end the hospital order before 
euthanasia or assisted suicide can be performed.772 Release of the person in ques-
tion may however involve a risk to others considering the danger the person in 
question may pose and seems therefore highly theoretical, especially if the person 
in question is placed pursuant to a hospital order with compulsory treatment. Af-
ter all, this measure is imposed to protect other people (or goods). 
Thirdly, the requirement of unbearable suffering. Unbearable suffering may re-
sult from pain but also from increasing dependence, loss of self and the prospect 
of a distressing death.773 Unbearable suffering without hope of improvement does 
not necessarily mean that the cause of suffering is somatic and the patient is in a 
terminal phase.774 Euthanasia or assisted suicide is also possible if the patient is 
not in a terminal phase but endures unbearable mental or physical suffering with-
out hope of improvement. A more comprehensive motivation is however required 
to substantiate the opinion that the patient suffers unbearably if the patient is 
not in a terminal phase.775 The Termination of Life on Request and Assisted Sui-
cide (Review Procedures) Act only relates to unbearable suffering resulting from a 
medical context, i.e. due to a medical classified somatic illness or mental disorder. 
It does not aim to regulate euthanasia for persons who no longer have the will 
to live/are fed up with life but do not suffer from an untreatable medical illness 
771. Kamerstukken II 1998/99, 26 691, no. 3, p. 9.
772. Dutch Association of Psychiatry 2009, pp. 53-56.
773. Kamerstukken II 1999/00, 26 691, no. 6, p. 59.
774. Supreme Court 21 June 1994, NJ 1994, 656 (Chabot), §§5.1-5.2.
775. Kamerstukken II 1993/94, 23 877, no. 1, pp. 4, 6. Supreme Court 21 June 1994, NJ 
1994, 656. Kamerstukken II 1998/99, 26 691, no. 3, p. 10. See about the required caution when 
determining whether a patient suffers unbearably due to other than somatic causes also: Supreme 
Court 21 June 1994, NJ 1994, 656 (Chabot), §§5.2. and 6.3.1.
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leading to unbearable suffering.776 After all, suffering due to a cause beyond the 
medical context falls outside the physician’s profession,777 whereas the physician is 
the only professional who can perform euthanasia or assisted suicide without be-
ing criminally liable. The Royal Dutch Medical Association has stressed that loss 
of function, loneliness and a loss of autonomy should be taken into account when 
examining a request for euthanasia.778 The Advisory Committee Schnabel, that 
examined the legal possibilities and dilemmas regarding assisted suicide for per-
sons who find themselves to have ‘completed’ life, has concluded that the current 
legal framework provides (sufficient) possibilities to take into account suffering of 
persons who find themselves to have completed life in relation to medical prob-
lems.779 Nevertheless, unbearable suffering is a highly subjective factor. Therefore, 
the examination whether the physician could reasonably conclude that the patient 
suffered unbearably should be marginal. If the suffering has for the most part a 
mental cause, an extra careful examination should be performed by the physician. 
Furthermore, the space of time can have some objectifying effects on determining 
whether the patient suffers unbearably.780 
Suffering from physical problems (for example a terminal phase of cancer) 
does not seem to be different during deprivation of liberty than in free society. 
The requirement of unbearable suffering in case of a mental illness is however 
extra problematic during deprivation of liberty as the mental suffering may be 
influenced by (the absence of future prospects due to) the deprivation of lib-
erty. This factor has been under discussion with regard to life-term prisoners who 
do not have a real prospect of release due to the absence of review in life-term 
sentences,781 and with regard to a Belgian detainee’s request for euthanasia.782 
776. Kamerstukken II 1999/00, 26 691, no. 6, p. 30. Kamerstukken I 2000/01, 26 691, no. 
137e, p. 4. Kamerstukken II 2000/01, 26 691, no. 22, pp. 59-60. Handelingen II 2000/01, 26, 
pp. 2107-2139, 2120. Handelingen II 2000/01, 27, pp. 2233- 2260, 2253-54. Kamerstukken I 
2000/01, 26 691, no. 137b, pp. 32, 34, 45-46. Handelingen I 2000/01, 27, pp. 1255-1273, 1262. 
Supreme Court 24 December 2002, ECLI:NL:HR:2002:AE8772.
777. Kamerstukken I 2000/01, 26 691, no. 137b, p. 32. Supreme Court 24 December 2002, 
ECLI:NL:HR:2002:AE8772.
778. Royal Dutch Medical Association 2011, p. 40.
779. Advisory committee completed life 2016. See for the response of the responsible ministers 
on this report: Kamerstukken II 2016/17, 32 647, no. 55. 
780. Kamerstukken II 1993/94, 23 877, no. 1, p. 5.
781. The State Secretary of Security and Justice has made proposals to introduce review of 
the life-term prison sentence. See among others: Kamerstukken II 2015/16, 29 279, no. 325. 
Kamerstukken II 2015/16, 29 279, no. 338. Kamerstukken II 2016/17, 29 279, no. 354; no. 366.
782. https://www.nrc.nl/nieuws/2015/01/05/euthanasie-achter-tralies-belgie-heeft-d
e-primeur-1455289-a24513. Last accessed: 17 February 2017. See also: https://www.nd.nl/
nieuws/buitenland/verlangen-naar-de-dood-achter-nederlandse-tralies.451327.lynkx. Last 
accessed: 8 March 2017. 
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Noteworthy is that the Dutch Association of Psychiatry has issued a guideline on 
how to deal with requests for assisted suicide in patients with psychiatric prob-
lems. The Dutch Association of Psychiatry expressed the view that assisted suicide 
cannot be performed if the person in question is placed in a psychiatric hospital 
pursuant to Article 15 Custodial Institutions (Framework) Act and is still detained 
on remand or if a sentence holding deprivation of liberty is not yet brought to 
an end. An argument for the view that euthanasia or assisted suicide cannot be 
performed in these circumstances is not provided in this guideline. The Dutch 
Association of Psychiatry furthermore stressed that assisted suicide should be pos-
sible if a hospital order with compulsory treatment is imposed on a person if the 
hospital order is repeatedly extended because the danger of relapse does not de-
crease, for example due to a chronic psychosis. Due to the nature of the psychiatric 
illness, the person in question may be subjected to a hospital order with com-
pulsory treatment without hope of improvement. Nevertheless, the psychiatrist 
should take into account the possibility that a hospital order may be discontinued 
against the psychiatrist’s advice which may remove the death wish of the person 
in question.783 If the latter situation would be the case, such a request for assisted 
suicide would in my opinion be highly influenced by the compulsory admission 
pursuant to the hospital order. The requirement of unbearable suffering laid down 
in the Termination of Life on Request and Assisted Suicide (Review Procedures) 
Act is in my view not fulfilled if the suffering results from, or is influenced by, the 
deprivation of liberty or a lack of care during deprivation of liberty.784
Fourthly, the requirement to consult an independent physician. The physician 
who is considering a request for euthanasia must consult another independent 
physician. A direct colleague, family member, assistant physician (arts-assistant), 
or other physician who is subordinate to the physician cannot be considered as 
independent.785 The independent physician786 must persuade himself of the med-
ical condition of the patient and his death wish by visiting and, if necessary, 
examining the patient. He must form an opinion on whether all of the require-
ments for euthanasia have been satisfied.787 If the suffering has a mental cause, it 
is not legally required to consult a psychiatrist, though it is expected considering 
783. Dutch Association of Psychiatry 2009, pp. 54-55.
784. See however Handtke and Bretschneider 2014.
785. Kamerstukken II 1998/99, 26 691, no. 3, p. 10.
786. In practice often a physician trained by the Euthanasia in the Netherlands Support and 
Assessment Programme (SCEN). There is at present a special training for the consulting physician, 
which is developed by the Royal Dutch Medical Association, and there is a special register for these 
physicians. KNMG opleiding SCEN-arts 2013.
787. Kamerstukken II 1998/99, 26 691, no. 3, p. 10.
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the nature of the request.788 The Dutch Association of Psychiatry recommends 
to consult two physicians in case of assisted suicide on a psychiatric patient: 1) a 
psychiatrist with special expertise in the field of the psychiatric disorder the pa-
tient suffers from, and 2) a second advisor who can examine the requirements in 
general.789 The requirement of an independent consult with a second physician 
(or third physician in case of mental suffering) in combination with the require-
ment of a voluntary and well-considered request raise a more procedural question, 
namely by whom a detainee’s request for assisted suicide or euthanasia should be 
examined and possibly performed? And where should it be performed?790 Per-
forming assisted suicide or euthanasia within a judicial institution by health care 
staff working for the State would mean that a criminal offence leading to the 
death of a detainee is performed within a judicial institution and by the State, 
which shows in my view resemblance with the death penalty. In my view, this 
construction cannot be considered as an option considering the lack of independ-
ence (see also chapter 6). Any appearance of involuntariness of the request and 
influence of the deprivation of liberty on this request must be ruled out. Alter-
natively, the deprivation of liberty could be suspended to (examine and) perform 
the assisted suicide or euthanasia outside the judicial institution,791 which may 
however pose a risk for the safety of other people, especially if the detainee is kept 
and cared for in a judicial institution under a hospital order. In my view, this ob-
jection makes euthanasia or assisted suicide in relation to mental suffering of a 
detainee highly theoretical. Considering the context of deprivation of liberty, eu-
thanasia or assisted suicide must in any event be performed and examined by an 
independent physician, which means that this physician is not institutionally or 
hierarchically connected to the institution or to the Custodial Institutions Agency, 
neither should that physician have a working relationship with the institution or 
the Custodial Institutions Agency. 
The aforementioned complicating aspects regarding requests for euthanasia or 
assisted suicide by detainees should be addressed in policy to ensure foreseeability, 
prevent arbitrariness and to ensure that any such requests of detainees are carefully 
788. Kamerstukken II 2000/01, 26 691, no. 9, p. 5.
789. Dutch Association of Psychiatry 2009, p. 44. Regional Euthanasia Review Committees, no. 
2014-01. See also Den Hartogh 2015. The presence of a psychiatrist in the Regional Euthanasia 
Review Committee is however not a legal requirement. Art. 3 Termination of Life on Request and 
Assisted Suicide (Review Procedures) Act. See also Buijsen 2014. A psychiatrist has however been 
appointed as member of the review committee. Regional Euthanasia Review Committees 2016, 
p. 9.
790. See also: Shaw and Elger 2016.
791. Dutch Association of Psychiatry 2009, pp. 55-56.
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dealt with to protect vulnerable persons such as detainees. As these aspects are at 
present not addressed,792 the Dutch State does in my view not sufficiently meet 
the requirement under Article 2 ECHR to protect vulnerable persons from taking 
their own life if this decision has not been taken freely and with full understand-
ing of the consequences.793
5.6. Concluding remarks
The dilemma between the Member State’s obligation to protect the health and life 
of detainees and the detainee’s right to self-determination and respect for private 
life in relation to medical confidentiality is in the Dutch legal framework firstly 
addressed by the principle laid down in Article 457 §1 Medical Treatment Con-
tracts Act. This provision determines that health care providers must keep medical 
data confidential, unless the patient consents to exchange of data. Article 457 §2 
Medical Treatment Contracts Act furthermore determines that necessary medical 
data can be provided to persons who are directly involved in the medical treat-
ment (agreement), such as the medical service of a judicial institution, without 
the patient’s consent. Consent of the patient with the exchange of information is 
in these cases assumed,794 although the patient may object to the exchange of in-
formation.795 This implies that the patient must be informed about the exchange. 
Furthermore, Article 35 Official Instructions for the Police prescribes that med-
ication, relevant registrations and the report of the physician, intended for the 
physician who will take over the treatment, must be sent with the police custody 
detainee in case of a transfer. The Inspectorates require physicians to discuss this 
exchange of information with the detainee.796 In view of the legislator, prison 
officers can be regarded as directly involved in the care of the detainee and may 
therefore receive necessary information to properly supervise detainees.797 In my 
view, prison (and police) officers should preferably not be regarded as directly 
involved in the medical treatment agreement. They can in my view be pro-
vided with necessary information about the detainee pursuant to the principle of 
792. See also Shaw and Elger 2016: study with regard to the question whether assisted suicide 
should be available to prisoners.
793. ECtHR 20 January 2011, no. 31322/07, §54 (Haas v. Switzerland).
794. Kamerstukken II 1990/91, 21 561, no. 6, p. 39.
795. Royal Dutch Medical Association 2010b.
796. Inspectorate Security and Justice and Health Care Inspectorate 2014, p. 22.
797. Stb. 2000, 121, p. 8.
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reasonableness and fairness (redelijkheid en billijkheid)798 in connection with the 
principle that a health care provider must act as a good health care provider.799
If a competent detainee objects to the exchange of medical data with the med-
ical service of the receiving penal institution (or with custody officers) in case of 
a transfer and persists after being fully informed by the physician about the pos-
sible consequences, the basic principle that follows from Dutch law is that no 
information is to be transferred.800 This corresponds with the basic idea behind 
positive obligations under the ECHR; the Member State’s positive obligation to 
protect the health and life of detainees should not be altered into an obligation to 
act against the detainee’s wishes to fulfil the obligation to protect his health and 
life.801 Risks for the detainee’s own health and risks for others should however 
be taken into account, whereas the severity of the risk is also a relevant factor. 
Transfer of necessary information is required if a legal obligation exists, for ex-
ample pursuant to the Public Health Act that requires certain contagious diseases 
to be reported. Dutch law also provides the possibility to exchange medical data 
if there exists a severe risk for others802 or for the patient himself;803 pursuant to 
the principle of a conflict of duties,804 medical data necessary to avert a severe risk 
for others or the patient himself can be transferred (for example to non-medically 
trained personnel and/or the medical service of the penal institution to which 
the detainee is transferred). If the detainee objects to the exchange of necessary 
information regarding a suicide risk, this information can in my view be trans-
ferred on the basis of a conflict of duties. If the detainee objects to the exchange 
of information, whereas not exchanging data brings along, in view of the physi-
cian, an unacceptable risk for the detainee’s own health (and that is not covered 
by the aforementioned situations), the principles of reasonableness and fairness 
in connection with the obligation to act as a good health care provider can in my 
view under certain circumstances justify an exchange of necessary data despite the 
detainee’s objection. The above-mentioned possibilities (as opposed to an obliga-
tion) to exchange information do however not ensure that necessary information 
regarding a suicide risk or risks for others is exchanged within judicial institutions 
798. Art. 6:2 §2 Civil Code. See also: Hartkamp 2006, pp. 307-310.
799. Art. 453 Medical Treatment Contracts Act.
800. Appendix I, p. 5, Letter Minister of Health, Welfare and Sport, 15 June 2016, 
964183-150018-MEVA.
801. See also: Jacobs 2012, p. 315. Hagens 2011, p. 217. Van Kempen 2008, p. 43. Concurring 
opinion of judge Bonello ECtHR 21 January 1999, no. 26103/95 (Geyseghem v. Belgium). Mertens 
2012, p. 226.
802. For example a risk of violence.
803. For example considering his physical condition.
804. Art. 6:74 Civil Code. Art. 40 Criminal Code (circumstances beyond one’s control).
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and between diverging establishments/authorities (such as police custody suites 
and courts). This exchange of information is required under the ECHR.805 There-
fore, such safeguards should be further developed in the Dutch legal framework 
and implemented in practice.
The starting point in Dutch law is that informed consent of a competent pa-
tient is required to perform medical examinations and treatment. The patient 
must also be fully informed about the consequences of refusing proposed treat-
ment or examination.806 In case of incompetent patients, the physician must 
involve the patient’s representative in the decision making process and the rep-
resentative must observe the patient’s best interests.807 Forced medical treatment 
of detainees to avert a danger is only possible if the detainee poses a danger to 
himself or others (forced treatment type A and B and forced treatment pursuant 
to Article 32 Custodial Institutions (Framework) Act), which corresponds with 
the principles arising from the ECHR.808 Although inconsistent views have been 
uttered as to whether a competent detainee can be force-fed pursuant to Article 
32 Custodial Institutions (Framework) Act,809 the Circular that prescribes that a 
competent detainee shall not be force-fed is still in force. Furthermore, the Cus-
todial Institutions Agency adheres to the guidelines issued by the Johannes Wier 
Stichting.810 These guidelines contain the principle that a competent detainee’s 
decision to start and persist in a hunger and/or thirst strike should be respected 
if that decision is taken freely and with full understanding of the consequences. 
It also contains guidelines how to relieve the suffering of a hunger and/or thirst 
striker. These factors (competence, decision taken freely, informed about possible 
consequences) are the relevant factors that can be deduced from the ECtHR’s case 
law to determine whether the State must intervene to protect the detainee’s health 
and life,811 whereas the ECtHR also requires that appropriate care is provided dur-
ing a hunger and/or thirst strike.812 The guidelines of the Custodial Institutions 
Agency on DNR’s furthermore show that, in correspondence with the ECtHR’s 
805. ECtHR 19 July 2012, no. 38447/09, §82 (Ketreb v. France). ECtHR 14 March 2002, no. 
46477/99, §61 (Paul and Audrey Edwards v. UK).
806. Art. 448 in connection with art. 450 Medical Treatment Contracts Act.
807. Art. 465 Medical Treatment Contracts Act.
808. ECtHR 5 April 2011, no. 2974/05, §79 (Vasyukov v. Russia).
809. It has been stressed in a Circular that no force-feeding will be applied if a competent 
detainee starts and persists in a hunger and/or thirst strike, though in heated political discussions it 
has been stressed that Article 32 Custodial Institutions (Framework) Act could provide the ground 
to force-feed a competent detainee. 
810. Custodial Institutions Agency 2016e.
811. ECtHR 22 November 2011, no. 35254/07, §83 (Makharadze and Sikharulidze v. Georgia).
812. ECtHR 5 April 2005, no. 54825/00, §§100-106 (Nevmerzhitsky v. Ukraine).
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case law, relevant factors to observe a DNR are the detainee’s capability to decide 
for himself and whether the detainee is informed about the possible consequences. 
Intervention is however expected if a detainee appears to have committed a sui-
cide attempt. 
As observed in the ECtHR’s case law,813 the right to self-determination of de-
tainees is not taken into account with regard to suicides among detainees. In the 
Netherlands, the aim is to prevent suicide among detainees as much as possible, 
which is also seen in the ECtHR’s case law. Dutch legislation on suicide preven-
tion during deprivation of liberty is to a large extent aimed at physical means to 
prevent suicide, for example performing a body search before a detainee is locked 
in (police), or isolating a detainee and supervising a detainee with a camera. In-
volvement of health care staff is required if these means are used. Noteworthy is 
that the decision to isolate a detainee and to use camera surveillance is limited to 
two weeks,814 which means that the decision whether or not to continue these 
measures should be reviewed every two weeks. Such a review is a safeguard to en-
sure proportionality of the measure, as required under Article 8 §2 ECHR. 
813. ECtHR 5 July 2005, no. 49790/99, §69 (Trubnikov v. Russia).
814. Art. 24 in connection with art. 24a Custodial Institutions (Framework) Act. Such a time 
limit is also set for other measures: the decision to apply mechanical means is for example limited 
to a duration of 24 hours. Art. 33 Custodial Institutions (Framework) Act.
Death in State Custody DRUK.indd   283 13-Sep-17   2:40:16 PM
Death in State Custody DRUK.indd   284 13-Sep-17   2:40:16 PM
CHAPTER 6. 
Procedural obligations to investigate 
deaths pursuant to Article 2 ECHR
6.1. Introduction
Member States do not only have obligations with an aim to preventing prema-
ture death during deprivation of liberty. The right to life would not be effective 
without a procedure to examine whether this right has been violated and to hold 
accountable those responsible.1 If a person dies during deprivation of liberty by 
the State, Member States have procedural obligations,2 including the obligation 
to investigate the death in question. For a clear understanding of the obligation 
to investigate deaths, it is important to understand the background of this obli-
gation and its position within the applicable system. The obligation of Member 
States to set up an effective system to prevent and suppress breaches of Article 2 
ECHR is therefore firstly discussed (section 6.2.). Subsequently, the obligation 
to perform an effective investigation into the death of a detainee (section 6.3.) 
will be described, by firstly discussing several general principles that are relevant 
for the obligation to perform an effective investigation. The minimum standards 
set to ensure the investigation’s effectiveness will furthermore be explored. Ex-
amination of the ECtHR’s case law shows that the minimum standards for the 
investigation’s effectiveness are hardly influenced by the manner in which per-
sons die, for example due to a natural cause of death, suicide, euthanasia etcetera. 
Therefore, the diverging causes/manners of death will only be explicitly discussed 
if special requirements are set. Concluding remarks regarding the question how 
1. ECtHR 27 September 1995, no. 18984/91, §161 (McCann and others v. UK).
2. Procedural obligations are obligations that require the organisation of domestic procedures 
to ensure better protection of persons by providing sufficient remedies for violations of rights. 
Council of Europe 2007, p. 16. See also: Brems 2013. Mowbray 2002. Harris et al 2014, pp. 214 
et seq. Gerards 2011, pp. 248 et seq. Xenos 2012. Lavrysen 2016, pp. 47 et seq.
Death in State Custody DRUK.indd   285 13-Sep-17   2:40:16 PM
286 Chapter 6 
the obligations enumerated in sections 6.2 and 6.3 can be effectively implemented 
in practice and to whom these obligations should be assigned will be discussed in 
section 6.4.
6.2. Obligation to set up an effective system
Member States must have a system that is capable of establishing the facts sur-
rounding deaths, the cause and manner of death, holding accountable those 
at fault and providing appropriate redress to the victim.3 The legislative and 
administrative framework set up to protect the right to life must be effectively 
implemented.4 The ECHR does not require one unified procedure to meet the 
Convention standards5 and Member States have a margin of appreciation regard-
ing the choice of means to fulfil the positive obligations under Article 2 ECHR.6 
The ECtHR stresses that under Article 2 ECHR Member States are obliged to 
develop an effective system – judicial or otherwise – to ensure that the framework 
developed to protect the right to life is properly implemented. This means that 
if death is caused intentionally, the State must react with a criminal law response 
(including a criminal investigation). If death is not caused intentionally, a civil, 
administrative or disciplinary remedy may suffice.7 The ECtHR also stresses 
that Member States have an obligation to set up an effective independent judicial 
system to determine the cause of death of patients in the care of the medical pro-
fession and to hold accountable those responsible.8 In literature, the point has 
been raised whether a judicial investigation is required under Article 2 ECHR. 
3. ECtHR 17 July 2014, no. 47848/08, §132, GC (Centre for Legal Resources on Behalf of 
Valentin Câmpeanu v. Romania).
4. ECtHR 30 November 2004, no. 48939/99, §91 (Öneryildiz v. Turkey).
5. ECtHR 1 July 2014, no. 77938/11, §149 (Dimitrov and others v. Bulgaria). See also: 
ECtHR 31 May 2016, no. 11167/12, §69 (Bakanova v. Lithuania).
6. ECtHR 17 December 2013, no. 25776/05, §62 (Dimitrovi v. Bulgaria).
7. ECtHR 16 November 2006, no. 52955/99, §74 (Huylu v. Turkey). In several cases against 
Russia, the ECtHR stresses the importance of opening a criminal case when an individual died 
during police custody if otherwise the validity of any collected evidence could be undermined 
considering the domestic procedural rules. This raises in my view the question whether an adequate 
legal framework to investigate exists. ECtHR 3 May 2012, no. 40657/04, §§56, 58 (Kleyn and 
Aleksandrovich v. Russia). See also: ECtHR 27 November 2014, no. 1157/10, §57 (Karsakova v. 
Russia). See furthermore: Van Kempen 2008b, pp. 43 et seq. 
8. ECtHR 9 April 2009, no. 71463/01, §155, GC (Šilih v. Slovenia). The ECtHR also stresses 
that in case of medical negligence, where death is not caused intentionally, a civil or disciplinary 
remedy may suffice (§194). See also: ECtHR 29 March 2016, no. 3853/14, §§62-63 (A.V. v. 
Estonia).
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Gaggioli and Elger state, while referring to the ECtHR’s case law, that an admin-
istrative investigation may suffice in case of an apparent natural death.9 Brems 
furthermore stresses that a judicial investigation is not required under Article 2 
ECHR, except for medical negligence cases.10 The International Committee of 
the Red Cross (ICRC) distinguishes between preliminary investigations and ju-
dicial investigations. It states that a judicial investigation is required if there are 
reasons to believe that death was caused by homicide or negligence and must be 
part of criminal proceedings, which also means that police officials must conduct 
these investigations.11 These proposals show in my view an error of reasoning as 
the cause and manner of death and the question whether there was any negligence 
or intent can only be validly established through an investigation. In my view, 
the aim of the obligation to set up a legal system must be kept in mind. Mem-
ber States are obliged to set up a system through which the facts surrounding the 
death and the cause and manner of death can be established and those responsible 
can be held accountable. This system must ensure that the investigating author-
ities have the tools12 to establish the facts and the cause and manner of death 
(such as an autopsy). The required system can furthermore be divided into several 
phases (although these phases cannot always be strictly divided and some overlap 
will be seen). Firstly, Member States are obliged to perform an official investiga-
tion into deaths through which the facts surrounding the death (including time, 
place, cause and manner of death) can be established.13 A second phase that can 
be distinguished is a phase of evaluating the facts and determining which steps/
measures need to be taken in response to the death. This phase must include a 
system which ensures that the persons responsible can be held accountable14 
and any breaches of the right to life can be repressed and punished.15 If death 
is caused intentionally, this must include an examination of whether the per-
son(s) involved is (are) criminally liable for that death. The obligation to set up 
9. Gaggioli and Elger 2017, p. 41.
10. Brems 2013, p. 142.
11. International Committee of the Red Cross 2013, p. 9.
12. A point of interest is that in some States specific investigative measures can only be employed 
if a suspicion of a criminal offence exists (see for example chapter 7, section 7.2 concerning the 
grounds to order a legal autopsy in the Netherlands). The ECtHR furthermore stresses that under 
certain circumstances the State must respond with a criminal investigation where the whole range 
of investigative measures can be used, such as questioning, search, seizure and crime reconstruction. 
ECtHR 18 June 2015, no. 41675/08, §53 (Fanziyeva v. Russia). See also: ECtHR 3 May 2012, no. 
40657/04, §§56-59 (Kleyn and Aleksandrovich v. Russia). ECtHR 6 October 2015, no. 4722/09, 
§71 (Turbylev v. Russia). ECtHR 8 October 2015, no. 38887/09, §44 (Fartushin v. Russia).
13. ECtHR 14 March 2013, no. 28005/08, §186 (Salakhov and Islyamova v. Ukraine).
14. ECtHR 6 July 2005, nos. 43577/98 and 43579/98, §110 (Nachova and others v. Bulgaria).
15. ECtHR 14 March 2013, no. 28005/08, §186 (Salakhov and Islyamova v. Ukraine).
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an effective system to establish the facts surrounding a death (including cause and 
manner of death) and to ensure that those responsible for the death can be held 
accountable also applies to deaths occurring during deprivation of liberty by the 
State. 
When a person dies during deprivation of liberty by the State, the specific 
context must be taken into account. It is important to stress the duty of the State 
to protect the health and well-being of persons deprived of their liberty by the 
State. Detainees are vulnerable due to the deprivation of liberty, and are often 
extra vulnerable considering the high prevalence of mental disorders (including 
addictions) and other health problems such as contagious diseases, injuries sus-
tained while committing a criminal offence or during apprehension, or due to 
intoxication.16 Furthermore, the fact that the events surrounding a death during 
deprivation of liberty lie in principle wholly or to a large extent within the exclu-
sive knowledge of the State must be taken into account.17 The aforementioned 
factors bring along an obligation for States to provide a plausible explanation for 
the cause of death and the treatment provided to the detainee prior to death,18 
though the burden of proof will not automatically rest on the authorities if a per-
son dies in the public domain in the presence of State officials.19 The State must 
provide an explanation within a reasonable term.20 Furthermore, if a detainee 
dies due to injuries sustained during deprivation of liberty, the State has to pro-
vide an explanation as to the cause of these injuries.21 Explanatory memos of the 
head of the authority involved and of the physician in charge of the treatment of 
the detainee (stating that the detainee’s own conduct attributed to his death) are 
not sufficient to account for a detainee’s death.22 The obligation to account for 
16. ECtHR 1 June 2006, no. 39922/03, §89 (Taïs v. France).
17. ECtHR 24 April 2003, no. 24351/94, §291 (Aktaş v. Turkey). ECtHR 14 December 
2010, no. 74832/01, §84 (Mižigárová v. Slovakia). ECtHR 1 June 2006, no. 39922/03, §85 (Taïs 
v. France). ECtHR 16 February 2012, no. 23944/04, §108 (Eremiášová and Pechová v. Czech 
Republic).
18. ECtHR 18 December 2008, no. 29971/04, §104 (Kats and others v. Ukraine). ECtHR 15 
February 2011, no. 35403/06, §73 (Tsintsabadze v. Georgia). ECtHR 13 June 2002, no. 38361/97, 
§111 (Anguelova v. Bulgaria). ECtHR 27 June 2000, no. 21986/93, §100 (Salman v. Turkey). 
ECtHR 7 June 2011, no. 42344/07, §54 (Predică v. Romania). ECtHR 24 March 2009, no. 
11818/02, §52 (Mojsiejew v. Poland). ECtHR 9 December 2008, no. 77766/01, §92 (Dzieciak 
v. Poland).
19. ECtHR 3 September 2013, no. 15762/10, §§25-27 (Cadiroğlu v. Turkey). See about the 
burden of proof if a person sustained injuries in the presence of police officers also: ECtHR 17 
December 2009, no. 4762/05, §119 (Mikayil Mammadov v. Azerbaijan).
20. ECtHR 24 March 2009, no. 11818/02, §63 (Mojsiejew v. Poland). 
21. ECtHR 1 June 2006, no. 39922/03, §95 (Taïs v. France). 
22. ECtHR 22 November 2011, no. 35254/07, §88 (Makharadze and Sikharulidze v. Georgia).
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the death of a detainee implies a need for scrutiny.23 If no effective investigation 
is performed, it will often mean that no plausible explanation can be provided for 
the death in question.24 The obligation to account for the death of a detainee 
and the obligation to perform an effective investigation are in my view therefore 
interconnected. If a plausible explanation is not provided for the death of a per-
son during deprivation of liberty by the State, Article 2 ECHR may25 be violated 
either in its substantive limb26 or in its procedural limb,27 though the ECtHR 
does not always state whether it concerns a substantive or procedural violation.28
6.3. Obligation to perform an effective investigation into 
death of a detainee
6.3.1. General principles
The procedural obligations under Article 2 ECHR require that the death itself 
is sufficiently investigated by establishing the facts and identifying the persons 
involved. It does not require a public inquiry into the general background of a 
suspicious death.29 Another basic principle is that the procedural obligation to 
investigate a death is an obligation of means and not of results. This means that 
the authorities must take all reasonably expected measures to collect evidence, 
23. ECtHR 3 April 2001, 27229/95, §91 (Keenan v. UK). ECtHR 7 January 2003, no. 
57420/00 (Younger v. UK).
24. ECtHR 22 November 2011, no. 35254/07, §§87-89 (Makharadze and Sikharulidze v. 
Georgia). ECtHR 15 February 2011, no. 35403/06, §§94-95 (Tsintsabadze v. Georgia). See also 
ECtHR 26 April 2016, no. 50756/13, §§120-121 (Seagal v. Cyprus): no meaningful investigation 
into injuries sustained during deprivation of liberty leads to violation of Article 3 ECHR, both 
under its substantive and procedural limb. See also ECtHR 19 December 2013, no. 22490/05, 
§128 (Marina Alekseyeva v. Russia): question whether plausible explanation for death has been 
provided is closely linked to the procedural obligation to conduct an effective investigation.
25. The case law of the ECtHR reveals some inconsistencies regarding the consequences 
involved.
26. ECtHR 18 May 2000, no. 41488/98, §70 (Velikova v. Bulgaria). ECtHR 3 May 2012, no. 
16850/09, §§68-70 (Yelden and others v. Turkey). See also ECtHR 13 July 2010, no. 45661/99, 
§126 (Carabulea v. Romania): substantive violation of Article 2 ECHR considering 1) the 
authorities’ failure to provide timely medical care, and 2) their failure to provide any plausible 
or satisfactory explanation for the death of a healthy, 27-year-old man in police custody. See also: 
ECtHR 1 June 2006, no. 39922/03, §§103-104 (Taïs v. France).
27. ECtHR 6 October 2005, no. 40262/98, §§116, 120-129 (H.Y. and HÜ.Y. v. Turkey).
28. ECtHR 13 June 2002, no. 38361/97, §§110, 121-122 (Anguelova v. Bulgaria).
29. ECtHR 6 February 2007, no. 21387/05, pag. 12-13 (Banks and others v. UK). 
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such as witness statements, forensic evidence and, if appropriate, an autopsy.30 
The need to provide first aid must always be given priority over the requirement 
that disturbance of the scene should be prevented as much as possible.31 The ob-
ligation to investigate also applies if a life-threatening situation occurred under 
suspicious circumstances.32 
The required form of investigation varies according to the nature of the 
infringement of life.33 The investigation must be capable of ascertaining the cir-
cumstances in which death occurred,34 “any shortcomings in the operation of the 
regulatory system”, and identifying the State officials or authorities involved.35 
One of the preliminary steps that has to be taken after it is established that a 
detainee has deceased and the appropriate investigative authorities have been no-
tified is to try to establish the cause and manner of death.36 Only ruling out a 
violent death37 or only establishing or ruling out the involvement of another 
person in a suspicious death does therefore not suffice to meet the procedural ob-
ligation to investigate these deaths.38
An internal autopsy (hereinafter: autopsy)39 is an important instrument to es-
tablish the cause of death. The ECtHR holds the view that an autopsy must be 
30. ECtHR 13 July 2010, no. 45661/99, §130 (Carabulea v. Romania). ECtHR 27 January 2011, 
no. 10907/04, §65 (Iordanovi v. Bulgaria). See for an example of a case where the authorities 
did not show the necessary diligence to collect evidence, which resulted in a procedural violation 
of Article 2 ECHR: ECtHR 31 January 2017, nos. 47222/07 and 47223/07, §44 (Abubakarova 
and Midalishova v. Russia). A list of observed inadequacies in the criminal investigation process 
was given by Leach. Leach 2011, pp. 202-206. See with regard to the requirement of questioning 
eye-witnesses, in particular police officers involved in the events: ECtHR 31 May 2005, no. 
27306/95, §115 (Kişmir v. Turkey).
31. ECtHR 14 April 2015, no. 24014/05, §193, GC (Mustafa Tunç and Fecire Tunç v. Turkey).
32. ECtHR 30 August 2016, no. 61170/09, §§29-30, 38 (Toptaniş v. Turkey).
33. ECtHR 14 April 2015, no. 24014/05, §170, GC (Mustafa Tunç and Fecire Tunç v. Turkey).
34. ECtHR 27 July 2004, no. 30015/96, §§58-60 (A.A. and others v. Turkey).
35. ECtHR 18 December 2008, no. 29971/04, §116 (Kats and others v. Ukraine). See also: 
ECtHR 4 April 2006, no. 32478/02, §65 (Sergey Shevchenko v. Ukraine). ECtHR 17 October 
2013, no. 26824/04, §93 (Keller v. Russia). ECtHR 7 June 2011, no. 42344/07, §65, 67 (Predică 
v. Romania).
36. ECtHR 14 December 2006, no. 4353/03, §74 (Tarariyeva v. Russia). See also ECtHR 3 
October 2013, no. 4299/03, §40 (Yuriy Illarionovich Shchokin v. Ukraine): the shortcomings in 
the investigation obstructed the possibility to establish the cause of death, which compromised the 
required effectiveness of the investigation. ECtHR 17 October 2013, no. 26824/04, §93 (Keller 
v. Russia).
37. ECtHR 24 February 2009, no. 63258/00, §§68-69 (Gagiu v. Romania).
38. ECtHR 28 April 2015, no. 34902/10, §69 (Sultan Dölek and others v. Turkey). 
39. As opposed to an external examination of the body.
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performed ‘where appropriate’.40 The Human Rights Handbook interprets ‘where 
appropriate’ as “whenever this could shed light on the cause of death”.41 The EC-
tHR also stressed that it is crucial to perform a formal autopsy in court cases.42 
Problematic of this approach is that at the moment the investigative authori-
ties have to decide whether or not to perform an autopsy, it is not always clear 
whether a case will be brought to court. This principle is therefore not really help-
ful when determining whether an autopsy should be performed. Furthermore, the 
detainee may have raised objections to an autopsy prior to his death43 and/or his 
next of kin may raise objections to an autopsy after the detainee has died, for ex-
ample considering cultural or religious reasons. The ECtHR recognises the right 
of physical integrity and the right of third parties to inviolability of a deceased’s 
body. It has not stated under which provision the latter right falls. In my view, it 
is reasonable to assume that the right of third parties (next of kin) to inviolability 
of the deceased’s body falls within the ambit of Article 8 ECHR. When objections 
have been raised against an autopsy, the detainee’s right to respect his physical 
integrity or the next of kin’s right to inviolability of the deceased’s body must be 
balanced against the interest of performing an autopsy. Religious or philosophical 
grounds are relevant when making this balance.44 Article 8 ECHR (and Article 
9 ECHR) require(s) that an interference must be in accordance with the law, is 
necessary in a democratic society and must pursue one of the aims laid down in 
the second paragraph of these provisions, including protection of health or pre-
vention of crime.45 In my view, an autopsy is a necessary instrument to determine 
the cause and manner of death and to determine whether or not death has been 
caused intentionally or by neglect.46 Examination of these factors is essential to 
40. ECtHR 14 December 2010, no. 74832/01, §93 (Mižigárová v. Slovakia). If domestic law 
prescribes an autopsy to be carried out, the ECtHR requires an autopsy to be performed. ECtHR 
17 July 2014, no. 47848/08, §§25, 146-147, GC (Centre for Legal Resources on Behalf of Valentin 
Câmpeanu v. Romania). See furthermore ECtHR 18 June 2013, no. 48609/06 §131 (Nencheva 
and others v. Bulgaria): the ECHR does not require that national law prescribes an autopsy to be 
performed on every death in a social institution.
41. Council of Europe 2006, p. 42.
42. ECtHR 30 November 2004, no. 38418/97, §55 (A.K. and V.K. v. Turkey). ECtHR 22 
November 2005, nos. 33420/96; 36206/97, §89 (Belkiza Kaya and others v. Turkey).
43. After the detainee’s death, Article 8 ECHR cannot be invoked with regard to the deceased’s 
own right to respect for his private life. ECtHR 15 May 2006, no. 1338/03 (The Estate of 
Kresten Filtenborg Mortensen v. Denmark). ECtHR 13 July 2006, no. 58757/00, §42 (Jäggi v. 
Switzerland). See also Van Beers 2009, pp. 212-215. Duijst and Naujocks 2016, p. 24.
44. ECtHR 13 July 2006, no. 58757/00, §§39, 41 (Jäggi v. Switzerland).
45. The latter is only mentioned in Article 8 §2 ECHR.
46. Several studies that compared the ante-mortem and post-mortem diagnosis show that the 
ante-mortem and post-mortem diagnosis were discrepant in 33,5% of the cases (on average). In 
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provide a plausible explanation for, and respond adequately to, the death in ques-
tion and to protect the health and life of other detainees by taking measures to 
prevent any similar future errors.47 Protection of health is an interest which may 
justify an interference with the individual’s physical integrity or the freedom of 
religion (for example by means of an autopsy), provided that this interference is 
necessary and is laid down in domestic law.
The manner in which an autopsy is performed and recorded must not leave 
essential questions unanswered.48 In Salman versus Turkey (concerning a death 
in police custody after torture) the ECtHR referred for example to the fact that 
photographs of the body were absent and no dissection and histopathological 
analysis of the injuries and marks on the body had been performed. It was also 
misleading that the physician who performed the autopsy had stated that the bro-
ken sternum could have been caused by cardiac massage, whereas no attempt was 
made to verify whether cardiac massage was actually applied.49 The ECtHR has 
furthermore referred to the United Nations Model Autopsy Protocol50 and Rec-
ommendation No. R (99) 3 of the Committee of Ministers on the Harmonisation 
of Medico-Legal Autopsy Rules,51 and stressed that the purpose of the autopsy 
is not only to establish the cause of death, but also to elucidate the circumstances 
surrounding the death, for example by a complete and accurate record of possible 
signs of ill-treatment and injury and by making an objective analysis of clinical 
findings.52 The results of an autopsy may for example give an indication on the 
approximate positions of the person who used a firearm and the victim, and the 
13% of the cases (on average), the post-mortem revealed pathology that, if diagnosed and treated 
prior to the person’s death, would have prolonged the patient’s survival. Kubat et al 2012.
47. See also Boglioli and Taff 1990, pp. 1-8.
48. ECtHR 19 February 1998, no. 22729/93, §§89, 92 (Kaya v. Turkey). ECtHR 27 June 2000, 
no. 21986/93, §§106-109 (Salman v. Turkey). In Jaloud versus the Netherlands (lethal firearm 
use in Iraq at checkpoint manned by personnel under the command and direct supervision of 
a Netherlands Royal Army officer), the ECtHR refers to the shortcomings of the autopsy report 
(extremely brief, lacking in detail and no pictures included). This was a relevant factor to conclude 
that there had been a procedural violation of Article 2 ECHR. However, the ECtHR did not relate 
these shortcomings to the investigation’s capacity to establish the cause of death or the persons 
responsible. ECtHR 20 November 2014, no. 47708/08, §§212-216, 227-228 (Jaloud v. The 
Netherlands). See furthermore: ECtHR 31 May 2005, no. 30949/96, §109 (Yasin Ateş v. Turkey). 
See also ECtHR 3 November 2015, no. 99/12, §70 (Olszewscy v. Poland): failure to establish 
whether applicant’s son was drunk or not.
49. ECtHR 27 June 2000, no. 21986/93, §§106-109 (Salman v. Turkey).
50. ECtHR 27 June 2000, no. 21986/93, §§73-74 (Salman v. Turkey).
51. ECtHR 9 May 2003, no. 27244/95, §181 (Tepe v. Turkey). The Autopsy Rules and its 
appendix contain detailed recommendations with regard to the autopsy, examination of the scene, 
and specific procedures (among others with regard to the constriction of neck).
52. ECtHR 14 December 2000, no. 22676/93, §89 (Gül v. Turkey).
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distance between these two persons when the shot was fired.53 An autopsy must 
be performed by a qualified medico-legal expert (expert in forensic pathology) or 
by a physician familiar with medico-legal examinations in suspected unnatural 
deaths. The body must not be disposed of before an adequate autopsy has been 
performed.54
Member States are under Article 3 ECHR obliged to protect the health and 
well-being of detainees,55 whereas Article 2 ECHR obliges Member States to pro-
tect the life of detainees.56 Considering that the ECtHR stresses that the right 
to life would not be effective without a procedure to examine whether this right 
has been violated and to hold accountable those responsible,57 it follows from the 
ECtHR’s case law that every death in State custody must be investigated to deter-
mine whether the State fulfilled the obligation to protect the life of the detainee 
in question. 
Article 2 ECHR brings along an obligation for the State to open an official 
probe after a detainee dies from an illness to assess the quality of the provided 
medical treatment58 and to determine whether there was medical negligence.59 
The ECtHR stated in 2017 that the argument that there is no obligation to inves-
tigate the death of a detainee if the apparent cause of death is a medical condition 
will not stand up; the death of the detainee and the allegations of the detainee’s 
wife holding inappropriate medical treatment triggered in view of the ECtHR 
the State’s duty to perform an effective investigation.60 In my view, the duty to 
investigate every death in custody exists regardless whether the next of kin raise 
a complaint. Requiring a complaint of the detainee’s next of kin would imply a 
disproportionate burden for the next of kin as the circumstances surrounding and 
preceding the death are in most cases unknown to them, whereas the accounta-
bility of the State is not ensured if no complaint is raised by the next of kin, for 
example if a detainee does not have any close relatives. With regard to errors in 
the provided healthcare, the ECtHR emphasises that an investigation is not only 
important in each individual case, but also for enabling medical professionals to 
remedy any deficiencies and prevent repetition of errors in the course of medical 
53. ECtHR 27 July 2004, no. 26144/95, §79 (Ikincisoy v. Turkey).
54. ECtHR 9 May 2003, no. 27244/95, §181 (Tepe v. Turkey). See with regard to principles for 
on-site forensic and medico-legal scene and corpse investigation: Cusack et al 2016.
55. ECtHR 26 October 2000, no. 30210/96, §94, GC (Kudła v. Poland). 
56. ECtHR 14 March 2002, no. 46477/99, §57 (Paul and Audrey Edwards v. UK).
57. ECtHR 27 September 1995, no. 18984/91, §161 (McCann and others v. UK).
58. ECtHR 11 February 2016, no. 15509/12, §98 (Karpylenko v. Ukraine). See also: ECtHR 20 
December 2016, no. 16363/07, §60 (Dzidzava v. Russia).
59. ECtHR 22 November 2011, no. 35254/07, §87 (Makharadze and Sikharulidze v. Georgia).
60. ECtHR 14 February 2017, no. 24421/11, §42 (Karakhanyan v. Russia).
Death in State Custody DRUK.indd   293 13-Sep-17   2:40:17 PM
294 Chapter 6 
care.61 Therefore, there also exists a public interest in performing an inquiry, 
namely the safety of patients in general and the quality of healthcare.
If there are reasons to assume that the person concerned died due to the use 
of force by State officials, the ECtHR expects that the investigation is performed 
in such a manner that it is possible to determine whether the force used was 
or was not justified under Article 2 ECHR considering the circumstances and 
to identify and (if justified) punish the persons responsible.62 The surrounding 
circumstances must also be taken into consideration, such as the planning and 
control of the actions in question. It must be examined whether the operation 
was planned and controlled in such a way that recourse to lethal force was mini-
mised to the greatest extent possible by taken all feasible precautions. The manner 
in which mentally disturbed persons are approached and treated and whether 
the State officials involved were sufficiently trained to deal with these persons is 
also relevant.63 It follows from the ECtHR’s case law that it should be examined 
whether the State officials who used the deadly force had sufficient training in 
the use of force.64 If it has been established that a detainee died due to a violent 
incident with another detainee, the investigation must be capable to determine 
whether the State authorities knew, or ought to have known, of the real and im-
mediate risk for the life of the detainee, and if so, whether they took sufficient 
preventive operational measures to avert that risk from materialising. Whether the 
detainee(s) involved suffered from mental health problems is important in this re-
gard, just like the screening on admission to allocate detainees.65 
When it appears that a detainee has committed suicide, an investigation must 
be performed to establish the cause of death and exclude the possibility of an ac-
cident or manslaughter. Once it is established that the detainee has committed 
suicide, it must be examined whether the authorities had failed in any way to 
prevent the suicide attempt or its fatal outcome.66 This means an examination of 
61. ECtHR 14 March 2013, no. 28005/08, §193 (Salakhov and Islyamova v. Ukraine). 
62. ECtHR 6 July 2005, nos. 43577/98 and 43579/98, §113 (Nachova and others v. Bulgaria). 
ECtHR 30 March 2016, no. 5878/08, §233, GC (Armani Da Silva v. UK). See also: ECtHR 27 
July 1998, no. 21593/93, §§77-78 (Güleç v. Turkey). The ECtHR also stressed that it is not for the 
ECtHR to prescribe in detail the procedure that should be adopted by the authorities to properly 
examine killings in which State agents may be implicated. ECtHR 4 May 2001, no. 37715/97, 
§123 (Shanaghan v. UK). ECtHR 4 May 2001, no. 28883/95, §159 (McKerr v. UK). 
63. ECtHR 16 January 2014, no. 5269/08, §§206, 232-233 (Shchiborshch and Kuzmina v. 
Russia).
64. ECtHR 21 June 2011, no. 31151/08, p. 12 (Obiora v. Norway). ECtHR 20 December 2004, 
no. 50385/99, §70, GC (Makaratzis v. Greece).
65. ECtHR 14 March 2002, no. 46477/99, §§55, 57-64 (Paul and Audrey Edwards v. UK).
66. ECtHR 5 July 2005, no. 49790/99, §§89-90 (Trubnikov v. Russia). ECtHR 14 February 
2012, no. 9296/06, §110 (Shumkova v. Russia). ECtHR 9 October 2012, no. 1413/07, §76 
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whether the authorities knew, or ought to have known, about a real and immedi-
ate suicide risk (including whether relevant information has been exchanged with 
the involved professionals), and if so, whether all reasonably possible measures 
have been taken to avert that risk, including basic precautions.67 
If a detainee dies due to the consequences of refusing food and/or liquids, 
several factors should be examined in the investigation into this death. Of impor-
tance is the basic principle that emerges in the ECtHR’s case law, namely that if 
a competent detainee starts and persists in a hunger and/or thirst strike, the State 
authorities do not have an obligation to intervene pursuant to Article 2 ECHR, 
provided that the detainee 1) is fully informed about the medical consequences, 
2) freely decided to start and persist in the refusal of food and/or liquids, and 3) 
is offered the necessary (nursing) care. In case of a hunger and/or thirst strike, 
the State must try to ascertain the true intention of the detainee’s protest and, if 
this reason is not truly whimsical, try to find a suitable arrangement.68 Following 
this line of reasoning, this principle should in my view also apply to competent 
detainees who stop ingesting food and liquids to hasten the end of their own life 
and detainees who refuse medical treatment or examinations (including CPR and 
a medical screening on admission) which (may) lead to the death of a detainee, 
though the ECtHR’s case law shows that intervention is obligated if the detain-
ee’s refusal will endanger the health of others, for example in case of a contagious 
disease.69 In case of an incompetent detainee and pursuant to practice in free so-
ciety, medical practitioners should decide about the medical necessity to intervene 
and on the therapeutic methods to be used, though the detainee’s representative 
should be involved and consent with any intervention by taking into account the 
detainee’s best interests, and the detainee should be heard in the decision mak-
ing process.70 The foregoing also implies that if a detainee dies due to euthanasia 
or assisted suicide, the investigation must in any event include an examination 
that the detainee was competent to decide for himself, made a voluntary and 
well-considered decision, and the euthanasia or assisted suicide is performed in a 
(Çoşelav v. Turkey): not sufficient to establish that a detainee had taken his own life and that no 
one had incited him to do so.
67. ECtHR 5 July 2005, no. 49790/99, §71 (Trubnikov v. Russia).
68. ECtHR 26 March 2013, no. 73175/10, §51 (Rappaz v. Switzerland). ECtHR 31 March 
2009, no. 1639/03, §§28-30 (Horoz v. Turkey). ECtHR 22 November 2011, no. 35254/07, 
§§82-83 (Makharadze and Sikharulidze v. Georgia).
69. ECtHR 5 April 2011, no. 2974/05, §79 (Vasyukov v. Russia).
70. ECtHR 5 April 2005, no. 54825/00, §64 (Nevmerzhitsky v. Ukraine): reference to 
Recommendation No. R (98) 7, I.C.16. ECtHR 9 March 2004, no. 61827/00, §58 (Glass v. UK). 
ECtHR 23 March 2010, nos. 45901/05 and 40146/06, §77 (M.A.K. and R.K. v. UK).
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medically sound manner to prevent an inhuman treatment or other forms of un-
professional conduct.
The foregoing shows that every death in State custody must be investigated to 
account for this death. More detailed requirements regarding the kind of inves-
tigation that must be performed are not provided by the ECtHR. It will depend 
on the circumstances of the case what kind of investigation is indicated, whereas 
the practical realities of investigation work should be taken into account. It is 
therefore not possible to develop a list of investigative measures that should be 
performed to meet the required effectiveness.71 The ECtHR did however set min-
imum standards (or parameters) for the effectiveness of the investigation. 
6.3.2. Minimum standards for the effectiveness of the investigation
The ECtHR expects that the investigative measures are adequate and that the 
investigation is performed by people who have an independent position with re-
gard to the persons who are involved in the events surrounding the death. The 
investigation must also be performed impartially. It must be instituted on the 
State’s own initiative, started promptly and be carried out expeditiously. There 
also needs to be a sufficient degree of public scrutiny of the investigation or its 
results. The next of kin must be involved in the procedure to guarantee their inter-
ests.72 The ECtHR has set the aforementioned minimum standards in diverging 
situations, including lethal force by law enforcement officers,73 a lethal fall from 
the window of the investigator’s office,74 a lethal firearm incident during inter-
71. ECtHR 3 May 2012, no. 16850/09, §74 (Yelden and others v. Turkey). See also: ECtHR 1 
February 2005, no. 43991/02 (Fonseca Mendes v. Spain). ECtHR 14 April 2015, no. 24014/05, 
§176, GC (Mustafa Tunç and Fecire Tunç v. Turkey). ECtHR 1 December 2009, no. 64301/01, 
§105 (Velcea and Mazăre v. Romania). ECtHR 30 November 2004, no. 38418/97, §51 (A.K. and 
V.K. v. Turkey). ECtHR 18 May 2000, no. 41488/98, §80 (Velikova v. Bulgaria).
72. ECtHR 14 December 2010, no. 74832/01, §§91-95 (Mižigárová v. Slovakia). ECtHR 
14 February 2012, no. 9296/06, §109 (Shumkova v. Russia). In Mustafa Tunç and Fecire Tunç 
versus Turkey, the ECtHR states that the investigation’s effectiveness is assessed on the basis of 
the following parameters: the adequacy of investigative measures, the investigation’s promptness, 
the involvement of the next of kin and the investigation’s independence. ECtHR 14 April 2015, 
no. 24014/05, §225, GC. See about the requirements of independence, substantive quality and 
the timeliness of the investigation: Van der Wilt and Lyngdorf 2009, pp. 39-75. See furthermore: 
Gaggioli 2013, pp. 494-498.
73. ECtHR 4 May 2001, no. 24746/94, §§12, 105-109 (Hugh Jordan v. UK).
74. ECtHR 17 October 2013, no. 26824/04, §§92-95 (Keller v. Russia). ECtHR 15 July 2014, 
no. 40485/08, §§74-77 (Petrović v. Serbia).
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rogation,75 a death of a detainee due to acts of violence of another detainee,76 
suicide of detainees,77 and detainees who died due to somatic problems.78 It has 
been stressed that these minimum standards should be met throughout the entire 
procedure, including the trial stage,79 though one unified procedure satisfying 
the necessary safeguards is not required.80 Changes in the organisation, like re-
structuring, cannot be an excuse for not fulfilling the State’s obligations.81 The 
minimum standards are inter-related parameters which means that each of these 
requirements, taken separately, “(…) does not amount to an end in itself (…)”, 
such as the required independence under Article 6 ECHR. Taken jointly, these 
criteria are used to assess the investigation’s effectiveness.82 As will be discussed 
in the following, this principle does not always apply when deaths during depri-
vation of liberty by the State are involved. Another noteworthy principle is that 
where death is not caused by the use of force or similar direct official actions, the 
effectiveness of the investigation may be assessed against a less exacting standard, 
though the investigation must nevertheless meet the minimum standards.83
Initiative of the State
A first minimum standard is that the involved State must institute an investigation 
into the death on its own motion. Practical reasons to impose this obligation on 
the State is that the person involved is deceased84 and the circumstances of a death 
occurring during deprivation of liberty are often largely confined within the ex-
clusive knowledge of State officials.85 The State authorities must act as soon as they 
are informed about the case.86 They should not await a formal complaint of the 
next of kin, neither should the responsibility for the conduct of any investigative 
75. ECtHR 14 December 2010, no. 74832/01, §§8, 91-95 (Mižigárová v. Slovakia).
76. ECtHR 14 March 2002, no. 46477/99, §§70-74 (Paul and Audrey Edwards v. UK).
77. ECtHR 14 February 2012, no. 9296/06, §§106-110 (Shumkova v. Russia). ECtHR 5 July 
2005, no. 49790/99, §§88-89 (Trubnikov v. Russia). ECtHR 8 October 2015, no. 51097/13, 
§§58-60 (Benmouna and others v. France).
78. ECtHR 18 December 2008, no. 29971/04, §§46, 53, 115-116 (Kats and others v. Ukraine). 
ECtHR 22 November 2011, no. 35254/07, §§70, 87 (Makharadze and Sikharulidze v. Georgia).
79. ECtHR 17 September 2013, no. 22426/11, §66 (Przemyk v. Poland).
80. ECtHR 4 May 2001, no. 37715/97, §123 (Shanaghan v. UK).
81. ECtHR 12 April 2016, no. 12060/12, §121 (M.C. and A.C. v. Romania).
82. ECtHR 14 April 2015, no. 24014/05, §225, GC (Mustafa Tunç and Fecire Tunç v. Turkey).
83. ECtHR 21 December 2010, no. 45744/08, §73 (Jasinskis v. Latvia).
84. ECtHR 27 June 2000, no. 22277/93, §91, GC (İlhan v. Turkey). ECtHR 6 February 2007, 
no. 21387/05 (Banks and others v. UK).
85. ECtHR 27 June 2000, no. 22277/93, §91, GC (İlhan v. Turkey). ECtHR 10 January 2012, 
no. 13462/06, §94 (Česnulevičius v. Lithuania).
86. ECtHR 3 may 2011, no. 20201/07 (Zemzami and Barraux v. France).
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procedure be left to the next of kin.87 The requirement to institute an investigation 
on the State’s own motion will therefore not be fulfilled through a civil procedure 
instituted by the detainee’s relatives.88 It is also not sufficient to start an investiga-
tion after the next of kin has lodged a complaint under Article 2 ECHR with the 
ECtHR and the case has been communicated to the State involved.89 
That the investigation must be performed on the initiative of the State implies 
in my view that the State must have a system where an authority is, or persons are, 
assigned to investigate the death and through which the right investigative party 
is notified on the initiative of the State. It therefore also implies an obligation to 
report if it has been established that a person has died during deprivation of lib-
erty by the State. The International Committee of the Red Cross recommends for 
example that the head of the custodial facility should initiate a preliminary in-
vestigation in case of a death in custody, that should take place immediately after 
the discovery of the death, by notifying the investigating authorities as soon as 
practicable.90 Considering the Member States’ obligation to account for injuries 
sustained during deprivation of liberty,91 it follows in my view from the EC-
tHR’s case law that the obligation to report also exists if an incident or medical 
emergency occurred during deprivation of liberty by the State that requires exami-
nation and the person in question is not able to act on his own behalf, for example 
because he is unconscious.92 
Independence and impartiality
A safeguard to ensure an effective investigation is that it is performed by persons 
who have an independent position towards the persons involved in the events 
surrounding the death of a detainee. Independence means a lack of institutional 
or hierarchical connection and practical independence.93 The absence of an insti-
87. ECtHR 4 May 2001, no. 24746/94, §105 (Hugh Jordan v. UK). ECtHR 14 March 2002, 
no. 46477/99, §69 (Paul and Audrey Edwards v. UK). ECtHR 8 April 2004, no. 26307/95, §221 
(Tahsin Acar v. Turkey). ECtHR 17 December 2009, no. 4762/05, §103 (Mikayil Mammadov v. 
Azerbaijan).
88. ECtHR 14 March 2002, no. 46477/99, §74 (Paul and Audrey Edwards v. UK). ECtHR 27 
January 2011, no. 10907/04, §64 (Iordanovi v. Bulgaria). ECtHR 7 July 2011, no. 55721/07, 
§165, GC (Al-Skeini and others v. UK). ECtHR 20 November 2014, no. 47708/08, §186, GC 
(Jaloud v. The Netherlands). 
89. ECtHR 5 July 2005, no. 49790/99, §§92, 94 (Trubnikov v. Russia).
90. International Committee of the Red Cross 2013, p. 9.
91. ECtHR 26 April 2016, no. 50756/13, §§120-121 (Seagal v. Cyprus).
92. ECtHR 6 February 2007, no. 21387/05, pag. 10 (Banks and others v. UK). ECtHR 27 June 
2000, no. 22277/93, §91, GC (İlhan v. Turkey). 
93. ECtHR 4 May 2001, no. 24746/94, §106 (Hugh Jordan v. UK). ECtHR 15 May 2007, no. 
52391/99, §325, GC (Ramsahai and others v. The Netherlands). ECtHR 14 December 2010, 
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tutional or hierarchical connection between the investigating party and the party 
under investigation or the person(s) responsible for the conduct of the party in-
volved in the events is an important safeguard against pressure of hierarchical 
superiors.94 Practical independence implies that the investigating party is able to 
depend on himself to perform the investigation (self-reliance),95 which means that 
the investigating party should not heavily rely on the conclusion of the State au-
thorities involved in the incident.96 Another example is that the investigators are 
not prevented from taking important steps in the investigation, which may lead to 
the loss of precious time and may have a negative impact on the overall conduct 
of the (criminal) proceedings, as the State authorities allegedly involved in the in-
cident failed to comply with the investigators’ compulsory orders.97 The ECtHR 
stresses however that it is inevitable that public prosecutors rely on the police for 
information. This factor is not in itself sufficient to conclude that they lack inde-
pendence in relation to the police.98 
The investigation must also be performed impartially.99 Impartiality means that 
there is no bias during an investigation. Bias or a lack of objectivity during an in-
vestigation may emerge in numerous ways. The ECtHR stresses that if an obvious 
line of inquiry is not investigated, the investigation’s capacity to establish the cir-
cumstances and to identify the persons responsible may be obstructed, which may 
lead to a procedural violation of Article 2 ECHR.100 If indispensable and obvious 
investigative steps are not performed, a plausible explanation must be provided as 
to why these steps have not been taken.101 Eagerly accepting a theory that clears the 
police officers involved in the incident, without exploring other hypotheses, shows 
no. 74832/01, §92 (Mižigárová v. Slovakia). ECtHR 7 June 2011, no. 42344/07, §66 (Predică 
v. Romania). ECtHR 14 April 2015, no. 24014/05, §177, GC (Mustafa Tunç and Fecire Tunç v. 
Turkey).
94. ECtHR 16 February 2012, no. 23944/04, §154 (Eremiášová and Pechová v. The Czech 
Republic).
95. Mowbray 2002, p. 440: investigators must “(…) ‘exercise ‘practical independence’, 
ie.self-reliance, in ascertaining and evaluating evidence during their inquiries.”
96. ECtHR 28 July 1998, no. 23818/94, §83 (Ergi v. Turkey). ECtHR 16 February 2012, no. 
23944/04, §§139, 157-160 (Eremiášová and Pechová v. The Czech Republic).
97. ECtHR 18 April 2013, no. 54765/09, §153 (Askhabova v. Russia).
98. ECtHR 16 February 2012, no. 23944/04, §139 (Eremiášová and Pechová v. The Czech 
Republic). ECtHR 15 May 2007, no. 52391/99, §344, GC (Ramsahai and others v. The 
Netherlands).
99. ECtHR 14 February 2012, no. 9296/06, §109 (Shumkova v. Russia).
100. ECtHR 3 May 2012, no. 16850/09, §§73-74 (Yelden and others v. Turkey). See also ECtHR 
27 January 2011, no. 10907/04, §§75-76 (Iordanovi v. Bulgaria): the impact of not transferring 
or recording the received information regarding the detainee’s diabetes status was not investigated.
101. ECtHR 18 May 2000, no. 41488/98, §82 (Velikova v. Bulgaria). ECtHR 15 July 2014, no. 
40485/08, §§82, 96 (Petrović v. Serbia).
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a lack of objectivity.102 A lack of objectivity can also appear when the testimony 
of police officers involved are considered fully credible despite their suspect be-
haviour, or by accepting the conclusions of a medical report that contradicts the 
conclusions of another medical report, whereas these contradictions are not clar-
ified and the conclusions are based on a questionable analysis.103 The authorities 
must make a serious attempt to examine what has happened and should not base 
their decisions on hasty or ill-founded conclusions just to close the investigation. 
Deficiencies in the investigation should be identified and the investigators must 
respond to such deficiencies, for example by following instructions given by the 
supervising authorities on the investigative steps that need to be taken to ensure 
that the incident is thoroughly examined.104 That additional investigative steps, or-
dered by a court, were carried out by the same prosecutor who did not take these 
steps earlier did not pose problems in view of the ECtHR.105 A lack of impartial-
ity may also consist of a refusal to examine the conclusions of forensic medical 
reports, a refusal to start criminal proceedings although ordered,106 or a lack of 
assistance by the involved State in providing evidence to the ECtHR.107 In con-
clusion, the difference between independence and impartiality is in my view that 
impartiality refers to the absence of actual collusion or bias and therefore directly 
affects the investigation’s effectiveness, whereas independence is a more objective 
guarantee against pressure, for example from hierarchical superiors, by requiring 
that there is no relationship between the investigation party and the party under 
investigation. A lack of independence does not by definition mean that the inves-
tigation lacks impartiality.
A question that arises when examining the ECtHR’s case law, is what conse-
quences are involved when the standard of an independent investigation is not 
fulfilled? Will this 1) by definition entail a procedural violation of Article 2 ECHR 
(therefore entailing an obligation), or 2) will a lack of independence only give 
reason to observe a more stringent scrutiny of the investigation’s effectiveness? 
The last-mentioned approach has been applied in Mustafa Tunç and Fecire Tunç 
versus Turkey, where the ECtHR clarified the meaning of independence required 
under Article 6 ECHR and independence required under Article 2 ECHR. Note-
worthy is that the case Mustafa Tunç and Fecire Tunç versus Turkey concerned 
102. ECtHR 23 February 2006, no. 46317/99, §§111, 113 (Ognyanova and Choban v. Bulgaria).
103. ECtHR 13 June 2002, no. 38361/97, §§143-144 (Anguelova v. Bulgaria). See also: ECtHR 
15 February 2011, no. 35403/06, §82 (Tsintsabadze v. Georgia).
104. ECtHR 16 October 2014, no. 27620/09, §§80, 83, 92 (Gordiyenko v. Ukraine).
105. ECtHR 14 April 2015, no. 24014/05, §242, GC (Mustafa Tunç and Fecire Tunç v. Turkey).
106. ECtHR 14 April 2015, no. 24014/05, §227, GC (Mustafa Tunç and Fecire Tunç v. Turkey).
107. ECtHR 2 September 2010, no. 71420/01, §172 (Bekirski v. Bulgaria).
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the death of a serviceman, and not the death of a detainee. In this judgment, 
the ECtHR states that Article 2 ECHR does not require absolute independence 
of the persons and authorities responsible for the investigation. They have to be 
sufficiently independent of the persons and authorities under investigation. The 
circumstances of the case are relevant to determine whether sufficient independ-
ence has been observed. When the statutory or institutional independence is 
called into question, a stricter scrutiny is required while examining the question 
whether the investigation was performed independently (in my view, impartially). 
The ECtHR stresses that if an issue arises regarding the independence and im-
partiality of the investigation, it must examine whether, and to what extent, the 
investigation’s effectiveness and the investigation’s ability to shed light on the cir-
cumstances of the death and to punish the persons or authorities responsible is 
compromised by that circumstance.108 A relevant factor to determine which of the 
two aforementioned approaches must be followed is whether death has occurred 
in circumstances engaging the State’s responsibility, such as deaths caused by po-
lice violence.109 Another relevant factor is how closely connected the investigating 
party and the party/persons under investigation are. This will be illustrated in the 
following. 
The independence of investigations into deaths occurring in prisons has sev-
eral times been examined by the ECtHR. An investigation into a death in prison 
that is performed by police detectives and supervised by a public prosecutor can 
be considered as independent, as these officials are institutionally and practically 
independent from the prison authorities.110 That State agencies with statutory re-
sponsibilities towards the detainee in question had set up the investigation into 
the detainee’s death, by establishing the terms of reference, appointing the chair-
man and members of the inquiry panel and the solicitors who assisted the inquiry, 
was in view of the ECtHR not sufficient to conclude that the inquiry showed 
a lack of independence. None of the appointed persons had a hierarchical link 
with the agencies involved in the events, nor was it asserted that they failed to act 
with independence.111 An inquiry by the investigation’s department of the Minis-
108. ECtHR 14 April 2015, no. 24014/05, §§219-234, 237, 254, GC (Mustafa Tunç and Fecire 
Tunç v. Turkey).
109. ECtHR 14 April 2015, no. 24014/05, §§255, GC (Mustafa Tunç and Fecire Tunç v. Turkey). 
ECtHR 15 May 2007, no. 52391/99, §§333-341, GC (Ramsahai and others v. The Netherlands).
110. ECtHR 3 May 2011, no. 20201/07 (Zemzami and Barraux v. France). See also: ECtHR 13 
December 2012, no. 62120/09, §101 (Volk v. Slovenia). ECtHR 22 January 2013, no. 31963/08, 
§57 (Mitić v. Serbia).
111. ECtHR 14 March 2002, no. 46477/99, §§80-81 (Paul and Audrey Edwards v. UK). In 
my view, the term ‘impartiality’ is more appropriate under these conditions. The ECtHR refers 
in my view to the conduct of the investigators and therefore examines whether or not there have 
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try of Justice, who was also in charge of the custodial institution involved in 
the death, showed a lack of independence considering the institutional connec-
tion.112 An investigation into a death in prison performed by the prison governor 
of the involved institution is not independent.113 Witness statements should not 
be obtained by the prison authority involved, such as the head of the institution, 
though this error can be remedied by interviewing these witnesses again or by 
confirming their statements through other means.114 An investigation by a com-
mission appointed by the Head of the Prison Administration and formed within 
the Prison Administration does also not fulfil the required independence. This 
lack of independence can be remedied by a second investigation fulfilling the re-
quirements under Article 2 ECHR.115 
An investigation into a violent death caused by (firearm use of ) police officers 
that is performed by the same officers,116 or by direct colleagues of the involved 
police officers will by definition not fulfil the required independence.117 This lack 
of independence cannot be remedied through supervision by an independent 
been any bias. See furthermore Kałużna versus Poland (concerning a death by hanging in prison), 
where the Regional Director of the Prison Service had appointed an inquiry group. The ECtHR’s 
decision does not provide details on the composition of this inquiry group. The ECtHR concluded 
that the persons performing the investigation were independent from the persons involved in the 
events, but did not give any reasons to substantiate that conclusion. ECtHR 17 February 2015, no. 
43696/14 (Kałużna v. Poland).
112. ECtHR 15 February 2011, no. 35403/06, §§9, 78-95 (Tsintsabadze v. Georgia): there were 
also a number of omissions in the investigation, including not exploring the possibility of homicide 
over suicide, which revealed a lack of objectivity.
113. ECtHR 5 July 2005, no. 49790/99, §§15, 90 (Trubnikov v. Russia). ECtHR 14 February 
2012, no. 9296/06, §116 (Shumkova v. Russia). That the prison governor of the involved 
institution opened a disciplinary procedure against the personnel of the prison and concluded 
that the personnel had not acted with negligence, was not criticised by the ECtHR in Kilavuz 
versus Turkey. The applicant did not complaint about this aspect. ECtHR 21 October 2008, no. 
8327/03, §§18-19, 98 (Kilavuz v. Turkey). The fact that the public prosecutor prepared a report 
together with the prison director, the deputy and a prison officer, containing a description of the 
ward in which the detainee had died, did also not give rise to critical comments of the ECtHR. 
Neither did the applicant complain about it. ECtHR 11 April 2006, no. 52392/99, §§31, 90-97 
(Uçar v. Turkey). 
114. ECtHR 18 December 2008, no. 29971/04, §§52, 121 (Kats and others v. Ukraine).
115. ECtHR 13 December 2012, no. 62120/09, §§51-53, 101 (Volk v. Slovenia).  
116. ECtHR 20 April 2010, no. 10036/03, §66 (Bektaş and Özalp v. Turkey).
117. ECtHR 15 May 2007, no. 52391/99, §§333-341, GC (Ramsahai and others v. The 
Netherlands). ECtHR 14 February 2017, no. 15980/12, §88 (Maslova v. Russia). Though the 
ECtHR’s case law also shows inconsistencies in this regard. See for example ECtHR 7 June 2011, 
no. 26814/09, §§38, 41-43, 115-127 (Mulder-van Schalkwijk v. The Netherlands), where police 
officers of the police unit involved in the lethal shooting incident questioned several witnesses. 
Nevertheless, no procedural violation of Article 2 ECHR had been found by the ECtHR. 
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authority.118 Exceptions are however acceptable if special circumstances necessitate 
the State officials involved or their direct colleagues to act before independent in-
vestigators have arrived to avoid loss or destruction of important evidence. If no 
such special circumstances occur, the ‘local’ State officials must only secure the area 
in question.119 An internal investigation by the same police district does in general 
not suffice if complaints are made under Article 2 ECHR, though this defect can be 
cured if the investigation is taken over by an independent investigating authority.120 
The position of the public prosecutor supervising the investigation into lethal 
force by police officers was discussed in Ramsahai and others versus The Nether-
lands. The public prosecutor who supervised the investigation in question and who 
decided not to prosecute the involved police officer who used his firearm was spe-
cifically in charge of the police work performed at the police station involved in the 
shooting. The ECtHR stresses that public prosecutors rely on the police for infor-
mation and support. This factor does not in itself lead to the conclusion that they 
lack sufficient independence with regard to the police, though this may be different 
if a close working relationship exists between a public prosecutor and a particular 
police force. In view of the ECtHR, the public prosecutor in question would pref-
erably have been unconnected to the police force involved (especially considering 
the role of the involved police force in the investigation). However, the degree of 
independence of the Netherlands Public Prosecution Service, the fact that the Chief 
Public Prosecutor had ultimate responsibility, and the possibility of review by an in-
dependent court (which had been used) were sufficient safeguards.121 The ECtHR 
118. ECtHR 4 May 2001, no. 28883/95, §128 (McKerr v. UK). ECtHR 4 May 2001, no. 
24746/94, §120 (Hugh Jordan v. UK). ECtHR 15 May 2007, no. 52391/99, §337, GC (Ramsahai 
and others v. The Netherlands). ECtHR 16 February 2012, no. 23944/04, §137 (Eremiášová and 
Pechová v. Czech Republic). See also ECtHR 23 June 2016, no. 30760/06, §107 (Kulyk v. Ukraine): 
reference to CPT-findings, which urged the Ukrainian authorities to create an independent 
investigative agency specialised in investigating complaints against public officials.
119. ECtHR 15 May 2007, no. 52391/99, §338, GC (Ramsahai and others v. The Netherlands). 
ECtHR 14 December 2010, no. 74832/01, §99 (Mižigárová v. Slovakia).
120. ECtHR 21 December 2010, no. 45744/08, §§75-76 (Jasinskis v. Latvia).
121. ECtHR 15 May 2007, no. 52391/99, §§342-346, GC (Ramsahai and others v. The 
Netherlands). See about the separate hierarchy of the Prosecution Service also: ECtHR 18 
November 2014, no. 22412/08, §85 (Emars v. Latvia). The ECtHR has furthermore emphasised: 
“Proceedings brought by one person to challenge a decision not to prosecute another do not 
themselves seek to determine “civil rights and obligations.” Therefore, Article 6 ECHR was not 
applicable. ECtHR 14 April 2015, no. 24014/05, §218, GC (Mustafa Tunç and Fecire Tunç v. 
Turkey). See with regard to the position of the public prosecutor also: ECtHR 12 April 2016, 
nos. 43626/13 and 69 other applications, §§36-37 (Ecaterina Mirea and others v. Romania). See 
ECtHR 7 June 2011, no. 42344/07, §70 (Predică v. Romania) regarding a lack of institutional 
independence of a military prosecutor in active service who supervised the investigation into a 
death during deprivation of liberty by the State.
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nevertheless emphasises the risk that if a review body becomes involved in an ad-
vanced stage, it may be impossible to remedy shortcomings in the investigation.122 
Furthermore, the required independence is especially of importance with regard to 
medical experts preparing a report. These medical experts must have “(…) formal 
and de facto independence” from the persons involved in the events.123
The foregoing shows that the required independence of an investigation is 
stringent when a person dies during deprivation of liberty by the State. These in-
vestigations should not be performed by persons involved in the events (such as 
police officers), or persons who were responsible for the care for the deceased person 
(such as involved health care staff or prison governors). The investigation’s inde-
pendence should in my view be ensured from the outset to prevent any appearance 
of collusion and/or to prevent that any shortcomings in the investigation cannot be 
remedied in a later stage.124 The independent investigative party should not depend 
on the authority that was responsible for the detainee’s care for information and 
should therefore have powers to ensure that they can gain access to necessary in-
formation. The public prosecutor who supervises the investigation must not have a 
close working relationship with the State officials involved in the events surrounding 
the death, such as police officers.
Promptness and reasonable expedition
A prompt and expeditious investigation into deaths is essential for several rea-
sons. Firstly, it is of importance in view of the amount and quality of the available 
evidence.125 The passage of time will furthermore drag out the ordeal for the next 
of kin. It is also of importance with regard to the faith of the public in the State’s 
122. ECtHR 14 April 2015, no. 24014/05, §234, GC (Mustafa Tunç and Fecire Tunç v. Turkey). 
ECtHR 7 July 2011, no. 55721/07, §173, GC (Al-Skeini and others v. UK).
123. ECtHR 11 December 2012, no. 14730/09, §59 (Karpisiewicz v. Poland). ECtHR 13 
November 2012, no. 41108/10, §95 (Bajić v. Croatia). ECtHR 8 January 2009, no. 36220/02, 
§59 (Barabanshchikov v. Russia). See about impartial experts also: ECtHR 10 January 2012, no. 
13462/06, §96 (Česnulevičius v. Lithuania).
124. It is in my opinion not relevant whether it is ‘fairly likely’ that death was due to natural or 
accidental causes, as proposed by the International Committee for the Red Cross (ICRC). The 
ICRC proposes that in these cases the authorities who are responsible for the place of detention 
(or an ad hoc review mechanism) may carry out the investigation into such deaths during custody 
(2013, p. 10). This proposal should in my view be rejected as it shows a fallacy; an investigation 
is necessary to determine whether a detainee died due to natural or accidental causes. The basic 
principle is that the circumstances and cause and manner of death must be established. These 
factors can only be established through an investigation. This investigation must be performed by 
an independent party and the requirement of an independent investigation applies as from the 
outset of the investigation and extends to the entire procedure. See also section 6.2.
125. ECtHR 14 March 2002, no. 46477/99, §86 (Paul and Audrey Edwards v. UK). ECtHR 27 
January 2011, no. 10907/04, §66 (Iordanovi v. Bulgaria).
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adherence to the rule of law and in its efforts to investigate the incident, especially 
when deaths during deprivation of liberty by the State are involved.126 
Though the ECtHR’s case law does not contain actual time-limits, it does re-
veal some indications for what is considered to be a prompt investigation.127 The 
ECtHR states in Velikova versus Bulgaria that the investigation in question had 
started promptly, as the investigation was opened immediately after the detainee was 
found dead at the police station. The investigators visited the site, questioned wit-
nesses and an autopsy was performed.128 An investigation instituted within several 
days after death occurred was also regarded as prompt,129 whereas an investigation 
that started eighteen months after the death was not considered to be commenced 
promptly.130 A prompt response after the death is especially of importance to per-
form specific investigative steps, such as an examination of the scene where the body 
has been found,131 or an autopsy. Autopsies should be carried out as soon as possible 
after death since the quality of the body tissue deteriorates over time, which will in-
fluence the results. A delay in performing an autopsy may for example obstruct the 
possibility to determine a more precise time of death.132 Supplementary questions to 
the pathologist or an investigation of the scene of the incident also need to be per-
formed soon after the events as it will no longer be possible or futile after a certain 
amount of time.133 Witnesses must also be questioned soon after the events, while 
126. ECtHR 5 July 2005, no. 49790/99, §92 (Trubnikov v. Russia).
127. See furthermore: Thoonen and Duijst 2015.
128. ECtHR 18 May 2000, no. 41488/98, §78 (Velikova v. Bulgaria). See also: ECtHR 23 
February 2006, no. 46317/99, §114 (Ognyanova and Choban v. Bulgaria). ECtHR 17 October 
2013, no. 26824/04, §§13-14, 97 (Keller v. Russia). ECtHR 17 February 2015, no. 43696/14, §14 
(Kałużna v. Poland).
129. ECtHR 14 February 2012, no. 9296/06, §§111, 116 (Shumkova v. Russia). ECtHR 13 
June 2002, no. 38361/97, §§48, 64, 141 (Anguelova v. Bulgaria). ECtHR 10 January 2012, no. 
13462/06, §95 (Česnulevičius v. Lithuania). See also ECtHR 6 October 2005, no. 40262/98, 
§119 (H.Y. and HÜ. Y. v. Turkey): the incident where the detainee was injured occurred however 
almost two weeks before the detainee’s death (§§19-33). See furthermore ECtHR 2 September 
2010, no. 71420/01, §§40, 172 (Bekirski v. Bulgaria): the ECtHR concludes that the investigation 
commenced promptly, namely on the day the detainee died (although there were a series of 
incidents in the days prior to the death of the detainee that also required an investigation). 
130. ECtHR 21 December 2010, no. 45744/08, §§78-79, 82 (Jasinskis v. Latvia). See also ECtHR 
5 July 2005, no. 49790/99, §92 (Trubnikov v. Russia): not prompt is opening a second investigation 
more than three years after the death. See also ECtHR 3 September 2013, no. 15762/10, §§33-35 
(Cadiroğlu v. Turkey): criminal proceedings commenced six years after the death.
131. ECtHR 24 March 2009, no. 11818/02, §56 (Mojsiejew v. Poland).
132. ECtHR 18 November 2014, no. 22412/08, §79 (Emars v. Latvia).
133. ECtHR 21 December 2010, no. 45744/08, §79 (Jasinskis v. Latvia). The ECtHR stresses in 
Taïs versus France that the second expert opinion was given three years after the events in question, 
which did not fulfil the required promptness. ECtHR 1 June 2006, no. 39922/03, §106 (Taïs 
v. France). In Mižigárová versus Slovakia, the ECtHR emphasises the fact that the scene of the 
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their memories are still fresh.134 In Aktaş versus Turkey, the ECtHR refers to a delay 
in taking witness statements of more than three and a half months, which delay had 
not been explained.135 A prompt response is absent if key witnesses are questioned 
respectively a year and more than three and a half years after the events.136 The fact 
that the victim was not questioned in the period between the incident and the vic-
tim’s death, although she could communicate during that period, undermined the 
effectiveness of the investigation since that evidence was no longer available after 
the victim’s death.137 Any proceedings (instituted after the preliminary investigation) 
should also commence promptly.138 In Paul and Audrey Edwards versus the United 
Kingdom, the ECtHR concluded that a delay in the opening of an inquest of ap-
proximately eighteen months after the death was sufficiently prompt, considering 
the considerable amount of work that needed to be done to prepare the investiga-
tion and the wide scope of the investigation. In view of the ECtHR the authorities 
acted with sufficient promptness.139 Opening an inquest after more than twenty-five 
months140 and eight years was however not sufficiently prompt.141
As far as the investigation’s expeditiousness is concerned, the entire length of 
all the performed investigations and proceedings must be taken into account, 
shooting was inspected very shortly after the incident, within a couple of hours after the shooting. 
ECtHR 14 December 2010, no. 74832/01, §§7-8, 30-31, 96 (Mižigárová v. Slovakia).
134. ECtHR 21 December 2010, no. 45744/08, §79 (Jasinskis v. Latvia). See also: ECtHR 
13 June 2000, no. 23531/94, §89 (Timurtaş v. Turkey). ECtHR 22 April 2010, no. 43418/06, 
§§87-88 (Mutayeva v. Russia).
135. ECtHR 24 April 2003, no. 24351/94, §§34, 44, 306 (Aktaş v. Turkey).
136. ECtHR 23 February 2006, no. 46317/99, §§114, 116 (Ognyanova and Choban v. Bulgaria). 
In Taïs versus France, the ECtHR stresses that the investigating judge only questioned the police 
officers involved in the death four years after the events. The investigation did not satisfy the 
required promptness. ECtHR 1 June 2006, no. 39922/03, §106 (Taïs v. France).
137. ECtHR 17 December 2009, no. 4762/05, §§130-131 (Mikayil Mammadov v. Azerbaijan).
138. ECtHR 14 December 2006, no. 4353/03, §91 (Tarariyeva v. Russia). ECtHR 3 September 
2013, no. 15762/10, §§32, 33, 35 (Cadiroğlu v. Turkey).
139. ECtHR 14 March 2002, no. 46477/99, §§85-86 (Paul and Audrey Edwards v. UK). An 
inquest purposes to determine who the deceased was and when, where and how the person in 
question came by his death. The Coroners Rules 1984, Article 36. Available at: www.legislation.
gov.uk. Last accessed: 27 April 2017. See also: McIntosh 2012. Rainey, Wicks and Ovey 2014, p. 
162: inquests are hearings conducted by coroners. Furthermore: Duijst-Heesters, Woudenberg-Van 
den Broek and Soerdjbalie-Maikoe (NFI) 2016, pp. 43-45. See for the response of the Minister of 
Security and Justice: Kamerstukken II 2016/17, 34 550 VI, no. 29.
140. ECtHR 4 May 2001, no. 24746/94, §§136, 139-140 (Hugh Jordan v. UK).
141. ECtHR 4 May 2001, no. 30054/96, §§130, 134 (Kelly and others v. UK). See also ECtHR 
16 July 2013, no. 43098/09, §§131, 140 (McCaughey and others v. UK): inquest hearing started 
twenty-one years after the deaths.
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including the final decision.142 An investigation lasting approximately one year is 
not in itself unreasonable in view of the ECtHR.143 An investigation that lasted 
approximately four years did also not lead to the conclusion that the requirements 
under Article 2 ECHR were not fulfilled because the delays in the investigation 
did not affect the ability to establish the circumstances surrounding the inci-
dent.144 It was also not unreasonable in view of the ECtHR that approximately 
seven months had elapsed between submission of the final police report and the 
decision not to prosecute.145 Lengthy proceedings are however a strong indica-
tion that the proceedings are defective and without a convincing and plausible 
explanation, the requirements under Article 2 ECHR will not be fulfilled.146 The 
ECtHR acknowledges that in some cases additional investigation (which will 
take time) is necessary to clarify inconsistencies or gaps. Multiple remittals for 
re-examinations or multiple re-openings are however indicative of a defective in-
vestigation.147 Another important factor is whether there are prolonged periods of 
unnecessary inactivity during the investigation or proceedings.148 An unjustified 
delay in the procedure of more than eight months was for example not compatible 
with the requirements under Article 2 ECHR.149 The ECtHR also stressed that a 
period of several months (two months) to execute simple procedural actions like 
forwarding the relevant files is too long.150 Another example of a lengthy and un-
142. ECtHR 17 December 2009, no. 4762/05, §131 (Mikayil Mammadov v. Azerbaijan). See 
also ECtHR 3 May 2012, no. 16850/09, §§75, 81 (Yelden and others v. Turkey).
143. ECtHR 3 February 2011, no. 8532/06, §91 (Geppa v. Russia). ECtHR 11 December 2012, 
no. 14730/09, §61 (Karpisiewicz v. Poland). See also ECtHR 13 December 2012, no. 62120/09, 
§105 (Volk v. Slovenia): investigation of approximately nine months sufficiently prompt. ECtHR 
24 March 2011, no. 23458/02, §320, GC (Giuliani and Gaggio v. Italy): preliminary investigation 
closed after approximately one year and four months later with a request for discontinuation. No 
excessive delay. 
144. ECtHR 17 October 2013, no. 26824/04, §§99-102 (Keller v. Russia). See also ECtHR 9 
December 2008, no. 77766/01, §110 (Dzieciak v. Poland): investigation lasting approximately two 
years, which was considered substantial (though there was also a significant period of inactivity). 
ECtHR 14 March 2002, no. 46477/99, §§85-86 (Paul and Audrey Edwards v. UK): inquiry 
lasting some two years was considered to be performed with sufficient expedition considering the 
amount of work that needed to be done and its complexity. 
145. ECtHR 28 May 2002, no. 43290/98, §119 (McShane v. UK).
146. ECtHR 12 January 2016, no. 62870/13, §107 (Bilbija and Blažević v. Croatia).
147. ECtHR 18 December 2014, no. 25435/06, §80 (Belenko v. Russia). ECtHR 17 September 
2013, no. 22426/11, §69 (Przemyk v. Poland).
148. ECtHR 16 January 2014, no. 5269/08, §256 (Shchiborshch and Kuzmina v. Russia). See 
also: ECtHR 14 April 2015, no. 24014/05, §183, GC (Mustafa Tunç and Fecire Tunç v. Turkey).
149. ECtHR 4 May 2001, no. 24746/94, §§136-140 (Hugh Jordan v. UK). ECtHR 9 December 
2008, no. 77766/01, §110 (Dzieciak v. Poland). ECtHR 24 March 2009, no. 11818/02, §§55, 58 
(Mojsiejew v. Poland).
150. ECtHR 12 January 2016, no. 62870/13, §116 (Bilbija and Blažević v. Croatia).
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justified inactivity is that an order to reopen the case is disregarded for over two 
and a half years.151 The ECtHR stresses in Ognyanova and Choban versus Bulgaria 
that relevant factors to establish a violation of Article 2 ECHR were the length of 
the investigation, which was almost five years, the very lengthy periods of inactiv-
ity between the investigative steps, and the limited number of investigative steps 
that had been taken.152 Proceedings with a length of six years and eight months 
(and eight years after the death in question) and that were still pending will by 
definition not meet the requirement of reasonable expedition.153 
In view of the interest of gathering evidence, there will only be a procedural 
violation of Article 2 ECHR if the delay had a negative effect on establishing 
essential facts to account for the death.154 Although the ECtHR stressed in the 
aforementioned Tunç case that the parameters formulated to assess the investi-
gation’s effectiveness (including the promptness of the investigation) are not an 
end in itself,155 it has also stressed that under Article 2 ECHR the Member States 
are obliged to start an investigation promptly and to perform it with reasonable 
expedition, regardless of whether any delay actually had an impact on the inves-
tigation’s effectiveness. This is essential considering the public confidence in the 
State’s adherence to the rule of law156 and the position of the next of kin. A serious 
breach of the investigation’s promptness and expedition can therefore be sufficient 
to conclude that Article 2 ECHR has been violated in its procedural limb when 
deaths during deprivation of liberty by the State (including death by lethal force) 
151. ECtHR 18 December 2014, no. 25435/06, §80 (Belenko v. Russia). 
152. ECtHR 23 February 2006, no. 46317/99, §§114, 116 (Ognyanova and Choban v. Bulgaria). 
See also ECtHR 2 September 1998, no. 22495/93, §§103, 107 (Yaşa v. Turkey): still no progress 
in the investigation more than five years after the death. ECtHR 17 December 2009, no. 4762/05, 
§131 (Mikayil Mammadov v. Azerbaijan): overall length of the investigation was more than four 
years and it was adjourned and resumed a number of times, without any improvement in the 
investigation’s effectiveness.
153. ECtHR 9 October 2012, no. 1413/07, §§77-78 (Çoşelav v. Turkey). See also ECtHR 17 
September 2013, no. 22426/11, §§53, 67-75 (Przemyk v. Poland): proceedings lasted for seventeen 
years, including significant periods of inactivity on the part of the courts. The criminal proceedings 
were ultimately discontinued, as the offence became prescribed.
154. ECtHR 17 December 2009, no. 4762/05, §§130-131 (Mikayil Mammadov v. Azerbaijan).
155. ECtHR 14 April 2015, no. 24014/05, §225, GC (Mustafa Tunç and Fecire Tunç v. Turkey). 
See also: ECtHR 12 January 2017, no. 3524/14, §§35-44 (Sarbyanova-Pashaliyska and Pashaliyska 
v. Bulgaria).
156. ECtHR 16 July 2013, no. 43098/09, §130 (McCaughey and others v. UK). ECtHR 16 July 
2013, no. 58559/09, §69 (Collette and Michael Hemsworth v. UK). ECtHR 9 December 2014, 
no. 19563/11, §86 (McDonnell v. UK).
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are concerned,157 as these cases concern the manner in which the State observes 
its obligations. 
The ECtHR’s case law demonstrates in my view that the required promptness 
and expedition are to a large extent casuistic, which makes it difficult to derive 
general principles as to what is considered to be a reasonable time frame. An in-
vestigation lasting approximately one year is not considered unreasonable. The 
main criterion is in my view whether there were prolonged periods of unnecessary 
inactivity, whereas the reasonableness of these periods are also strongly connected 
to the peculiarities of each individual case.
Involvement of next of kin and public scrutiny
To ensure accountability in theory and in practice, maintain public confidence 
in the authorities’ adherence to the rule of law and to prevent any appearance of 
collusion in, or tolerance of, unlawful acts, Article 2 ECHR requires that the in-
vestigation or its results should be sufficiently public.158 This means that the facts 
need to become known to the public and in particular to the relatives of the vic-
tim.159 The degree of the required public scrutiny may vary case by case. The next 
of kin must however always be involved in the procedure to such an extent that 
their legitimate interests are safeguarded.160 The argument that the next of kin can 
only be recognised as successors of the victim once it has been established that a 
crime has been committed has been rejected by the ECtHR. Suicides would oth-
erwise be placed outside the scope of the procedural aspect of Article 2 ECHR.161 
The question arises as to when and how the next of kin of a person who died dur-
ing deprivation of liberty will be sufficiently involved?
A first step in the immediate aftermath of the death of a detainee is to (try 
to) inform the family of the detainee about the death.162 The next of kin must 
furthermore be informed correctly and in a timely fashion about the progress of 
157. ECtHR 5 July 2005, no. 49790/99, §92 (Trubnikov v. Russia): delay in starting second 
investigation. ECtHR 20 May 2010, no. 12336/03, §§103-104 (Perişan and others v. Turkey).
158. ECtHR 15 May 2007, no. 52391/99, §353, GC (Ramsahai and others v. The Netherlands). 
ECtHR 22 February 2011, no. 24329/02, §165 (Soare and others v. Romania).
159. ECtHR 29 March 2001, no. 37602/97 (Sieminska v. Poland). 
160. ECtHR 4 May 2001, no. 37715/97, §92 (Shanaghan v. UK). ECtHR 27 July 2004, no. 
57671/00, §32 (Slimani v. France). See also: Brems and Lavrysen 2013. The circle of relatives that 
must be involved has not been further defined by the ECtHR. 
161. ECtHR 18 May 2010, no. 24034/07, §44 (Anusca v. Moldova).
162. ECtHR 9 October 2012, no. 1413/07, §§74-75 (Çoşelav v. Turkey).
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the investigation163 and/or proceedings.164 Providing information is however not 
enough. In several judgments the ECtHR stresses that the relatives must be ac-
tively involved in the investigation165 and in a timely fashion,166 to enable them to 
effectively intervene during the investigation.167 The next of kin must for example 
be informed or consulted about any proposed evidence or witnesses168 and should 
have the opportunity to present other evidence.169 Participation of the next of kin 
can be ensured by providing the next of kin the right to appear as private prosecu-
tor in a criminal procedure.170 An obvious breach of the next of kin’s involvement 
in the investigation was that, contrary to domestic law, the relatives were con-
fronted with a fait accompli by providing them with the autopsy report, without 
informing them in advance about the investigator’s decision to order a forensic 
examination.171 Article 2 ECHR does not require that the investigating authorities 
should comply with every request for a particular investigative measure made by 
the next of kin during the investigation.172 Neither does Article 2 ECHR require 
that the next of kin should be provided the opportunity to appoint an expert who 
may attend forensic examinations.173 The relatives must be informed about a dis-
continuation order or a decision halting the proceedings.174 These decisions must 
163. ECtHR 18 December 2008, no. 29971/04, §122 (Kats and others v. Ukraine). The next of 
kin must be informed about significant developments: ECtHR 15 January 2015, no. 69842/10, 
§61 (Albakova v. Russia).
164. ECtHR 14 December 2000, no. 22676/93, §93 (Gül v. Turkey). 
165. ECtHR 15 September 2015, no. 37847/13, §39 (Lari v. The Republic of Moldova). See also: 
ECtHR 7 June 2011, no. 323/04, §71 (Mecheva v. Bulgaria).
166. ECtHR 20 February 2007, no. 46748/99, §89 (Salgin v. Turkey).
167. ECtHR 17 December 2009, no. 4762/05, §132 (Mikayil Mammadov v. Azerbaijan). 
See also: ECtHR 11 February 2014, no. 69527/10, §34 (Vasîlca v. The Republic of Moldova). 
ECtHR 18 May 2010, no. 24034/07, §§44-45 (Anusca v. Moldova). Effective participation in the 
proceedings can be ensured by granting the next of kin the procedural status of a victim. ECtHR 
15 January 2015, no. 69842/10, §62 (Albakova v. Russia).
168. ECtHR 7 June 2011, no. 42344/07, §71 (Predică v. Romania). ECtHR 18 December 2008, 
no. 29971/04, §122 (Kats and others v. Ukraine).
169. ECtHR 31 March 2005, no. 38187/97, §232 (Adali v. Turkey).
170. ECtHR 12 January 2017, no. 3524/14, §§11, 15-16, 43 (Sarbyanova-Pashaliyska and 
Pashaliyska v. Bulgaria).
171. ECtHR 15 February 2011, no. 35403/06, §81 (Tsintsabadze v. Georgia). ECtHR 13 July 
2010, no. 45661/99, §133 (Carabulea v. Romania).
172. ECtHR 15 May 2007, no. 52391/99, §348, GC (Ramsahai and others v. The Netherlands). 
ECtHR 14 April 2015, no. 24014/05, §180, GC (Mustafa Tunç and Fecire Tunç v. Turkey).
173. ECtHR 24 March 2011, no. 23458/02, §315, GC (Giuliani and Gaggio v. Italy).
174. ECtHR 18 December 2008, no. 29971/04, §122 (Kats and others v. Ukraine). ECtHR 27 
July 1998, no. 21593/93, §§11-13, 82 (Güleç v. Turkey). ECtHR 23 February 2006, no. 46317/99, 
§§115-116, 43, 61 (Ognyanova and Choban v. Bulgaria).
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be given in time and the reasons for these decisions must be provided.175 If not, 
effective challenge of these decisions may be impeded. 
The terms of the next of kin’s access to the file should be defined.176 As earlier 
stated, the relatives must have access to that information yielded by the investi-
gation which is necessary to participate effectively in the proceedings.177 Access 
to material in the case file may also be necessary to challenge the decision not to 
prosecute effectively.178 In Oğur versus Turkey, the ECtHR for example notes that 
the next of kin had neither access to the case file during the investigation nor dur-
ing the court proceedings, and the decision not to institute criminal proceedings 
was not served on the applicant’s lawyer. Therefore, the applicant was not in a po-
sition to appeal.179 In Ramsahai and others versus the Netherlands, the ECtHR 
stresses that the relatives do not have automatic access to the case file when the 
investigation is still under way, as police reports and investigative materials may 
involve sensitive issues. If such is the case, the next of kin and the public can be 
given access in other stages of the procedures available in the State concerned. In 
that particular case, the next of kin had been denied any involvement or access to 
the file during the investigation by the National Police Internal Investigations De-
partment.180 As for the next of kin’s involvement in the proceedings, a noteworthy 
judgment is Paul and Audrey Edwards versus The United Kingdom (lethal inci-
dent between two detainees), where the ECtHR concludes that the relatives were 
not sufficiently involved in the procedure. The inquiry performed into the death 
sat in private, though its report was made public. The parents of the deceased 
detainee were only allowed to attend three days of the inquiry, when they them-
selves were given the opportunity to provide evidence. They were not represented 
and were unable to question witnesses. The private character of the inquiry, from 
which the relatives were excluded except for the stage when they were allowed to 
175. ECtHR 20 October 2009, no. 3990/04, §52 (Trufin v. Romania). ECtHR 1 December 
2009, no. 64301/01, §114 (Velcea and Mazăre v. Romania). ECtHR 15 July 2014, no. 40485/08, 
§92 (Petrović v. Serbia).
176. ECtHR 5 July 2005, no. 49790/99, §93 (Trubnikov v. Russia).
177. ECtHR 14 April 2015, no. 24014/05, §216, GC (Mustafa Tunç and Fecire Tunç v. Turkey). 
In Adali versus Turkey, the ECtHR stressed that the investigation file was inaccessible to the 
deceased’s family: copies of the post-mortem and ballistic reports were only received after the 
application was communicated to the Government. ECtHR 31 March 2005, no. 38187/97, §232 
(Adali v. Turkey).
178. ECtHR 14 April 2015, no. 24014/05, §§210-211, GC (Mustafa Tunç and Fecire Tunç v. 
Turkey). ECtHR 5 June 2007, no. 63758/00, §§76-77 (Anik and others v. Turkey).
179. ECtHR 20 May 1999, no. 21594/93, §§13, 92, GC (Oğur v. Turkey).
180. ECtHR 15 May 2007, no. 52391/99, §§298-299, 309, 347-350, GC (Ramsahai and others 
v. The Netherlands). 
Death in State Custody DRUK.indd   311 13-Sep-17   2:40:19 PM
312 Chapter 6 
give evidence, was one of the two relevant factors (next to the lack of power to 
compel witnesses) to establish a procedural violation of Article 2 ECHR.181
Despite the aforementioned principles, the ECtHR’s case law does not ex-
plicitly state what information collected in the investigation must be shared with 
the next of kin. The question whether the privacy of the deceased detainee may 
preclude the relatives’ access to the case file and to information relating to the de-
ceased, such as medical data, is not raised under Article 2 ECHR.182 A noteworthy 
factor in this regard is medical confidentiality. The ECtHR’s case law demon-
strates that medical confidentiality must be observed after the death of the patient 
in question,183 though it also contains judgments where the ECtHR did not ac-
knowledge that Article 8 ECHR can be invoked with regard to the deceased’s 
own right to respect for his private life after the person in question died.184 As 
discussed before, Article 2 ECHR comprises a right for the detainee’s next of 
kin to be involved in the procedure to such an extent that their legitimate inter-
ests are safeguarded. This right can be based on the close personal ties between 
the deceased detainee and his next of kin, i.e. their family life.185 The question 
what information needs to be provided to the next of kin can in my view be an-
swered by the basic principle arising from the ECHR that the next of kin must 
be involved in the procedure in such a manner that their legitimate interests are 
safeguarded.186 As stressed by Mirandola, “(…) information is not regarded as a 
right per se, but only as mean for an effective involvement in the proceedings”.187 
In my view, the next of kin have the right to be involved in the procedure, and 
thus informed, in such a manner that their legitimate interests are safeguarded. 
The next of kin’s legitimate interests include clarifying the facts surrounding the 
death and securing the accountability of State officials involved for any alleged 
acts and/or omissions,188 such as the question whether sufficient measures have 
181. ECtHR 14 March 2002, no. 46477/99, §§82-84, 87 (Paul and Audrey Edwards v. UK).
182. This may be explained by the fact that the deceased is no longer in the position to complain 
(about a violation of Article 8 ECHR).
183. ECtHR 18 May 2004, no. 58148/00, §47 (Éditions Plon v. France).
184. ECtHR 15 May 2006, no. 1338/03 (The Estate of Kresten Filtenborg Mortensen v. Denmark). 
ECtHR 13 July 2006, no. 58757/00, §42 (Jäggi v. Switzerland). See also: Van Beers 2009, pp. 
212-215. Duijst and Naujocks 2016, p. 24.
185. The ECtHR stressed in Petrova versus Latvia that there was an interference with the 
applicant’s right to respect for private life as the applicant was not informed, as one of the closest 
relatives, about the removal of her son’s organs after his death and could therefore not exercise 
certain rights allegedly established under domestic law. ECtHR 24 June 2014, no. 4605/05, 
§§87-89 (Petrova v. Latvia).
186. ECtHR 4 May 2001, no. 37715/97, §92 (Shanaghan v. UK).
187. Mirandola 2016, p. 186.
188. ECtHR 13 March 2007, no. 57389/00, §111 (Huohvanainen v. Finland).
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been taken to prevent a foreseeable risk for the life of the detainee in question or, 
if lethal force was used, whether this was absolutely necessary in defence of any 
person from unlawful violence, to effect a lawful arrest, to prevent the escape in 
case of lawful deprivation of liberty, or in action lawfully taken for the purpose of 
quelling a riot or insurrection (Article 2 ECHR). 
In view of the ECtHR, public accountability of the authorities and public scru-
tiny of their actions can be ensured by involving the next of kin of a deceased 
detainee.189 However, the ECtHR also stresses that if a vulnerable person loses 
his life in a horrendous manner due to a number of failures by public authorities 
and officials who have the responsibility to protect that person’s welfare, the pub-
lic interest calls for the widest exposure possible. In the Edwards case, the ECtHR 
stresses that although the report of the inquiry was made public, no reason was 
provided for the fact that the inquiry was held in private. The private character 
of the proceedings was a relevant factor to find a procedural violation of Article 
2 ECHR.190 Article 2 ECHR does not require that all proceedings following an 
inquiry into a violent death be public, provided that there is a sufficient element 
of public scrutiny which ensures the aforementioned goals. A procedure to chal-
lenge a decision not to prosecute does not need to be public. The same goes for 
the decision taken in this procedure. The latter principle was criticised by Judges 
Jočienė and Popović: “(…) an obligation to make the decision public cannot be 
placed on the applicants. (…) only a public decision could exclude any negative 
allusion concerning the actions taken by the authorities when examining a matter 
of such crucial importance”.191 I agree to this view; the general public may also 
want to know the reasons for (not) prosecuting anyone. If both the government 
and the relatives do not publish this decision, it will remain unknown to the gen-
eral public. This may have a negative influence on the public’s confidence in the 
State’s observance of its own laws.
The fact that the ECtHR stresses that if a vulnerable person loses his life in a 
horrendous manner due to a number of failures by public authorities and officials 
189. ECtHR 18 May 2010, no. 24034/07, §44 (Anusca v. Moldova). In El-Masri versus The 
Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia (concerning extraordinary rendition), the ECtHR stresses 
the importance of the right to know what had happened, not only for the applicant and his family, 
but also for other victims and the general public. ECtHR 13 December 2012, no. 39630/09, §191, 
GC (El-Masri v. The Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia).
190. ECtHR 14 March 2002, no. 46477/99, §§82-83, 87 (Paul and Audrey Edwards v. UK). 
See also ECtHR 8 July 2014, no. 22965/10, §79 (Yurtsever and others v. Turkey): public scrutiny 
in case of excessive use of force.
191. ECtHR 15 May 2007, no. 52391/99, §§353-354, GC (Ramsahai and others v. The 
Netherlands). See also chapter 7, section 7.6.
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who have the responsibility to protect that person’s welfare, the public interest 
calls for the widest exposure possible192 provokes the question whether this min-
imum standard only applies if the death of a detainee results from a criminal 
offence. Such a procedural approach implies that the domestic law that penalises 
particular conduct and not the peculiarities of the case is decisive on the question 
how much exposure should be given to the case in question. This procedural ap-
proach does not follow from the ECHR; the ECtHR clearly states that the specific 
failures and the seriousness of the case (i.e. a material approach) are decisive to de-
termine how much exposure should be given to a death in custody. Furthermore, 
if only deaths resulting from a criminal offence would be subjected to the wid-
est exposure possible, suicides would fall outside this category, whereas the same 
failures (such as a failure to pass necessary information, inadequate screening)193 
could be attributed to the State authorities.194 
Public scrutiny by means of exposure to the public aims to ensure that State 
officials are held accountable if justified by the circumstances, which serves the 
confidence of the public in the State’s adherence to the rule of law. The man-
ner in which ‘the widest exposure possible’ should be ensured is not specified by 
the ECtHR, nor is the question addressed whether this would interfere with the 
detainee’s right to respect for private life.195 An option to ensure the widest ex-
posure possible is to publish anonymised data regarding the death, which would 
not lead to an interference with the detainee’s private life as the data are removed 
from identifying particulars or details. This is however different if personal data 
regarding a detainee are exposed to the public. Such an exposure requires that the 
detainee’s right to respect for private life, which right can reasonably be seen to 
have been passed on to the next of kin after the detainee’s death,196 is balanced 
against the public interest that the authorities are held accountable if the facts of 
the case give cause for that. This public interest falls in my view under the interest 
of protecting the rights of others and to prevent crime, as mentioned in Article 
8 §2 ECHR. The interference must also be proportionate to the legitimate aim 
pursued.197 An option to ensure the proportionality of an interference with the 
detainee’s private life can be observed by only making the investigation’s conclu-
sions public, as proposed by the ICRC (next to involving the next of kin in the 
192. ECtHR 14 March 2002, no. 46477/99, §83 (Paul and Audrey Edwards v. UK).
193. ECtHR 14 March 2002, no. 46477/99, §64 (Paul and Audrey Edwards v. UK).
194. ECtHR 18 May 2010, no. 24034/07, §44 (Anusca v. Moldova).
195. See however ECtHR 14 March 2002, no. 46477/99, §83 (Paul and Audrey Edwards v. 
UK): the ECtHR mentions “any possible considerations of medical privacy”.
196. ECtHR 18 May 2004, no. 58148/00, §34 (Éditions Plon v. France).
197. EComHR 9 July 1991, no. 14461/88 (Chave Née Jullien v. France).
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process).198 Such an interference requires a legal basis in domestic law to ensure 
foreseeability. 
The foregoing shows that the relatives of a person who died during deprivation of 
liberty by the State must be sufficiently informed and involved in the procedure 
to safeguard their legitimate interests. Though this is a somewhat vague criterion, 
it means in any event that the next of kin must be timely informed about the 
progress of the investigation, important investigative steps that will be taken such 
as an autopsy, and the motivated decision to close or halt the investigation, the 
cause and manner of death, the circumstances in which death occurred, whether 
sufficient measures have been taken to prevent a foreseeable risk for the life of the 
detainee in question or, if lethal force has been used, whether this was absolutely 
necessary in defence of any person from unlawful violence, to effect an arrest, to 
prevent the escape of the detainee, or in action lawfully taken for the purpose of 
quelling a riot or insurrection (Article 2 ECHR). The system applicable in the in-
volved State is in my view also relevant to establish whether the next of kin has 
been sufficiently involved, which can be illustrated by the manner in which the 
next of kin were involved in the inquest in the Edwards case (United Kingdom) 
versus the manner in which the relatives were informed in the Ramsahai case (The 
Netherlands). How public scrutiny to the general public should be ensured does 
in my view not clearly emerge in the ECtHR’s case law. Sufficiently involving the 
next of kin may suffice. Whether (more) public disclosure is required depends on 
whether death was caused by failings of State officials. 
6.4. Concluding remarks
If a detainee dies, an effective investigation must be performed to account for 
this death. The minimum standards for an effective investigation are an inde-
pendent and impartial investigation on the initiative of the State, that fulfils the 
requirement of promptness and expedition, involves the next of kin to safeguard 
their legitimate interests and ensures sufficient public scrutiny. Not fulfilling one 
of the minimum standards for an effective investigation may suffice to find a 
procedural violation of Article 2 ECHR, for example completely excluding the 
next of kin or a protracted investigation that drags out the ordeal for the next of 
kin. Several State authorities are involved in these cases, including the authori-
ties responsible for protecting the detainee’s health and life and the investigative 
198. International Committee of the Red Cross 2013, p. 13.
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authorities. Effective implementation of the obligation to investigate deaths dur-
ing deprivation of liberty by the State implies in my view that these obligations 
must be clearly assigned to the appropriate (independent) authorities. The obliga-
tion to institute an investigation on the State’s own motion implies an obligation 
for the State authority that was responsible for the protection of the health and 
life of the deceased detainee to involve the independent investigative authorities 
as soon as possible after the authority is acquainted with the death of a detainee 
or a life-threatening situation. This will enable the investigative authorities to 
initiate an investigation that fulfils the requirements of promptness and expedi-
tion. Such an obligation to report inevitably lies with the responsible authority 
as it is often the first (and only) party with knowledge of the detainee’s death or 
the life-threatening situation. To ensure that the next of kin and the public are 
objectively informed about the death, this task should lie with the investigative 
authorities and not the State authority that was responsible for the protection of 
the health and life of the deceased detainee.
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CHAPTER 7. 
Implementation of procedural obligations 
to investigate deaths in the Netherlands
7.1. Introduction
The procedural obligations arising from Article 2 ECHR to set up a system that 
deals with possible breaches of the right to life and to investigate deaths during 
deprivation of liberty by the State, including the minimum standards to ensure 
the investigation’s effectiveness, have been discussed in chapter 6. In this chapter, 
it will be explored if, and if so, what, safeguards exists in Dutch law to meet these 
minimum standards with regard to deaths during deprivation of liberty by the 
State and whether the applicable Dutch systems fulfil the requirements arising 
from the ECHR. 
To fully understand the applicable Dutch legal framework, this study will firstly 
discuss the Dutch legal regimes that are relevant in relation to investigations into 
deaths during deprivation of liberty by the State (section 7.2). The legal remedies 
available to the relatives of a deceased detainee, such as disciplinary or complaint 
proceedings or civil proceedings to recover damages, will not be discussed in this 
chapter. This study will only discuss the available procedures that obliges the 
Dutch State authorities to act after a detainee dies. Subsequently, this study dis-
cusses the safeguards laid down in these systems to fulfil the minimum standards 
of effectiveness as developed under the ECHR and the systems’ strengths and 
weaknesses considering these minimum standards (sections 7.3-7.7). To illustrate 
how risks may emerge in practice, data (including data gathered in the studies of 
Thoonen and Duijst) will be discussed. In chapter 6, section 6.4, it has been dis-
cussed how the diverging responsibilities to investigate deaths during deprivation 
of liberty by the State arising from the ECHR can be effectively implemented in 
practice. In the concluding remarks of this chapter, it will be discussed whether 
these obligations are in the Netherlands assigned to the appropriate authorities to 
ensure effective implementation in practice.
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7.2. Applicable legal regimes
If a person dies in the Netherlands, several steps must be taken and several legal 
regimes may apply. These regimes also apply during deprivation of liberty by the 
State and will be discussed in the following. Noteworthy is that these procedures 
do not distinguish between the diverging situations in which a detainee may die 
(e.g. due to violence or due to an illness). 
 Burial Act and Code of Criminal Procedure
The Burial Act regulates the procedure that has to be followed if a person has 
died.1 This Act does not regulate who is authorised to establish that a person is 
dead, nor does it contain regulations on how death should be established. How-
ever, only a declaration of a physician who declares a person deceased will have 
legal consequences.2 A first (inquiring) step after the death of a person has been 
confirmed is to perform an external examination of the body.3 This is an ob-
ligatory step and not fulfilling this obligation is punishable.4 The Burial Act 
does not prescribe how an external examination of the body must be performed, 
though several guidelines have been developed on how to perform an external 
examination.5 The physician must determine whether the person died due to 
natural causes or otherwise, by performing an external examination of the body, 
the direct surroundings and the circumstances in which the death occurred, and 
by examining the medical history of the deceased. The date of death should be 
determined, just like an indication for the time of death.6 The following man-
ners of death are distinguished in the Burial Act: natural death (Article 7 §1) 
and non-natural death (Article 76 §1). These terms are not defined in the Bur-
ial Act. The following definition for a natural death has been developed by the 
1. See with regard to this procedure also: Duijst 2011b.
2. Art. 3 in connection with art. 7 §1, art. 10 §1, art. 11 and art. 12 Burial Act. See also: Public 
Prosecution Service, Forensic Medical Society, Health Care Inspectorate and Royal Dutch Medical 
Association 2016, p. 3.
3. Art. 3 Burial Act.
4. Art. 81, section 1 Burial Act.
5. Forensic Medical Society and Dutch Association of Community Health Services 2016; 
2011c; 2011d. Royal Dutch Medical Association 2005. Public Prosecution Service, Forensic 
Medical Society, Health Care Inspectorate and Royal Dutch Medical Association 2016. There also 
exists a forensic technical standard on external examinations. See: Duijst and Naujocks 2016, pp. 
67, 84-86.
6. Das 2011b, p. 45. Reijnders and Das 2012, p. 7. Public Prosecution Service, Forensic 
Medical Society, Health Care Inspectorate and Royal Dutch Medical Association 2016, p. 3.
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Public Prosecution Service, Forensic Medical Society, Health Care Inspectorate 
and Royal Dutch Medical Association: death caused by a(n) (spontaneous) illness, 
including a complication of a medical treatment that is performed ‘lege artis’.7 
A non-natural death has been defined as follows: death as a direct or indirect con-
sequence of an accident, violence or other external cause, of suicide, or caused 
intentionally by another person or through another person’s neglect.8 The lat-
est guideline of the Public Prosecution Service, Forensic Medical Society, Health 
Care Inspectorate and Royal Dutch Medical Association states that a non-natural 
death includes all cases where the physician is not convinced of a natural cause of 
death, such as death caused by an accident, violence, or suicide.9
The external examination of the body is in principle performed by the at-
tending physician,10 i.e. the last physician who provided in any way medical 
assistance to the patient during his life. A locum tenens is only allowed to per-
form the external examination if he has sufficient knowledge about the patient 
and his health condition prior to death. This means, for example, that a physician 
who works at an emergency department in a hospital is not allowed to perform 
the external examination if his role was limited to determining the death of the 
patient or if the patient died shortly after entering the hospital.11 If the attending 
physician is not convinced of a natural cause of death, he is obligated to notify 
the forensic physician who will subsequently perform an external examination of 
the body.12 This procedure enables any criminal offence to be detected,13 which 
ought to give the police and public prosecutor cause to institute a criminal investi-
gation.14 Though not regulated by the Burial Act, the aim of this Act presupposes 
that the attending physician must provide the forensic physician with the medi-
cal data necessary to perform the external examination. This includes in any case 
7. Public Prosecution Service, Forensic Medical Society, Health Care Inspectorate and 
Royal Dutch Medical Association 2016, pp. 2, 4. See also: Das 2011b, p. 46. The State Health 
Inspectorate (1994, p. 9) developed the following definition of a natural death: any death caused by 
a spontaneous illness and/or old age. Death caused by old age has been removed from the current 
definition.
8. Das 2011b, p. 58. The State Health Inspectorate (1994, p. 9) developed the following 
definition of a non-natural death: any death (also) resulting from external (physical or chemical) 
violence, even if it is not caused by human conduct, and deaths caused by neglect or on purpose. 
See furthermore: Das 2004 (PhD thesis on death certificates).
9. Public Prosecution Service, Forensic Medical Society, Health Care Inspectorate and Royal 
Dutch Medical Association 2016, pp. 4-5.
10. Art. 3 Burial Act.
11. State Health Inspectorate 1994, pp. 7-8.
12. Art. 7 §3 Burial Act. 
13. Kamerstukken II 1951/52, 2410, no. 3, p. 7. Kamerstukken I 1984/85, 11 256, no. 7, p. 5. 
14. Art. 142 §§1-2 and art. 149 Code of Criminal Procedure.
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the information which causes doubts about a natural cause of death.15 Although 
this is not regulated by law, the forensic physician should take a decision whether 
he will perform the external examination solo, together with the police, or if the 
police should carry out a forensic investigation before the external examination of 
the body will be performed.16 
If the attending or forensic physician is convinced that the person died due to 
a natural cause, he must issue a death certificate,17 which includes the statement 
that the physician himself has examined the body externally.18 The physician 
must also issue a statement regarding the cause of death and the information di-
rectly related to the cause of death for the purpose of statistics.19 If the forensic 
physician is not convinced of a natural death, he has to report the death to the 
public prosecutor20 appointed to the place where the death has occurred, or if 
this is not clear, where the body has been found or taken to shore.21 This ena-
bles the public prosecutor to investigate whether the death is caused by a criminal 
offence and is therefore a means to filter possible criminal offences.22 The latter 
investigation is in practice performed by the police under supervision of a pub-
lic prosecutor. Noteworthy in this regard is that the police is responsible for the 
actual enforcement of legal order.23 Enforcement of legal order includes actu-
ally preventing, detecting and putting an end to criminal offences.24 When the 
police acts to maintain legal order through criminal law enforcement, the police 
falls under the authority of the public prosecutor. The public prosecutor may 
give directions to police officers on how to enforce legal order through criminal 
law enforcement.25 If the forensic physician has reported the death to the public 
15. Public Prosecution Service, Forensic Medical Society, Health Care Inspectorate and Royal 
Dutch Medical Association 2016, p. 6.
16. Reijnders and Das 2012, p. 15. 
17. Art. 7 §1 Burial Act.
18. Appendix I. Model statement regarding the cause of death by attending physician (Bijlage 
I. Model van de verklaring van overlijden, af te geven door de behandelende arts). Appendix 
II. Model statement regarding cause of death by forensic physician (Bijlage II. Model van de 
verklaring van overlijden, af te geven door de gemeentelijke lijkschouwer). Decree Burial (Besluit 
op de lijkbezorging).
19. Doodsoorzaakverklaring, B-formulier. Art. 12a §1 Burial Act.
20. Art. 10 §1 Burial Act.
21. Art. 14 §1 Burial Act in connection with art. 1:19f  Civil Code.
22. Public Prosecution Service, Forensic Medical Society, Health Care Inspectorate and Royal 
Dutch Medical Association 2016, p. 3.
23. Art. 3 Police Act 2012.
24. Kamerstukken II 2006/07, 30 880, no. 3, p. 45. Kamerstukken II 1985/86, 19 535, no. 3, 
p. 6. Prosecuting and trying criminal offences also falls under the enforcement of legal order. These 
steps are the responsibility of the public prosecutor and judge respectively.
25. Art. 12 §§1-2 Police Act 2012.
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prosecutor, the public prosecutor must issue a statement that there does not exist 
an objection to burial or cremation of the body. The public prosecutor may refuse 
to issue such a statement if the body is still necessary for the investigation,26 and 
he can also issue a partial leave, holding that the body may only be buried but 
not cremated. 
The public prosecutor is authorised to order a legal autopsy in connection with 
a criminal investigation (i.e. if a suspicion of a criminal offence arises).27 The 
Health Care Inspectorate is also authorised to order an autopsy,28 just like the 
chairman of the Dutch Safety Board.29 Legal autopsies ordered by a public prose-
cutor are (mainly)30 performed by the Netherlands Forensic Institute (NFI). The 
NFI is an agency of the Ministry of Security and Justice31 and provides, among 
others, services to the Public Prosecution Service, the police, special investigation 
agencies, the judiciary and the Ministry of Security and Justice.32 In practice, the 
public prosecutor decides whether a legal autopsy will be performed, after being 
advised by the forensic physician, the police and in some cases after discussing the 
case with a forensic pathologist of the NFI. A legal autopsy is not standard proce-
dure in the Netherlands when suicides or lethal traffic accidents are concerned.33 
A non-legal, clinical autopsy may be performed if the detainee has given his con-
sent prior to his death. The next of kin may also request for a non-legal, clinical 
autopsy.34
The duty of medical confidentiality in relation to a (criminal) police investi-
gation cannot be left undiscussed. Health care providers are bound by the duty 
of medical confidentiality and in the Netherlands it is generally accepted that 
26. Art. 12 Burial Act. The registrar must also give permission to bury or cremate a body and 
this permission can only be given if a death certificate is produced by a physician or the public 
prosecutor issued a statement holding no objections to burial or cremation. This is a safeguard to 
prevent that a body is buried or cremated while (further) investigation on the body is necessary.
27. Art. 73 §1, subsection a Burial Act. 
28. Art. 73 §1, subsection b Burial Act.
29. Art. 73 §1, subsection c Burial Act.
30. The Maastricht Forensic Institute (TMFI) is also acknowledged to perform forensic (legal) 
autopsies. Kamerstukken II 2014-2015, 34 000 VI, no. 18, p. 117.
31. https://www.government.nl/ministries/ministry-of-security-and-justice/contents/
organisation/departments-and-institutions. Last accessed: 3 March 2017.
32. Art. 42 §2 Ministry of Security and Justice (Organisation) Decree 2015. See also art. 35 §2, 
section f Ministry of Security and Justice (Organisation) Decree 2015. Wangmo et al raised the 
question where and how the forensic body of any State should be institutionalised in view of the 
required independence. The importance of separation of powers was stressed by the participants in 
this study. Wangmo et al. 2014, pp. 30-37.
33. Kamerstukken II 2014-2015, 34 000 VI, no. 18, p. 117.
34. Art. 72 Burial Act.
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this duty remains in force after the patient has died.35 The duty of medical con-
fidentiality brings along the right to refrain from giving evidence in criminal 
investigations/proceedings or from answering questions.36 Medical confidenti-
ality aims to protect the patient’s privacy and to create a relationship of trust 
between patient and health care provider which serves the patient’s willingness to 
seek healthcare. Breaching medical confidentiality is only allowed in accordance 
with a legal obligation, with the patient’s consent, in case of a conflict of duties, 
or a weighty interest.37 Though the Dutch legislator holds the view that the right 
to refrain from giving evidence or answering questions prevails over the interest 
of tracing criminal offences,38 it is important to note that the duty of medical 
confidentiality does not exist to prevent an investigation into healthcare that is 
provided to a deceased patient. Although the powers to search and confiscate ob-
jects and documents are restricted when these objects and documents are covered 
by the duty of medical confidentiality,39 it has been accepted that in ‘very ex-
ceptional circumstances’ the interest of tracing criminal offences prevails over the 
duty of medical confidentiality.40 Such very exceptional circumstances were ac-
cepted by the Supreme Court in a case of a physician suspected of a serious crime 
(culpable homicide), where no indications were present that the deceased patient 
would have objected to obtain the data, the data were crucial to establish the truth 
and could not be obtained through other means.41 The study of Thoonen and 
Duijst on deaths during deprivation of liberty by the police shows that it occurred 
that the physician (of the hospital) refused to provide the National Police Internal 
Investigations Department any medical information about a deceased detainee by 
referring to the duty of medical confidentiality.42 This finding shows in my view 
a lacuna in the Dutch legal framework to effectively investigate deaths occurring 
during deprivation of liberty by the State. The investigative party should have the 
means to obtain necessary data to perform an effective investigation. The criterion 
35. RTG ‘s-Gravenhage 19 August 2014, ECLI:NL:TGZRSGR:2014:87. Duijst 2007, p. 48. 
Leenen et al 2014, p. 145.
36. Art. 218 Code of Criminal Procedure.
37. Duijst 2007, pp. 26-34, 61-70. Leenen et al 2014, p. 141.
38. Duijst 2007, pp. 75-78.
39. Art. 96a §3, art. 98 §1 Code of Criminal Procedure.
40. Supreme Court 21 October 2008, ECLI:NL:HR:2008:BD7817. See also: Supreme Court 1 
March 1985, NJ 1986, 173. Supreme Court 14 October 1986, NJ 1987, 490. Supreme Court 30 
November 1999, ECLI:NL:HR:1999:AA3805.
41. Supreme Court 21 October 2008, ECLI:NL:HR:2008:BD7817.
42. Thoonen and Duijst 2015, p. 103. See in this regard: Recommendation No. R (99) 3 of the 
Committee of Ministers on the Harmonisation of Medico-Legal Autopsy Rules, principle IV.5: 
hospital records, admission blood specimens and any X-rays should be obtained if the decedent 
was hospitalised prior to death.
Death in State Custody DRUK.indd   322 13-Sep-17   2:40:20 PM
Implementation of procedural obligations to investigate deaths in the Netherlands  323
of ‘very exceptional circumstances’ in view of a criminal procedure does not suffice 
when deaths during deprivation of liberty by the State are concerned.
Dutch law does not contain special provisions on the external examination and 
autopsy when deaths during deprivation of liberty by the State are concerned. The 
aforementioned system laid down in the Burial Act therefore applies if a person 
dies while deprived of his liberty by the State. The Custodial Institutions Agency 
has developed a guideline for the procedure to be followed after a detainee has 
died in a judicial institution.43 This guideline prescribes that if a detainee dies in 
a judicial institution, the situation must be left unchanged as much as possible 
with a view to the police investigation, though lifesaving actions always have pri-
ority. The custodial staff must seal the scene where the detainee was found dead/
died and it is no longer allowed to enter that place unless the governor of the in-
stitution gives permission or, if the body has been confiscated, after the public 
prosecutor lifts the embargo. The next of kin must be informed of the possibility 
to perform a non-legal, clinical autopsy. In view of the investigation performed 
by the National Police Internal Investigations Department44 and the internal 
investigation, the head of the involved ward must collect the available informa-
tion about the detainee registered by the custodial staff of the ward. The medical 
service of the institution must examine the medical file of the detainee and the 
psychologist must collect all available information regarding the detainee’s men-
tal condition. Furthermore, the local police must be informed.45 The local police 
will perform an investigation which may include a forensic examination of the 
scene and questioning of witnesses.46 The public prosecutor appointed to the 
district where the institution is situated (hereinafter: the local public prosecutor) 
must be informed by the on duty member of the board.47 
43. The external examination will be further discussed in section 7.4. The guideline of the 
Custodial Institutions Agency is applicable to (among others) penal institutions and State-run 
(not private) institutions where the hospital order with compulsory treatment can be imposed. 
Custodial Institutions Agency 2009, pp. 2, 11. This means that other institutions assigned to 
enforce hospital orders with compulsory treatment are not bound by the aforementioned guideline 
and may apply diverging approaches.
44. It is striking that the guideline refers to an investigation by the National Police Internal 
Investigations Department as this authority will only perform an investigation into deaths occurring 
in penal institutions if the integrity of the State is severely breached and the detainee died due to 
a non-natural cause. Instruction tasks and responsibilities National Police Internal Investigations 
Department, Stcrt. 2010, no. 20477. 
45. Custodial Institutions Agency 2009, pp. 8, 12-13. 
46. National Ombudsman, no. 2012/037, pp. 11-13.
47. Custodial Institutions Agency 2009, p. 12. 
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The National Police Internal Investigations Department may under certain cir-
cumstances also be involved in the investigation into deaths due to a non-natural 
cause occurring in penal institutions. Relevant factors are the gravity and scope of 
the case and/or the position of the State official(s) involved. A special committee, 
composed of a member of the Board of Procurators General, Chief Public Pros-
ecutor of the Public Prosecution Service’s National office, the managing director 
of the National Police Internal Investigations Department and the public prose-
cutor assigned to coordinate the investigations performed by the National Police 
Internal Investigations Department, determines whether or not the National Po-
lice Internal Investigations Department will be involved.48 The National Police 
Internal Investigations Department instituted for example an investigation into 
the death of a detainee in the penal institution Zwolle; the governor of this penal 
institution has been prosecuted (and acquitted) in that case.49 The National Po-
lice Internal Investigations Department also instituted an investigation into the 
suicide of a detainee in penal institution Zuid-Oost, location Ter Peel in 2005.50 
It is in my view not clear why the aforementioned cases have been examined by 
the National Police Internal Investigations Department, whereas others cases (in-
cluding suicides) have not been investigated by this Department. This raises the 
question whether some arbitrariness is seen in the choice to involve the National 
Police Internal Investigations Department in the investigation into deaths occur-
ring in penal institutions.
If a person dies while deprived of his liberty by the Dutch police, the Chief of 
Police must make sure that the Public Prosecution Service will be informed imme-
diately.51 The National Police Internal Investigations Department is assigned to 
investigate cases of lethal firearm use by police officers, just like other cases of 
lethal force by police officers and deaths occurring while the person in question 
48. Instruction tasks and responsibilities National Police Internal Investigations Department, 
Stcrt. 2010, no. 20477.
49. https://www.om.nl/organisatie/rijksrecherche-0/. Last accessed: 28 April 2017. News 
report 8 December 2008: public prosecution service has the intention to prosecute the governor 
concerning the death of a detainee. See furthermore: District Court Zwolle 12 March 2009, 
ECLI:NL:RBZLY:2009:BH5678.
50. National Ombudsman, no. 2007/202. The National Police Internal Investigations 
Department may also institute an investigation into deaths occurring in other judicial institutions 
such as Detention and Removal Centres, as they did in the case concerning the fire at Schiphol-Oost, 
where 11 detainees lost their life and another 15 persons (detainees and custodial staff) were injured. 
See for example: Court of Appeal ‘s-Gravenhage 1 March 2013, ECLI:NL:GHDHA:2013:BZ2763.
51. The same applies to suicide attempts. Art. 26 §7 Official Instructions for the Police.
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was held by the police.52 As stated before, the public prosecutor will decide in 
such cases whether or not a legal autopsy must be performed. The study of Thoo-
nen and Duijst into deaths during deprivation of liberty by the police shows that 
an autopsy had not been performed in 12 of the 78 included cases (15%). In 3 of 
these 12 cases, a plausible explanation as to the cause of death was, from a med-
ical perspective, absent.53 Noteworthy in this regard is the grounds to perform 
a legal autopsy, as laid down in the Burial Act. A public prosecutor or another 
judicial authority is authorised to order an autopsy as part of a criminal inves-
tigation.54 A somewhat peculiar inconsistency can be found in this provision 
as death is not always (or often not) caused by a criminal offence, yet the aim of 
performing a legal autopsy is precisely to establish or exclude the possibility of a 
criminal offence.55 This loophole may lead to the situation that an autopsy is not 
performed because no suspicion of a criminal offence exists although it is not clear 
what caused the person’s death. Another weakness of the current system is that 
the National Police Internal Investigations Department is only assigned to investi-
gate deaths occurring under the care of the police, incidents where force has been 
used and which have led to death or (severe) physical injury and other incidents 
occurring while the person fell under the care of State officials and the person in 
question sustained severe injuries. If a detainee becomes unwell in a police cell or 
during apprehension, does not regain consciousness but does not die immediately, 
the ECHR requires a prompt investigation.56 At present, no legal safeguard exists 
that these cases are directly reported to the National Police Internal Investigations 
Department and investigated. 
It is furthermore noteworthy that a bill has been introduced to develop a spe-
cial system for police officers who have used (lethal) force while on duty.57 The 
bill contains a provision to conduct an inquiry into the facts of the case if a police 
officer has used violence while performing his duties. By introducing an inquiry 
into the facts, the National Police Internal Investigations Department may en-
force certain investigative powers without the requirement of a suspicion of a 
criminal offence.58 
52. Instructions tasks and responsibilities National Police Internal Investigations Department, 
Stcrt. 2010, no. 20477.
53. Thoonen and Duijst 2015.
54. Art. 73 §1, section a Burial Act.
55. Thoonen and Duijst 2015.
56. ECtHR 30 August 2016, no. 61170/09, §§29-30, 38 (Toptaniş v. Turkey).
57. Kamerstukken II 2015/16, 29 628, no. 588.
58. Kamerstukken II 2016/17, 34 641, no. 2 (art. 511a-511ab). In response to this draft, the 
Council for the Judiciary raised the question which specific provisions laid down in the Code of 
Criminal Procedure will apply to an inquiry into the facts. Council for the Judiciary 2016.
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 Healthcare Quality, Complaints and Disputes Act
Another relevant legal regime is an inquiry pursuant to the Healthcare Quality, 
Complaints and Disputes Act.59 This Act obliges care providers to report calami-
ties occurring in the provided care to the Dutch Health Care Inspectorate.60 The 
aim of reporting calamities is to detect any dysfunction of the healthcare quality 
system.61 This procedure only applies to calamities in the provided care. A calam-
ity is defined as a non-intended or unexpected event with respect to the quality 
of healthcare and that has led to the death of a patient or a severe harmful effect 
for a patient.62 It must be stressed that a ‘calamity’ and a ‘non-natural’ death are 
not the same. If a calamity has occurred, it is nevertheless possible that the person 
in question has died due to natural causes. A non-natural death in a health care 
facility does not have to be a calamity, for example if a person has died due to the 
consequences of a broken hip after a fall, whereas the fall has no relation with the 
provided healthcare. Nevertheless, it is unlikely that the attending physician will 
issue a death certificate stating that he is convinced of a natural cause of death in 
the case of a calamity. If a calamity has occurred in a health care facility, the foren-
sic physician will usually be notified.63
If a calamity is reported to the Health Care Inspectorate, the health care pro-
vider will be given the opportunity to perform its own inquiry into the calamity, 
unless the nature of the report or other information about the care provider gives 
the Health Care Inspectorate cause to perform its own inquiry into the calami-
ty.64 The idea behind this approach is that the care provider will learn the most 
by examining the calamity itself.65 The Inspectorate has to set requirements that 
the health care provider involved in the calamity has to observe when performing 
59. See also the theme number of Tijdschrift voor Gezondheidsrecht (2016, 2) on the Healthcare 
Quality, Complaints and Disputes Act.
60. Art. 11 §1 Healthcare Quality, Complaints and Disputes Act. A care provider is defined as 
an institution or a health care provider operating solo. An institution stands for: 1) a legal body 
that provides care professionally, 2) persons who provide care in an organisational context, and 3) 
a person who provides care professionally. Art. 1 §1 Healthcare Quality, Complaints and Disputes 
Act. See also Huisman 2010: reporting procedure in case of suicide. Health Care Inspectorate 2014.
61. Kamerstukken I 2013/14, 32 402, F, p. 7.
62. Art. 1 §1 Healthcare Quality, Complaints and Disputes Act. Uncertainty about 
the precise scope of a calamity exists. http://nos.nl/artikel/2107987-schippers-in
spectie-moet-calamiteitenonderzoeken-publiceren.html. Last accessed: 28 April 2017. 
63. Public Prosecution Service, Forensic Medical Society, Health Care Inspectorate and Royal 
Dutch Medical Association 2016, p. 12.
64. Art. 8.7 §2 Decree Healthcare Quality, Complaints and Disputes.
65. Kamerstukken II 2014-2015, 24 170, no. 151, p. 2.
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the inquiry.66 The Health Care Inspectorate issued a guideline on what is ex-
pected of a health care provider when composing a report regarding a calamity. 
The guideline contains instructions on the expected information, for example the 
method used to analyse the calamity (for instance PRISMA),67 a description of 
the facts, including a time schedule of the events and a description of the com-
munication between care providers (internal and external), an analysis of the basic 
causes leading to the death, classified into technical, organisational and/or human 
causes, and the conclusions.68 
If the care provider involved in the calamity has performed an own inquiry, 
the Health Care Inspectorate will examine the report to determine whether a care-
ful inquiry has been performed and whether sufficient measures for improvement 
have been taken. If so, the Inspectorate will close the investigation into the ca-
lamity by informing the involved parties about this decision in writing.69 If the 
care provider does not perform an own inquiry, or the inquiry of the care provider 
does not fulfil the requirements, the Inspectorate will investigate the calamity it-
self70 by questioning the care provider or the involved company, the next of kin 
and, unless the Inspectorate is of the view that this is not necessary for the in-
quiry, other persons involved in the calamity.71 The Inspectorate may also obtain 
an expert report if this is considered to be in the interest of the inquiry.72 The 
Inspectorate will only lay down the relevant facts in a draft report (to which the 
parties involved may respond) if it has investigated the calamity itself.73 In that 
case, and after the Inspectorate has received the responses, it will lay down a final 
report with the relevant facts, the conclusions of the Inspectorate and the meas-
ures that need to be taken.74 The received responses will be taken into account 
when drafting the final report. If a response to the draft is not adopted in the final 
66. Art. 8.7 §2 Decree Healthcare Quality, Complaints and Disputes.
67. Prevention Recovery Information System for Monitoring and Analysis (PRISMA). The 
PRISMA-Medical method is a method to develop and evaluate preventive measures by building 
a quantitative database of incidents and process deviations. It contains three steps: 1) causal tree 
incident description, 2) classification of root causes, and 3) developing structural measures for 
improvement. See for example Snijders et al 2009.
68. Health Care Inspectorate 2016.
69. Art. 8.9 §§1-2 Decree Healthcare Quality, Complaints and Disputes.
70. Art. 8.8 §1 Decree Healthcare Quality, Complaints and Disputes. See art. 24 Healthcare 
Quality, Complaints and Disputes Act: competence of Inspectorate to examine the files of patients.
71. Art. 8.8. §2, section b Decree Healthcare Quality, Complaints and Disputes.
72. Art. 8.8. §2, section c Decree Healthcare Quality, Complaints and Disputes.
73. Art. 8.10 §§1-3 Decree Healthcare Quality, Complaints and Disputes.
74. Art. 8.11 §1 Decree Healthcare Quality, Complaints and Disputes.
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report, this must be motivated by the Inspectorate.75 The Public Prosecution Ser-
vice must be notified if the Inspectorate suspects that a criminal offence has been 
committed and the Inspectorate is not authorised to investigate that offence.76
The medical service of a judicial institution (including penal institutions) is a care 
provider pursuant to the Healthcare Quality, Complaints and Disputes Act and 
is therefore obligated to report calamities to the Health Care Inspectorate. The 
Custodial Institutions Agency refers to this obligation in the National guideline 
on the procedure that has to be followed after a death in a judicial institution has 
occurred. It states that each death in a judicial institution is a calamity, though 
not every death in a judicial institution is a calamity as defined in the Care Insti-
tutions (Quality) Act77 which have to be reported to the Health Care Inspectorate. 
The guideline prescribes that the governor of the judicial institution must ap-
point a committee if the death can be regarded as a calamity pursuant to the 
Care Institutions (Quality) Act.78 The National ombudsman observed in 2012 
that the Custodial Institutions Agency and the Health Care Inspectorate used 
diverging definitions of a calamity79 and not all calamities in the Prison System 
Division were reported to the Health Care Inspectorate.80 In a memo of Novem-
ber 2011/January 2012,81 it has been stressed that the Care Institutions (Quality) 
Act’s definition of calamity will be followed within the Prison System Division.82 
A practice has been developed where a special committee, composed within the 
Prison System Division, receives all notifications of deaths occurring within the 
Prison System Division and assigns a chairman and secretary for the inquiry after 
a death in a penal institution. The medical advisor of the healthcare department 
of the Custodial Institutions Agency may advise about the nature, direction and 
extent of the investigation and specific medical aspects that have to be examined. 
75. Art. 8.11 §2 Decree Healthcare Quality, Complaints and Disputes. If the Health Care 
Inspectorate is of the opinion that measures need to be taken immediately in view of the safety 
of patients or the care, it may deviate from the procedure laid down in the artt. 8.1 – 8.26 of the 
Decree Healthcare Quality, Complaints and Disputes. See art. 8.28.
76. Art. 162 §2 Code of Criminal Procedure. See also: Information protocol Public Prosecution 
Service-Health Care Inspectorate (Informatieprotocol OM-IGZ). Instruction investigation of 
the facts/criminal investigation and prosecution in medical cases (Aanwijzing feitenonderzoek/
strafrechtelijk onderzoek en vervolging in medische zaken), Stcrt. 2010, 15 449.
77. This Act has been replaced by the Healthcare Quality, Complaints and Disputes Act.
78. Custodial Institutions Agency 2009, p. 15. See also: Custodial Institutions Agency 2007.
79. National ombudsman, no. 2012/037, p. 14. 
80. National ombudsman, no. 2012/037, p. 29. Duijst et al 2012, p. 90.
81. Both dates are mentioned in this memo.
82. Memo inquiry committee calamities (Notitie Calamiteitenonderzoekscommissie), November 
2011/January 2012.
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An inquiry is in these cases performed by professionals working within the 
Prison System Division to determine whether or not a calamity has occurred in 
the provided care. At present, all deaths occurring in penal institutions are also 
reported to the Health Care Inspectorate and the Inspectorate Security and Jus-
tice.83 The report of the inquiry committee is sent to both Inspectorates, unless 
the report includes medical data.84 The Health Care Inspectorate examines the 
provided healthcare and the Inspectorate Security and Justice examines peniten-
tiary aspects, including access to healthcare.85 The Inspectorates may perform a 
joint investigation. In 2013, the Inspectorate Security and Justice and the Health 
Care Inspectorate investigated for example several suicides in the penal institution 
Vught86 and the death of Alexander Dolmatov in a Detention and Removal Cen-
tre.87 The Inspectorates also organise periodic meetings to exchange (information 
about) reported incidents. The aforementioned practice, including the role of the 
Inspectorate Security and Justice in the inquiries performed into deaths occurring 
in judicial institutions, has at present not been laid down in law, nor has it been 
implemented in the National guideline of the Custodial Institutions Agency into 
deaths occurring in judicial institutions.
Both an investigation by the police and an inquiry pursuant to the Health-
care Quality, Complaints and Disputes Act may be carried out if a death occurs 
in a judicial (including a penal) institution (simultaneously or with some over-
lap). This was also observed by the Dutch National Ombudsman, who concluded 
that no integral investigation is performed to establish the cause of death and the 
circumstances in which deaths in Dutch penal institutions occur. It emphasised 
the diverging focus of the police investigation and the inquiry pursuant to the 
Care Institutions (Quality) Act (at present the Healthcare Quality, Complaints 
and Disputes Act), leading to an insufficient illumination of the care process and 
possible shortcomings. The Ombudsman emphasised that the police investigation 
aims to examine whether a direct connection between the death and the conduct 
of the persons involved exists. For that purpose, the events directly preceding the 
death are investigated. The inquiry pursuant to the Care Institutions (Quality) 
Act aims to examine whether the death could have been prevented and whether 
improvements are possible to prevent similar calamities in the provided health-
care in the future. In the view of the Ombudsman, it is unclear whether possible 
83. Work programme 2016 Inspectorate Security and Justice, p. 17. See also: Memo inquiry 
committee calamities, November 2011/January 2012.
84. See also: Health Care Inspectorate 2015b, p. 22.
85. Work programme 2016 Inspectorate Security and Justice, p. 17.
86. Inspectorate Security and Justice and Health Care Inspectorate 2013 (Vught).
87. Inspectorate Security and Justice 2013 (Dolmatov).
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criminal negligence in the entire care process is examined. The Ombudsman also 
stressed that the results of both investigations were not exchanged. Possible in-
consistencies or gaps were therefore not or insufficiently visible. Whether or not 
the conclusions of the two investigations are compatible is also not examined.88 
The State Secretary’s response to the criticism that no integral investigation was 
performed was that the Inspectorate Security and Justice was given a coordinating 
role as it had a complete picture of the manner in which deprivation of liberty in 
penal institutions was imposed.89 Furthermore, not all of the factors that need to 
be answered under the ECHR in case of death in custody are at present included 
in the guideline for reports on calamities, for example whether sufficient meas-
ures have been taken in response to a suicide risk. The question therefore arises 
whether these factors are addressed in the inquiry.
The statutory obligation to report calamities regarding the provided care to the 
Health Care Inspectorate90 applies in my view also to forensic physicians and fo-
rensic nurses who provide healthcare to detainees held by the police.91 A study 
of Thoonen and Duijst shows however that, save for one case, none of the in-
cluded files indicated that the death during police custody had been reported 
to the Health Care Inspectorate although problems in the care process were ob-
served.92 Furthermore, considering the results of two studies, the question has 
been raised whether it would be better to involve the Health Care Inspectorate 
for the examination of the provided healthcare to deceased detainees held by the 
police instead of the National Police Internal Investigations Department and the 
Public Prosecution Service. It has been stressed that the Health Care Inspectorate 
is better equipped to evaluate the provided healthcare.93 The National Police In-
ternal Investigations Department also stressed that it does not have at its disposal 
special medical expertise,94 which is necessary to evaluate provided healthcare. 
The study of Thoonen and Duijst also shows that not all problems with regard to 
the provided healthcare, that were observed by these authors during this study, 
were explicitly identified by the public prosecutor in his notification of the results 
88. National Ombudsman, no. 2012/037, p. 31.
89. Kamerstukken II 2012/13, 24 587, no. 478, p. 2.
90. Art. 11 §1 Healthcare Quality, Complaints and Disputes Act.
91. See also: Thoonen and Duijst 2015, p. 108.
92. Thoonen and Duijst 2015, p. 101. It must be stressed that this study only included files of the 
Public Prosecution Service, the National Police Internal Investigations Department and the NFI.
93. Thoonen and Duijst 2015, p. 108. National Police Internal Investigations Department 2006, 
pp. 13-14.
94. National Police Internal Investigations Department 2006, pp. 13-14.
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of the investigation and his final decision on how to handle the case.95 As for 
the diverging parties involved in supervising the manner in which detainees are 
treated and in the investigations into deaths during deprivation of liberty by the 
State,96 it has been emphasised that there may be a risk of fragmentation of avail-
able information.97
 Termination of Life on Request and Assisted Suicide 
(Review Procedures) Act
A special procedure has been developed in the Netherlands to review a performed 
euthanasia or assisted suicide. The physician who performs euthanasia or assisted 
suicide must report the death to the forensic physician and must provide this phy-
sician with a report containing the reasons why the criteria for euthanasia/assisted 
suicide have been observed.98 The forensic physician must report the euthanasia 
or assisted suicide to the public prosecutor (though in principle only to obtain 
a statement holding no objections against burial/cremation) and to the review 
committee.99 The later will examine the report and determine whether the cri-
teria have been observed.100 If the committee is of the opinion that one or more 
of the criteria have not been observed, the committee must notify the physician 
involved, the Board of Procurators General and the Health Care Inspectorate.101 
The review committee must at least consist of a lawyer, a physician, and an expert 
on ethical questions.102 In response to the Minister’s wish to ensure the expertise 
of a psychiatrist in the review committees in case of requests for euthanasia due to 
mental suffering,103 a psychiatrist has been appointed as member.104
As discussed in chapter 5, section 5.5.5., the Termination of Life on Request 
and Assisted Suicide (Review Procedures) Act does not make a distinction between 
(requests for) euthanasia or assisted suicide by persons at liberty or persons who 
are deprived of their liberty, nor has the Custodial Institutions Agency developed 
95. Thoonen and Duijst 2015, p. 104.
96. Namely the Health Care Inspectorate, Inspectorate Security and Justice, supervisory 
committees, and the National Police Internal Investigations Department. See with regard to 
supervisory committees also: Vegter and Gunther Moor 2005.
97. Thoonen and Duijst 2015, p. 110. 
98. Art. 7 §2 Burial Act.
99. Art. 10 §§1-2 Burial Act.
100. Art. 8 §1 Termination of Life on Request and Assisted Suicide (Review Procedures) Act.
101. Art. 9 §2 Termination of Life on Request and Assisted Suicide (Review Procedures) Act.
102. Art. 3 §2 Termination of Life on Request and Assisted Suicide (Review Procedures) Act.
103. Kamerstukken II 2014/15, 32 647, no. 40, pp. 22-23.
104. Regional Euthanasia Review Committees 2016, p. 9.
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a policy regarding requests for euthanasia or assisted suicide of detainees and the 
procedure to be followed if euthanasia or assisted suicide would be performed on 
request of a detainee. 
 Concluding remarks
At present, no overall and integral system exists that regulates the procedure and 
investigation into deaths during deprivation of liberty by the State. Instead of one 
overall regime, several procedures can be distinguished, namely: 1) the external 
examination of the body by a forensic physician (whether or not in cooperation 
with the police), 2) a police investigation (or investigation by the National Po-
lice Internal Investigations Department) under supervision of a public prosecutor 
which may result in a criminal investigation, and 3) an inquiry pursuant to the 
Healthcare Quality, Complaints and Disputes Act. The external examination and 
the police investigation may overlap, as the police may be involved in the exter-
nal examination of the body. In other words, the investigative regimes that are 
applicable in free society are also applied when death occurs during deprivation 
of liberty by the State. The aforementioned procedures can be divided into sev-
eral stages where diverging investigative measures can be performed, for example 
the forensic investigation at the scene of the incident or a legal autopsy. Various 
investigating authorities can be involved to perform these investigative measures. 
Noteworthy is that the Custodial Institutions Agency has not developed a policy 
regarding requests for euthanasia or assisted suicide, which raises the question 
how such requests are dealt with in practice. 
In the following, I will discuss whether, and if so, what, safeguards exists in the 
Dutch legal framework to fulfil the minimum standards to ensure an effective 
investigation into deaths during deprivation of liberty and the strength and weak-
nesses of the aforementioned procedures in view of these minimum standards.
7.3. Initiative of the State
Dutch law, regulations and policy contain several safeguards to report a death. 
These safeguards will be discussed in view of the diverging procedures concerned.
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 External examination of the body and police investigation
The Burial Act obliges the attending physician to report a death to a forensic phy-
sician if he is not convinced of a natural cause of death.105 A legal safeguard to 
enable the public prosecutor to filter possible criminal offences is that the forensic 
physician has to report the death to the public prosecutor if he is not convinced 
of a natural cause of death.106 Safeguards to fulfil the legal obligations to report 
to the forensic physician and the public prosecutor if doubts exist about a natural 
cause of death is that deliberately issuing a false death certificate is punishable,107 
just like not reporting a death to a public prosecutor by a forensic physician if 
he is not convinced of a natural cause of death.108 Additional directives to re-
port deaths in judicial institutions have been issued by the Custodial Institutions 
Agency. Each death that occurs in a judicial institution must be reported to the 
forensic physician, who must perform the external examination of the body.109 
Physicians who work in the institution are pursuant to this directive not allowed 
to perform the external examination even though it appears that the person died 
due to natural causes. The local police must furthermore be informed and sum-
moned, and the local public prosecutor and the medical advisors of the healthcare 
department of the Custodial Institutions Agency must be notified.110
The Chief of Police has a legal obligation to ensure that a death or a suicide 
attempt during deprivation of liberty by the police is immediately reported to the 
Public Prosecution Service.111 The reason to report these cases to the Public Pros-
ecution Service does, to my knowledge, not emerge in the legislative history.112 
The police is furthermore instructed to notify the National Police Internal 
105. Art. 7 §3 Burial Act.
106. Art. 10 §1 Burial Act.
107. Art. 228 Code of Criminal Procedure. A system to check death certificates does however not 
exist.
108. Art. 81, section 1 Burial Act.
109. See also: Public Prosecution Service, Forensic Medical Society, Health Care Inspectorate and 
Royal Dutch Medical Association 2016, p. 8.
110. Custodial Institutions Agency 2009, pp. 3-4, 11-12. This guideline does however not apply 
to private institutions where hospital orders with compulsory treatment can be imposed. Deaths 
of persons held in a psychiatric hospital pursuant to a hospital order combined with compulsory 
treatment must be reported to the Health Care Inspectorate and to the public prosecutor. Art. 51 
§3 in connection with art. 58 §1 Psychiatric Hospitals (Compulsory Admissions) Act.
111. Art. 26 §7 Official Instructions for the Police.
112. Kamerstukken II 1994/95, 23 900, no. 3, p. 41. Kamerstukken II 2003/04, 28 824, no. 13, 
p. 2. Stb. 1994, 224. In former days, the Chief of Police also needed to inform the Minister of 
the Interior and Kingdom Relations to establish an overview of the total number of deaths during 
deprivation of liberty by the police, to get insight in the causes and, if necessary, to take measures. 
This is no longer required. 
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Investigations Department and the local public prosecution office if a person has 
died while falling under the care of the police or due to applied force by the po-
lice.113 As with the guideline issued on deaths occurring in judicial institutions, no 
safeguards have been laid down in law to ensure that all deaths or suicide attempts 
and other life-threatening incidents occurring during deprivation of liberty by the 
police are reported to the public prosecutor and the National Police Internal In-
vestigations Department with the aim of instituting an investigation, nor are there 
any consequences involved if this procedure is not observed.
 Inquiry pursuant to Healthcare Quality, Complaints and Disputes 
Act
Calamities in the provided healthcare must be reported by the care provider to 
the Health Care Inspectorate if the event resulted in the death of the patient or 
had severe consequences for the patient.114 Not reporting a calamity to the Health 
Care Inspectorate may lead to an administrative fine and is punishable with a 
prison sentence or a fine.115 
The National guideline on deaths occurring in judicial institutions distin-
guishes diverging definitions of calamities which may occur during deprivation 
of liberty.116 The National Ombudsman observed that the number of deaths in 
the Prison System Division registered by the Custodial Institutions Agency over 
the period 2009-2011 diverged from the number registered by the Health Care In-
spectorate, thus showing that not all deaths in penal institutions over the period 
2009-2011 had been reported to the Health Care Inspectorate.117 More recent pol-
icy of the Custodial Institutions Agency shows that the definition of calamity as 
laid down in the Healthcare Quality, Complaints and Disputes Act is followed.118 
It must be stressed that a practice has been developed to report all deaths occur-
ring in penal institutions to both the Health Care Inspectorate and Inspectorate 
Security and Justice,119 followed by an inquiry to determine whether a calamity has 
occurred. A legal safeguard to ensure that all deaths occurring in penal insti-
tutions are reported and investigated does however not exist as the Healthcare 
113. National Police 2016, p. 18. Instruction tasks and responsibilities National Police Internal 
Investigations Department, Stcrt. no. 20477.
114. Art. 11 §1, section a Healthcare Quality, Complaints and Disputes Act.
115. Art. 30 §§1-2 Healthcare Quality, Complaints and Disputes Act.
116. Custodial Institutions Agency 2009, p. 4.
117. National Ombudsman, no. 2012/037, pp. 17-18.
118. Custodial Institutions Agency 2012b.
119. Work programme 2016 Inspectorate Security and Justice, p. 17.
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Quality, Complaints and Disputes Act only relates to calamities. There does fur-
thermore exist an obligation to report special events to the Minister.120 However, a 
legal safeguard to investigate life-threatening incidents during deprivation of lib-
erty by the State not specifically relating to the provided healthcare does not exist.
Several studies showed that not all deaths during deprivation of liberty by the 
police were, as required in those days, reported to the Ministry of the Interior 
and Kingdom Relations.121 The study of Thoonen and Duijst also shows that, 
for one exception, none of the deaths occurring during deprivation of liberty by 
the Dutch police in the period 2005-2010 appeared to have been reported to the 
Health Care Inspectorate,122 even though problems in the medical conduct of the 
physician were observed by Thoonen and Duijst.123
 Review pursuant to Termination of Life on Request and Assisted 
Suicide (Review Procedures) Act
A system to report and examine a death as a result of euthanasia or assisted suicide 
has been developed in the Netherlands. The physician who performed euthanasia 
or assisted suicide must report the death to the forensic physician.124 The forensic 
physician will subsequently perform the external examination and must receive a 
reasoned report from the physician who performed the euthanasia or assisted su-
icide about the manner in which the criteria for euthanasia/assisted suicide have 
been observed.125 The forensic physician must notify the public prosecutor about 
this non-natural death,126 though in general the public prosecutor will not make 
any further inquiries about these cases.127 The forensic physician must send the 
report of the physician who performed the euthanasia or assisted suicide to the 
Regional Euthanasia Review Committee, who will examine whether the criteria 
120. Art. 5a §1 Custodial Institutions (Framework) Act. Art. 7a §1 Hospital Orders (Framework) 
Act.
121. National Police Internal Investigations Department 2006, p. 10. Blaauw 2001, p. 12.
122. Thoonen and Duijst 2015, p. 101. It must be stressed that this study only included files of the 
Public Prosecution Service, the National Police Internal Investigations Department and the NFI.
123. Thoonen and Duijst 2014, pp. 293-294.
124. Art. 7 §2 Burial Act.
125. Art. 10 §2 Burial Act. Duijst 2014, pp. 81-82. The Burial Act requires that the physician 
will send the forensic physician a form to report these deaths, whereas in practice the physician 
will immediately notify the forensic physician by telephone after death occurred (and often the 
euthanasia/assisted is announced in advance). Reijnders and Das 2012, p. 67.
126. Art. 7 §1 Burial Act.
127. Instructions for decisions to be taken into euthanasia and assisted suicide on request, Stcrt. 
2007, 46.
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for euthanasia or assisted suicide have been observed by the physician.128 Not 
reporting euthanasia or assisted suicide to the forensic physician, not providing 
a reasoned report and/or not reporting these deaths to the review committee is 
punishable.129 
If euthanasia or assisted suicide would be considered during deprivation of 
liberty by the State, the aforementioned reporting system would fulfil the require-
ment of an investigation into the death on the State’s own motion. However, as 
discussed in chapter 5, no policy exists to ensure that extra care will be observed 
when examining beforehand whether the requirements for euthanasia or assisted 
suicide are fulfilled, which is in my view problematic considering the requirement 
arising from the ECHR to protect vulnerable persons130 such as detainees.131
 Concluding remarks
The foregoing shows that the Dutch legal framework contains several guaran-
tees to report deaths during deprivation of liberty by the State. However, not all 
these guarantees have a statutory basis or legal consequences if these deaths are 
not reported. Examples are the instructions to notify the National Police Internal 
Investigations Department if a person dies during deprivation of liberty by the 
police or the current procedure to report all deaths in penal institutions to the 
Health Care Inspectorate and the Inspectorate Security and Justice. Furthermore, 
only non-intended or unexpected events related to the quality of healthcare that 
has led to a severe harmful effect for a patient must be reported to the Health Care 
Inspectorate and investigated. Special events during deprivation of liberty in judi-
cial institutions must be reported to the Minister. A legal safeguard to investigate 
life-threatening (though not lethal) incidents during deprivation of liberty not 
specifically relating to the provided healthcare does not exist. Incidents that do 
not immediately lead to the death of the detainee in question, though have severe 
consequences for that person, may nevertheless require a prompt response consid-
ering the available evidence. Examples are an incident where the detainee’s access 
to healthcare is not facilitated by custodial staff (such as police custody officers) 
or there are errors in the distribution of medication, leading to severe (though not 
immediately lethal) consequences for the detainee. Suicide attempts during depri-
vation of liberty by the police must be reported to the Public Prosecution Service, 
128. Art. 8 §1 Termination of Life on Request and Assisted Suicide (Review Procedures) Act.
129. Art. 81, section 1 Burial Act.
130. ECtHR 20 January 2011, no. 31322/07, §54 (Haas v. Switzerland).
131. ECtHR 3 April 2001, no. 27229/95, §91 (Keenan v. UK).
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though this obligation is not followed by an obligation to investigate these at-
tempts. As stressed in chapter 5, section 5.4.7, the meaning of a calamity in the 
provided healthcare during deprivation of liberty by the police is not clear. Fur-
thermore, the applicable instructions for the police only require notification of the 
National Police Internal Investigations Department if the detainee dies, though it 
may be necessary to start an investigation immediately after an incident, for exam-
ple if the detainee is unconscious and cannot raise any objections himself. In these 
cases, the duty to institute an investigation arises in my view from the ECHR as 
the person in question is no longer in a position to raise any complaints, whereas 
the incident occurred during deprivation of liberty.132 The lack of legal safeguards 
to institute in these cases an investigation on the State’s own motion does in my 
view not correspond with the requirements arising from the ECHR.
7.4. Independence and impartiality
There are several legal safeguards to ensure independence of the investigation into 
a death during deprivation of liberty by the State (which serves impartiality and 
the investigation’s effectiveness), though the system also shows some weaknesses 
in this regard. These safeguards and weaknesses will be discussed in view of the 
diverging professionals involved in the investigation.
 External examination of the body 
The guideline on deaths occurring in judicial institutions issued by the Custodial 
Institutions Agency stresses that, to safeguard objectivity and independence, the 
external examination of the body should always be performed by an independ-
ent forensic physician and not by the physician working in the institution. This 
applies to all deaths occurring in judicial institutions, regardless of whether the 
death seems to have a natural cause.133 It is important to keep in mind that forensic 
132. ECtHR 6 February 2007, no. 21387/05, pag. 10 (Banks and others v. UK). ECtHR 27 June 
2000, no. 22277/93, §91, GC (İlhan v. Turkey). 
133. This guideline is only applicable to (among others) penal institutions and State-run institutions 
where hospital orders with compulsory treatment can be imposed. Custodial Institutions Agency 
2009, pp. 3, 9, 11. See furthermore: Public Prosecution Service, Forensic Medical Society, Health 
Care Inspectorate and Royal Dutch Medical Association 2016, p. 8. The latter guideline applies 
to all institutions where hospital orders with compulsory treatment can be executed. In former 
days, the physician of the penal institution performed the external examination of the body 
whenever a detainee died in the institution, which was criticised by Hendriks and van Dijk. They 
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physicians have several responsibilities in the forensic field, including performing 
external examinations of the body to determine the cause of death in possible ‘sus-
picious’ deaths and documenting injuries of persons involved in violent crimes. 
Many forensic physicians are also assigned to provide medical assistance to de-
tainees held by the police. It is therefore possible that a forensic physician, in line 
with the national guideline134 summoned to perform an external examination after 
a death in a judicial institution, has been involved in the treatment of the person 
concerned during deprivation of liberty by the police. Dutch legislation contains 
a provision for these situations. A forensic physician is not allowed to carry out 
the external examination of the body if he has treated the person in the two years 
prior to his death.135 It is nevertheless conceivable that a colleague connected to 
the same organisation has treated the deceased detainee during deprivation of 
liberty by the police. Dutch law does not contain a provision to prevent that the 
external examination is under these circumstances performed by that physician, 
although the independence of that physician is an issue. Moreover, some forensic 
physicians also provide healthcare to detainees held in judicial institutions (during 
the evening, night and weekends). In these circumstances, a forensic physician of 
another district should perform the external examination of the body. This is not 
guaranteed in Dutch law or policy.
Except for Article 6 §1 Burial Act, Dutch law does not contain a provision to 
prevent that a forensic physician who is also assigned to provide medical assistance 
to persons held by the police in the unit involved will perform an external exam-
ination on the body if a person died during deprivation of liberty by the police 
in that unit.136 The study of Thoonen and Duijst into deaths during deprivation 
of liberty by the police (2005-2010) shows that in at least 81% of the included 
cases (N=78), the external examination was performed by a forensic physician 
connected to the police unit involved. Though in most of these cases it was not 
known whether the forensic physician was also assigned to provide medical assis-
tance to persons held by the police in that unit, in seven cases the detainee was, 
prior to the death, visited by a colleague of the forensic physician and in three 
recommended that the external examination should always be performed by a forensic physician if 
a detainee dies in a penal institution. Hendriks and van Dijk 2008. See also Custodial Institutions 
Agency 2007, p. 18.
134. Custodial Institutions Agency 2009, p. 11.
135. A forensic physician is furthermore not allowed to perform the external examination if he was 
related to the deceased (namely up to the third degree) or if he was the partner of the deceased (by 
marriage or registered partnership). Art. 6 §1 Burial Act.
136. The guideline of the Public Prosecution Service, Forensic Medical Society, Health Care 
Inspectorate and Royal Dutch Medical Association (2016, p. 8) does not refer to deaths occurring 
during deprivation of liberty by the police.
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cases the forensic physician had provided some form of assistance to the detainee 
concerned (for example during resuscitation or during a prior period of depri-
vation of liberty).137 Furthermore, forensic physicians have, besides their role in 
providing medical assistance to detainees, a working relationship with the police 
in criminal investigations. Considering the ECtHR’s case law, the external ex-
amination of the body should in my view be performed by a forensic physician 
unconnected to the police unit where a death during deprivation of liberty oc-
curred. Preferably, this should be laid down in law to ensure that this procedure is 
followed throughout the entire country. 
 Police investigation
As discussed before, the guideline developed by the Custodial Institutions Agency 
prescribes that the local police must be informed and summoned if a person dies 
in a judicial institution.138 This guideline does not apply to non-judicial institu-
tions where hospital orders with compulsory treatment can be imposed. Although 
a guideline has been issued by the Public Prosecution Service, Forensic Medical 
Society, Health Care Inspectorate and Royal Dutch Medical Association holding 
that a forensic physician must be notified in case of a death in, among others, 
non-judicial institutions where hospital orders with compulsory treatment are ex-
ecuted, this guideline also stresses that the external examination of the body is in 
principle performed without the presence of the police. The police should only be 
notified in case of suspicion of a criminal offence or if requested by the care pro-
vider or forensic physician.139 If this is not the case, the police will not perform 
an investigation. It is furthermore noteworthy that the Dutch police is (since 1 
January 2013) one National police force, with 11 different (regional) units. Police 
officers are authorised to perform their duties in the entire country.140 Neverthe-
less, police officers should refrain from serving their function outside the unit 
where they are appointed unless it is reasonably necessary to act, the law deter-
mines otherwise or the police officer has the competent authorities’ permission to 
act.141 The involvement of the local police in the investigation into a death in a 
judicial institution does not seem to be problematic at first sight. A point of in-
terest regarding a police investigation into a death that has occurred in a judicial 
137. Thoonen and Duijst 2015, p. 101.
138. Custodial Institutions Agency 2009, p. 12. 
139. Public Prosecution Service, Forensic Medical Society, Health Care Inspectorate and Royal 
Dutch Medical Association 2016, pp. 8-9.
140. Art. 6 §1 Police Act 2012.
141. Art. 6 §2 Police Act 2012. See also: art. 146 §1 Code of Criminal Procedure.
Death in State Custody DRUK.indd   339 13-Sep-17   2:40:22 PM
340 Chapter 7 
institution is whether or not the detainee in question has been transferred from 
the police custody suite of the investigating police unit to the judicial institution 
involved. Events during deprivation of liberty by the police may be relevant to 
clarify the circumstances in which death occurred and must therefore be inves-
tigated. Considering the required independence of the investigative parties, the 
involved police unit should not perform any investigative steps if the deceased 
detainee had been deprived of his liberty by that police unit prior to him being 
transferred to the judicial institution. This especially applies if that transfer has 
taken place recently.142 A safeguard to prevent that the local police investigates 
these deaths does not exist, which is problematic in view of the ECtHR’s case law.
An important safeguard to ensure an independent investigation into deaths oc-
curring during deprivation of liberty by the police is that a special authority is 
assigned to investigate (possible) breaches of the integrity of Dutch State officials 
(such as corruption, but also cases of lethal force by police officers and deaths 
during deprivation of liberty by the police), namely the National Police Inter-
nal Investigations Department.143 Although the officials of this body are police 
officers and therefore bound by several provisions laid down in the Police Act 
2012,144 this department is not part of the Dutch police force as a legal body. 
This has been a well-considered choice of the Dutch legislator, considering the 
required independence under Article 2 ECHR.145 The Board of Procurators Gen-
eral, the highest authority of the Public Prosecution Service, is in charge of the 
National Police Internal Investigations Department146 and appoints its officers.147 
The Grand Chamber of the ECtHR concluded in the Ramsahai case (concerning 
lethal firearm use by the Amsterdam-Amstelland police unit) that the National 
Police Internal Investigations Department, which performed the investigation in 
this case, had sufficient independence for the purpose of Article 2 ECHR. The 
ECtHR refers to the fact that it is a nationwide service with an own chain of com-
mand, answerable to the Board of Procurators General, the highest prosecuting 
authority in the Netherlands.148  
142. See also: Duijst et al 2012, pp. 99-100.
143. Art. 49 Police Act 2012. See also art. 5 Rules organisation Public Prosecution Service 2012. 
Instructions tasks and responsibilities National Police Internal Investigations Department, Stcrt. 
2010, no. 20477.
144. Art. 50 Police Act 2012.
145. Kamerstukken II 2006/07, 30 880, no. 3, pp. 14, 35-36.
146. Art. 51 Police Act 2012.
147. Art. 53 §3 Police Act 2012.
148. ECtHR 15 May 2007, no. 52391/99, §§294, 333, GC (Ramsahai and others v. The 
Netherlands).
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With respect to deaths that occur during deprivation of liberty by the police 
(including deaths due to police violence), the role of the involved police unit in 
the investigation cannot be left undiscussed. In response to (among others) the 
Chamber judgment of the ECtHR in the Ramsahai case,149 the Board of Procura-
tors General issued instructions for the procedure that has to be followed after law 
enforcement officials, including police officers, have used (deadly) force, for ex-
ample deadly firearm use. The National Police Internal Investigations Department 
is assigned to investigate the facts of these cases and must be informed immedi-
ately after the events by the involved police unit. Meanwhile, the local police unit 
must take care of victims, secure the location, and make an inventory of possible 
witnesses. The basic principle is that the involved police unit does not carry out 
investigative steps. The local police unit is only allowed to perform investigative 
steps if necessary in view of the investigation by the National Police Internal In-
vestigations Department. A senior police officer must give an order to perform 
these steps and these steps will be carried out under his responsibility. If reasons 
exist to do so, these investigative steps must be repeated or verified by the Na-
tional Police Internal Investigations Department on completeness and reliability. 
In view of their capacity, the National Police Internal Investigations Department 
may ask for assistance from the Bureau Internal Affairs150 or from another police 
unit than the involved one. The National Police Internal Investigations Depart-
ment should ask the assistance of a police unit not involved in the events to 
perform the forensic investigation.151 It is noteworthy that a well-founded conclu-
sion on whether violence has or has not been used can only be reached after an 
effective investigation into a death, whereas the aforementioned instructions of 
the Board of Procurators General apparently hold the view that this can always 
be determined immediately after death has occurred. The instructions leave room 
for the police officers involved to determine whether lethal force has been used, 
which is not the appropriate pathway considering the required objectivity. 
The guarantees laid down in the aforementioned instructions are more strin-
gent than the principles formulated in Dutch case law. In 2007, the Court of 
Appeal Amsterdam needed to examine whether the investigation regarding a death 
during deprivation of liberty by the police after the use of police violence (other 
than firearm use) was sufficiently independent. The Court of Appeal ruled that 
149. ECtHR 10 November 2005, no. 52391/99 (Ramsahai and others v. The Netherlands).
150. At present the Department Security, Integrity and Complaints (Veiligheid, Integriteit en 
Klachten). National police, Annual report 2014, p. 76.
151. Instructions procedure to be followed in case of used force by (police) official, Stcrt. 2006, no. 
143 / pag. 7. See with regard to the Mercatorplein case: Court of Appeal Amsterdam 9 December 
2005, ECLI:NL:GHAMS:2005:AU7731.
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in the case at hand, the lack of independence was sufficiently met, as the ‘tactical’ 
investigation was performed by the National Police Internal Investigations De-
partment. The forensic investigation on the site of the incident was performed by 
the local police unit. The Court of Appeal stated however that this investigation 
was not of such a nature that it could only be performed by forensic detectives of 
the National Police Internal Investigations Department.152 The study of Thoonen 
and Duijst into deaths during deprivation of liberty by the police in the period 
2005-2010 reveals that it is not uncommon for the involved police unit to perform 
investigative measures; in circa 50% of the included cases (N=78) the involved 
police unit had performed some investigative steps, such as the questioning of 
witnesses, a search throughout the neighbourhood or performing the forensic in-
vestigation on the scene.153 
The National regulations on the care for police custody detainees furthermore 
prescribe that the local police will take the first measures to secure the area after 
a detainee has died (and are therefore notified) and are instructed not to perform 
investigative measures. The person in charge of the police custody suite should 
however make photos of the scene. The police unit of another district should be 
notified to perform the forensic investigation; it is explicitly stressed that the local 
forensic investigation unit should not be notified.154 
 Supervision by public prosecutor
The guideline issued by the Custodial Institutions Agency stresses that the lo-
cal public prosecutor must be informed by the on duty member of the board if 
a death in a judicial institution has occurred.155 The reason to inform the Public 
Prosecution Service may be found in the fact that the Public Prosecution Service is 
at present responsible for the execution of decisions made by the courts, including 
the decision to hold a person in detention on remand and to impose a prison sen-
tence.156 However, the public prosecutor will also lead the police investigation and 
the forensic physician must report to the public prosecutor if that physician has 
152. The incident and the investigation in question occurred in 2003, before the instruction of 
the Board of Procurators General had been issued. Court of Appeal Amsterdam 16 February 2007, 
ECLI:NL:GHAMS:2007:AZ8826.
153. Thoonen and Duijst 2015, p. 102.
154. National Police 2016, pp. 22-23.
155. Custodial Institutions Agency 2009, p. 12. 
156. Art. 553 Code of Criminal Procedure. See also: Duijst 2009, p. 402. The responsibility 
to execute judicial decisions will however be shifted from the Public Prosecution Service to the 
Minister of Security and Justice. Kamerstukken I 2016/17, 34 086, no. 19, 3.
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doubts about a natural cause of death. Driven by the Ramsahai judgment of the 
ECtHR, the Court of Appeal Amsterdam has twice recommended that an inves-
tigation into any death during State custody (regardless of whether State officials 
have used violence or whether indications for severe negligence of the State exist) 
should be carried out under responsibility of an investigating judge and under 
supervision of a public prosecutor of the National Public Prosecution Office. In 
view of the Court of Appeal, this approach can even take away the appearance of 
possible dependence.157 The Custodial Institutions Agency has not implemented 
these recommendations in the aforementioned guideline. The Dutch legislator 
has however stressed the important role of the investigating judge in preventing 
the appearance of bias in investigations. In 2011, a bill was passed to strengthen 
the position of the investigating judge. During the consideration of this bill, the 
legislator stressed that the involvement of the investigating judge may prevent the 
appearance of bias in investigations where the integrity of State officials (such as 
police officers) comes into play.158 Notwithstanding the aforementioned case law, 
there are also cases where Dutch courts did not raise any objections against the 
fact that a (chief ) public prosecutor of the local district had decided not to pros-
ecute with respect to a death in a judicial institution. An example is the review of 
the decision not to institute a prosecution regarding the fire at the Detention and 
Removal Centre at Schiphol-Oost, where 11 detainees died and another 15 per-
sons (detainees and custodial staff) were injured. The Haarlem prosecution office 
(the same district) decided in that case not to prosecute the Custodial Institutions 
Agency, the governor of the Detention and Removal Centre and several members 
of the custodial staff.159 The required independence of the investigation under the 
ECHR demands in my view that investigations into deaths occurring in judicial 
institutions should be supervised by a public prosecutor not connected to the dis-
trict where the institution is situated. The responsibilities of public prosecutors 
157. Court of Appeal Amsterdam 29 October 2008, ECLI:NL:GHAMS:2008:BG3792. Court 
of Appeal Amsterdam 16 February 2007, ECLI:NL:GHAMS:2007:AZ8826. In 2006, the Court 
of Appeal Amsterdam gave an order to institute a judicial preliminary investigation with regard to 
the death of a detainee held by the police. By doing so, the Court of Appeal wanted to send a clear 
message to the Public Prosecution Service that every possible case of lethal force by State officials 
must be investigated accurately and carefully from the very start. Court of Appeal Amsterdam 12 
December 2006, ECLI:NL:GHAMS:2006:AZ4607. 
158. Kamerstukken II 2009/10, 32 177, no. 3, p. 15. Examining Judges (Extended Powers) Act.
159. Court of Appeal Amsterdam 10 November 2014, ECLI:NL:GHAMS:2014:4642. Court 
of Appeal Amsterdam 16 December 2009, ECLI:NL:GHAMS:2009:BK6788. See also Court 
of Appeal ‘s-Hertogenbosch 2 October 2007, ECLI:NL:GHSHE:2007:BD6443: death in penal 
institution Overmaze, Maastricht. A public prosecutor of the Maastricht district decided not to 
prosecute. 
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are after all to a large extent limited to the district where the public prosecutor is 
assigned.160 A legal safeguard to ensure supervision by a public prosecutor of an-
other district does however not exist. On the contrary, the applicable guideline 
prescribes that a local public prosecutor should be informed.
If a person dies while deprived of his liberty by the police, the Chief of Police 
must make sure that the Public Prosecution Service is informed immediately.161 It 
is not regulated which public prosecution office (local or another district) should 
be notified. The role of the Public Prosecution Service that supervises the investi-
gation into fatal police violence has been evaluated after the Chamber judgment 
of the ECtHR in the Ramsahai case. The instructions on the procedure that needs 
to be followed after law enforcement officials have used (deadly) force, issued by 
the Board of Procurators General, has been amended in response. The Chief pub-
lic prosecutor must see to it that the investigation is not supervised by a public 
prosecutor who has a close working relationship with the concerned division (on-
derdeel) of the police unit involved in the events. Any appearance of dependence 
must be prevented. A definition of ‘close working relationship’ is not provided. 
The instructions furthermore stipulate that the public prosecutor is responsible 
for the investigation and for its progress. The public prosecutor who supervises 
the investigation must inform the Chief public prosecutor about the progress of 
the investigation and must consult the Chief public prosecutor on all relevant 
decisions. The investigation must be recorded and the record must be sent to the 
Chief public prosecutor appointed to the district where the incident has occurred 
(thus the local Chief public prosecutor). The Chief public prosecutor will then 
examine whether the violence used was in accordance with the law and he may 
order additional investigative measures. If a firearm has been used, the Chief pub-
lic prosecutor must present his intended decision on how to handle the incident 
to an advisory committee. The Advisory committee police firearm use will advise 
the Chief public prosecutor about the manner in which the incident should be 
dealt with. According to the instruction, this is an obligatory step. The Advisory 
committee is part of the Public Prosecution Service.162 The aforementioned in-
struction only applies to incidents where State officials such as police officers 
have used (deadly) force. The Board of Procurators General has not issued an 
instruction on the procedure that has to be followed in all cases where a person 
died while held by the police. Furthermore, the starting point followed in the 
160. Art. 148 §1 Code of Criminal Procedure.
161. Art. 26 §7 Official Instructions for the Police.
162. Instructions procedure to be followed in case of used force by (police) official, Stcrt. 2006, 
no. 143 / pag. 7.
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aforementioned instruction is inconsistent; whether a person died due to violence 
by the police can only be validly determined after an effective investigation. 
As stressed before, Dutch case law shows that some courts recommend that an 
investigation into a death during State custody should be carried out under re-
sponsibility of an investigating judge and under supervision of a public prosecutor 
of the National Public Prosecution Office.163  Other Dutch courts do not involve 
the role of the public prosecutor while examining the independence of the inves-
tigation164 or have not raised objections if a local public prosecutor decided not to 
prosecute.165  The Dutch case law also contains examples where the investigation 
into lethal force by police officers was supervised by a public prosecutor of another 
district than the district where the incident occurred and/or a public prosecutor 
from another district decided not to prosecute.166 The aforementioned case law re-
163. Court of Appeal Amsterdam 29 October 2008, ECLI:NL:GHAMS:2008:BG3792. Court of 
Appeal Amsterdam 16 February 2007, ECLI:NL:GHAMS:2007:AZ8826. 
164. See for example Court of Appeal Amsterdam 20 November 2008, 
ECLI:NL:GHAMS:2008:BG4942: lethal shooting incident by the police (district not mentioned). 
The Court of Appeal stated that a sufficiently exhaustive and independent investigation had 
been performed, but does not involve the position of the public prosecutor in this examination. 
Though the judgment does not mention which police district was involved, other sources 
show that this has been the Utrecht police unit. See ECtHR 7 June 2011, no. 26814/09 
(Mulder-Van Schalkwijk v. The Netherlands). See also Court of Appeal Arnhem 21 January 2009, 
ECLI:NL:GHARN:2009:BH1023: lethal police shooting (district not mentioned but probably the 
Twente police unit as the incident occurred in Hengelo).
165. Court of Appeal Amsterdam 5 June 2007, ECLI:NL:GHAMS:2007:BA6609: person died 
after losing consciousness during deprivation of liberty in a police cell in Haarlem. (Chief ) 
public prosecutor assigned to the district of Haarlem decided not to prosecute. See also: Court 
of Appeal Amsterdam 12 December 2006, ECLI:NL:GHAMS:2006:AZ4607. Court of Appeal 
Amsterdam 20 June 2008, ECLI:NL:GHAMS:2008:BD4913. Court of Appeal Amsterdam 10 
November 2008, ECLI:NL:GHAMS:2008:BG3914: person died after losing consciousness during 
a struggle in an observation cell at the police headquarters in Amsterdam. A public prosecutor of 
the Amsterdam prosecution office decided not to prosecute. Eventually, the Court of Appeal gave 
the order to prosecute several police custody officers (BG3914). This case was brought before the 
District Court Amsterdam, which ruled that the investigation in this case fulfilled the requirement 
of independence (and that of carefulness and scrupulousness). District Court Amsterdam 9 
February 2010, ECLI:NL:RBAMS:2010:BL3168. See also Court of Appeal ‘s-Gravenhage 20 
January 2015, ECLI:NL:GHDHA:2015:67: lethal force by police officers of Rotterdam police 
unit. The Chief public prosecutor of the Rotterdam District decided not to prosecute. In Court of 
Appeal ‘s-Hertogenbosch 23 October 2012, ECLI:NL:GHSHE:2012:BY1116, the decision neither 
discloses which police force was involved in the fatal shooting, nor the location of the shooting.
166. Court of Appeal Amsterdam 14 May 2012, ECLI:NL:GHARN:2012:BW5870: two police 
officers of the Gelderland-Zuid police unit used lethal force. The incident was initially supervised 
by a public prosecutor of the Arnhem district office (the same district). After examination of 
the results of the investigation, the public prosecutor decided that the police officers should be 
regarded as suspects. The supervision of the investigation was therefore handed over to a public 
prosecutor of the Utrecht prosecution office. See also Court of Appeal ‘s-Gravenhage 20 January 
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veals in my view inconsistencies with regard to the role of the Public Prosecution 
Service in investigations into deaths during State custody (including fatal police 
force) and the standards that should be applied. The study of Thoonen and Duijst 
regarding the investigations into deaths occurring during deprivation of liberty 
by the police (period 2005-2010) shows that in 88% of the cases (N=78) a public 
prosecutor of the same district supervised the investigation. In more than half of 
the included cases (ca. 56%), a local (Chief ) public prosecutor made the decision 
regarding prosecution, while in 31% of the cases no decision could be derived 
from the case file.167 Practice therefore shows that in most cases the local public 
prosecutor supervises the investigations into deaths during deprivation of liberty 
by the police, which raises in my view questions regarding the independence of 
the investigation. Following the line of reasoning of the ECtHR in the Ramsahai 
case,168 the investigation into any death occurring during deprivation of liberty by 
the police must in my view be supervised by a public prosecutor not connected to 
the involved police unit. This is at present not ensured in Dutch law.
 Inquiry committee Healthcare Quality, Complaints and Disputes 
Act
The guideline issued by the Health Care Inspectorate on inquiries that have to be 
performed into calamities stresses that the function and background of the mem-
bers of the inquiry committee and the degree of involvement in the calamity must 
be mentioned in the inquiry report. It also prescribes that the inquiry must be 
performed by people who have sufficient expertise and who are preferably inde-
pendent.169 The required independence has not been further defined.
The 2009 guideline issued by the Custodial Institutions Agency furthermore 
prescribes that the governor of the penal institution is the chairman of the inquiry 
committee that must examine a calamity,170 which practice has been observed in 
the study of Duijst et al into suicides in penal institutions in 2005-2010.171 As to 
my knowledge, the 2009 guideline of the Custodial Institutions Agency has not 
2012, ECLI:NL:GHSGR:2012:BV1431: lethal force by police officers of the Rotterdam-Rijnmond 
police unit during beach riots at Hoek van Holland. A public prosecutor of the ‘s-Gravenhage 
prosecution office decided not to prosecute. See with regard to this case also Court of Appeal 
‘s-Gravenhage 28 June 2013, K12/0276.
167. Thoonen and Duijst 2015, pp. 103-104.
168. ECtHR 15 May 2007, no. 52391/99, §345, GC (Ramsahai and others v. The Netherlands)
169. Health Care Inspectorate 2016.
170. Custodial Institutions Agency 2009, p. 15.
171. Duijst et al 2012, pp. 73, 79, 90.
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been amended up to now. Furthermore, several studies show that the members of 
these committees were often employed in the penal institution where the death 
has occurred,172 which has been criticised by several parties.173 In response to these 
studies, the State Secretary made changes; henceforth the inquiries into calami-
ties must be performed under the chairmanship of a governor of another penal 
institution not involved in the death and the members of the committees must be 
independent.174 An independent chairman means that the governor is not involved 
in the applicable system and processes within the penal institution where the 
death occurred.175 Whether this definition also applies to independent members is 
not clear. As stressed before, a practice has been developed where a special com-
mittee, composed within the Prison System Division, performs the inquiry after 
a death in a penal institution. This is regarded as a form of peer review (collegiale 
toetsing).176 The ECtHR has stressed that an inquiry performed by a committee 
which is composed by, and within, the Prison Administration does not satisfy the 
required independence.177 A problematic factor of a committee composed within 
the Prison Administration (in the Netherlands: Prison System Division) is the hi-
erarchical relationship between the persons who have final responsibility for the 
detainee and the persons who are performing the investigation. The practice in 
the Netherlands to compose the inquiry committee by personnel of another penal 
institution and chaired by a governor of another penal institution does in my view 
not sufficiently meet the independence required under the ECHR.
With respect to calamities in the provided healthcare to detainees held by the 
police, it is noteworthy that there is no national policy on how to examine these 
cases pursuant to the Healthcare Quality, Complaints and Disputes Act. The re-
quired independence is in these cases therefore not sufficiently ensured in the 
Dutch legal framework.
Lastly, the position of the State Inspectorates cannot be left undiscussed. Worth 
mentioning in this regard is that the Netherlands is bound by the Optional Pro-
tocol to the Convention against Torture (OPCAT). The OPCAT prescribes that 
172. Duijst et al 2012, p. 90. See also: National Ombudsman, no. 2012/037, pp. 20-21. 
173. Duijst et al 2012, pp. 101-102. See also: National Ombudsman, no. 2012/037, pp. 31-32.
174. Kamerstukken II 2012/13, 24 587, no. 478, p. 2. See also: Kamerstukken II 2014-2015, 24 
170, no. 151, p. 2.
175. Memo inquiry committee calamities, November 2011/January 2012.
176. Memo inquiry committee calamities, November 2011/January 2012. See also Kamerstukken 
II 2015/16, 24 587, no. 662: internal investigation and police investigation performed into a lethal 
incident between two detainees.
177. ECtHR 13 December 2012, no. 62120/09, §§51-53, 101 (Volk v. Slovenia).  
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each State Party shall maintain, designate or establish one or several independ-
ent national preventive mechanisms to prevent torture at the domestic level. 
The OPCAT also introduces a Subcommittee on Prevention. The mandate of 
the Subcommittee on Prevention includes, among others, advising and assisting 
State Parties with regard to the establishment of the national preventive mech-
anism (NPM) and making recommendations and observations to State Parties 
to strengthen the capacity and mandate of the NPM. The Netherlands has not 
established a separate organisation to implement the NPM; it designated several 
State Inspectorates as NPM (namely the Inspectorate Security and Justice, Health 
Care Inspectorate, Inspectorate for Youth Care, Council for the Administration 
of Criminal Justice and Protection of Juveniles and three other organisations 
with a ‘listener role’ (toehoorder). With regard to the NPM in the Netherlands, it 
has been stressed that the Inspectorate Security and Justice and the Health Care 
Inspectorate operate in close connection to the political leadership of their Minis-
tries. It has been recommended to work on a more independent position of both 
Inspectorates to prevent that a Minister or State Secretary will interfere in investi-
gations performed by the NPM or with regard to priorities set by the NPM.178 The 
CPT furthermore stressed in their latest report regarding the visit to the Nether-
lands that it appeared that the Health Care Inspectorate is not taking an active 
role in monitoring healthcare in prison.179 
178. National Ombudsman, no. 2014 0273. Handelingen II 2014/15, 466: response State 
Secretary. See also: Letter Council for the Administration of Criminal Justice and Protection of 
Juveniles dd 10 November 2014, no. RSJ/100/2306/14/AvB/HE. Subcommittee on Prevention 
of Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment 2016, pp. 7-8. 
Kamerstukken II 2016/17, 33 826, no. 18: the State Secretary stresses that all the participants 
and other organisations involved (toehoorders) in the NPM are independent, both functionally 
and operationally. The State Secretary refers to the new directions concerning State Inspectorates 
(Aanwijzingen inzake de Rijksinspecties, no. 3151041, in force since 1 January 2016) that stresses 
that no special instructions can be given by the Minister to the State Inspectorates holding that 
the State Inspectorate cannot perform or conclude a specific investigation, regarding the manner in 
which an investigation is performed, and regarding the findings, conclusions and recommendations 
of the State Inspectorates (instruction 14). See also letter Council for the Administration of 
Criminal Justice and Protection of Juveniles dd 8 November 2016 to State Secretary Security 
and Justice, no. RSJ/101/2834/16/PM/HE: Council stresses that it can no longer implement the 
NPM-related activities considering the State Secretary’s view on the implementation of the NPM 
in the Netherlands. See furthermore: Rijksuniversiteit Groningen 2013, pp. 30-31. Jacobs and Van 
Kalmthout 2015.
179. CPT/Inf (2017) 1, Netherlands, p. 11.
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 Regional Euthanasia Review Committee 
Some problematic factors regarding the investigation’s independence can be iden-
tified when euthanasia or assisted suicide during deprivation of liberty by the 
State would be considered. As discussed before, the current procedure is that the 
physician who performs euthanasia or assisted suicide must provide the forensic 
physician a reasoned report regarding the manner in which the statutory require-
ments are observed.180 The forensic physician must send the report to the Regional 
Euthanasia Review Committee.181 This review committee must at least consist of a 
lawyer, a physician and an expert on ethical or moral issues.182 
Though the Regional Euthanasia Review Committees do in principle not have 
a hierarchical or institutional connection with judicial institutions or private insti-
tutions where the hospital order with compulsory treatment can be imposed, and 
could therefore be regarded as sufficiently independent, one may wonder whether 
these committees are sufficiently familiar with the Prison System Division or the 
Forensic Care Division to review whether a performed euthanasia or assisted su-
icide meets all the requirements. This especially applies to the requirement that 
can be derived from the ECHR that the request should be made freely, which 
implies in my opinion that is is not influenced by the deprivation of liberty. One 
may argue that such expertise is present within the Prison System Division, such 
as the Custodial Institutions Agency. However, a review committee composed by 
the Custodial Institutions Agency cannot be regarded as sufficiently independent 
to review these cases and is in my view not an option. To fulfil these tasks carefully 
in relation to euthanasia or assisted suicide for detainees, the review committee’s 
independence and expertise must be guaranteed. At present, these factors are in 
my opinion not sufficiently addressed in Dutch law or policy.
 Concluding remarks
The requirement for independence of an investigation into deaths occurring dur-
ing deprivation of liberty by the State is gaining more and more ground in the 
Dutch legal framework. There are nevertheless still points of improvement. Pref-
erably, it should be laid down in law that the external examination of the body 
should be performed by a forensic physician not connected to the authority re-
sponsible for the care for the detainee, that the local police should refrain from 
180. Art. 7 §2 Burial Act.
181. Art. 10 §2 Burial Act.
182. Art. 3 §2 Termination of Life on Request and Assisted Suicide (Review Procedures) Act.
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performing any investigative measures themselves if they have been involved in 
the deprivation of liberty of the detainee in question (prior to his transfer to a ju-
dicial institution) and that supervision by the public prosecutor should lie with 
a prosecutor not connected to the district where death occurred. That inquiry 
committees to examine calamities are composed within the Prison System Di-
vision, under chairmanship of a governor of another penal institution, is not in 
accordance with the required independence of the investigation and should in my 
view be rejected. Noteworthy is that the guidelines of the Custodial Institutions 
Agency on deaths occurring in judicial institutions do not apply to non-judicial 
institutions where hospital orders with compulsory treatment can be imposed. 
There are therefore not sufficient safeguards to ensure a complete independent 
inquiry into deaths occurring in these establishments. This also applies to calam-
ities in the provided healthcare to detainees held by the police. Furthermore, the 
position of the Inspectorate Security and Justice and the Health Care Inspectorate 
have been called into question; it has been stressed that these Inspectorates oper-
ate in close connection to the political leadership of their Ministries. This does not 
correspond with the required independence under the ECHR, which is (among 
others) problematic in view of their involvement in inquiries into deaths in State 
custody. Lastly, if euthanasia and assisted suicide are allowed during deprivation 
of liberty by the State, the legislator or the Custodial Institutions Agency should 
develop law/policy on the composition of the review committees to ensure an in-
dependent and sufficiently qualified review of euthanasia or assisted suicide on a 
detainee.
7.5. Prompt response and reasonable expedition
Dutch legislation contains several safeguards to ensure a prompt response after 
a person has died and to guarantee an expeditious investigation into the death. 
These safeguards also apply to deaths that occur during deprivation of liberty by 
the State and are in the following discussed in view of the diverging regimes. 
 Burial Act
Article 3 Burial Act determines that the external examination of the body should 
be performed as soon as possible after death. A more detailed guideline has been 
provided by the Public Prosecutor, Forensic Medical Society, Health Care Inspec-
torate and Royal Dutch Medical Association, namely within three hours after 
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the attending physician has been informed about the death.183 Not observing the 
principles laid down in Article 3 Burial Act is punishable, which means in my 
view that it is also punishable if the external examination of the body is not per-
formed as soon as possible after death.184 If the forensic physician has performed 
the external examination and is not convinced of a natural death, he has to inform 
the public prosecutor and registrar without delay.185 Not observing these obliga-
tions is also punishable.186 In view of a potential criminal investigation, it is not 
allowed to bury or cremate a body within thirty-six hours after death, unless the 
public prosecutor agrees, and the body must be buried or cremated no later than 
the sixth working day after death occurred.187 This implies that an autopsy must, 
in principle, be performed within a couple of days. Though the Burial Act does 
not contain an explicit provision on the period of time the attending physician 
should issue a death certificate in, the system of the Burial Act shows that these 
steps must be taken within a couple of days. After all, it is not allowed to bury or 
cremate a body without a death certificate or permission of the public prosecutor 
and the body must be buried or cremated within seven workdays after death.188 
Breaches of these regulations are punishable.189
 Code of Criminal Procedure
Provisions to guarantee expedition during a criminal investigation can also be 
found in the Code of Criminal Procedure. Important in this regard is the position 
of the investigating judge, who has supervisory powers with regard to the pre-trial 
investigation.190 The investigating judge has to see to it that the investigation is not 
unnecessarily delayed.191 If requested by the suspect or his lawyer, or on his own 
motion if the investigating judge has performed investigative measures himself, 
183. Public Prosecution Service, Forensic Medical Society, Health Care Inspectorate and Royal 
Dutch Medical Association 2016, p. 3.
184. Art. 81, section 1 Burial Act. 
185. Art. 10 §1 Burial Act.
186. Art. 81, section 1 Burial Act.
187. Art. 16 and art. 17 §1 Burial Act. 
188. Art. 7 §1 in connection with §3, art. 10 §1, art. 12 and art. 16 Burial Act. The mayor may 
however give permission to deviate from the time frame to dispose the body. Art. 17 §1 Burial Act.
189. Art. 80 Burial Act.
190. See about the investigating judge also: Corstens (edited by Borgers) 2014, p. 235 et seq. 
and chapter XI. The supervision by the investigating judge includes the lawfulness of the use 
of investigative powers, the progress of the investigation, the balance between the interests 
of the investigation and the interests of the suspect and the completeness of the investigation. 
Kamerstukken II 2009/10, 32 177, no. 3, p. 2.
191. Art. 180 §1 Code of Criminal Procedure.
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the investigating judge may examine the process of the investigation. He may re-
quest the case file for that purpose. If necessary, the investigating judge may hear 
the public prosecutor and the suspect or his lawyer.192 The investigating judge may 
fix a term in which the investigation should be completed and he is authorised 
to bring the case before the court in order to obtain a statement holding that the 
case is closed.193 Furthermore, if the public prosecutor is of the opinion that a 
prosecution is opportune, the prosecution must commence as soon as possible,194 
though no precise term has been set. Time limits have been set for completion 
of criminal proceedings; the district court should for example give a judgment 
within two years after the suspect could reasonably expect that he would be pros-
ecuted, unless the suspect is detained on remand. Under the latter circumstances 
the judgment should be given within sixteen months.195 Noteworthy is that the 
aforementioned provisions only apply to a criminal investigation, whereas a po-
lice investigation (or investigation by the National Police Internal Investigations 
Department) into deaths occurring during deprivation of liberty by the State do 
not always (or mostly not) contain a criminal investigation. 
Time limits are (to a large extent) absent for the various stages during the 
procedure developed to complain about the public prosecutor’s decision not to 
prosecute (12-Sv procedure). All directly interested parties (including relatives if 
the case involved a death) may submit a complaint with the Court of Appeal 
about the decision of the public prosecutor not to prosecute.196 The Court of Ap-
peal has the authority to order a prosecution.197 If the public prosecutor has sent 
the suspect a notification that he will not be prosecuted any further, the complaint 
must be made within three months after the complainant became familiar with 
the dismissal.198 The same time limit applies if the public prosecutor imposed a 
penal order (strafbeschikking),199 unless this order will not be executed in full.200 
Dutch law does not contain any other provisions regarding the time frame within 
192. Art. 180 §2 Code of Criminal Procedure. This means that the investigating judge is not 
always authorised to supervise the progress of the investigation, namely if there is no request of the 
suspect or his lawyer to examine the progress of the investigation and/or the examining judge has 
not performed any investigative acts himself. Kamerstukken II 2009/10, 32 177, no. 3, p. 24. See 
also: Corstens (edited by Borgers) 2014, p. 367.
193. Art. 180 §3 Code of Criminal Procedure.
194. Art. 167 §1 Code of Criminal Procedure. Art. 242 §1 Code of Criminal Procedure.
195. Supreme Court 17 June 2008, ECLI:NL:HR:2008:BD2578.
196. Art. 12 §1 Code of Criminal Procedure.
197. Art. 12i §1 Code of Criminal Procedure.
198. Art. 12l §2 Code of Criminal Procedure.
199. Art. 12k §1 Code of Criminal Procedure.
200. Art. 12k §2 Code of Criminal Procedure.
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which complaints must be made. The space of time is however a factor that will 
be taken into account by the Court of Appeal when examining whether it is op-
portune to prosecute.201 Up to now, the legislator did not set a term to handle 
these complaints.202 
 Healthcare Quality, Complaints and Disputes Act
Care providers are obliged to report calamities related to the provided healthcare 
to the Health Care Inspectorate without delay.203 This means that a calamity must 
be reported within three workdays after it has been established that a calamity has 
occurred.204 Care providers have six weeks to establish whether a calamity has oc-
curred in the provided healthcare.205 The care provider or the involved company 
must complete its own inquiry into the calamity within eight weeks, though this 
term can be extended on request.206 The legislator did not set a term in which 
the own investigation of the Health Care Inspectorate should be completed (if 
performed). Nevertheless, the Inspectorate must inform the person who reported 
the calamity about the term in which it will complete the investigation207 and the 
legislator has set several terms for the diverging stages of the inquiry, for example 
the term set to submit a response regarding any inaccuracies in the report of ques-
tioning (two weeks),208 to send the draft report (as soon as possible),209 to submit 
a response as to any inaccuracies in the draft report (four weeks)210 and the term 
to finish the final report about the inquiry performed by the Health Care Inspec-
torate (at the latest four weeks after the term set to respond to the draft report has 
elapsed).211 The Inspectorate should send the final report as soon as possible to 
the person who reported the calamity, the involved care provider or the involved 
company and the persons who were involved in the inquiry.212 
201. Van Gend and Visser 2004, pp. 56, 88.
202. The legislator has however uttered the intention to introduce a statutory term to handle these 
complaints. Kamerstukken II 2015/16, 29 279, no. 278, p. 74. See furthermore: Van Lent, Boone 
and Van den Bos 2016 (report about the lead time to handle complaints).
203. Art. 11 §1 Healthcare Quality, Complaints and Disputes Act.
204. Aanhangsel Handelingen II 2012/13, 786.
205. Stb. 2015, 447, p. 24.
206. Art. 8.7 §2 Decree Healthcare Quality, Complaints and Disputes.
207. Art. 8.8 §2 Decree Healthcare Quality, Complaints and Disputes.
208. Art. 8.8 §3 Decree Healthcare Quality, Complaints and Disputes.
209. Art. 8.10 §2 Decree Healthcare Quality, Complaints and Disputes.
210. Art. 8.10 §3 Decree Healthcare Quality, Complaints and Disputes.
211. Art. 8.11 §1 Decree Healthcare Quality, Complaints and Disputes.
212. Art. 8.11 §3 Decree Healthcare Quality, Complaints and Disputes.
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 Additional regulations and policy relating to deprivation of 
liberty
Specific safeguards to guarantee a prompt response can also be found in guidelines 
and instructions specifically relating to the context of deprivation of liberty. The 
Custodial Institutions Agency prescribes that the local police should be informed 
and summoned and the local public prosecutor should be informed as soon as 
death has been established.213 Contrary to the Healthcare Quality, Complaints 
and Disputes Act, that determines that calamities must be reported to the Health 
Care Inspectorate, a practice has been developed that every death in a judicial in-
stitution must be reported to the Health Care Inspectorate and the Inspectorate 
Security and Justice.214 
Article 26 §7 Official Instructions for the Police requires that the Chief of Police 
must ensure that the Public Prosecution Service will be notified immediately if 
a detainee dies or attempted to commit suicide during deprivation of liberty by 
the police, though (as stressed before) the background of this provision can be 
found in getting an overview of the total number of deaths and suicide attempts. 
The police is also instructed to immediately alarm the National Police Internal 
Investigations Department and the local Public Prosecution Office.215 If the lethal 
incident involves the use of force by a police officer, the official of the National 
Police Internal Investigations Department is instructed to come to the site of the 
incident as soon as possible.216 The study of Thoonen and Duijst shows that the 
total length of the investigations performed by the National Police Internal Inves-
tigations Department under supervision of a public prosecutor was on average (as 
far as this could be derived from the case files) 159 days (range 4-372), 217 which is 
not problematic in view of the requirements arising from the ECHR.218 
213. Custodial Institutions Agency 2009, p. 12.
214. Work programme 2016 Inspectorate Security and Justice, p. 17.
215. Instruction tasks and responsibilities National Police Internal Investigations Department, p. 
5.
216. Instruction procedure to be followed in case of used force by (police) official.
217. Thoonen and Duijst 2015.
218. ECtHR 3 February 2011, no. 8532/06, §91 (Geppa v. Russia): investigation of approximately 
one year not unreasonable.
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 Termination of Life on Request and Assisted Suicide 
(Review Procedures) Act
Special terms have been set for the review procedure in case of euthanasia or as-
sisted suicide. The physician who performs the euthanasia or assisted suicide must 
immediately notify the forensic physician.219 After having performed the external 
examination of the body, the forensic physician must immediately send the review 
committee the report about the manner in which the physician who performed 
the euthanasia or assisted suicide has observed the criteria for euthanasia or as-
sisted suicide.220 The review committee must give a reasoned judgment whether or 
not the criteria for euthanasia or assisted suicide have been met within six weeks 
after the committee received the report of the physician. This term may be ex-
tended once for another six weeks.221 Observing a term of maximum 12 weeks to 
review an euthanasia or assisted suicide corresponds with the requirements set by 
the ECtHR, who does not find it in itself unreasonable if an investigation into a 
death of a detainee due to an illness takes approximately one year.222 The annual 
reports of the review committees show however that the legal terms have been 
exceeded in the past; the review committees acknowledged that the term to deal 
with reported euthanasia’s and assisted suicides was unacceptably long in 2011 and 
2012 due to a high workload.223 The 2015 annual reports show that the average 
term to review a report was 39 days, therefore falling within the statutory term.224
There does not exist a possibility to appeal against the judgment of the review 
committee.225 If the review committee is of the opinion that the criteria have 
been met, the case is closed. If not, the review committee will notify the Board 
of Procurators General and the Health Care Inspectorate.226 The Instructions for 
decisions to be taken into euthanasia and assisted suicide on request give several 
terms to be observed by the Board of Procurators General to examine whether 
prosecution should follow. 
219. Art. 7 §2 Burial.
220. Art. 10 §2 Burial Act.
221. Art. 9 §§1, 3 Termination of Life on Request and Assisted Suicide (Review Procedures) Act.
222. ECtHR 3 February 2011, no. 8532/06, §91 (Geppa v. Russia).
223. Regional Euthanasia Review Committees 2012, pp. 3, 5. Regional Euthanasia Review 
Committees 2013, p. 5. 
224. Regional Euthanasia Review Committees 2016, p. 4.
225. This has been criticised. Hendriks 2014.
226. Art. 9 §2 Termination of Life on Request and Assisted Suicide (Review Procedures) Act.
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 Concluding remarks
The Dutch legal framework contains several guarantees to ensure a prompt and 
expeditious investigation into a death during deprivation of liberty by the State, 
though not all of these guarantees are backed up by legal consequences if time 
frames are not observed. Furthermore, the time limits set in the Code of Criminal 
Procedure only apply to criminal investigations. Another point of interest is that 
no time frames are set for the inquiry performed by the Health Care Inspectorate.
7.6. Involvement of next of kin 
The Burial Act, the Medical Treatment Contracts Act,227 nor the Termination of 
Life on Request and Assisted Suicide (Review Procedures) Act contain an obliga-
tion to inform or involve the next of kin in the investigation into the death of a 
relative, except for the obligation to inform the next of kin228 that a legal autopsy 
has been ordered by the public prosecutor229 and the possibility for the next of 
kin to request for a non-legal, clinical autopsy.230 The policy that has been devel-
oped for the specific context of deprivation of liberty by the State does contain 
safeguards in this regard.
 Policy relating to deprivation of liberty
The guideline of the Custodial Institutions Agency on the procedure to be fol-
lowed after a detainee dies in a judicial institution contains instructions on how to 
involve the relatives. This guideline prescribes that if a detainee has died, the man-
agement of the judicial institution must inform the next of kin about the death 
as soon as possible. The on duty member of the board of the judicial institution 
must inform the next of kin extensively about the death of the detainee and the 
227. The Ministries of Health, Welfare and Sport and Security and Justice are however preparing 
a bill which contains a provision holding, among others, the right for the next of kin to inspect 
the medical file or to receive a copy of the medical file of the deceased patient if the next of kin is 
informed about the fact that a calamity has occurred regarding the provided care or if the next of 
kin have a weighty interest. https://www.internetconsultatie.nl/concept_wijziging_wgbo. Last 
accessed: 5 March 2017.
228. I.e. the husband/wife who is not separated from bed and board (niet van tafel en bed 
gescheiden echtgenoot), registered partner (geregistreerd partner) or other life partner, or other close 
relatives up to the third degree (or heirs/persons who take care of the body). Art. 72 §2 Burial Act.
229. Art. 73 §2 Burial Act.
230. Art. 72 §2 Burial Act.
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course of events during the detainee’s stay in the judicial institution. The next of 
kin also need to be informed about (the expenses of ) the funeral, and the pos-
sibility to perform a non-legal, clinical autopsy on the next of kin’s initiative, to 
visit the scene where the detainee died and to see the body. If the body has been 
confiscated by the public prosecutor, the relatives should be referred to the public 
prosecutor for information about the investigation.231 
The National Police Internal Investigations Department has detectives who are 
specifically assigned to act as liaison between the investigating officers and the 
family of the deceased (family liaison officers). According to the National Po-
lice Internal Investigations Department’s protocol on family liaison officers, these 
officers will, among others, be involved if the National Police Internal Investiga-
tions Department investigates a case designated as a major criminal investigation, 
where the person died due to the use of violence, or the person in question is se-
riously wounded and cannot look after his own interests.232 These criteria do not 
involve all cases where a person died while deprived of his liberty by the State 
(for example by the police). Furthermore, the question whether lethal force has 
been used can only be validly answered after an effective investigation has been 
performed, whereas family liaison officers are expected to be involved from the 
outset of the investigation. The protocol determines that the family liaison officer 
has (among others) the responsibility to inform the next of kin about the progress 
of the investigation and to exchange information with the next of kin. The pro-
tocol does not state which information can be provided to the next of kin and at 
what stage.233 The National regulations on the care for police custody detainees 
prescribe that the police officer in charge should keep in touch with the next of 
kin afterwards.234 It is not clear what ‘afterwards’ means, nor is it clear what the 
contact between the responsible police officer in charge and the next of kin should 
entail. As the public prosecutor has final responsibility for the investigation of the 
National Police Internal Investigations Department, the public prosecutor must 
decide which information, and in what phase that information can be provided 
to the next of kin. The following will however show that the legislation does not 
231. Custodial Institutions Agency 2009, pp. 13-14. The guideline does not contain a definition 
of the term ‘next of kin’.
232. National Police Internal Investigations Department 2016. The protocol does not contain a 
definition of the term ‘next of kin’.
233. National Police Internal Investigations Department 2016.
234. National Police 2016, p. 24. The regulation uses the term ‘family’, without providing a 
definition.
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contain clear principles for providing information to the next of kin of a deceased 
detainee.
 Police investigation and Code of Criminal Procedure
As stressed before, the Burial Act only requires that relatives are informed about 
the decision of the public prosecutor to order a legal autopsy.235 The Royal Dutch 
Medical Association stresses that the forensic physician is not allowed to inform 
a third party, including the relatives, about his findings regarding the examined 
death and must refer persons who request information to the public prosecu-
tor. The forensic physician may provide information if the public prosecutor has 
given its consent.236 The Custodial Institutions Agency stresses that if the public 
prosecutor has ordered seizure of the body, the next of kin should not be given 
information that may obstruct the investigation. The governor of the judicial in-
stitution must refer the relatives to the public prosecutor if they want to receive 
information about the investigation into the cause of death and the public prose-
cutor is assigned to inform the relatives about the outcome of the investigation,237 
though it is not regulated how, and to what extent, information can be provided. 
In case of a non-natural death, the public prosecutor will normally weigh any in-
terests in view of a criminal investigation when deciding about whether, and to 
what extent, the next of kin can be informed.238 
The public prosecutor will also supervise the investigation into the death of a 
person while deprived of his liberty by the police239 and will therefore decide 
on the information that can or cannot be provided to the next of kin, regard-
less of whether the death in question had a natural or non-natural cause. The 
study of Thoonen and Duijst on deaths during deprivation of liberty by the po-
lice (2005-2010) shows that the manner in which the Public Prosecution Service 
informed the relatives about the results of the investigation varied; some relatives 
were provided the opportunity to examine the case file and others were not, some 
were provided with a copy of the case file and others were not. The notifications 
about the results of the investigation and the decision also varied; some were 
well-founded and others were not. Though no conclusions could be drawn on 
235. Art. 73 §2 Burial Act. See also: Custodial Institutions Agency 2009, p. 13.
236. Royal Dutch Medical Association 2012b, pp. 49-50.
237. Custodial Institutions Agency 2009, pp. 14-15.
238. Duijst and Naujocks 2016, pp. 82-83.
239. Instructions tasks and responsibilities National Police Internal Investigations Department, 
Stcrt. 2010, no. 20477.
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whether the relatives had been sufficiently informed, Thoonen and Duijst raise 
the question whether the Dutch legislation contains a gap with regard to the in-
formation that should be provided to the relatives of persons who died during 
deprivation of liberty by the State. Thoonen and Duijst stress that the rights of 
the victim, as laid down in the Code of Criminal Procedure, only apply in case 
of a criminal offence, which is not necessarily (or often not) the case when deaths 
during deprivation of liberty by the State are concerned.240 Noteworthy is that the 
duty to inform the next of kin and of public accountability in case of deaths dur-
ing deprivation of liberty by the State has been stressed in Dutch case law. The 
Court of Appeal Amsterdam emphasises that the next of kin must be informed in 
a timely fashion about the results of the investigation, the decision taken by the 
public prosecutor whether or not to prosecute and the motivation for this deci-
sion.241 This Court of Appeal also stresses the public duty to account for deaths if 
the responsibility of the State may be engaged and to perform a public investiga-
tion.242 Despite these principles arising from Dutch case law, the next of kin’s right 
to information should in my view be laid down in law or policy to ensure that 
the relatives will be sufficiently informed and to prevent arbitrariness.243 Article 2 
ECHR also requires that the terms for the next of kin’s access to the file are de-
fined,244 which is at present not ensured in the Netherlands if no criminal offence 
has been committed (or a calamity in the provided healthcare has occurred). The 
Code of Criminal Procedure contains several rights for victims (in this regard and 
hereinafter: the next of kin) during (a) criminal investigation and proceedings. 
These provisions only apply to persons (including legal bodies) who have suffered 
financial loss or other damage due to a criminal offence.245 As discussed before, 
a bill has been drafted to introduce the possibility of an inquiry into the facts in 
the Code of Criminal Procedure. This bill will declare the rights laid down in Ar-
ticles 51a et seq, namely the rights of victims of criminal offences, applicable to 
240. Thoonen and Duijst 2015, p. 113.
241. Court of Appeal Amsterdam 29 October 2008, ECLI:NL:GHAMS:2008:BG3792. Court of 
Appeal Amsterdam 16 February 2007, ECLI:NL:GHAMS:2007:AZ8826.
242. Court of Appeal Amsterdam 10 November 2008, ECLI:NL:GHAMS:2008:BG3914. See also 
District Court Amsterdam 9 February 2010, ECLI:NL:RBAMS:2010:BL3168: court stresses the 
public duty to account if a person possibly died due to the use of force by State officials.
243. See also: Thoonen and Duijst 2015, p. 113.
244. ECtHR 5 July 2005, no. 49790/99, §93 (Trubnikov v. Russia).
245. Art. 51a et seq Code of Criminal Procedure. See however the amendment of art. 51a; this 
amendment will add (a definition of ) the term relative, namely: family members of a person who’s 
death is directly caused by a criminal offence. Family members are: the husband/wife, the registered 
partner (geregistreerd partner) or other life partner of the deceased, blood relatives of the deceased 
in the ascending or descending line, blood relatives up to the fourth degree of the collateral line, 
and persons who are dependent on the deceased. Kamerstukken I 2015/16, 34 236, A.
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an inquiry into the facts.246 However, this inquiry into the facts is only meant for 
cases where it has to be determined whether the police officer acted in accordance 
with the instruction on the use of force. Therefore, it does not include all cases of 
deaths occurring under the responsibility of the State. The aforementioned defi-
ciency in law is thus not sufficiently addressed.  
With respect to the rights of victims, the Code of Criminal Procedure prescribes 
that the public prosecutor must make sure that the victims (in this regard the next 
of kin) are treated correctly. On the next of kin’s request, the public prosecutor 
must inform the relatives about the outset of the investigation and its progress, 
the date and time the suspect must appear in court and about the final judg-
ment of the court.247 The public prosecutor may grant the next of kin on his or 
her request access to the case file, though only with regard to the part that is of 
importance to the next of kin. If the case is brought before a court, the criminal 
court that examines the case is authorised to give this permission.248 The public 
prosecutor may refuse access to the file if it is reasonable to assume that it may 
cause severe inconvenience for a witness or a witness may be severely hindered in 
his profession or professional duties, it will harm a weighty interest in detecting 
criminal offences, or it will harm national security.249 The next of kin also has 
the right to receive a copy of the part of the case file he is authorised to access.250 
In the interest of privacy, detecting and prosecuting criminal offences or weighty 
public interests, the public prosecutor may refuse to provide a copy. The crimi-
nal court is authorised to decide on this matter if the case is brought before the 
court.251 The next of kin must be informed of a refusal in writing252 and the next 
of kin may lodge a complaint about a refusal with the investigating judge within 
fourteen days.253 The next of kin may also request the public prosecutor to add 
relevant documents to the file.254 These provisions fulfil in my view the require-
ment to inform the next of kin pursuant to the ECHR, though does not ensure 
any active involvement of the next of kin in the investigation and, as stressed be-
fore, only apply if a criminal offence has been committed. It therefore does not 
246. Kamerstukken II 2016/17, 34 641, no. 2 (art. 511a).
247. Art. 51a §§1-4 Code of Criminal Procedure.
248. Art. 51b §1 Code of Criminal Procedure.
249. Art. 51b §3 in connection with art. 187d §1 Code of Criminal Procedure.
250. Art. 51b §6 Code of Criminal Procedure.
251. Art. 51b §6 in connection with art. 32 §2 Code of Criminal Procedure.
252. Art. 51b §6 in connection with art. 32 §3 Code of Criminal Procedure.
253. Art. 51b §6 in connection with art. 32 §4 Code of Criminal Procedure.
254. Art. 51b §2 Code of Criminal Procedure.
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sufficiently safeguard the involvement of the next of kin if no criminal offence has 
been committed.
During the pre-trial phase of a criminal investigation two kinds of investiga-
tions can be distinguished: 1) an investigation by the police under supervision 
of the public prosecutor, and 2) an investigation by the investigative judge. If an 
investigation has been performed by the police under supervision of the public 
prosecutor, the public prosecutor may decide not to prosecute considering the 
public interest and he is authorised to postpone the decision on prosecution un-
der certain conditions and for a certain period.255 It is not regulated how these 
dismissals need to be given. Such dismissals are therefore called ‘informal dismiss-
als’.256 These decisions do not have to be reasoned.257 If a prosecution has already 
started (i.e. if a judge has been involved in a criminal case),258 the public prose-
cutor may still decide not to prosecute pursuant to Article 242 Code of Criminal 
Procedure. In fact, the public prosecutor may dismiss the case as long as the trial 
has not started. If the case involves a suspicion of a crime and the public prosecu-
tor decides not to prosecute pursuant to Article 242 Code of Criminal Procedure, 
the public prosecutor must inform the known directly involved persons about the 
decision to dismiss the case in writing and forthwith.259 If the case is dismissed 
because the facts of the case do not involve a criminal offence, the suspect is not 
liable to punishment or there are insufficient indications for the suspect’s guilt, the 
notification must contain the ground for dismissal.260 The Board of Procurators 
General has issued an instruction on the use of these grounds for dismissal. The 
reasoning for dismissal of a case must be registered in the case file. The ground for 
dismissal is regarded as such reasoning. These grounds are numbered (and thus 
standardised), which means that an explanation regarding a dismissal may only 
contain the code number and a standard explanation.261 A code number and a 
255. Art. 167 §2 Code of Criminal Procedure.
256. Corstens (edited by Borgers) 2014, p. 604.
257. Tak 2008, p. 86.
258. For example if a person is detained on remand by the investigating judge. Corstens 2015, p. 
115.
259. Art. 243 §4 Code of Criminal Procedure. 
260. Art. 247, section d-e Code of Criminal Procedure.
261. Instruction on the use of grounds for dismissal, Stcrt. 2014, 23614. There is, for example, 
a special ground for dismissal in case of lawful use of violence by police officers. See however the 
new art. 51ac Code of Criminal Procedure (Kamerstukken I 2015/16, 34 236, A): at his request, 
the victim must be sufficiently informed to enable the victim to decide whether he will lodge a 
complaint with the Court of Appeal as laid down in art. 12 Code of Criminal Procedure. This 
must include (a summary of ) the reasons for the decision. Art. 51ab furthermore determines 
that the victim must be informed about his rights during the first contact with the involved law 
enforcement officer. 
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standard explanation will in my view not suffice to fulfil the required reasoning 
for a dismissal under the ECHR if a death of a detainee is involved.
If the public prosecutor decides not to prosecute (for example with regard to 
the death of a detainee), persons with a direct interest in prosecution may seek a 
court order to institute a prosecution.262 Persons with a direct interest in prosecu-
tion cannot lodge a complaint if the suspect has successfully made a complaint 
against the summons or if the suspect has received a statement issued by the 
competent court holding that the criminal case against him has been closed.263 
The Court of Appeal is competent to decide whether or not prosecution should 
follow.264 If a complaint has been made, the Court of Appeal must summon the 
complainant for a hearing.265 The person(s) whose prosecution has been asked 
may be heard by the Court of Appeal and the court cannot order his prosecution 
without hearing that person, or at least after he has properly been summoned for 
a hearing.266 These hearings are not public.267 The person who made the complaint 
about the decision not to prosecute has the right to be represented by a lawyer.268 
If requested, the chairman of the Court of Appeal may permit the complainant to 
examine the case file. The chairman may decide that parts of the case file should 
be excluded from examination to protect privacy, in the interest of detecting and 
prosecuting criminal offences, or in view of weighty public interests.269 A copy of 
some parts of the case file may be refused on the same grounds.270 The complain-
ant must be informed in writing about a refusal to provide such a copy.271 The 
Court of Appeal may give an order to prosecute and may refuse to give such an 
order considering the public interest. It may also order that the public prosecu-
tor demands certain investigative measures to be performed by the investigating 
judge.272 If a complaint has been made pursuant to Article 12 Code of Criminal 
Procedure, the public prosecutor is only allowed to send the complainant a notifi-
cation of non-prosecution if the Court of Appeal consents with such a decision.273 
262. Art. 12 §1 Code of Criminal Procedure.
263. Art. 12l §1 in connection with art. 262 and art. 36 Code of Criminal Procedure.
264. Art. 12 §1 Code of Criminal Procedure.
265. Art. 12d Code of Criminal Procedure. There are exceptions to this principle.
266. Art. 12e Code of Criminal Procedure.
267. Art. 12f in connection with art. 21 §1, and art. 22 Code of Criminal Procedure. See also art. 
4 §1 Judiciary (Organisation) Act.
268. Art. 12f §1 Code of Criminal Procedure.
269. Art. 12f §2 Code of Criminal Procedure.
270. Art. 12f §3 Code of Criminal Procedure.
271. Art. 12f §4 Code of Criminal Procedure.
272. Art. 12i Code of Criminal Procedure.
273. Art. 243 §5 Code of Criminal Procedure.
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The decision of the Court of Appeal does not have to be made public.274 Only the 
suspect and the other participants in the proceedings must be informed about the 
decision without delay.275 This decision must be reasoned.276 The ECtHR passed a 
judgment with regard to this procedure in the Netherlands. The ECtHR stressed 
that this procedure should not be equated with a prosecution as it only enables di-
rectly involved persons to challenge a decision not to prosecute. It concluded that 
the proceedings before the Court of Appeal did not need to be public; a person 
whom it was considered not to be appropriate to institute a prosecution should 
be spared the unpleasantness of a public hearing. The Court of Appeal’s decision 
in this procedure does not need to be made public either as the complainants 
(relatives of the victim) were provided with a reasoned decision and they were 
not prevented from making the decision public themselves. For that reason, the 
danger of any improper cover-up by the Netherlands authorities was sufficiently 
obviated.277
 Inquiry pursuant to Healthcare Quality, Complaints and Disputes 
Act
Article 10 §3 Healthcare Quality, Complaints and Disputes Act prescribes that the 
health care provider informs the next of kin of a deceased patient about the nature 
and circumstances of incidents that occurred while providing healthcare to the 
patient and which had noticeable effects on that patient. If a calamity is reported 
to the Health Care Inspectorate and the care provider is offered the opportunity 
to perform its own inquiry into the calamity, the Inspectorate must set require-
ments about the manner the relatives should be informed about the calamity 
and are involved in the investigation.278 More specific requirements are however 
274. Art. 24 §1 Code of Criminal Procedure: if a public hearing is prescribed, the decision must 
be delivered in public.
275. Art. 24 §4 Code of Criminal Procedure.
276. Art. 24 §1 Code of Criminal Procedure.
277. ECtHR 15 May 2007, no. 52391/99, §§300, 354, GC (Ramsahai and others v. The 
Netherlands). See chapter 6, section 6.3.2, for my objection regarding this judgment of the ECtHR.
278. Art. 8.7 §3 Decree Healthcare Quality, Complaints and Disputes. Art. 1 §1 Healthcare 
Quality, Complaints and Disputes Act contains a definition of the next of kin, namely: a) the 
husband/wife of the deceased who is not separated from bed and board (niet van tafel en bed 
gescheiden echtgenoot) or the registered partner (geregistreerd partner), b) other blood relatives or 
relatives by marriage if this person provided fully or partly for the maintenance of the deceased in 
the time of his death or was obliged to provide for the maintenance of the deceased in the time 
of his death according to a judicial decision, c) the person who was living with the deceased in a 
family unit prior to the event that brings along the liability and who provided fully or partly for the 
maintenance of the deceased in the time of his death, as far as it is plausible that this would have 
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not provided by the legislator, which diminishes the effectiveness of this provi-
sion and the next of kin’s legal certainty regarding its access to information. The 
Health Care Inspectorate only stresses that it must be reported whether the next 
of kin have been questioned and how aftercare has been provided to the next of 
kin. It must also report about the relatives’ response on how the calamity is dealt 
with and to the provided aftercare.279 Article 8.9 §1 Decree Healthcare Quality, 
Complaints and Disputes determines that if the Health Care Inspectorate is of 
the opinion that the calamity has been examined carefully and sufficient measures 
have been taken in response, the Inspectorate will close the investigation into the 
calamity. The Inspectorate is only obliged to inform the person who reported the 
calamity and the care provider or the involved company of the decision to close 
the investigation.280 This does not always include the relatives. The Inspectorate 
must inform the involved parties in writing about the decision to close the inves-
tigation and this decision must be reasoned.281 If the Health Care Inspectorate 
performs an own investigation, it will draw up a draft report. This draft report 
will be provided to the persons who have been heard during the investigation 
(often including the next of kin), the person who reported the calamity and the 
health care provider or company involved. These parties must have the opportu-
nity to respond to factual inconsistencies in the draft.282 After having received the 
responses, the Inspectorate must draw up the final report.283 The Inspectorate is 
obliged to send the final report to the person who reported the calamity, the in-
volved care provider or company and the persons who have been involved in the 
investigation.284 Therefore, the next of kin will only receive the final report if they 
fall within one of these aforementioned categories. Neither the Healthcare Qual-
ity, Complaints and Disputes Act, nor the Decree contains an explicit right for 
the relatives to examine or obtain the report.285 Though the next of kin may be 
heard during the inquiry, any other active involvement of the next of kin in the 
inquiry is not ensured. This does not correspond with the requirement under the 
been continued without the death, d) the person with whom the deceased was living in a family 
unit and who was supported by the deceased through a shared household, e) blood relatives of the 
deceased within the first degree and within the second degree of the collateral line.
279. Health Care Inspectorate 2016. 
280. Art. 8.9 §2 Decree Healthcare Quality, Complaints and Disputes.
281. Art. 8.9 §§1-2 Decree Healthcare Quality, Complaints and Disputes.
282. Art. 8.10 §§1-3 Decree Healthcare Quality, Complaints and Disputes.
283. Art. 8.11 §1 Decree Healthcare Quality, Complaints and Disputes.
284. Art. 8.11 §3 Decree Healthcare Quality, Complaints and Disputes.
285. Legemaate has stated that art. 10 §3 Healthcare Quality, Complaints and Disputes Act will 
be observed if the care provider provides the next of kin with the report regarding the calamity. 
Legemaate 2015, pp. 127-129.
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ECHR to involve the next of kin in the investigation in such a manner that their 
legitimate interests are observed.286 
Dutch case law illustrates that there are discussions regarding the relatives’ ac-
cess to the inquiry reports. The case law reveals several cases where a relative did 
not receive a copy of the inquiry report, neither from the care provider involved 
nor from the Health Care Inspectorate.287 Although these cases do not relate to 
deprivation of liberty by the State, these cases are in my view nevertheless relevant 
as the Healthcare Quality, Complaints and Disputes Act is applicable to calami-
ties during deprivation of liberty. Discussions regarding the next of kin’s access to 
information are in my view not sufficiently addressed in this Act and may there-
fore occur. The duty of medical confidentiality cannot be left undiscussed in this 
regard as information is often not provided by referring to this duty, which duty 
stays in force after the death of the patient.288 As discussed in chapter 5, the duty 
of medical confidentiality is stipulated in several Dutch laws, namely Article 457 
Medical Treatment Contracts Act and Article 88 Individual Health Care Profes-
sions Act. The current opinion in the Netherlands is that the duty of medical 
confidentiality will remain in force after the patient’s death,289 which view also 
emerges in Dutch case law.290 The duty to observe medical confidentiality also 
applies towards the relatives of the patient, except for the representative of the 
patient, for example if the patient is not capable to decide for himself and he is 
represented by a family member.291 Representation will come to an end with the 
death of the patient concerned. Nevertheless, representatives should in principle 
be given access to medical data relevant to determine whether mistakes have been 
made in the provided healthcare that led to the patient’s death.292 If no represent-
286. ECtHR 27 July 2004, no. 57671/00, §32 (Slimani v. France).
287. These cases relate to the Care Institutions (Quality) Act. In these procedures, the next of kin 
requested access to the reports pursuant to the Freedom of Information Act (this procedure will be 
discussed below). See for example Administrative Jurisdiction Division of the Council of State 27 
April 2011, ECLI:NL:RVS:2011:BQ2643, GJ 2011/86: suicide of a patient of a health care facility. 
District Court ‘s-Hertogenbosch 26 July 2010, ECLI:NL:RBSHE:2010:BN3026. District Court 
Dordrecht 4 December 2007, ECLI:NL:RBDOR:2007:BB9778: request for report regarding 
suicide. District Court Arnhem 6 March 2008, ECLI:NL:RBARN:2008:BC9172: request for 
report regarding suicide. District Court Utrecht 30 August 2012, ECLI:NL:RBUTR:2012:BX6278: 
request for report regarding the death of the plaintiff’s mother.
288. See also Royal Dutch Medical Association 2010c, pp. 26-29.
289. Koops 1997, pp. 1638-1639. De Jong 1998, pp. 1017-1020. Ploem 1999, pp. 1826-1829. 
Blok 2003, pp. 273-278. Duijst 2007, p. 48. Leenen et al 2014, p. 145.
290. President District Court ‘s-Gravenhage 28 June 1996, TvGR 1997/14. RTG ‘s-Gravenhage 
19 August 2014, ECLI:NL:TGZRSGR:2014:87.
291. Art. 457 §1 in connection with §3 Medical Treatment Contracts Act.
292. Court of Appeal Amsterdam 29 January 1998, TvGR 1998, 34. RTG ‘s-Gravenhage 19 
August 2014, ECLI:NL:TGZRSGR:2014:87.
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ative was involved with regard to a patient, the duty of medical confidentiality 
remains in force, although a practice of weighing the involved interests have been 
developed. The concept of implied consent has been developed in case law to 
handle requests for information by the next of kin who were not the representa-
tive of the deceased patient. This means that the health care provider (and if the 
case is presented to the court, the judge) will examine whether the patient, if he 
would still have been alive, would have assented to providing the relatives with 
the requested information. If not, the health care provider is not allowed to pro-
vide information to these relatives.293 The District Court Noord-Holland stresses 
however that the patient’s mandate authorising a person to obtain medical data 
while that patient is alive does not by definition imply that this consent also cov-
ers access to medical data after the patient has died.294 This line of reasoning makes 
the decision-making process in my view unnecessarily complicated and does not 
sufficiently observe the patient’s right to self-determination that is expressed in 
the mandate. Another relevant criterion that has been introduced in case law is a 
weighty interest.295 A weighty interest of the relatives may justify an infringement 
on the duty of confidentiality.296 An example of a weighty interest is knowing who 
your parent is297 or knowing the cause of death considering the risk for the rela-
tives’ health.298 The relatives’ right to be involved in the procedure into the death 
of their relative during deprivation of liberty by the State is up to now not ex-
plicitly recognised as a weighty interest. Moreover, this right will not be fulfilled 
if the detainee’s next of kin has to resort to a court to obtain information, as the 
relatives in the aforementioned case law have done. If the relatives have to resort 
to such court procedures, the requirement set under Article 2 ECHR to involve 
the relatives in the procedure when a death of a detainee is concerned will not 
be fulfilled. Furthermore, the aforementioned practice of weighing the diverging 
interests deviates from the principles arising from the ECHR. The ECtHR does 
not make such an appraisal; it requires that in all cases of a death in custody, the 
next of kin must be involved in the procedure to safeguard their legitimate inter-
ests. To ensure the next of kin’s right to be involved in the procedure, the terms of 
293. Court of Appeal Amsterdam 24 June 1999, NJK 1999, 77.
294. District Court Noord-Holland 8 December 2015, ECLI:NL:RBNHO:2015:12044.
295. Court of Appeal ’s-Hertogenbosch 18 September 2000, NJ 2001, 555. Supreme Court 20 
April 2001, JOL 2001, 268. See also: Duijst 2007, pp. 48-50. Leenen, Gevers and Legemaate 2007, 
p. 232. Leenen et al 2014, p. 151.
296. District Court Oost-Nederland 28 March 2013, ECLI:NL:RBONE:2013:BZ6271.
297. Court of Appeal ‘s-Hertogenbosch 18 September 1991, NJ 1991, 796.
298. District Court Noord-Holland 8 December 2015, ECLI:NL:RBNHO:2015:12044.
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their access to the file must be clearly defined.299 This is at present not sufficiently 
ensured in Dutch law.
 Concluding remarks
The aforementioned legal frameworks (Burial Act, Code of Criminal Procedure, 
Healthcare Quality, Complaints and Disputes Act) contain diverging definitions 
of the term ‘next of kin’, which means that the circle of the next of kin that must 
be involved/informed may diverge according to the applicable framework. The 
relatives’ right to be involved in the procedure is in my view sufficiently guar-
anteed in the Code of Criminal Procedure as far as it concerns their access to 
information and to add relevant documents to the case file. However, a death 
during deprivation of liberty will not always (or in most cases in the Netherlands, 
not) involve a criminal offence. Strictly speaking, the provisions guaranteeing the 
rights of victims do not apply if no criminal offence has been committed.300 The 
Healthcare Quality, Complaints and Disputes Act requires that the Health Care 
Inspectorate sets requirements about the manner the relatives should be informed 
about the calamity and are involved in the investigation. As no substantive re-
quirements are set about the manner in which the relatives must be informed, 
these requirements are in my view not sufficient to ensure the next of kin’s right 
to be involved in the procedure to safeguard their legitimate interests. There are 
insufficient safeguards to ensure the relatives’ access to the file or to ensure that 
they are informed about the final results. This does not correspond with the obli-
gations under Article 2 ECHR in case of a deceased detainee. 
7.7. Public scrutiny
As discussed in chapter 1, there is limited information available on deaths occur-
ring during deprivation of liberty by the Dutch State. Occasionally, some reports 
about deaths during State custody are published. The investigation of the Inspec-
torate Security and Justice and the Health Care Inspectorate into the death of 
Alexander Dolmatov in a Detention and Removal Centre has been published,301 
299. ECtHR 5 July 2005, no. 49790/99, §93 (Trubnikov v. Russia).
300. See however the bill that introduces the inquiry into the use of force by law enforcement 
officers. Kamerstukken II 2016/17, 34 641, no. 2 (art. 511a). 
301. Inspectorate Security and Justice 2013 (Dolmatov). 
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just like an investigation into several suicides in penal institution Vught.302 In 
2016, the State Secretary stressed that he could not answer parliamentary questions 
about the care provided to a detainee prior to his suicide in a penal institution 
considering the detainee’s right to respect his private life. The report of the ca-
lamity committee and the report of the department of safety and integrity were 
not made public as they contained personal data of the detainee and information 
about the safety procedures applicable within the institution. These investigations 
are internal investigations performed by the Custodial Institutions Agency.303 The 
Health Care Inspectorate furthermore states on its website that reports on inci-
dents and calamities are not always made public by the Inspectorate. These reports 
may be published if there is significant political or public interest in the case.304 
This is in my view not the criterion that should be used, namely the criterion de-
veloped by the ECtHR, i.e. that the public interest requires the widest exposure 
possible if a detainee dies in a horrendous manner due to a number of failures by 
State authorities.305 
Except for the requirement of public hearings and public judgments laid down 
in Dutch law,306 Dutch legislation does not contain an explicit safeguard to en-
sure public scrutiny with regard to investigations into deaths occurring during 
deprivation of liberty by the State, although Article 110 of the Dutch Constitu-
tion cannot be left undiscussed in this regard. This article prescribes that the State, 
when performing its duties, has to observe the principle of publicity (openbaar-
heid) pursuant to provisions laid down in law. These provisions are laid down in 
the Freedom of Information Act. This Act distinguishes the situation where in-
formation is published on request (passive publication) (Articles 3-7) or on the 
State’s own motion (proactive publication) (Articles 8-9).307 Proactive publication 
only relates to policy. As to passive publication, the Freedom of Information Act 
determines in Article 3 that requests for information about administrative mat-
ters should be granted in compliance with Article 10 and Article 11. Article 10 §1 
302. Inspectorate Security and Justice and Health Care Inspectorate 2013 (Vught). Other European 
countries do provide this information; the British Prison & Probation Ombudsman publishes 
reports on fatal incidents in prison on its website. www.ppo.gov.uk. Last accessed: 5 March 2017. 
303. Aanhangsel Handelingen II 2015/16, 1907.
304.  http://www.igz.nl/onderwerpen/handhaving_en_toezicht/openbaarmaking/. Last 
accessed: 5 March 2017. Kamerstukken II 2004/05, 29 800 XVI, no. 135. See also: Van der 
Jagt-Jobsen and Nijveld 2013, pp. 214-225.
305. ECtHR 14 March 2002, no. 46477/99, §§82-83, 87 (Paul and Audrey Edwards v. UK).
306. Art. 121 Dutch Constitution. Art. 269, art. 362, art. 415 Code of Criminal Procedure. Art. 
70 and art. 74 Individual Health Care Professions Act.
307. Though a bill has been introduced that will replace the current Freedom of Information Act. 
Kamerstukken I 2015/16, 33 328, A. See also: Kremers and Masthoff 2014.
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determines that information will not be provided if this d) involves personal data 
as mentioned in chapter 2 §2 of the Personal Data Protection Act (e.g. medical 
data), unless privacy will apparently not be breached by providing the data. No 
appraisal of interests is required under this provision. Medical data of a deceased 
person is not regarded as personal data pursuant to the Personal Data Protection 
Act,308 and can therefore not be the ground to refuse information. According to 
Article 10 §2 Freedom of Information Act, no information should be provided if 
the interest of publicity is outweighed by one (or more) of the interests enumer-
ated in that provision, including the interest of: d) inspection and supervision by 
State authorities (bestuursorganen), e) to respect the privacy of a person, or g) to 
prevent a disproportionate disadvantage for the persons involved in the matter. 
The Freedom of Information Act also applies to the Health Care Inspectorate. 
Several family members who could not get access to the calamity report about 
the death of their relative presented their case to the court and requested a copy 
of the report pursuant to the Freedom of Information Act.309 The judge ruled in 
several of these cases that the interest of publicity outweighs the interests men-
tioned in Article 10 §2 Freedom of Information Act.310 In 2011, the Administrative 
Jurisdiction Division of the Council of State ruled (regarding disclosure of a re-
port on suicide) that the interest of inspection and supervision outweighs the 
interest of publicity.311 In March 2016, a request to publish the calamity reports 
regarding (among others) suicides in penal institutions was rejected by referring 
to the interest of supervision that may be compromised if these reports were to 
be published. The Minister referred to the risk that calamities would no longer 
be reported, or not all relevant information would be provided.312 This is in my 
view a striking, not tenable stand as Dutch law clearly contains an obligation (not 
a choice) to report a calamity, while not fulfilling this obligation is punishable 
308. Kamerstukken II 1997/98, 25 892, no. 3, pp. 47, 50.
309. See for example Administrative Jurisdiction Division of the Council of State 27 April 2011, 
GJ 2011/86. See also: De Roode 2012, footnote 9. These cases did not relate to deprivation of 
liberty by the police or in penal institutions.
310. District Court Dordrecht 4 December 2007, ECLI:NL:RBDOR:2007:BB9778: 
involved health care facility objected to the fact that the Minister had decided to publish 
an anonymised report regarding a suicide. District Court ‘s-Hertogenbosch 26 July 2010, 
ECLI:NL:RBSHE:2010:BN3026. The ground to refuse to publish information pursuant to Article 
10 §1, section d Freedom of Information Act is not applicable on data relating to deceased persons. 
Kamerstukken I 2013/14, 32 402, F, p. 64.
311. Administrative Jurisdiction Division of the Council of State 27 April 2011, 
ECLI:NL:RVS:2011:BQ2643, GJ 2011/86.
312. Letter Ministry Security and Justice 4 March 2016, 728177.
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with a fine and constitutes a criminal offence.313 Besides, by anonymising the ca-
lamity reports (both with regard to the patient, as well as the involved health care 
professionals), there is no interference with the private life of the involved patient, 
whereas the professional conduct cannot be traced back to an individual health 
care professional. 
Contradictory views on this matter have been uttered by the Dutch legisla-
tor. The legislator found it undesirable that reports about calamities involving the 
death of a patient could be made public pursuant to the Freedom of Informa-
tion Act.314 Therefore, an explicit duty of confidentiality for the inspectors of the 
Health Care Inspectorate with regard to information provided while reporting a 
calamity has been introduced in the Healthcare Quality, Complaints and Disputes 
Act.315 In view of the legislator, the introduction of this explicit duty of confi-
dentiality will oblige the Inspectorate to decline requests for information falling 
under this duty. The legislator stated that this would imply that the judge would 
no longer get to perform an examination of the Freedom of Information Act.316 
This reasoning has been criticised by de Roode, who stressed that Article 10 §2 
Freedom of Information Act requires that the diverging interests are weighed; it 
does not require an assessment of whether the information falls under the duty of 
confidentiality.317 Considering the risk that not all calamities would be reported 
to the Inspectorate in fear of publication, it has been recommended to introduce 
an explicit legal provision holding that calamities that must be reported to the 
Health Care Inspectorate are not public.318 This is for example explicitly regulated 
for incidents that must be reported internally.319 Noteworthy is that the legislator 
also introduced a bill that brings along automatic publication of information re-
lating to the supervision of, among others, the Health Care Inspectorate.320 The 
legislator has stated that this includes reports relating to calamities, without per-
sonal data.321 The direction in which the legislator is heading is therefore unclear.
313. Art. 30 Healthcare Quality, Complaints and Disputes Act.
314. Kamerstukken I 2013/14, 32 402, F, pp. 64-65.
315. Art. 25 §3 Healthcare Quality, Complaints and Disputes Act. See also: Kastelein 2015. The 
legislator stresses that this is an independent obligation and not an obligation derived from the 
duty of confidentiality of the health care provider who collected the information. Kamerstukken I 
2013/14, 32 402, F, p. 46.
316. Kamerstukken I 2013/14, 32 402, F, p. 65.
317. De Roode 2012, p. 193.
318. As has been introduced in the Aviation Act. ZonMw 2013, pp. 25, 458. De Roode 2012, 
pp. 201-202.
319. Art. 9 §7 Healthcare Quality, Complaints and Disputes Act.
320. Kamerstukken I 2016/17, 34 111, A. See also http://nos.nl/artikel/2107987-schippers-in
spectie-moet-calamiteitenonderzoeken-publiceren.html. Last accessed: 6 March 2017. 
321. Kamerstukken II 2015/16, 31 016, no. 95, p. 4.
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Anonymised reports on euthanasia and assisted suicide are at present published by 
the Regional Euthanasia Review Committees on their website.322 Not all reports 
are however published; only reports that are important for the development of 
standards regarding euthanasia or assisted suicide are made public.323  
 Concluding remarks
The foregoing shows that at present hardly any consideration is given to the re-
quirement of public scrutiny when deaths during deprivation of liberty by the 
State are concerned. The deceased detainee’s privacy is given as argument not to 
publish, while in the Netherlands medical data of deceased persons is not regarded 
as personal data pursuant to the Personal Data Protection Act, and this criterion 
does not emerge in the ECtHR’s case law under Article 2 ECHR. Furthermore, if 
the published information is anonymised, Article 8 ECHR is in my view by defi-
nition not applicable. The Health Care Inspectorate stresses that it will publish its 
reports if the case received significant political or public attention, which is not 
the criterion to be used considering the ECtHR’s case law; the ECtHR stresses 
that if a vulnerable person loses his life in a horrendous manner due to a number 
of failures by public authorities and officials who have the responsibility to protect 
that person’s welfare, the public interest calls for the widest exposure possible.324 
Introduction of the possibility of automatic publication of anonymised reports 
regarding calamities will ensure transparency. It will also provide other care pro-
viders the opportunity to take note of errors made in the care process and to take 
measures to prevent similar errors within the own organisation. 
7.8. Concluding remarks
If a person dies during deprivation of liberty by the Dutch State, an external ex-
amination of the body must be conducted in accordance with the Burial Act to 
determine whether or not the person in question died due to a natural cause. In 
addition to this obligation, two separate investigations may be conducted: an 
investigation by the police (or the National Police Internal Investigations De-
partment) under supervision of a public prosecutor and an inquiry based on the 
Healthcare Quality, Complaints and Disputes Act. The involved State authorities 
322. https://www.euthanasiecommissie.nl/. Last accessed: 5 March 2017. 
323. Regional Euthanasia Review Committees 2015, p. 4.
324. ECtHR 14 March 2002, no. 46477/99, §83 (Paul and Audrey Edwards v. UK).
Death in State Custody DRUK.indd   371 13-Sep-17   2:40:25 PM
372 Chapter 7 
are instructed to notify the police or the National Police Internal Investigations 
Department. However, the Healthcare Quality, Complaints and Disputes Act 
only requires that calamities in the provided care are reported to the Health Care 
Inspectorate, which does not necessarily cover all deaths nor all life-threatening 
incidents that may occur during deprivation of liberty by the State. This loop-
hole illustrates that the requirement to develop a system in which all deaths and 
life-threatening incidents during deprivation of liberty by the State are reported 
and effectively investigated is not fulfilled in the Netherlands. Furthermore, the 
results of the police investigation and the inquiry pursuant to the Healthcare 
Quality, Complaints and Disputes Act are not exchanged and the independence 
of the inquiry committees composed within the Prison System Division is not 
sufficiently ensured. Another problematic factor is that the applicable legal frame-
works (Code of Criminal Procedure and the Healthcare Quality, Complaints and 
Disputes Act) do not ensure that the relatives of a deceased detainee are in all 
cases sufficiently involved in the procedure to safeguard their legitimate interests; 
the Code of Criminal Procedure is not always applicable, whereas the Healthcare 
Quality, Complaints and Disputes Act does not contain an unambiguous right for 
the relatives to be involved in the procedure. Furthermore, the 2009 guideline of 
the Custodial Institutions Agency determines that the governor of the involved in-
stitution should inform the relatives about the death, although it also stresses that 
the relatives should be referred to the public prosecutor if the body has been con-
fiscated. This practice does not fully correspond with the requirements that follow 
from the ECHR; an independent investigative body should inform the relatives 
about the investigation and the results. Furthermore, except for the requirements 
of public hearings and public judgments, Dutch law does not contain a clear legal 
framework that ensures public scrutiny with regard to deaths in custody.   
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Synthesis
8.1. Questions arising after the death of a detainee
The central research question of this study is: What obligations arise from the 
ECHR regarding deaths during deprivation of liberty by the State in a crimi-
nal justice context and does the Dutch legal framework contain the safeguards 
necessary to fulfil these obligations? Human rights obligations with the aim of 
preventing premature death of detainees and to investigate these deaths as well as 
the Dutch legal framework on this matter have been discussed in chapters 4-7. An 
overall analysis of the detailed discussion of these obligations and the Dutch legal 
framework on this matter shows that three main points can be derived, namely: 
1) accountability, 2) the right to self-determination of detainees in relation to end 
of life decisions, and 3) the obligation to provide extra protection to detainees. In 
the following, the central research question will be answered by focussing on these 
three factors. To that end, the obligations arising from the ECHR will be firstly 
discussed and subsequently I will examine whether the Dutch legal framework 
contains the safeguards necessary to fulfil these obligations. 
If a person no longer has the freedom to move (his body), or to come and go as 
he pleases because he is 1) physically restrained, or 2) not able or not free to leave 
a restricted space or area of his own volition on account of State authorities, that 
person is deprived of his liberty. Deprivation of liberty brings along (positive) ob-
ligations for the State in question, as from the outset of the deprivation of liberty. 
These obligations exist to ensure that detainees can exercise their human rights.1 
If a death occurs during deprivation of liberty by the State, an investigation must 
be performed to account for this death. This chapter commences with the theme 
of this book, i.e. the death of a detainee and therefore the obligation to investigate 
and account for these deaths. The reason for this approach (compared with the 
1. Jacobs 2012, p. 315. Hagens 2011, p. 217. Van Kempen 2008, p. 43. Concurring opinion 
of judge Bonello in ECtHR 21 January 1999, no. 26103/95 (Geyseghem v. Belgium).
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approach in the preceding chapters) is that questions will arise, and must arise, if 
a detainee dies; the death of a detainee will, and must, raise the question whether 
sufficient measures have been taken to try to avert this outcome in view of the 
obligations arising from Article 2 and Article 3 ECHR. The obligation to inves-
tigate the death of detainees and the obligation to protect the health and life of 
detainees are also closely connected to each other. The key factors in this regard 
are accountability and the requirement to provide extra protection to detainees. 
The questions that must be examined during the investigation into the death of 
a detainee or a life-threatening incident with regard to a detainee are dictated by 
the preventive measures that ought to be taken by the State to prevent premature 
death of a detainee (section 8.2.). These preventive measures may however conflict 
with the detainee’s right to self-determination, which, in turn, will bring this syn-
thesis back to role of the obligation to account for the death of detainees and the 
obligation to provide extra protection to detainees (section 8.3.). Proposed amend-
ments and final remarks in view of all the findings regarding the Netherlands, as 
expounded in sections 8.2.-8.3., will follow in section 8.4.
8.2. Accountability and extra protection of detainees
If a detainee dies, the ECHR obliges the Member State in question to perform 
an investigation.2 Unlike the principle stated by the ECtHR,3 this obligation 
should in my opinion not depend on the question whether the next of kin raise 
allegations that the obligation to protect the life of the detainee has not been ful-
filled. If such a complaint would be required, it brings along the risk that Member 
States only account for deaths during deprivation of liberty where the relatives 
lodged a complaint. The duty to investigate these deaths arises from the fact that 
a detainee died while the State has the obligation to protect the health and life of 
detainees. The obligation to investigate also applies if a life-threatening situation 
occurs during deprivation of liberty.4 
The duty to investigate presupposes that the Member State has developed and 
implemented an effective system to ensure that deaths occurring during depriva-
tion of liberty by the State can be properly investigated. If such an effective system 
is absent, the right to life will lose its effectiveness and it may diminish the pub-
lic confidence in the State’s adherence to the rule of law. One of the aims of an 
2. ECtHR 10 April 2001, no. 26129/95, §149 (Tanli v. Turkey).
3. ECtHR 14 February 2017, no. 24421/11, §42 (Karakhanyan v. Russia).
4. ECtHR 30 August 2016, no. 61170/09, §§29-30, 38 (Toptaniş v. Turkey).
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investigation is to account for deaths occurring during deprivation of liberty by 
the State.5 The State’s obligation to account for all deaths during deprivation 
of liberty follows from the State’s responsibility to protect the health and life of 
detainees which, in turn, follows from the (particular) vulnerability of detainees 
considering the deprivation of liberty. The obligation to account also follows from 
the fact that the circumstances surrounding a death during deprivation of liberty 
lie, in general, wholly, or to a large extent, within the exclusive knowledge of the 
State. The obligation to investigate and account for these deaths is a means to de-
termine whether the State has fulfilled its obligations to protect the health and 
life of the detainee in question. This must include an explanation for the death 
and must ensure that those at fault are held accountable.6 Compared to deaths 
of persons in free society, extra stringent scrutiny is therefore required with regard 
to the investigation into deaths of detainees.7 
The ECtHR has not developed a list of investigative measures that ought to 
be taken during the investigation but has set minimum standards for an effective 
investigation, namely an independent and impartial investigation on the initiative 
of the State, that fulfils the requirement of promptness and expedition, involves 
the next of kin of the deceased detainee to safeguard their legitimate interests and 
ensures sufficient public scrutiny. The steps to be taken under Article 2 ECHR af-
ter a detainee has died can be divided into three phases that will overlap. 
 – Firstly, the phase of performing an effective investigation to gather and estab-
lish the facts, including the cause and manner of death and the circumstances 
surrounding and preceding the death. An important instrument to determine 
the cause and manner of death is an autopsy.8 
 – Secondly, evaluating the collected information and determining whether suf-
ficient measures have been taken to try to avert the death. If necessitated by 
the circumstances, it must be determined if, and if so, what, measures have to 
be taken to prevent similar errors in the future or to impose any criminal or 
disciplinary measures.
 – Thirdly, the investigation and its results must be sufficiently transparent to ac-
count for a death during deprivation of liberty by the State. The requirement 
of transparency requires in any event that the next of kin are involved in the 
procedure in such a manner that ‘their legitimate interests are safeguarded’. 
5. ECtHR 27 June 2000, no. 21986/93, §99 (Salman v. Turkey).
6. ECtHR 14 December 2006, no. 4353/03, §74 (Tarariyeva v. Russia).
7. ECtHR 30 March 2016, no. 5878/08, §234, GC (Armani Da Silva v. UK).
8. ECtHR 27 January 2011, no. 10907/04, §65 (Iordanovi v. Bulgaria).
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The last criterion is somewhat vague. Specific requirements with regard to the in-
formation that must be given to the next of kin are not provided. Principles that 
can be deduced from the ECtHR’s case law are that the next of kin must be in-
formed in a timely fashion about the progress of the investigation,9 important 
investigative steps that will be taken, like an autopsy,10 and the motivated deci-
sion to close or halt the investigation.11 Whether the next of kin is sufficiently 
involved depends in my view also on the system developed in the Member State 
in question, which can be illustrated by the differences between the inquest held 
in private in the Edwards case, which was criticised by the ECtHR,12 and the 
manner in which the next of kin had been informed in the Ramsahai case, namely 
after the investigation of the National Police Internal Investigations Department 
closed the investigation and the public prosecutor decided not to prosecute, which 
was not criticised.13 With regard to the accountability towards the general pub-
lic, the ECtHR’s case law does not contain specific guidelines on how to realise 
accountability towards the public. Involving the next of kin may suffice to en-
sure public scrutiny. However, if a detainee dies in a horrendous manner due to a 
number of failures by State officials, the widest exposure possible should be given 
to the investigation and its results.14 To ensure that the next of kin and the public 
are fully informed, without making a selection of (and thus withholding) relevant 
information, this task should in my view lie with the independent authority that 
must perform the investigation.
The cause and manner of death play a decisive role with regard to the direction 
of the investigation. Important in this regard is whether the risk for the detainee’s 
life was foreseeable and, if so, whether sufficient preventive measures have been 
taken to try to avert that risk. If a detainee dies due to force by State officials, it 
must be determined whether the force used was absolutely necessary in view of 
one or more of the grounds enumerated in Article 2 ECHR. If a detainee dies 
due to violence by another detainee, it must be determined whether sufficient 
measures have been taken to avoid foreseeable risks, such as the allocation of de-
tainees, and whether State officials sufficiently responded to the incident. In case 
of a death due to natural causes, it must be determined whether the health risk 
in question was foreseeable and, if so, whether the State authorities provided the 
9. ECtHR 18 December 2008, no. 29971/04, §122 (Kats and others v. Ukraine).
10. ECtHR 15 February 2011, no. 35403/06, §81 (Tsintsabadze v. Georgia).
11. ECtHR 18 December 2008, no. 29971/04, §122 (Kats and others v. Ukraine).
12. ECtHR 14 March 2002, no. 46477/99, §§82-84, 87 (Paul and Audrey Edwards v. UK).
13. ECtHR 15 May 2007, no. 52391/99, §§298-299, 309, 347-350, GC (Ramsahai and others 
v. The Netherlands). 
14. ECtHR 14 March 2002, no. 46477/99, §83 (Paul and Audrey Edwards v. UK).
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detainee with the necessary healthcare. Important aspects in this regard are ac-
cess, quality and continuity of healthcare, transfer of necessary information and 
medication safety. If a detainee dies due to suicide, it must be examined whether 
the suicide risk was foreseeable and, if so, whether sufficient measures have been 
taken to try to avert this risk, such as offering psychological/psychiatric treatment 
if necessary considering the detainee’s condition.
Dutch law does not contain an unambiguous and clear obligation to perform 
an effective investigation into all deaths and life-threatening situations occurring 
during deprivation of liberty by the State with the aim to account for these deaths, 
nor does it contain an integral system to investigate all deaths of detainees. The 
legal systems developed to investigate deaths in free society are also applied dur-
ing deprivation of liberty by the State, although some additional instructions have 
been developed.15 Two different systems exist in the Netherlands to investigate 
deaths during deprivation of liberty by the State, namely a police investigation (or 
an investigation by the National Police Internal Investigations Department) un-
der supervision of a public prosecutor and an inquiry pursuant to the Healthcare 
Quality, Complaints and Disputes Act (formerly the Care Institutions (Quality) 
Act). 
With regard to the minimum standards for the investigation’s effectiveness, 
notable points are the insufficient safeguards in Dutch law to ensure the inde-
pendence of the inquiry committees composed within the Prison System Division 
(and in institutions where hospital orders with compulsory treatment can be 
imposed), to ensure involvement of an independent forensic physician in the ex-
ternal examination of the body in the case of a death during police custody, and to 
ensure involvement of the next of kin during a police investigation and an inquiry 
pursuant to the Healthcare Quality, Complaints and Disputes Act. The practice 
that the prison governor, the authority responsible for the care of the detainee, 
informs the next of kin is in my view not in line with the required independence 
of the investigation, which implies that the independent investigative authority 
informs the next of kin about the progress and results of the investigation to en-
sure that they are objectively and fully informed, without the risk that relevant 
information is not provided. 
15. Such as involving an independent forensic physician to perform the external examination in 
case of a death in a judicial institution and the instruction that all deaths must be reported to the 
Inspectorate of Security of Justice and the Health Care Inspectorate.
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Public scrutiny is ensured in Dutch criminal and disciplinary law by the re-
quirement of public hearings and a public judgment.16 However, the ECtHR does 
not follow a procedural approach on this matter, but a material approach, i.e. not 
the question whether a criminal or disciplinary investigation has been instituted, 
but the facts of the case are decisive when determining how much exposure must 
be given to a case.17 No explicit guarantee exists in the Netherlands to ensure, if 
required by the circumstances, public scrutiny with regard to deaths during State 
custody and to ensure that the decision to publish relevant information about 
these deaths lies with an independent party not connected to the State party 
involved or to the party with final responsibility for the health and life of the 
detainee in question. The aforementioned factors do not fulfil the requirements 
arising from the ECHR.
Another noteworthy factor is that a police investigation aims to determine 
whether or not a criminal offence has been committed, which is not necessar-
ily the same as accounting for a death.18 Only excluding a criminal offence also 
means that the investigation has a relatively small scope. One may raise the ques-
tion whether a police investigation (including that of the National Police Internal 
Investigations Department) will cover all questions that need to be answered 
to sufficiently account for the detainee’s death, for example whether sufficient 
precautions have been taken in relation to the care for the detainee to prevent 
that lethal force by State officials had to be used (were the officials for example 
sufficiently equipped to prevent escalation of the situation) or whether the sit-
uation has been carefully dealt with if a detainee dies after refusal of treatment 
or food and/or liquids. The National guideline issued by the Custodial Institu-
tions Agency prescribes that the local police should be notified. This guideline is 
not applicable to non-judicial institutions where hospital orders with compulsory 
treatment can be enforced. The Dutch legal framework does therefore not con-
tain a safeguard that a police investigation is always performed when a person dies 
while deprived of his liberty within the criminal law context; the only legal possi-
bility to fulfil the duty to account for these deaths is through the inquiry pursuant 
to the Healthcare Quality, Complaints and Disputes Act. Several objections can 
however be raised regarding this inquiry. An inquiry pursuant to the Healthcare 
16. Art. 121 Dutch Constitution. Art. 269, art. 362, art. 415 Code of Criminal Procedure. Art. 70 
and art. 74 Individual Health Care Professions Act.
17. I.e. that if a detainee dies in a horrendous manner due to a number of failures by State officials, 
the widest exposure possible should be given to the investigation and its results. ECtHR 14 March 
2002, no. 46477/99, §83 (Paul and Audrey Edwards v. UK).
18. See also: commentary from De Jonge, District Court Zwolle 12 March 2009, 
ECLI:NL:RBZLY:2009:BH5678, NJCM-bulletin (34) 2009, no. 7, pp. 747-757.
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Quality, Complaints and Disputes Act could be an instrument to answer the 
questions that must be raised pursuant to Article 2 ECHR, though at present 
there does not exist a safeguard that the necessary questions are actually raised to 
sufficiently examine whether the State fulfilled the duty to protect the health and 
life of detainees. Two separate investigations also means fragmentation of infor-
mation as the investigations are performed by diverging parties and the results of 
both investigations are not exchanged. 
Another complicating factor is that the police (and the National Police In-
ternal Investigations Department) acts within the framework of the Code of 
Criminal Procedure. The Code of Criminal Procedure requires a relatively high 
standard to justify the use of specific investigative measures (suspicion of a crim-
inal offence). An obligatory (and first) step if a person dies during deprivation 
of liberty by the Dutch State is an external examination of the body to estab-
lish that the person in question is dead and to determine whether the person in 
question died due to natural causes or otherwise. One of the aims of this proce-
dure is to filter non-natural deaths and cases where a criminal offence may have 
been committed. This aim does in my opinion not fulfil the requirements under 
the ECHR, namely to account for a death during deprivation of liberty by the 
State, which requires more than merely excluding a criminal offence. A criminal 
law procedure is also an ultimum remedium and therefore not always the most 
appropriate system to be used to examine deaths in custody. Noteworthy is that 
Article 73, section a of the Burial Act determines that a public prosecutor may 
order a legal autopsy in view of a criminal investigation. Such a restrictive crite-
rion to ordering a legal autopsy brings along that in not all of these cases is an 
autopsy performed because no suspicion of a criminal offence exists. Consider-
ing that medical studies demonstrate the importance of performing an autopsy 
to determine the precise cause and manner of death,19 combined with the case 
law of the ECtHR that stresses the importance of performing an autopsy,20 an 
autopsy is in my view indispensable to sufficiently account for the death of a de-
tainee. Another argument to perform an autopsy in all deaths during deprivation 
of liberty by the State is to prevent that questions arise afterwards as no autopsy 
was performed during the initial investigation. Performing an autopsy at a later 
stage brings along the risk that questions remain unanswered due to the deteri-
oration of body tissues. Furthermore, the police (including the National Police 
Internal Investigations Department) nor the Public Prosecution Service has in my 
view sufficient expertise to evaluate the provided healthcare, whereas the study 
19. Kubat et al 2012.
20. ECtHR 14 December 2010, no. 74832/01, §93 (Mižigárová v. Slovakia).
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of Thoonen and Duijst shows that in some cases medical data was not provided 
by the involved physician to the National Police Internal Investigations Depart-
ment by referring to the duty of medical confidentiality. This means that a death 
cannot be effectively investigated due to a lack of information, whereas the inves-
tigative party should not depend on the authority responsible for the care of the 
detainee in question to receive information but should have the means to obtain 
all necessary information. Considering the definition of a calamity laid down in 
the Healthcare Quality, Complaints and Disputes Act, the inquiry pursuant to 
this Act is not by definition required if a death occurs during deprivation of lib-
erty. With regard to judicial institutions, this objection is overcome as the Prison 
System Division expects all deaths in custody to be examined with the aim to 
determine whether or not a calamity has occurred. Nevertheless, discussions may 
arise regarding the necessity to perform an inquiry into the death of a detainee 
due to natural causes. Furthermore, this objection is not overcome with regard to 
deaths during deprivation of liberty by the police. These deaths are, in general, 
not examined pursuant to the Healthcare Quality, Complaints and Disputes Act 
but only by the National Police Internal Investigations Department.
To conclude, the ECHR requires an investigation into deaths in custody to 
account for these deaths and to determine whether the State fulfilled its obliga-
tion to protect the health and life of detainees. The approach in the Netherlands 
is that the investigations aim to determine whether or not a criminal offence has 
been committed or a calamity in the provided care has occurred. A first conclu-
sion is that Dutch law does not contain an (overall) system which ensures that an 
effective investigation is performed into all deaths and life-threatening situations 
occurring during deprivation of liberty, whereas such an investigation is capable of 
1) providing in all of these deaths a plausible explanation with regard to the cause 
of death through an autopsy, and 2) determining whether the State fulfilled its 
obligation to protect the health and life of the detainee in question. In my view, 
nor the police investigation, nor the inquiry pursuant to the Healthcare Quality, 
Complaints and Disputes Act, nor the combination of these investigations fulfils 
the requirements regarding the investigation pursuant to the ECHR, namely to 
account for the death of a detainee, i.e. to establish the facts (including the cause 
and manner of death and the circumstances surrounding and preceding death) 
to evaluate the collected information and determine whether sufficient measures 
have been taken to try to avert the death. In my opinion, the applied approach 
in the Netherlands does not sufficiently meet the requirements arising from the 
ECHR.
With respect to the obligations to prevent premature death in custody, the find-
ings show that the Dutch legal framework contains to a large extent the safeguards 
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necessary to fulfil the obligations under the ECHR to prevent premature death of 
detainees by providing the necessary (health)care and taking protective measures. 
There are nevertheless points of improvements. The right of patients (like med-
ical confidentiality, the right to have medical records destroyed etcetera) are laid 
down in the Medical Treatment Contracts Act, which is, in view of the legislator, 
applicable during deprivation of liberty by the State as far as the legal relationship 
permits. Deviations from this Act should have a basis in law, which is at present 
not sufficiently ensured due to the applicability of this Act pursuant to Article 
464. This brings along the risk of arbitrariness and ‘cherry-picking’. Other points 
of improvement are clear legislation that ensures exchance of medical data within 
judicial institutions and between diverging establishments/authorities (such as po-
lice custody suites, public prosecution office and courts) if necessary in case of 
risks for others or in case of a suicide risk, and clear legislation or policy to eval-
uate incidents and calamities regarding healthcare provided to persons deprived 
of their liberty by the police. A medical screening on admission is furthermore 
not regulated in Dutch law. It is however expected by the Custodial Institutions 
Agency and it is, in general, performed in practice. Problematic is however that no 
legal standards have been developed on how to deal with a detainee who refuses 
such a screening, which brings along that the screening should be addressed in 
law. It is also noteworthy that the grounds for notifying a forensic physician with 
regard to the condition of a police custody detainee are unilaterally laid down in 
regulations; these grounds should preferably be developed in cooperation with the 
involved physicians. Dutch law contains a safeguard that representatives (curator 
or mentor) of incompetent detained patients are involved in decisions regarding 
the treatment plan. A point of interest is how to deal with incompetent detainees 
who do not have a curator or mentor. As the Medical Treatment Contracts Act is 
in force when providing healthcare to detainees, the person authorised in writing 
by the detained patient, life partner, or a parent, child or brother or sister should 
be involved as representative (Article 465).
8.3. Extra protection of detainees and the right to 
self-determination of detainees with regard to end of life 
decisions
The obligation to take preventive measures aimed at protecting the health and 
life of detainees may conflict with the detainee’s right to self-determination. The 
ECtHR’s approach towards end of life decisions of detainees and the detainee’s 
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right to self-determination compared to the approach on these matters in free so-
ciety is another notable point. Important in this regard is the basic idea behind 
positive obligations in this context; the State’s positive obligation to provide the 
necessary healthcare exists to compensate or repair the rights of detainees that are 
jeopardised by the deprivation of liberty. The detainee’s right to receive the neces-
sary healthcare should not be altered into an obligation of Member States to apply 
healthcare against the detainee’s wishes.21  
The case law of the ECtHR shows that if a competent detainee starts and persists 
in a hunger and/or thirst strike, the State authorities do not have an obligation 
to intervene under Article 2 ECHR, provided that the detainee is fully informed 
about the consequences, freely decided to start and persist in the refusal of food 
and/or liquids. The necessary (nursing) care must however be offered to relieve the 
suffering.22 Member States have a margin of appreciation to determine whether 
a detainee will be force-fed, provided that three requirements for force-feeding 
have been met, namely: 1) medical necessity to intervene, 2) there must exist pro-
cedural safeguards to make the decision and these must have been complied with, 
and 3) the manner in which force-feeding is performed does not breach the mini-
mum level of severity required to fall within the ambit of Article 3 ECHR.23 This 
means that if the State intervenes, this intervention is restricted by the (absolute) 
prohibition laid down in Article 3 ECHR; intervention must not lead to torture, 
or an inhuman or degrading treatment. 
The line of reasoning with regard to hunger and/or thirst strikes of detainees 
(no obligation to intervene if the detainee is fully informed about the conse-
quences, freely decided to start and persist in the refusal) can also be applied to 
competent detainees who stop ingesting food and/or liquids to hasten the end of 
their own life and detainees who refuse medical treatment or examinations (in-
cluding CPR and a medical screening on admission) that (may) lead to the death 
of a detainee. The ECtHR’s case law shows that intervention is in these cases nev-
ertheless obligated if the detainee’s refusal will endanger the health of others, for 
example in case of a contagious disease or considering the detainee’s dangerous-
ness for other detainees or the personnel involved.24 
The dilemma that arises in case of euthanasia and (assisted) suicide differs from 
the aforementioned end of life decisions as it involves an active termination of life. 
21. Jacobs 2012, p. 315.
22. ECtHR 26 March 2013, no. 73175/10, §51 (Rappaz v. Switzerland). ECtHR 31 March 
2009, no. 1639/03, §§28-30 (Horoz v. Turkey).
23. ECtHR 5 April 2005, no. 54825/00, §94 (Nevmerzhitsky v. Ukraine).
24. ECtHR 5 April 2011, no. 2974/05, §79 (Vasyukov v. Russia).
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The positive obligation of the State to protect the health and life of detainees does 
in my view not by definition bring along that requests for euthanasia or assisted 
suicide by detainees are rejected, provided that the vulnerable position of detain-
ees is taken into account. However, such a case has up till now not been lodged 
with the ECtHR. The question whether the person in question is capable of freely 
reaching a decision on euthanasia or assisted suicide with full understanding of 
the consequences requires extra carefulness when such a request is considered 
during deprivation of liberty by the State, as the deprivation of liberty may have 
an influence on this request. In any event, Member States do not have an obliga-
tion to facilitate euthanasia or assisted suicide (of detainees). On the contrary, the 
ECtHR’s case law shows that Member States must act if they know, or ought to 
know, of a suicide risk with regard to an individual detainee.25 
Remarkably, the right to self-determination of detainees pursuant to Article 8 
ECHR is (in general) not taken into account by the ECtHR when end of life 
decisions of detainees are concerned. The most notable example in this regard is 
the examination of force-feeding. Force-feeding is, in general, not examined un-
der Article 8 ECHR, but only under Article 2 and/or Article 3 ECHR. The three 
factors that must be examined in these cases under Article 3 ECHR26 correspond 
with the requirements to justify an interference with the rights laid down in Arti-
cle 8 ECHR, namely: 1) in accordance with the law, 2) necessity, 3) in the interest 
of the protection of health. However, as stressed before, the State’s obligation 
to provide the necessary healthcare exists to compensate or repair human rights 
which are jeopardised by the deprivation of liberty.27 Following this approach 
would mean that the medical necessity to intervene cannot overrule the detain-
ee’s right to self-determination if the detainee is capable to decide for himself, is 
fully informed and freely decided on the matter. This shows in my view that the 
theory of implied limitations is still not completely abandoned from the ECtHR’s 
case law. 
Noteworthy in this regard is the distinction between the right to 
self-determination and the right to physical integrity, although these concepts 
25. ECtHR 3 April 2001, no. 27229/95, §§90-93 (Keenan v. UK).
26. Namely, the medical necessity to intervene, procedural safeguards to make the decision must 
exist and must be complied with, and the manner in which the forced treatment is applied must 
not exceed the minimum level of severity required to fall within the ambit of Article 3 ECHR. 
ECtHR 5 April 2005, no. 54825/00, §§100-106 (Nevmerzhitsky v. Ukraine). See also: ECtHR 11 
July 2006, no. 54810/00, §§69-72, GC (Jalloh v. Germany).
27. Jacobs 2012, p. 315. See also: Hagens 2011, p. 217. Van Kempen 2008, p. 43. Concurring 
opinion of judge Bonello ECtHR 21 January 1999, no. 26103/95 (Geyseghem v. Belgium).
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are closely connected when end of life decisions are concerned.28 The assessment 
under Article 3 ECHR only relates to the physical integrity of the detainee and 
not the question whether the detainee has the right to start and persist in a hun-
ger and/or thirst strike. The question whether it is the detainee’s ultimate form 
of self-determination to commit suicide is furthermore not yet (explicitly) ad-
dressed in the ECtHR’s case law. The ECtHR only states that there are general 
measures and precautions which will be available to diminish the opportunities 
for self-harm, without infringing on personal autonomy. It will depend on the 
circumstances of the case whether more stringent measures are necessary and 
whether it is reasonable to apply them.29 This view, that starts with intervention, 
does not fully correspond with the view of  the ECtHR in Haas versus Switzer-
land, a case relating to the outside world, where it has been stressed in general 
terms that the right to private life encompasses the right to decide by what means, 
and at what point, a person’s own life will end. 
Next to the aforementioned principle, the ECtHR also underlines the obliga-
tion of State authorities to prevent an individual from taking his own life if that 
decision has not been taken freely and with full understanding of the consequenc-
es.30 Even though the ECtHR does not explicitly recognise the right to commit 
suicide in Haas versus Switzerland, this right does eventually follow from Article 8 
ECHR considering the right to self-determination. In Haas versus Switzerland, the 
ECtHR does not make a distinction between end of life decisions, such as suicide, 
refusal of treatment or nourishment or euthanasia/assisted suicide. This distinction 
is made with regard to end of life decisions of detainees, which is illustrated by the 
approach regarding suicide31 and hunger and/or thirst strikes.32 A difference in the 
approach regarding the right to self-determination applied in free society and during 
deprivation of liberty is therefore seen. The ECtHR’s case law does not provide an 
explanation as to why these diverging approaches are applied.33 
As observed under the ECHR, the right to self-determination is not explicitly con-
sidered in the Netherlands in relation to suicide among detainees, though this right 
is taken into account in relation to suicides in free society, provided that the person 
28. ECtHR 22 July 2003, no. 24209/94, §§32-33 (Y.F. v. Turkey).
29. ECtHR 3 April 2001, no. 27229/95, §92 (Keenan v. UK).
30. ECtHR 20 January 2011, no. 31322/07, §51 (Haas v. Switzerland).
31. Namely that Article 2 ECHR obliges State authorities to respond in case of a suicide risk 
regarding an identified detainee.
32. Namely that intervention under Article 2 ECHR is not required, provided that the detainee 
is competent to decide for himself, is fully informed about the consequences, freely decided to start 
and persists in his decision.
33. See also: Jacobs 2012, pp. 198-199.
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in question is capable to decide for himself.34 The aim is to prevent suicide among 
detainees as much as possible, which can be illustrated by the pilot instructions on 
advance directives not to apply resuscitation (DNR), which determine that resus-
citation must be applied if it appears that a detainee with a DNR tried to commit 
suicide. The fact that such extra instructions are made, whereas the principle of 
equivalence of care would mean that advance directives containing a refusal to be 
resuscitated should in general be respected,35 also illustrates that the principle of 
equivalence of care is not fully observed and a different, more restrictive approach 
is followed during deprivation of liberty than in free society. Also noteworthy is 
that in the Netherlands the same, more open, movement as in the case law of the 
ECtHR is seen with regard to end of life decisions in free society;36 following 
the legislation on euthanasia and assisted suicide in case of unbearable physical 
or mental suffering, discussions on expanding the possibility of assisted suicide in 
case of completed life are held in the Netherlands.37 If the bill on assisted suicide 
in case of completed life is passed, it is hardly likely that detainees would be given 
the possibility of assisted suicide if they feel that their life is completed considering 
the approach laid down in the pilot instructions on DNR’s. However, no specific 
policy has been developed in the Netherlands to deal with requests for euthanasia 
or assisted suicide by detainees although there are several complicating factors re-
garding such requests during deprivation of liberty by the State. 
The fact that no policy has been developed raises the question whether eutha-
nasia or assisted suicide is tolerated during deprivation of liberty by the Dutch 
State and how the detainee’s right to self-determination in this regard is observed. 
If euthanasia is not tolerated during deprivation of liberty, a different approach 
is observed during deprivation of liberty and in free society. If it is tolerated, the 
question arises as to how the complicating factors are addressed to provide suffi-
cient protection to vulnerable persons. Noteworthy is that euthanasia and assisted 
suicide are forms of active termination of a person’s life. Both concepts are severe 
criminal offences in the Netherlands, although it is not punishable if performed 
by a physician according to the requirements laid down in the Termination of Life 
34. As illustrated by valid advance directives that, in principle, ought to be respected in case 
of suicide attempts. Art. 450 §3 Medical Treatment Contracts Act. Kamerstukken II 1999/00, 26 
885, no. 1, p. 9.
35. Art. 450 §3 Medical Treatment Contracts Act. Kamerstukken II 1999/00, 26 885, no. 1, 
p. 9.
36. Compare ECtHR 29 April 2002, no. 2346/02, §§39-40 (Pretty v. UK) and ECtHR 20 
January 2011, no. 31322/07, §§51, 54 (Haas v. Switzerland).
37. Advisory committee completed life 2016. See also the bill on assisting end of life of elderly 
on request (Wetsvoorstel toetsing levenseindebegeleiding van ouderen op verzoek).
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on Request and Assisted Suicide.38 One the one hand, the ECHR does not by 
definition rule out that euthanasia or assisted suicide is performed on detainees. 
On the other, the ECHR does not contain an obligation for States to facilitate 
euthanasia or assisted suicide. The fact that euthanasia and assisted suicide require 
cooperation by the State authorities should not be considered lightly as it could 
be associated with the death penalty. These requests require therefore a clear and 
careful examination. The fact that these end of life decisions are criminal offences 
makes a request for euthanasia or assisted suicide extra complicated compared 
to other end of life decisions of detainees, such as a refusal of treatment which 
leads to the premature, though natural death of a detainee. As the Dutch State 
must protect vulnerable persons (such as detainees),39 a policy on euthanasia and 
assisted suicide during deprivation of liberty must in my view be developed to 
sufficiently observe the obligations arising from Article 2 ECHR and to ensure 
foreseeability regarding these aspects of the right to self-determination. If this 
policy would make it possible to perform euthanasia or assisted suicide during 
deprivation of liberty, it should in any event contain an obligation to report the 
intention to the Public Prosecution Service before the request is fulfilled as eu-
thanasia and assisted suicide are criminal offences. In my view, the absence of a 
policy on euthanasia and assisted suicide in case of deprivation of liberty by the 
State brings along that the Dutch State does not sufficiently meet the requirement 
under Article 2 ECHR to protect vulnerable persons.
The foregoing shows that the approach in the Netherlands with regard to end of 
life decisions of detainees corresponds with the ECtHR’s approach on these mat-
ters; both systems follow a more restrictive approach with regard to the detainee’s 
right to self-determination compared to the approach on these matters in free so-
ciety. From this arises the question what the basis is for the more restrictive view 
on the detainee’s right to self-determination? Several arguments have been put for-
ward in this regard. Firstly, the detainee’s vulnerability. Secondly, considerations 
of security and the interest of preserving order within the institution. Thirdly, the 
reason why a person is deprived of his liberty in a criminal law context, namely 
to stand trial and to gather evidence from the suspect, or to serve a prison sen-
tence.40 In the following, it will be discussed whether these arguments will hold 
to justify the diverging approaches of the ECtHR and the Netherlands with re-
gard to end of life decisions of detainees.
38. Art. 293 and art. 294 Criminal Code.
39. ECtHR 20 January 2011, no. 31322/07, §54 (Haas v. Switzerland).
40. Jacobs 2012, pp. 135-145.
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Article 2 ECHR obliges Member States to protect vulnerable people. Persons 
must be protected from taking hasty decisions that endanger their life. Individ-
uals must be prevented from taking their own life if the decision has not been 
taken freely and with full understanding of the consequences.41 The ECtHR’s 
case law shows that State authorities must respond in case of a known suicide risk 
regarding an identified detainee.42 The fact that detainees find themselves in a 
vulnerable position (and must be protected from taking hasty decisions) because 
the State deprives the person in question of his liberty and places the detainee in 
a (for most persons) unwanted situation can justify the approach of the ECtHR. 
Extra protection must be given to detainees considering their vulnerable position, 
i.e. the deprivation of liberty, but also in view of any mental or physical illnesses. 
The argument that extra protection must be provided to detainees due to their 
vulnerable position is however not tenable with regard to end of life decisions if 
the detainee is competent to decide for himself, is fully informed about the con-
sequences, freely decided and persists in his decision. If the end of life decision 
is not influenced by the deprivation of liberty, but is made freely and with full 
understanding of the consequences, the extra vulnerability of detainees cannot 
justify the more restrictive approach. 
What is the justification to intervene against the detainee’s wishes if the detainee is 
competent to decide for himself, is fully informed about the consequences, freely 
decided and persists in his decision? The ECtHR has stressed that the context of 
deprivation of liberty inevitably influences the manner and extent to which de-
tainees may enjoy the rights laid down in the ECHR.43 In my view, this aspect 
can only relate to considerations of security and of preserving order that require 
more stringent measures than in free society.44 Why considerations of security 
and preserving order require intervention of the State with regard to end of life 
decisions of detainees, whereas such intervention is not applied for that reason in 
the outside world, is in my view not clear. In my opinion, these aspects cannot 
justify the different approaches. 
41. ECtHR 20 January 2011, no. 31322/07, §54 (Haas v. Switzerland).
42. ECtHR 3 April 2001, no. 27229/95, §93 (Keenan v. UK).
43. ECtHR 4 January 2008, no. 23800/06 (Shelley v. UK). The Court referred to the principle 
of minimum restrictions as laid down in the European Prison Rules (EPR): “Restrictions placed 
on persons deprived of their liberty shall be the minimum necessary and proportionate to the 
legitimate objective for which they are imposed.” ECtHR 24 July 2012, no. 35972/05, §124 (Iacov 
Stanciu v. Romania). Appendix to recommendation Rec(2006)2 of the Committee of Ministers to 
Member States on the European Prison Rules, nos. 1-3.
44. See also: Jacobs 2012, p. 313.
Death in State Custody DRUK.indd   387 13-Sep-17   2:40:27 PM
388 Chapter 8 
Another argument that has been put forward is that detainees should be kept alive 
until a final verdict has been reached to ensure that justice can be done and to 
prevent public unrest (based on the interest of preventing disorder or crime). In 
this view, the suspect is an important agent in the process of gathering evidence 
and arriving at the truth.45 Noteworthy is that Article 1 ECHR states that the 
rights laid down in the Convention must be ensured to everyone and restrictions 
on these rights must be justified in accordance with the exception provisions laid 
down in the ECHR. Article 8 ECHR requires that interferences with the right 
to respect the person’s right to self-determination must be in accordance with the 
law and necessary in the interests of national security, public safety or the eco-
nomic well-being of the country, for the prevention of disorder or crime, for the 
protection of health or morals, or for the protection of the rights and freedoms 
of others. Necessity requires “a pressing social need” that is proportionate to one 
or more of the legitimate aims the Member State pursues.46 In my opinion, the 
argument that a suspect must live to stand trial to serve the interest of prevent-
ing disorder or crime, cannot be the justification for forced physical intervention 
that also interferes with the detainee’s right to self-determination regarding end of 
life decisions as it is not proportional and therefore not in correspondence with 
the required necessity. Important factors to assess the proportionality that, in my 
view, cannot be left undiscussed are the presumption of innocence but also the 
seriousness of the interference. A suspect must be presumed innocent until he has 
been declared guilty. The presumption of innocence requires that States must ex-
ercise restraint in applying restrictive measures on detained suspects. Furthermore, 
an interesting stance has been put forward by Mertens. Mertens referred to the 
Dutch Minister of Justice’s view while defending the abolition of the death pen-
alty by stating that the people’s view should be taken into account, though this 
opinion does not determine what is lawful and what is unjust.47 The same stance 
can in my view be applied to the argument of forced intervention in relation to 
an end of life decision of a detainee to appease public unrest regarding certain 
criminal offences.48 Public unrest follows after all from the personal feelings of (a 
part of ) the people that are shocked by the criminal offence(s) in question, which 
45. Jacobs 2012, pp. 135-145, 321-330. This point was also raised by Shaw and Elger 2016.
46. ECtHR 1 June 2004, no. 8704/03 (Van der Graaf v. The Netherlands). See also: ECtHR 8 
November 2011, no. 18968/07, §139 (V.C. v. Slovakia).
47. Mertens 2012, p. 147.
48. See ECtHR 1 June 2004, no. 8704/03 (Van der Graaf v. The Netherlands): “This 
responsibility stemmed directly from the fact that the Netherlands authorities rightly considered it 
to be of the utmost importance that, in order to appease and prevent the great public unrest caused 
by the killing of Mr Fortuyn, the applicant be brought to trial.”
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detracts the required objectivity. If the people’s view, emerging in public unrest, 
would be the decisive factor in determining whether intervention should follow 
in relation to an end of life decision of a detainee, this would mean that a highly 
subjective factor is in the end decisive in such cases. This is in my view undesira-
ble, especially if forced intervention implies physical intervention. Furthermore, 
the fact that a suspect has the right to remain silent and may therefore not con-
tribute to finding the truth detracts the necessity of the interference and therefore 
also the proportionality. The argument that criminal proceedings will end if the 
suspect dies merely shows in my view a procedural lacuna in finding the truth 
in such cases; it is after all still possible to continue the investigation to find the 
truth after a suspect died. The aforementioned arguments are in my view thus 
not tenable to justify forced physical intervention to ensure that a suspect lives to 
stand trial. With regard to non-physical intervention that only interferes with the 
detainee’s right to privacy and self-determination (for example extra supervision 
in case of a suicide risk), the intervention can be regarded as less intrusive than 
in case of physical intervention. This is relevant in view of the seriousness of the 
interference, which, in turn, is relevant with regard to the proportionality of the 
interference. Prolonged extra supervision (for example through camera surveil-
lance) does however constitute a serious interference with the detainee’s privacy 
and self-determination. The nature of the interference is therefore an important 
factor when balancing the interests involved. In my opinion, the more serious the 
interference with the detainee’s privacy and self-determination is, the less propor-
tional the interference will be in view of the presumption of innocence.
The argument that a sentenced detainee should be kept alive to serve his prison 
sentence could fall under the interest of prevention of disorder or crime as men-
tioned in Article 8 ECHR. However, the proportionality of forced measures to 
ensure that a sentenced detainee will be kept alive to ensure that he will serve his 
prison sentence may in my view be even more out of balance than in the case of 
a detained suspect that must be kept alive to stand trial considering the length 
of time that can be involved. It may, in my view, under certain circumstances 
constitute an inhuman treatment (and thus prohibited under Article 3 ECHR) 
considering the aim, nature and context of the measure, the manner and method 
in which the treatment is applied, the duration of the treatment, and its physical 
and mental effects.49
In my opinion, the detainee’s vulnerability, considerations of security and the 
interest of preserving order within the institution, and the reason why a person 
49. ECtHR 26 October 2000, no. 30210/96, §91, GC (Kudła v. Poland). ECtHR 28 September 
2015, no. 23380/09, §86, GC (Bouyid v. Belgium).
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is deprived of his liberty in a criminal law context, namely to stand trial and to 
gather evidence from the suspect, or to serve a prison sentence, cannot (fully) 
justify the more restrictive approach on end of life decisions when a competent 
detainee is fully informed about the consequences, freely decides and persists in 
his decision. 
What are other explanations for the more restrictive approach? A difference be-
tween the diverging end of life decisions is that in case of the refusal of treatment 
or food/liquids which refusal is respected, non-intervention will eventually have 
a lethal outcome. In case of euthanasia or (assisted) suicide, the person’s life is 
actively terminated by a third person, the person in question is assisted in termi-
nating his own life or takes his own life. The fact that euthanasia, assisted suicide 
and suicide are active terminations of a person’s life, combined with the fact that 
there is more supervision on detainees compared to persons in free society, may 
be a relevant explanation. As in free society, suicide is a difficult situation for the 
persons involved, especially those who discover the suicide, whereas the inher-
ent extra supervision and controlled environment during deprivation of liberty 
provides more opportunities to intervene compared to free society where people 
are free to come and go as they please. The fact that these end of life decisions 
are difficult for the directly involved persons could fall within in the interest of 
protection of health (namely the health of the persons who find the detainee 
dead). However, the manner in which detainees can be found dead due to suicide 
may vary considerably (compare severe self-influcted injuries versus an overdose), 
whereas not in all of these cases the detainee will be found in a way that differs 
substantially from the situation in which a detainee inevitably dies due to a nat-
ural cause, or an accident. Therefore, this factor cannot fully justify the more 
restrictive approach regarding the right to self-determination of detainees. 
Does the more restrictive approach on end of life decisions of detainees fol-
low from the State’s obligation to account for the death of a detainee and to 
prevent deaths of detainees as much as possible considering this obligation? It is 
not inconceivable that the State’s obligation to account deters the State parties 
and professionals involved50 as this means that they can be addressed on their 
professional conduct and any errors made in the process. This is however an inev-
itable consequence of their profession and their professional involvement during 
deprivation of liberty by the State. It therefore cannot justify a more restrictive 
approach on end of life decisions of detainees. In my view, the State parties and 
professionals involved during deprivation of liberty must take the responsibility 
50. See also: Handtke and Wangmo 2014.
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to account and should not be willing to avoid taking this responsibility. This 
principle is explicitly laid down in the modern Hippocratic Oath, the oath that 
physicians take if they finish medical school, as put into words by the Netherlands 
Federation of University Medical Centres, Royal Dutch Medical Association and 
Association of Universities: “Ik zal mij open en toetsbaar opstellen” (I shall act in 
a transparent and verifiable manner).”51 The obligation to account for the death 
of a detainee requires in my view that there must be an appropriate system to 
investigate. When designing and implementing the system to investigate deaths 
in State custody, it should be kept in mind that the investigation must primarily 
aim to examine whether the State involved has fulfilled the obligation to protect 
the health and life of the detainee. A disciplinary or criminal law response must 
follow if this is necessitated by the circumstances. If this is not necessitated by 
the circumstances, the involved professionals must be spared the unpleasantness 
of being the subject of disciplinary or criminal investigations or proceedings.52 
This approach should in my view be ensured in the system developed to investi-
gate these deaths as it will ensure that the death of a detainee can be effectively 
investigated, whereas at the same time the professionals involved are not unneces-
sarily dragged into criminal or disciplinary proceedings that will overburden the 
professionals involved.
Lastly, does the more restrictive approach on end of life decisions of detainees 
follow from the idea that deaths in custody must be prevented as much as possible 
and at all costs53 as it is seen as a failure of the system to take care of detainees?54 
In my opinion, the ECHR obliges State authorities to take necessary measures 
to protect the health and life of detainees to compensate or repair the rights that 
are jeopardised by the deprivation of liberty. This means for end of life decisions 
of detainees that State authorities have an obligation to act with regard to factors 
that are influenced by the deprivation of liberty, such as access to (mental) health-
care, but also whether the deprivation of liberty influences the end of life decision. 
If such an influence is present, the State must respond. State authorities must for 
example respond to indications of a suicide risk to try to take away the wish to 
commit suicide, such as adequate psychological/psychiatric care and guidance in 
51. Netherlands Federation of University Medical Centres (Nederlandse Federatie van 
Universitair Medische Centra, NFU), Royal Dutch Medical Association (KNMG) and Association 
of Universities (Vereniging van Universiteiten) 2010.
52. ECtHR 15 May 2007, no. 52391/99, §§300, 354, GC (Ramsahai and others v. The 
Netherlands).
53. Adshead mentions this aspect in the commentary to the paper of Elger et al. Adshead 2015.
54. This aspect was mentioned by Richter and Hostettler 2017. See with regard to end of life in 
prison also: Liebling 2017.
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response to mental illnesses. The right to self-determination is however a right to 
be taken into account in case of end of life decisions of a competent detainee, for 
example with regard to the reasonableness of measures to prevent a suicide risk 
(such as extra supervision through camera surveillance or physical means to in-
tervene). In my view, the key factor that emerges from the framework of Article 
2 and Article 3 versus Article 8 ECHR is the balance between the extra care that 
must be given to detainees in view of their vulnerable position, with due respect 
for their right to self-determination and physical integrity by closely examining 
the proportionality of any proposed interferences, whereas the State authorities 
should not be given a disproportionate burden in preventing deaths of detainees 
at all costs.
8.4. Proposed amendments for the Netherlands and final 
remarks
A certainty in life is that everyone will die at some point. That point may come 
during deprivation of liberty by the State. Not every death during deprivation of 
liberty can be prevented. The State has however the obligation of means with a 
view to preventing premature death of detainees. If a death occurs during depri-
vation of liberty by the State, an investigation must be performed to account for 
that death. With regard to the obligation to account, it must be kept in mind 
that the State is authorised by their citizens to deprive persons of their liberty if 
the requirements of Article 5 ECHR have been met. This power brings along the 
obligation to care for detainees and to be transparent on the manner in which 
the State has taken care of detainees prior to their death. Evaluating each death 
is furthermore important to determine whether points of improvement can be 
identified.  
The development in the Netherlands to introduce an inquiry into the facts (in-
stead of a criminal investigation) when a police officer uses (lethal) force is in my 
opinion a more appropriate approach of dealing with deaths in custody, taking 
these cases out of the deterrent criminal law procedure and with the explicit aim 
to investigate whether the force has been used according to the Official Instruc-
tions for the Police on the use of force.55 Police officers are after all authorised 
to use force in specific circumstances. In my view, Dutch law should contain 
a clear legal obligation to investigate all deaths (and life-threatening situations) 
55. Kamerstukken II 2016/17, 34 641, no. 2 (art. 511a-511ab).
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occurring during deprivation of liberty by the State within a reasonable term by 
emphasising the obligatory nature of this investigation and by addressing the key 
questions to be answered in this investigation. Such a legal obligation ensures that 
all deaths during State custody are investigated as discussions regarding the neces-
sity to (further) investigate these deaths are already addressed. A legal obligation 
to investigate also provides an explicit legal ground to share medical data with the 
investigative authority, therefore preventing discussions on whether or not it is al-
lowed to exchange such information. The obligation to account for these deaths 
by examining whether the State has fulfilled the obligation to protect the health 
and life of detainees must be given priority over the duty of medical confiden-
tiality. The procedure should contain an unambiguous obligation to perform an 
autopsy to (try to) establish the cause of death. 
Preferably one authority, with sufficient expertise (including on healthcare is-
sues) to address all questions that ought to be examined in the investigation, 
should be assigned to investigate all deaths occurring during deprivation of lib-
erty by the State. Assigning one authority with the task to investigate all deaths 
during deprivation of liberty by the State has the advantage of bringing together 
knowledge,56 will facilitate a central overview of the total numbers of deaths and 
may identify errors in the system, including errors due to the transfer of detainees 
between diverging establishments, for example errors in the transfer of necessary 
information. Furthermore, an integral investigation has the advantage of obvi-
ating any gaps that may arise if two separate investigations are performed (the 
investigation of the police or National Police Internal Investigations Department 
and the inquiry pursuant to the Healthcare Quality, Complaints and Disputes 
Act). Aim of this investigation should be to investigate when, where and how the 
detainee in question came by his death, evaluate the provided care (or used force), 
identify any errors, and, if necessary, take measures. The authority that ought to 
be assigned to investigate deaths in custody should not have a hierarchical rela-
tionship with the Minister or State Secretary of Security and Justice, the Custodial 
Institutions Agency, judicial and non-judicial institutions where hospital orders 
with compulsory treatment can be enforced, or the National police. If necessary, 
a criminal investigation and prosecution should be instituted as soon as possible 
after a suspicion of a criminal offence arises. This same applies to disciplinary 
proceedings. The legal provision holding the obligation to institute an effective 
investigation into all deaths during deprivation of liberty by the State should also 
address the issue of involving and informing the next of kin. In my view, the task 
of involving the next of kin in the investigation and informing them of the results 
56. See also: Council for the Judiciary 2016b, pp. 3-4.
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of the investigation should lie with the independent investigative authority. The 
authority that was responsible for the care of the deceased detainee should not 
have a role in this regard, although contact between this authority and the next of 
kin can be important in view of the aftercare for the next of kin (and perhaps also 
for the personnel involved). 
A policy must be developed to address the manner in which requests for eutha-
nasia or assisted suicide by detainees are dealt with and, if performed, are reported 
and examined. If such requests are fulfilled, this procedure should at least contain 
an obligation to report the intention to perform euthanasia or assisted suicide to 
the Public Prosecution Service.
Finally, developing a legal domestic framework to meet the requirements aris-
ing from Human Rights Conventions is a step to ensure that the right to life of 
detainees is effectively implemented. Another step is (to assess) whether this le-
gal framework is actually observed in practice, for example through monitoring 
of supervisory committees or by performing studies on this matter. Widespread 
media coverage leading to heated political discussions in response to individual 
deaths occurring during deprivation of liberty by the State does not contribute 
to the willingness to investigate and learn from earlier deaths and to be transpar-
ent about these deaths. The Minister responsible for healthcare stressed in 2016 
that “hospitals should respond to the challenges to learn from calamities and to 
improve the provided healthcare by being transparent about calamities”.57 Note-
worthy is that figures on the number and causes of deaths in judicial institutions 
are not published on a national level, few studies have been performed on deaths 
occurring in judicial institutions, and few initiatives have been taken to ensure 
transparency on this subject to the general public. I would like to invite the Dutch 
Government and Parliament to take up that challenge.
57. http://nos.nl/artikel/2107987-schippers-inspectie-moet-calamiteitenonderzoeken-publi 
ceren.html. Last accessed: 30 April 2017.
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Summary
The European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR) is an important legal 
framework with regard to death in State custody. This framework has been dis-
cussed in literature. However, an in-depth study on the obligation to prevent 
death in State custody and to investigate these deaths, combined with a study on 
the question whether the Dutch legal framework contains the safeguards neces-
sary to fulfil these obligations has up to now not been performed. This legal study 
aims to explore the precise scope of the abovementioned obligations under the 
ECHR and whether the Dutch legal framework contains the safeguards neces-
sary to fulfil these obligations. The central research question of this study is the 
following: what obligations arise from the ECHR regarding deaths during depri-
vation of liberty by the State in a criminal justice context and does the Dutch legal 
framework contain the safeguards necessary to fulfil these obligations? 
Chapter 1 of this book introduces the background and reasons for this research, 
the research questions, and demarcation and normative framework of this study. 
It also discusses the methodology, research sources and the structure of the book. 
This book consists of three parts: 
1) deprivation of liberty in a criminal justice context (chapter 2 and chapter 3); 
2) the obligations of Member States to prevent premature deaths during depri-
vation of liberty by providing the necessary healthcare and taking protective 
measures (chapter 4 and chapter 5); and 
3) the obligation of Member States to investigate deaths during deprivation of 
liberty (chapter 6 and chapter 7).
Chapter 8 contains a synthesis of the findings.
Chapter 2 and chapter 3 address three questions to demarcate this study, namely 
1) what constitutes deprivation of liberty under responsibility of the State in a 
criminal justice context within the meaning of the ECHR, 2) which means of 
coercion and criminal law penalties and measures in response to a suspicion 
or conviction of having committed a criminal offence laid down in Dutch law 
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constitute deprivation of liberty pursuant to Dutch law, and 3) does the Dutch 
legal framework regarding deprivation of liberty under responsibility of the State 
in a criminal justice context meet the requirements that follow from the ECHR? 
To that end, this study firstly addresses the question what constitutes ‘physical lib-
erty’ within the meaning of Article 5 ECHR. The following definition of physical 
liberty has been formulated: the freedom to move (on the spot) and to come and 
go as one pleases without interference of the State, though within the legal frame-
work of a democratic society. Physical liberty is protected by Article 5 ECHR, 
whereas specific aspects of this physical liberty, namely the freedom of movement 
within the territory of a State, to choose one’s residence and to leave any country, 
are regulated by Article 2 Protocol No. 4 ECHR. Deprivation of liberty within the 
meaning of Article 5 ECHR means that a person’s physical freedom is completely 
or to a large extent taken from that person as he does not have the freedom to 
move (his body) or to come and go as he pleases because he is physically restrained 
or not able or free to leave a restricted space or area of his own volition due to 
physical barriers or the absence of a reasonable choice on this matter. Depriva-
tion of liberty in a criminal justice context relates to deprivation of liberty on a 
suspicion of having committed a criminal offence (within the meaning of Article 
6 ECHR: criminal charge) or after conviction by a court of having committed 
a criminal offence. The scope of a criminal justice context is further specified in 
section 2.5.
Noteworthy is that Dutch law follows a procedural approach with respect 
to deprivation of liberty, which means that it contains the powers and grounds 
to deprive a person of his liberty in connection with a suspicion or conviction 
of having committed a criminal offence, like the power to apprehend a suspect, 
without clearly defining the perimeters of deprivation of liberty. This differs from 
the material approach of the ECtHR; the ECtHR examines (if appropriate) in 
each individual case whether the person in question was deprived of his liberty. 
The difference in the approach of the Dutch legislator compared to the approach 
of the ECHR and the ECtHR does not seem problematic as Dutch law contains 
the powers that can be imposed and the conditions in which the powers can be 
enforced. The question which specific Dutch means of coercion and criminal law 
penalties and measures constitute deprivation of liberty within the meaning of 
Article 5 ECHR in response to a suspicion or conviction of having committed a 
criminal offence, is addressed in section 3.5.
Chapter 4 discusses the question what obligations regarding healthcare and pro-
tective measures Member States have pursuant to the ECHR with an aim to 
prevent premature death of detainees. The starting point in the ECtHR’s case law 
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is that Member States have negative and positive obligations to protect the life of 
detainees. Negative obligations encompass obligations to refrain from conduct 
that endangers the life of detainees, for example the use of force. Positive obliga-
tions to protect the life of detainees can be divided into: 1) protective measures 
to prevent the death of detainees because of the State, 2) protective measures to 
prevent lethal violence by other detainees, and 3) healthcare and protective meas-
ures to avert premature death due to health issues. Next to these categories, the 
category holding 4) dilemmas between obligations of Member States versus end 
of life decisions of detainees (refusal of treatment, hunger and/or thirst strike, stop 
eating and drinking to hasten the end of life, suicide, euthanasia and assisted sui-
cide) can be distinguished. The starting point with regard to positive obligations is 
that if the State authorities know, or should know, about a real and immediate risk 
to the life of an identified detainee, the State authorities have to take all reason-
ably expected measures within the scope of their powers to try to avert that risk.
Positive obligations to take protective measures with the aim of preventing 
the death of detainees because of the State are, among others, developing and 
implementing a legal framework that protects the right to life, regulating the 
use of force by State officials, sufficient training of State officials in applying 
force, and planning and controlling policing operations to minimise the risks 
for the life of persons involved, for example through the presence of medically 
trained personnel to provide timely first aid. State authorities must also ensure 
that detainees are held in a safe environment, among others by preventing drug 
trafficking in prison and to ensure hygienic living conditions (food, clean estab-
lishments etcetera). With regard to protective measures to prevent deadly force by 
other detainees, basic precautions after apprehension are security measures like 
a body search to prevent detainees from carrying dangerous objects. Screening 
of detainees in view of their allocation (for example in a shared cell) is another 
protective measure, just like exchanging information about a detainee’s perceived 
dangerousness. Specific security and surveillance measures must be taken if there 
are indications of inter-prisoner violence. With regard to positive obligations to 
provide the necessary healthcare and take protective measures aimed at averting 
premature death due to health issues, several preconditions can be derived from 
the ECtHR’s case law: 1) ensuring appropriate environment (including a medical 
screening on admission), 2) access to healthcare, 3) quality of healthcare, 4) con-
tinuity of healthcare, 5) keeping a medical record and transfer of information, 6) 
medication safety, and 7) evaluation of healthcare. These preconditions are further 
specified in section 4.4.
The obligations of Member States to protect the health and life of detainees 
(arising from Article 2 and Article 3 ECHR) may conflict with the detainee’s right 
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to self-determination (as protected by Article 8 ECHR) in relation to end of life 
decisions. These dilemmas are addressed in sections 4.5-4.6. Noteworthy in this 
regard is the reason to introduce positive obligations towards detainees, namely to 
compensate for the fact that the possibility to arrange matters like nourishment 
and access to healthcare are taken from detainees. The State therefore has an ob-
ligation to arrange such matters. This brings along that there does not exist an 
obligation to act against the detainee’s wishes if the detainee only endangers his 
own life, provided that the detainee is capable to decide for himself (competent), 
is fully informed about, and fully understands, the (possible) consequences. In 
other words, the positive obligations are not introduced as paternalistic instru-
ment but to compensate for the (consequences of ) deprivation of liberty. This also 
means that State authorities must bear in mind any possible influence of the dep-
rivation of liberty on end of life decisions, which requires extra vigilance. Another 
important factor with regard to end of life decisions is whether the detainee’s 
wishes endanger the life of others (which brings along an obligation to act).
Chapter 5 answers the questions what safeguards exist in the Dutch legal frame-
work to fulfil the aforementioned obligations under the ECHR and whether the 
Dutch legal framework meets the requirements that follow from the ECHR. The 
findings show that the Dutch legal framework contains to a large extent the safe-
guards necessary to meet the obligations arising from the ECHR though there are 
several points of improvement, such as a clear provision regarding the applicabil-
ity of the Medical Treatment Contracts Act (deviations from this Act should have 
an explicit basis in law) and a legal basis for the medical screening on admission 
in a penal institution. The dilemmas with regard to end of life decisions of detain-
ees, raised in chapter 4, are in chapter 5 discussed in the light of the Dutch legal 
framework (section 5.5.-5.6.).
The scope of the obligation to investigate the death of detainees pursuant to the 
ECHR is examined in chapter 6. The findings show that the ECHR requires 
Member States to set up an effective system to establish the facts surrounding 
deaths, holding accountable persons at fault and providing appropriate redress to 
the victims. State authorities must provide a plausible explanation for the cause of 
death and the treatment provided to the detainee prior to the death. This means, 
among others, that all deaths during deprivation of liberty by the State must be 
investigated. The ECtHR has not developed a list of investigative measures that 
ought to be taken to investigate the death of detainees, though has developed 
minimum standards to ensure an effective investigation, namely an investigation 
1) on the initiative of the State, that 2) fulfils the requirements of independence 
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and impartiality, 3) is started promptly and performed with reasonable expedition, 
and 4) fulfils the requirement of public scrutiny, which in any case means that the 
next of kin of the deceased detainee are involved. The obligation to investigate is 
a means to determine whether the State authorities fulfilled the obligation to pro-
tect the health and life of the detainee. The cause and manner of death determine 
therefore the steps that need to be taken during the investigation. This means, for 
example, that if it is established that the detainee in question died due to violence 
by State officials, it must be determined whether the use of force was absolutely 
necessary in view of one or more of the goals mentioned in Article 2 ECHR. If 
it is established that the detainee died due to an illness, it must be determined 
whether the authorities knew, or ought to have known, of this health risk and, if 
so, whether the necessary healthcare was provided prior to the death.
Chapter 7 explores what safeguards exist in the Dutch legal framework to fulfil 
the obligations enumerated in chapter 6 and whether the Dutch legal framework 
meets the requirements that follow from the ECHR. The findings show that the 
Dutch legal framework does not contain an explicit obligation to investigate all 
deaths and life-threatening incidents during State custody to determine whether 
the State authorities fulfilled the obligation to protect the health and life of the 
detainee in question. There are insufficient safeguards to ensure that all questions 
that need to be raised during the investigation pursuant to the ECHR are actually 
addressed. Furthermore, the required independence of the investigation is not en-
sured for all investigative parties involved, for example with regard to the position 
of the forensic physician and the inquiry committees formed within the Prison 
System Division. Involvement of the next of kin is also not sufficiently ensured, 
nor are there sufficient safeguards to ensure public scrutiny by the general public.
This study closes with a synthesis in chapter 8. An overall analysis of the detailed 
discussions of the obligations regarding death in State custody identifies three 
main issues, namely: 1) accountability, and 2) the right to self-determination of 
detainees with regard to end of life decisions, versus 3) the obligation to provide 
extra protection to detainees. In chapter 8, the central research question of this 
study is addressed by focusing on these three factors. Noteworthy conclusions 
are that the obligation to investigate all deaths during State custody is a means 
to determine whether the State fulfilled the obligation to protect the health and 
life of a deceased detainee and therefore to account for that death. The obligation 
to investigate and account stems from the fact that detainees find themselves in a 
vulnerable position due to the deprivation of liberty, whereas deprivation of lib-
erty brings along the obligation to provide extra protection. The key questions 
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to be answered during the investigation are dictated by the preventive measures 
that should have been taken to protect the health and life of the detainee (such as 
suicide prevention etcetera). Preventive measures that State authorities intend to 
apply in view of the extra protection that should be given to detainees may how-
ever conflict with the detainee’s right to self-determination, particularly if end of 
life decisions are involved. Both the ECHR and the Netherlands apply a more re-
strictive approach when dealing with end of life decisions of detainees compared 
to the approach on these matters in free society. Several arguments that are put 
forward in this regard are discussed in section 8.3., namely the detainee’s vulner-
ability, considerations of security and the interest of preserving order within the 
institution, and the reason why a person is deprived of his liberty in a criminal law 
context, namely to stand trial and to gather evidence from the suspect, or to serve 
a prison sentence. This discussion leads to the conclusion that these arguments 
cannot (fully) justify the diverging approaches. Therefore, other explanations for 
the more restrictive approach are explored. This exploration leads to the conclu-
sion that the essence of the dilemmas between Article 2 and Article 3 versus Article 
8 ECHR concerns the balance between providing extra care considering the vul-
nerable position of detainees, with due regard of the right to self-determination 
and physical integrity of detainees through a careful examination of the propor-
tionality of intended interferences, whereas State authorities should not be given 
a disproportionate burden to prevent deaths in State custody at all costs. Proposed 
amendments and final remarks regarding the Netherlands are made in section 8.4.
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Samenvatting
Het Europees Verdrag voor de Rechten van de Mens (EVRM) is een belangrijk 
juridisch kader met betrekking tot overlijden in detentie. Hoewel dit kader is be-
sproken in literatuur is er nog geen diepgaand onderzoek gedaan naar enerzijds de 
verplichting om overlijden in detentie te voorkomen en om deze overlijdensgeval-
len te onderzoeken, en anderzijds een onderzoek naar de vraag of het Nederlandse 
juridische kader waarborgen bevat om aan deze verplichtingen te voldoen. Het 
doel van dit juridische onderzoek is om in kaart te brengen welke verplichtin-
gen lidstaten hebben op grond van het EVRM en of het Nederlandse juridische 
kader waarborgen bevat om aan deze verplichtingen te voldoen. De centrale 
onderzoeksvraag is: welke verplichtingen met betrekking tot overlijden tijdens 
vrijheidsbeneming in strafrechtelijke context volgen uit het EVRM en bevat het 
Nederlandse juridische kader waarborgen om aan die verplichtingen te voldoen? 
In hoofdstuk 1 worden de achtergrond en de redenen voor dit onderzoek uiteen-
gezet, evenals de onderzoeksvragen, de afbakening en het normatief kader van dit 
onderzoek, en de methode, bronnen en structuur van het boek. Dit boek bestaat 
uit drie delen: 
1) vrijheidsbeneming in strafrechtelijke context (hoofdstuk 2 en hoofdstuk 3); 
2) verplichtingen van lidstaten om overlijden tijdens vrijheidsbeneming te voor-
komen door het bieden van de noodzakelijke medische zorg en het nemen van 
beschermende maatregelen (hoofdstuk 4 en hoofdstuk 5); en
3) verplichtingen van lidstaten om overlijden tijdens vrijheidsbeneming te onder-
zoeken (hoofdstuk 6 en hoofdstuk 7).
Hoofdstuk 8 bevat een synthese van de bevindingen.
In hoofdstuk 2 en hoofdstuk 3 worden ter afbakening van dit onderzoek drie vra-
gen behandeld, namelijk 1) wat is vrijheidsbeneming onder verantwoordelijkheid 
van de overheid in een strafrechtelijke context in de zin van het EVRM, 2) welke 
in het Nederlandse recht opgenomen dwangmiddelen en strafrechtelijke sanc-
ties en maatregelen in reactie op een verdenking van, of veroordeling voor, het 
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plegen van een strafbaar feit houden vrijheidsbeneming in volgens Nederlands 
recht, 3) is het Nederlandse juridische kader met betrekking tot vrijheidsbene-
ming in strafrechtelijke context en onder verantwoordelijkheid van de overheid 
in overeenstemming met de eisen die voortvloeien uit het EVRM? Om deze vra-
gen te beantwoorden wordt allereerst onderzocht wat fysieke vrijheid in de zin 
van artikel 5 EVRM inhoudt. Fysieke vrijheid is als volgt gedefinieerd: de vrij-
heid om te bewegen (met je lichaam) en te gaan en staan wanneer en waar men 
wil zonder inmenging van de overheid, maar wel binnen het juridische kader van 
een democratische samenleving. Fysieke vrijheid wordt beschermd door artikel 5 
EVRM, terwijl specifieke aspecten van deze fysieke vrijheid, namelijk de vrijheid 
van verplaatsing binnen het grondgebied van een staat, de vrijheid een woonplaats 
te kiezen en de vrijheid om welk land dan ook te verlaten, worden gereguleerd 
door artikel 2 Protocol Nr. 4 EVRM. Vrijheidsbeneming in de zin van artikel 5 
EVRM betekent dat de fysieke vrijheid van een persoon volledig of grotendeels 
is benomen omdat hij niet de vrijheid heeft te bewegen (met zijn lichaam) of te 
gaan en staan waar deze persoon wil omdat hij is gefixeerd of niet in staat of niet 
vrij is om een bepaalde beperkte ruimte of gebied te verlaten door fysieke grenzen 
of de afwezigheid van een redelijke keuze op dit vlak. Vrijheidsbeneming in straf-
rechtelijke context houdt in dat sprake is van vrijheidsbeneming in verband met 
een verdenking van het plegen van een strafbaar feit (in de betekenis van artikel 6 
EVRM) of na veroordeling voor het plegen van een strafbaar feit. De reikwijdte 
van de strafrechtelijke context wordt in paragraaf 2.5 nader besproken.
Het Nederlandse recht volgt een procedurele benadering met betrekking tot 
vrijheidsbeneming; het bevat de bevoegdheden en gronden om de vrijheid van 
een persoon te benemen in verband met een verdenking van, of veroordeling 
voor, het plegen van een strafbaar feit, zoals de bevoegdheid een verdachte aan 
te houden, zonder dat de buitengrenzen van vrijheidsbeneming duidelijk zijn af-
gebakend. Dit is een andere benadering dan de materiële benadering van het 
Europees Hof voor de Rechten van de Mens (EHRM); het EHRM onderzoekt 
(indien relevant) in ieder individueel geval of de betrokkene zijn vrijheid was 
benomen. De uiteenlopende benaderingen van de Nederlandse wetgever verge-
leken met de benadering van het EVRM en het EHRM lijkt niet problematisch 
aangezien het Nederlandse recht de bevoegdheden bevat die kunnen worden toe-
gepast en onder welke voorwaarden ze kunnen worden gebruikt. De vraag welke 
Nederlandse dwangmiddelen en strafrechtelijke sancties en maatregelen in reactie 
op een verdenking van, of veroordeling voor, het plegen van een strafbaar feit vrij-
heidsbeneming oplevert in de betekenis van artikel 5 EVRM wordt beantwoord 
in paragraaf 3.5.
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Hoofdstuk 4 behandelt de vraag welke verplichtingen staten hebben met be-
trekking tot zorg en beschermende maatregelen op grond van het EVRM om 
vroegtijdig overlijden van gedetineerden te voorkomen. Uitgangspunt in de ju-
risprudentie van het EHRM is dat staten negatieve en positieve verplichtingen 
hebben om het leven van gedetineerden te beschermen. Negatieve verplichtin-
gen betreffen verplichtingen om zich te onthouden van gedrag dat het leven van 
gedetineerden in gevaar brengt, zoals het gebruik van geweld. Positieve verplich-
tingen om het leven van gedetineerden te beschermen kunnen worden ingedeeld 
in: 1) beschermende maatregelen om overlijden van gedetineerden vanwege de 
staat te voorkomen, 2) beschermende maatregelen om dodelijk geweld tussen ge-
detineerden te voorkomen, 3) zorg en beschermende maatregelen om vroegtijdig 
overlijden door gezondheidsproblemen te voorkomen. Daarnaast wordt een vierde 
categorie onderscheiden, namelijk de dilemma’s tussen de verplichtingen van de 
staat versus ‘end of life decisions’ van gedetineerden (weigering van behandeling, 
honger- en dorststaking, stoppen met eten en drinken om het einde van het le-
ven te bespoedigen, suïcide, euthanasie en hulp bij zelfdoding). Uitgangspunt ten 
aanzien van positieve verplichtingen is dat wanneer overheidsinstanties weten of 
hadden moeten weten van een reëel en onmiddellijk risico voor het leven van een 
specifieke gedetineerde, de overheidsinstanties alle redelijkerwijs te verwachten 
maatregelen moeten nemen om te proberen dat risico af te wenden.
Positieve verplichtingen om beschermende maatregelen te nemen om overlijden 
van gedetineerden te voorkomen zijn onder meer het ontwikkelen en implemen-
teren van een juridisch kader dat het recht op leven beschermd, het reguleren van 
het gebruik van geweld door overheidsfunctionarissen, het voldoende trainen van 
overheidsfunctionarissen in het gebruik van geweld, en het plannen en controle-
ren van politieoperaties om risico’s voor het leven van personen tot een minimum 
te beperken, bijvoorbeeld door de aanwezigheid van medisch geschoold personeel 
zodat tijdig eerste hulp kan worden geboden. Overheidsinstanties moeten ook 
verzekeren dat gedetineerden in een veilige omgeving worden ondergebracht, on-
der meer door drugshandel binnen detentie te voorkomen en door hygiënische 
leefomstandigheden te creëren (voedsel, schoon onderkomen etcetera). Basis voor-
zorgsmaatregelen na aanhouding om dodelijk geweld door medegedetineerden te 
voorkomen zijn veiligheidsmaatregelen zoals een fouillering om te voorkomen dat 
gedetineerden gevaarlijke voorwerpen bij zich dragen. Het screenen van gedeti-
neerden met het oog op hun plaatsing (bijvoorbeeld in een gedeelde cel) is een 
andere beschermende maatregel, net als uitwisseling van informatie over de mate 
van gevaar dat een gedetineerde vormt. Speciale veiligheids- en toezichtsmaatrege-
len moeten worden genomen als er aanwijzingen zijn dat er geweld wordt gebruikt 
tussen gedetineerden. Verschillende randvoorwaarden kunnen worden afgeleid uit 
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de jurisprudentie van het EHRM met betrekking tot positieve verplichtingen om 
de noodzakelijke medische zorg te bieden en beschermende maatregelen te nemen 
gericht op het voorkomen van vroegtijdig overlijden van gedetineerden, namelijk 
1) verzekeren van een geschikte omgeving (waaronder een medische screening bij 
binnenkomst), 2) toegang tot gezondheidszorg, 3) kwaliteit van gezondheidszorg, 
4) continuïteit van gezondheidszorg, 5) het bijhouden van een medisch dossier en 
het uitwisselen van informatie, 6) medicatieveiligheid, en 7) evaluatie van gezond-
heidszorg. Deze randvoorwaarden worden in paragraaf 4.4. uitgebreid besproken.
De verplichtingen van lidstaten om de gezondheid en het leven van gedeti-
neerden te beschermen (voortvloeiend uit artikel 2 en artikel 3 EVRM) kunnen 
conflicteren met het recht op zelfbeschikking van de gedetineerde (beschermd 
door artikel 8 EVRM) in relatie tot ‘end of life decisions’. Deze dilemma’s worden 
besproken in paragrafen 4.5.-4.6. Noemenswaardig met betrekking tot dit onder-
werp is de reden om positieve verplichtingen met betrekking tot gedetineerden 
te introduceren, namelijk ter compensatie voor het feit dat het regelen van zaken 
als voeding en toegang tot zorg is weggenomen van gedetineerden. De overheid 
heeft daarom een verplichting om dergelijke zaken te regelen. Dit brengt met zich 
dat er geen verplichting bestaat om tegen de wensen van de gedetineerde in te 
handelen als de gedetineerde alleen zijn eigen leven in gevaar brengt, mits de ge-
detineerde wilsbekwaam is, volledig is geïnformeerd over, en volledig begrip heeft 
van, (mogelijke) gevolgen. Anders geformuleerd, positieve verplichtingen zijn niet 
geïntroduceerd als paternalistisch instrument, maar zijn geïntroduceerd om de 
(consequenties van de) vrijheidsbeneming te compenseren. Dit brengt met zich 
dat overheidsinstanties elke mogelijke invloed van de vrijheidsbeneming op ‘end 
of life decisions’ in acht moet nemen, hetgeen extra waakzaamheid vereist. Een 
ander belangrijk aspect met betrekking tot ‘end of life decisions’ is of de wensen 
van de gedetineerde het leven van andere personen in gevaar brengt (hetgeen een 
verplichting tot handelen met zich brengt).
Hoofdstuk 5 beantwoordt de vraag welke waarborgen er bestaan in het Neder-
landse juridische kader om de voornoemde verplichtingen op grond van het 
EVRM te verzekeren en of het Nederlandse juridische kader voldoet aan de eisen 
die voortvloeien uit het EVRM. De bevindingen laten zien dat het Nederlandse 
juridische kader voor een groot deel waarborgen bevat om aan de verplichtin-
gen op grond van het EVRM te voldoen hoewel er wel verbeterpunten zijn, 
zoals een duidelijke wetsbepaling inzake de toepasselijkheid van de Wet op de 
geneeskundige behandelingsovereenkomst (WGBO, afwijkingen van deze wet 
zouden een expliciete wettelijke basis moeten hebben) en een wettelijke grondslag 
voor de medische screening bij binnenkomst in een penitentiaire inrichting. De 
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dilemma’s met betrekking tot ‘end of life decisions’ van gedetineerden, besproken 
in hoofdstuk 4, worden in hoofdstuk 5 besproken in het licht van het Nederlandse 
juridische kader (paragraaf 5.5.-5.6.). 
De reikwijdte van de verplichting om overlijdensgevallen van gedetineerden te 
onderzoeken op grond van het EVRM wordt in hoofdstuk 6 besproken. De bevin-
dingen laten zien dat het EVRM van lidstaten vereist dat ze een effectief systeem 
ontwikkelen om de feiten rondom overlijdensgevallen vast te stellen, de verant-
woordelijke(n) verantwoording af te laten leggen en genoegdoening te bieden aan 
slachtoffers. Overheidsinstanties moeten een plausibele verklaring geven voor de 
doodsoorzaak en de behandeling die is geboden voor het overlijden van de gede-
tineerde. Dit betekent, onder meer, dat alle overlijdensgevallen van gedetineerden 
tijdens vrijheidsbeneming door de overheid moeten worden onderzocht. Hoewel 
het EHRM geen lijst heeft ontwikkeld met onderzoekshandelingen die moeten 
worden verricht om het overlijden van gedetineerden te onderzoeken, heeft het 
wel minimumeisen gesteld om een effectief onderzoek te verzekeren, namelijk een 
onderzoek 1) op initiatief van de overheid, dat 2) voldoet aan de eis van onafhan-
kelijkheid en onpartijdigheid, 3) prompt is gestart en voortvarend wordt verricht, 
en 4) voldoet aan de eis van openbaarheid, hetgeen in alle gevallen ten minste 
dient te betekenen dat de nabestaanden van de overleden gedetineerde zijn be-
trokken. De verplichting om onderzoek te verrichten is een middel om te bepalen 
of de overheidsinstanties hebben voldaan aan de verplichting om de gezondheid 
en het leven van de gedetineerde te beschermen. De doodsoorzaak en de aard van 
het overlijden bepalen derhalve de stappen die moeten worden genomen tijdens 
het onderzoek. Dit betekent, onder meer, dat wanneer het is vastgesteld dat de 
betreffende gedetineerde is overleden door het geweld van overheidsfunctionaris-
sen, er moet worden onderzocht of het gebruik van geweld absoluut noodzakelijk 
was met het oog op een of meer van de doelen die worden genoemd in artikel 
2 EVRM. Als het is vastgesteld dat de gedetineerde is overleden door een ziekte, 
moet worden onderzocht of de autoriteiten wisten of hadden moeten weten van 
het gezondheidsrisico en zo ja, of de noodzakelijke medische zorg is geboden voor 
het overlijden.
Hoofdstuk 7 onderzoekt welke waarborgen het Nederlandse juridische kader be-
vat om te voldoen aan de verplichtingen die zijn uiteengezet in hoofdstuk 6 en 
of het Nederlandse juridische kader voldoet aan de eisen die voortvloeien uit het 
EVRM. De bevindingen laten zien dat het Nederlandse juridische kader geen 
expliciete verplichting bevat om alle overlijdensgevallen en levensbedreigende inci-
denten tijdens vrijheidsbeneming door de overheid te onderzoeken om te bepalen 
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of de overheidsinstanties hebben voldaan aan de verplichting om de gezondheid 
en het leven van de gedetineerde in kwestie te beschermen. Er zijn onvoldoende 
waarborgen om te verzekeren dat alle vragen die moeten worden gesteld in het 
onderzoek op grond van het EVRM daadwerkelijk worden behandeld. De vereiste 
onafhankelijkheid van het onderzoek is niet voor alle betrokken onderzoekende 
partijen verzekerd, bijvoorbeeld met betrekking tot de positie van de forensisch 
arts en de calamiteitencommissies die worden gevormd binnen het Gevangeniswe-
zen. De betrokkenheid van nabestaanden is ook niet voldoende verzekerd, noch 
zijn er voldoende waarborgen voor openbaarheid van het onderzoek.
Dit onderzoek wordt in hoofdstuk 8 met een synthese afgesloten. Middels een 
helicopterview analyse van hetgeen is besproken inzake de verplichtingen rondom 
overlijden in detentie worden drie hoofdpunten geïdentificeerd, namelijk 1) 
verantwoordelijkheid, en 2) het zelfbeschikkingsrecht van gedetineerden met 
betrekking tot ‘end of life decisions’ versus 3) de verplichting om extra bescher-
ming te bieden aan gedetineerden. De hoofdvraag van dit onderzoek wordt in 
hoofdstuk 8 behandeld in het licht van deze drie hoofdpunten. Noemenswaardige 
conclusies zijn dat de verplichting om onderzoek te doen naar alle overlijdensge-
vallen in detentie een middel is om te bepalen of de overheid heeft voldaan aan de 
verplichting om de gezondheid en het leven van de overleden gedetineerde te be-
schermen en zodoende verantwoording af te leggen voor dat overlijdensgeval. De 
verplichting om onderzoek te doen en verantwoording af te leggen vloeit voort uit 
het gegeven dat gedetineerden zich in een kwetsbare positie bevinden door de vrij-
heidsbeneming, terwijl de vrijheidsbeneming de verplichting met zich brengt om 
extra bescherming te bieden. De kernvragen die moeten worden beantwoord in 
het onderzoek worden voorgeschreven door de preventieve maatregelen die had-
den moeten worden genomen om de gezondheid en het leven van de gedetineerde 
te beschermen (zoals suïcidepreventie etcetera). Preventieve maatregelen die over-
heidsinstanties beogen in te zetten gelet op de extra bescherming die moet worden 
geboden kunnen echter in conflict komen met het recht op zelfbeschikking van 
de gedetineerde, met name als ‘end of life decisions’ aan de orde zijn. Zowel het 
EVRM als Nederland hanteren een meer restrictieve benadering wanneer het gaat 
om ‘end of life decisions’ van gedetineerden in vergelijking met de benadering 
van deze kwesties in de vrije samenleving. Verschillende argumenten die in dit 
opzicht naar voren zijn gebracht worden besproken in paragraaf 8.3, namelijk de 
kwetsbaarheid van gedetineerden, het belang van veiligheid en het handhaven 
van de orde in de inrichting, en de reden waarom de betrokkene diens vrijheid 
is benomen in strafrechtelijke context, namelijk om terecht te staan en bewijs te 
vergaren (verdachten), of het uitzitten van een gevangenisstraf (veroordeelden). 
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Na afweging van deze argumenten wordt geconcludeerd dat deze argumenten de 
verschillende benaderingen niet (volledig) kunnen rechtvaardigen. Gelet hierop 
worden andere verklaringen voor de meer beperkte benadering onderzocht. Deze 
verkenning leidt tot de conclusie dat de essentie van het dilemma tussen artikel 
2 en artikel 3 EVRM versus artikel 8 EVRM ziet op de balans tussen het bieden 
van extra zorg gelet op de kwetsbare positie van gedetineerden, met gepaste aan-
dacht voor het recht op zelfbeschikking en fysieke integriteit van gedetineerden 
middels een zorgvuldige beoordeling van de proportionaliteit van beoogde in-
terventies, terwijl overheidsinstanties geen disproportionele last wordt gegeven 
om overlijdensgevallen in detentie ten koste van alles te voorkomen. Tot slot vol-
gen in paragraaf 8.4. verbetervoorstellen en slotopmerkingen met betrekking tot 
Nederland.
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